LAM WAI MING PAUL AND ANOTHER v. LAM SUET MING SILVIA

HCAP 30/2024

[2026] HKCFI 1159

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PROBATE ACTION NO 30 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  These proceedings concern the estate (“the Estate”) of the late Mr Lam Tin Yin (林天然) (“the Deceased”), who passed away at the age of 90 on 16 March 2024. The Deceased has 3 children, namely, the Plaintiffs (“Paul” and “Grace”, collectively “Ps”) and the Defendant (“Silvia”). Silvia is the eldest daughter, Grace is the one in the middle, and Paul is the youngest son.

2.  On 27 August 2024, Ps commenced these proceedings by issuing the Writ of Summons herein with a Statement of Claim annexed thereto for the following reliefs:

(1) an order that the Will of the Deceased dated 22 June 2011 (“the 2011 Will”) be pronounced in solemn form in law;

(2) an order that Paul be granted (or alternatively, be authorized to apply for) letters of administration of the Estate upon compliance of all and any requisition which may be raised by the Probate Registry;

(3) in the alternatively to (2) above, an order that a practicing solicitor as professional administrator be granted (or alternatively, be authorized to apply for) letters of administration of the Estate upon compliance of all and any requisition which may be raised by the Probate Registry;

(4) a declaration that the purported will of the Deceased dated 9 September 2002 (“the 2002 Will”) is invalid and/or has been duly revoked by the 2011 Will.

3.  On 15 October 2024, Silvia filed the Defence and Counterclaim (“D&C”) prepared by herself. In the Counterclaim, Silvia seeks the following:

(1) an order requiring Ps to present the 2011 Will to her to inspect, and requiring Ps to explain to her by what means Ps obtained the 2011 Will;

(2) an order requiring Paul to set out the details of the items in a safe deposit box jointly opened by Paul and the Deceased in 2021;

(3) an order requiring Grace to produce evidence to show her misappropriation of HK$1 million from the mother (such sum was subsequently returned to the Deceased);

(4) an order requiring Paul to produce the WhatsApp messages sent by him to her on 16 March 2024 as evidence in court;

(5) an order appointing (a) (first choice) a professional solicitor as the administrator of the Estate; (b) (second choice) Silvia as the sole administratrix of the Estate;

(6) damages for compensating her psychological sufferings due to the false allegations made by Ps in the past few years;

(7) damages for compensating the time and costs spent by her in the litigation concerning the Estate;

(8) costs; and

(9) any further relief that the Court may deem fit.

4.  On 2 January 2025, Ps filed the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim.

5.  This is the substantive hearing of Ps’ application for summary judgment pursuant to Order 14 taken out on 26 May 2025 (“the O14 Application”).

6.  In these proceedings, Ps were and are legally represented at all times. Silvia was acting in person until 12 January 2026. Silvia is legally represented since 12 January 2026.

7.  Shortly before this substantive hearing, the parties have reached an agreement that the substantive reliefs sought by Ps be granted, leaving costs to be argued in this hearing. On 13 February 2026, I made a Consent Order, in which I granted, inter alia, the following:

(1) the 2011 Will[1] be pronounced in solemn form in law;

(2) caveats nos. HCCA 2729/2024 entered on 24 April 2024 and HCCA 8575/2025 entered on 22 December 2025 together with all other caveats entered in relation to the Estate (if any) do cease to have effect;

(3) Mr Ng Kin Yuen, solicitor of Messrs Liu, Chan & Lam, be granted letters of administration of the Estate with the 2011 Will annexed upon compliance of all and any requisition which may be raised by the Probate Registry; and

(4) extending the time for Ps to lodge and serve written submissions for the hearing on 20 February 2026 to 13 February 2026.

8.  In this hearing, Mr Tommy Cheung represents Ps, and Mr Kenny Kwok represents Silvia.

9.  At the beginning of this hearing, Mr Kwok sought leave to withdraw the Counterclaim, and leave was granted.

10.  The only remaining issue to be resolved in this hearing is costs of these proceedings, including costs of the O14 Application.

