BAPPI ABDUS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 3623/2019

[2026] HKCFI 3627

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3623 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By summons (“the Summons”) filed on 14 January 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal, out of time, against this Court’s order made on 12 February 2025, whereby his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 21 November 2019, confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 July 2018 which rejected his claim for non-refoulement on the grounds of BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk and persecution risk, was dismissed.

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. The Applicant is therefore late in taking out the Summons by 322 days.

3.  In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10).

4.  Given that the statutory period for lodging an appeal is 14 days, the present delay is substantial by any standard. However, no explanation whatsoever has been proffered by the Applicant for such delay. As I note, the Applicant accepts that the order should have been served to his address on time but just that he “unfortunately” did not receive it.

5.  The next consideration is, most importantly, the merits of the intended appeal. The Applicant has failed to disclose any arguable ground upon which the appeal could reasonably succeed. All that he asserts is that he disagrees with me and I have reviewed his application “lightly”. It is trite that the Court will not exercise its discretion to extend time where the proposed appeal is, on its face, devoid of merit (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).

6.  The absence of merit in an intended appeal weighs decisively against the grant of an extension of time. To allow the Applicant to proceed with a challenge that is plainly without merit would serve only to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily, prejudice the proper administration of the refoulement process, and undermine the interests of the proposed respondent.

7.  Accordingly, the Summons for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal is dismissed.