B. BACKGROUND

11.  At an early stage of these proceedings, on 26 November 2024, Ps invited Silvia to agree to the reliefs sought by Ps, for the opposition raised by her in the D&C is unmeritorious. On 9 December 2024, Silvia replied and did not agree to P’s proposal.

12.  On 26 May 2025, Ps took out the O14 Application. The O14 Application is supported by, inter alia, an affirmation made by Madam Lam Sau Mei (“Madam Lam”) dated 28 April 2025 (“LSM Affirmation”). Madam Lam is the only surviving witness of the 2011 Will. In that affirmation, Madam Lam has given clear evidence that the 2011 Will is a one-page document. That one-page document is Document A mentioned in §14(2) below.

13.  Concerning the O14 Application, there were 3 call-over hearings before me. For the purpose of discussing the appropriate costs order, it would be necessary to set out what happened in those call-over hearings in some detail.

14.  1^st call-over hearing on 15 July 2025

(1) In this hearing, I tried to ascertain the parties’ respective positions and to see whether the scope of the differences can be narrowed down so that some costs and time could be saved.

(2) On the 2011 Will, Ps’ position is that the 2011 Will is a one-page document dated 22 June 2011 (“Document A”)[2], signed by the Deceased as the testator and by two witnesses[3]. By the 2011 Will, the Deceased bequeathed his estate to his 3 children (ie Paul, Grace and Silvia) in equal shares. However, the 2011 Will does not appoint anyone as the executor of the will. Hence, it would be necessary for the Court to appoint an administrator. Ps propose that Paul be appointed as the administrator, alternatively a practicing solicitor be appointed as a professional administrator.

(3) In D&C, Silvia said:

“根據父親給被告人的2011年遺囑 e copy，裏面是有提及到此遺囑（契約）是最後契約，也即時代表父親在他遺產分配上的最後決定”[4]

“(5) 被告人（1）首選：誠懇的請求法庭委任出一位獨立及專業的律師作為父親的遺產承辦人，以公平和公正及大小事情需要全部三人同意的情形下去處理父親的遺產或（2）次選：批準被告人成為唯一的遺產承辦人，並委任被告人推舉的獨立律師代表被告，處理父親林天然先生的遺產”[5]

(4) In the 1^st call-over hearing, Silvia told the Court the following:

(a) She agreed that the 2011 Will is the Deceased’s last will, not the 2002 Will.

(b) However, she argued that the 2011 Will is not the one alleged by Ps. Her position is that the 2011 Will consists of 2 pages, and Document A is only the first page of the 2011 Will. According to Silvia, the second page of the 2011 Will is a table setting out the assets of the Deceased (“Document B”)[6]. Silvia said when the Deceased gave her a copy of the 2011 Will in 2014, and the 2011 Will was a document of 2 pages, which were Document A and Document B.

(c) As to who should be the administrator of the Estate, Silvia changed the position adopted by her in D&C. In the 1^st call-over hearing, Silvia put forward a primary position that she should be appointed as the administratrix of the Estate. If this primary case is not accepted, her alternative position is that a practicing solicitor proposed by her be appointed as the administrator of the Estate.

(5) In the 1^st call-over hearing:

(a) The Court observed that there is no signature on Document B. Further, there is nothing on Document B changing the meaning of Document A. Whether Document B is part of the 2011 Will or not, the Estate would still be distributed to the Paul, Grace and Silvia in equal shares.

(b) Mr Cheung observed that even if Document B represents the assets owned by the Deceased in 2011, bearing in mind that the Deceased passed away in 2024, the assets owned by the Deceased at the time of his death might well be very different. Thus, the contents of Document B may not be meaningful in the administration of the Estate.

(c) Notwithstanding these observations, Silvia insisted to contend that the 2011 Will is not Document A only, but also includes Document B.

(6) After knowing the parties’ respective stances, I gave directions for the filing of evidence and for fixing the substantive hearing of the O14 Application.

15.  2^nd call-over hearing on 18 September 2025

(1) By the time of this call-over hearing, the substantive hearing of the O14 Application has been fixed on 20 February 2026. The purpose of having this call-over hearing is to give directions for the handling of the voluminous evidence put in by Silvia by a USB. Some other matters were also discussed in this call-over hearing.

(2) In this call-over hearing, Mr Cheung told that Court that in the O14 Application, Ps would not seek an order to appoint Paul as the administrator of the Estate, and would only seek an order to appoint a practicing solicitor as the professional administrator.

(3) Silvia insisted that she would argue that the 2011 Will is a document consisting of both Document A and Document B. However, after some consideration, Silvia told the Court that she would not seek to be appointed as the sole administratrix of the Estate, but would only seek an order to appoint a practicing solicitor nominated by her as the administrator.

16.  However, after the 2^nd call-over hearing, Silvia wrote to the Court and said that she was under pressure in the 2^nd call-over hearing and did not consider the matter thoroughly. After re-considering the matter, she insisted that she should be appointed as the sole administratrix of the Estate.

17.  3^rd call-over hearing on 9 December 2025

(1) The purpose of the 3^rd call-over hearing is to see whether there is any house-keeping matter(s) which need to be dealt with before the substantive hearing.

(2) In this call-over hearing, Silvia said that she was under pressure in the 2^nd call-over hearing. She intended to retract from the position adopted by her in the 2^nd call-over hearing and argued that she should be appointed as the sole administratrix in the substantive hearing.

(3) Some further directions were given in this call-over hearing, including the directions for lodging written submissions. Pursuant to those directions, Ps should lodge and serve written submissions on or before 30 January 2026, and Silvia should lodge and serve written submissions on or before 6 February 2026.

18.  On 18 December 2025, Silvia wrote to the Court and said that she withdrew (a) the contention that the 2011 Will is a two-page document; and (b) her contention that she should be appointed as the sole administratrix of the Estate. However, Silvia stated “[t]he withdrawal is for the Feb 2026 substantive hearing only. It does not cover any future proceedings that may be incurred.”

19.  On 29 December 2025, the Court replied and directed that since Silvia maintains her objection to Ps’ claim, the substantive hearing of the O14 Application on 20 February 2025 shall stand.

20.  On 12 January 2026, Messrs Chaine, Chow & Barbara Chow (“CCBC”) started to represent Silvia.

21.  On 16 January 2026, CCBC wrote to Ps’ solicitors Messrs Hon & Co (“HC”) and put forward a settlement offer on “without prejudice save as to costs” basis. The proposal is that the reliefs set out in §7(1) to §7(3) above be granted, and there be no order as to costs in these proceedings. The deadline for accepting the offer has been set as 20 January 2026.

22.  On 20 January 2026, HC replied and said that a period of 4 days (with a weekend therein) is unreasonable for Ps to consider the offer. HC were still in the course of taking instructions and would revert once they were in the position to do so.

23.  On 22 January 2026, CCBC asked for a reply by close of business the next day, otherwise the offer made would be deemed to be refused.

24.  On 27 January 2026, HC wrote to CCBC and said that the present proceedings are hostile in nature because of Silvia’s unmeritorious oppositions throughout. Although Silvia now effectively abandoned all her oppositions, it would only be fair and just for Silvia to be personally held liable for all costs incurred by Ps up to 16 January 2026 (without the right to recover the same from the Estate). HC invited a reply from CCBC on or before 2 February 2026.

25.  On 28 January 2026, by an open letter from CCBC to HC, CCBC stated that there be no objection to the reliefs set out in §7(1) to §7(3) above, and the substantive hearing on 20 February 2026 be vacated, and the costs issue be dealt with by paper disposal. CCBC requested that a reply be given on 29 January 2026.

26.  On 29 January 2026, HC replied and said that the 1-day period given by CCBC was unreasonable and would revert when they were in the position to do so.

27.  On 5 February 2026, CCBC wrote to HC and complained that Ps did not lodge written submissions in accordance with the timetable set out in the Order dated 9 December 2025.

28.  On 5 February 2026, HC write to CCBC and said that as to the substantive issues in these proceedings, Ps would be prepared to agree to Silvia’s proposal. However, Silvia should provide an undertaking that she would make an application to the Master’s Office to withdraw her application for the grant of probate to her in reliance on the 2002 Will. As to the costs issue, Ps would agree to paper disposal.

29.  Subsequently, there is some further correspondence passing between the parties’ respective solicitors concerning whether Ps have any legitimate reason not to lodge the written submissions and to prepare the hearing bundles in accordance with the timetable laid down in the Order dated 9 December 2025. For the purpose of this decision, it would not be necessary to list out all the correspondence in this decision.

C. THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE STANCES ON COSTS

C1. Ps’ position

30.  Mr Cheung for Ps submits that:

(1) in respect of 1/3 of the costs of these proceedings, there be no order as to costs. Alternatively, 1/3 of the costs of these proceedings be borne by the Estate, to be taxed if not agreed (“Part I”);

(2) in respect of the remaining 2/3 of the costs of these proceedings, those costs be borne by Silvia personally, to be taxed if not agreed (“Part II”).

31.  Mr Cheung explains that the purpose of Part I is to take care of the following:

(1) Ps agree and accept that the choice of professional administrator can be considered as a move for the benefit of the Estate.

(2) At the early stage of these proceedings, Paul sought to appoint himself to be the administrator. Ps say that although that move was entirely out of good faith with the purpose to control costs, Ps agree that it would be fair to make no order as to costs to reflect this aspect.

(3) Insofar as there is any procedural slip on Ps’ part, Ps are of the respectful view that such matters can be captured under Part I.

32.  Mr Cheung submits Part II is reasonable for the following reasons:

(1) Silvia’s opposition to Ps’ case that the 2011 Will was the Deceased’s last valid will and the 2011 Will only consisted of one page was an unreasonable opposition which was bound to fail.

(2) Much time and costs have been wasted by Silvia’s highly objectionable conducts throughout the proceedings:

(a) filing of voluminous unorganized evidence to try to persuade the Court that she should be appointed as the sole administratrix of the Estate, even though it was clear that she was not a suitable candidate;

(b) two additional call-over hearings were held on 18 September 2025 and 9 December 2025 so as to address and deal with the issues generated by Silvia;

(c) Silvia has been adopting a fluctuating stance throughout the proceedings and Ps were compelled to incur additional costs to address D’s changes of stances. Such conduct on Silvia’s part has generated the additional issue of whether D should be allowed to resile from her position, and to continue with her claim to seek an order allowing her to be the administratrix;

(d) serious allegations were made by D against Ps, and some of which were shown to be false or at least unfounded;

(e) Silvia also raised a list of counterclaims against Ps, which are wholly unjustified, necessitating the incurrence of time and costs on Ps’ part to study, analyse and deal with the same.

(3) The fair and reasonable conducts of Ps throughout these proceedings.

(4) Silvia’s unreasonable approach towards settlement of the issues of these proceedings.

C2. Silvia’s position

33.  Mr Kwok for Silvia submits that:

(1) Proposal A

(a) As to 1/3 of Ps’ costs and Silvia’s costs in these proceedings, those costs be borne by the Estate; and

(b) As to the remaining 2/3 of Ps’ costs and Silvia’s costs in these proceedings, there be no order as to costs.

(2) Proposal B (alternative to Proposal A)

(a) As to 2/3 of Ps’ costs and Silvia’s costs in these proceedings, those costs be borne by the Estate; and

(b) As to the remaining 1/3 of Ps’ costs and Silvia’s costs in these proceedings, there be no order as to costs.

34.  Mr Kwok submits that there are 3 main issues in these proceedings:

(1) validity of the 2011 Will;

(2) whether the 2011 Will has 2 pages; and

(3) the appointment of administrator.

35.  Mr Kwok submits that:

(1) As to the costs concerning the validity of the 2011 Will, the parties’ costs should be borne by the Estate. Silvia has not put forward any positive case against the validity of the 2011 Will. In the D&C, Silvia merely puts Ps to prove the 2011 Will in solemn form.

(2) As to the costs concerning whether the 2011 Will being a one-page or two-page document, there should be no order as to costs.

(a) The issue was reasonably raised by Silvia, for she had been given a copy of the 2011 Will (ie Document A) and Document B. It would be reasonable to Silvia to query whether the 2011 Will is a one-page or two-page document.

(b) Ps were in breach of RHC Order 76 rule 5(1)(a) for failing to file an affidavit of testamentary scripts, describing all testamentary scripts of which they have knowledge, within 14 days after Silvia acknowledged service. Had Ps complied with this rule, they would have confirmed, on oath, that the 2011 Will in their possession, which contained only one page, was all the testamentary scripts they knew of, before close of pleadings. Ps’ non-compliance caused Silvia to reasonably raise such issue.

(3) As to costs concerning appointment of administrator, there should be no order as to costs. Since the 2011 Will does not appoint an executor, it would be necessary to make an application to the Court to appoint an administrator, which is for the Estate’s benefit. Ps and Silvia are entitled in the same degree of priority to a grant of letters of administration with will annexed.[7] Both Ps and Silvia have proposed candidates to be appointed as the professional administrator. Neither party should be regarded as having won this issue.

36.  Mr Kwok has also made criticisms against Ps for non-compliance with the timetable in the Order dated 9 December 2025 in relation to the preparation of hearing bundles and lodging written submissions.

D. DISCUSSION

D1. The principles

37.  When a case is settled save as to costs, the Court has a wide discretion regarding costs. The principles are as follows[8]:

(1) There is no tradition for there to be “no order as to costs” when a case is settled.

(2) The Court has to decide if the party seeking costs has substantially obtained the reliefs sought in the litigation.

(3) The Court has a wide discretion not only as to the manner by which the issue of costs is to be determined, but also what evidence should be received and what findings to make.

(4) At each end of the spectrum there will be cases where it is obvious which side would have won had the substantive issues been fought to a conclusion. In between, the position will, in differing degrees, be less clear. How far the Court will be prepared to look into the previously unresolved substantive issues will depend on the circumstances of the particular case, not least the amount of costs at stake and the conduct of the parties.

(5) The Court will first consider if it is in a position to say what the likely outcome after trial would have been. If it is not in a position to do so, the order may well be no order as to costs.

(6) The Court may permit parties to adduce evidence on the question of costs.

(7) A broad brush can be taken by referring to all matters already laid before the Court, e.g. pleadings, correspondence, witness statements, transcripts of evidence and the terms of the settlement order.

(8) The objective is to do justice between the parties without incurring unnecessary Court time and consequentially additional costs.

38.  In considering costs in a probate action, the Court can adopt an issue-based approach.[9]

39.  The principles concerning costs in a probate action have been set out by the Court of Final Appeal in Nina Kung v Wang Din Shin (No 2)[10], in which Ribeiro PJ said:

“12. Accordingly, the general rule where opposition to a will is unsuccessful is that costs follow the event. However, if the case can be shown to fall into one or other of the two exceptions, the order is, in the first category (where the litigation is caused by the conduct of the testator or the residual beneficiary) for the costs to come out of the estate; and in the second category (where circumstances lead reasonably to an investigation of the will’s validity) for there to be no order as to costs. I shall refer to these two categories as “the first exception” and “the second exception” respectively.

……

15. It is, however, important to note that the manner in which the challenge to a will is mounted may determine the court’s approach to costs. A case may fall prima facie within one of the two exceptions, but if opposition to the will goes beyond putting the proponent to strict proof of its validity and takes the form of hostile litigation, the general rule whereby costs follow the event is likely to be applicable. ……

17. It follows that in exercising its discretion, the court draws a distinction between litigation reasonably undertaken by a person in order to require the validity of a will to be investigated by the court, and litigation which is fundamentally hostile, where the opposing party takes it upon himself to establish a positive case such as of forgery, fraud or undue influence, with a view to defeating the will and advancing his own claim to the estate over that of the will’s proponent. It is of course perfectly open to the will’s opponent to adopt such an approach. However, he runs the risk of an adverse costs order if he is unsuccessful.”

40.  In Lam Wai Lik Eric, the Court of Appeal explained that Nina Kung was decided before CJR, and before the amendment of Order 62 rule 5. The Court of Appeal said that Nina Kung should be read in light of the amendment of Order 62 rule 5:

(1) The Court is no longer confined to a consideration under Order 62 rule 7 of whether an issue has been raised “improperly or unnecessarily”; and

(2) Order 62 rule 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(a) now require the Court to consider parties’ conduct, including whether it was “reasonable” for a party to raise a particular issue in all the circumstances of the case.

41.  In view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lam Wai Lik Eric, the matters set out in Order 62 rule 5 would also be relevant in considering costs in a probate action.

42.  As to the costs of an application by a beneficiary of an estate for an order to appoint an administrator, the authority is Re Buckton[11].

(1) If the application is necessary for the administration of the estate and is for the benefit of the estate, the case would fall within the second category, the costs should be borne by the estate.

(2) If the application is a hostile claim against the other beneficiaries, the case would fall within the third category, and the unsuccessful party should bear the costs.

D2. The parties’ consensus

43.  The parties are now in agreement that the 2011 Will in Ps’ (ie Document A only) is the last valid will of the Deceased. Under the 2011 Will, the Estate would be equally distributed to Paul, Grace and Silvia. Hence, realistically, the effect of saying that a certain part of the costs of these proceedings be borne by the Estate, would be same as the effect of making no order as to costs in relation to that part. To simplify the matter and to avoid some taxation work, both Mr Cheung and Mr Kwok agree that if I come to the conclusion that a certain part of the costs of these proceedings should be borne by the Estate, I could simply make no order as to costs in relation to that part.

44.  Mr Cheung and Mr Kwok are also in agreement as to the costs of the application for appointing a professional administrator, there should be no order as to costs.

D3. Costs in relation to the 2011 Will

45.  In my view, costs in relation to the 2011 Will should be borne by Silvia personally.

46.  First, I am unable to agree that Silvia has not put forward a positive case against the 2011 Will in Ps’ case (ie the 2011 Will being a one page document, which is Document A).

(1) In D&C[12], Silvia said:

“請參考上文第4點 (The 2011 Will), 因為被告人沒有2011年父親平安紙的有效副本，所以被告人便憑着2002年平安紙的正本, 作為申請父親遺產的依據”

(2) The evidence shows that Silvia did make an application for grant of probate based upon the 2002 Will. By making that application, Silvia had made her stance clear, ie the last valid will of the Deceased is not the 2011 Will in Ps’ case (ie Document A only), but is the 2002 Will relied upon by her in her application for probate.

(3) In my view, in her pleadings, Silvia has put forward a positive case against the validity of the 2011 Will in Ps’ case (ie Document A only).

(4) Subsequently, in the call-over hearings, although Silvia said that she accepted that the 2011 Will is the last valid will of the Deceased, at all times she maintained the position that the 2011 Will in Ps’ case (ie Document A only) is not the will of the Deceased. She did not merely require Ps to prove their case, but put forward a positive case that the 2011 Will is a document consisting of two pages, ie both Document A and Document B.

47.  Second, as to whether the 2011 Will being a one-page or a two-page document, in my view, Silvia’s contention that Document B is part of the 2011 Will, and Silvia’s insistence on maintaining that contention, are unreasonable and unarguable.

(1) Document B is merely a table setting out some assets. There is no description thereon saying which asset(s) would be bequeathed to whom upon the death of the Deceased. There is no signature thereon. There is no reference to any other document thereon. In my view, looking at Document B, any reasonable man would not have the impression that Document B may be a will or part of a will.

(2) Document A has been properly signed by the Deceased as the testator and by two witnesses. It is a self-contained document, in which the Deceased’s intention to bequeath his estate to his 3 children in equal shares has been clearly set out. No other document is mentioned therein. In my view, Document A on its face is clearly a self-contained will made by the Deceased.

(3) Further, the point made by Mr Cheung as set out in §14(5)(b) above is unanswerable. It is contrary to common sense that the assets as shown in Document B would be the assets to be distributed to Ps and Silvia upon the death of the Deceased.

(4) After seeing LSM Affirmation filed in support of the O14 Application, Silvia still insisted to maintain her contention that the 2011 Will is not the one in Ps’ case, but should be a document of two pages. Viewing the evidence objectively, such insistence cannot be said as reasonable in any sense.

48.  As to Mr Kwok’s contention that Ps’ non-compliance with Order 76 rule 5(1)(a) caused Silvia to raise the issue whether the 2011 Will being a one-page or two-page document, with respect, there is no evidence from Silvia in support of the causation alleged in this contention.

49.  I do not regard Silvia’s challenges against the 2011 Will in Ps’ case is caused by the conduct of the Deceased or Ps. I also do not regard that there are circumstances leading reasonably to an investigation of the validity of the 2011 Will in Ps’ case. Further, I am of the view that Silvia’s challenge against the 2011 Will in Ps’ case is unreasonable, and much costs have been incurred as a result of these unreasonable challenges made by Silvia.

50.  In my view, costs in relation to the validity of the 2011 view should be borne by Silvia personally.

D4. Costs in relation to Silvia’s application for an order appointing herself as the sole administratrix of the Estate

51.  Silvia has made an application for an order appointing herself as the sole administratrix of the Estate, and this is her primary case. Only when this application is unsuccessful, she would pursue an application for an order to appoint a professional administrator.

52.  I must say that this application made by Silvia is unmeritorious and unreasonable, and is a hostile claim against Ps.

(1) As can be seen from the D&C, in particular the Counterclaim, Silvia is hostile to Ps and has made adverse claims against Ps. In view of the great tension between Ps and Silvia, unless there is a special reason, the Court would not appoint any of them to be the administrator of the Estate. Such an appointment would probably lead to more arguments and more contentious issues. I do not see any reason in support of Silvia’s application for an order appointing herself to be the sole administratrix of the Estate.

(2) In the O14 Application, Silvia has put in voluminous evidence which is unorganized and irrelevant to the issues in this case. This demonstrates that she is not a person who could handle matters in an organized manner. In view of this, the Court would certainly not appoint her as the sole administratrix of the Estate.

53.  In my view, Silvia’s application for an order appointing herself as the sole administratrix of the Estate falls within the third category in Re Buckton, and Silvia should personally bear the costs of that application.

D5. Withdrawal of the Counterclaim

54.  Silvia has withdrawn the Counterclaim. There is no reason why Silvia should not bear the costs of the Counterclaim personally in the circumstances.

D6. Overview

55.  With all the aforesaid in mind, I am of the view that the majority of the costs in these proceedings should be borne by Silvia personally. I have also taken into account (a) costs in relation to the application of a professional administrator should be borne by the Estate; (b) Paul has made an application to appoint himself as the sole administrator of the Estate at an early stage of these proceedings; and (c) there are some procedural slips on Ps’ part (ie non-compliance with Order 76 rule 5(1)(a), and non-compliance with the timetable laid down in the Order dated 9 December 2025). Taking a broad-brush approach, I would order that 2/3 of the costs of these proceedings be borne by Silvia personally. As to the remaining 1/3, there would be no order as to costs.

56.  I have reviewed the correspondence passing between the parties’ respective solicitors before this hearing carefully. In my view, nothing in the correspondence would have the effect of altering the aforesaid conclusion.

E. DISPOSITION

57.  For the reasons above, I order that:

(1) 2/3 of the costs of these proceedings (including costs of the O14 Application, costs of this hearing and costs reserved) be paid by Silvia personally to Ps, to be taxed if not agreed; and

(2) as to the remaining 1/3 of the costs of these proceedings, there be no order as to costs.

58.  I am grateful to Mr Cheung and Mr Kwok for the helpful assistance provided to the Court.