香港特別行政區 訴 羅少韓及另一人

HCMA 579/2019

[2020] HKCFI 2673

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

申請終審法院上訴許可之證明書

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2019年第579號

（原九龍城裁判法院刑事案件2019年第1667號）

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判 案 書

前言

1.  第一申請人及第二申請人分別為裁判法院原審時的第二及第三被告人和上訴時的第二及第三上訴人。他們與另一被告人在裁判法院於審訊後裁定一項「以三合會社團成員的身份行事罪」罪名成立。第一申請人及第二申請人分別判入獄9 個月及5個月，而另一被告人則入獄7個月。他們不服定罪，提出上訴。本席駁回第一申請人及第二申請人的上訴，及判處另一被告人上訴得直，並於2020年8月20日頒下判案書。

2.  第一及第二申請人於2020年8月31日根據第484章《香港終審法院條例》第32條呈上動議通知書，要求本席頒令證明本案涉及重大及廣泛重要性的法律觀點，以便他們向終審法院申請上訴許可。

動議

3.  兩位申請人所提出涉及重大及有廣泛重要性的法律觀點如下：

「在審訊中，一名並非證人的第三者，在被告不在場且沒有聽到的情況下所說的說話（例如：他相信某項活動是與三合會相關的），若呈納該段說話的目的並非為了證明說話內容本身真實，而只是邀請陪審團考慮該段說話的確曾經作出，並邀請他們就這事實作出推論（如：該名被告正在以三合會成員身份行事），則該段說話可否被呈堂？」

控罪案情

4.  控方第一證人是一名卧底警員，負責調查及蒐集有關三合會組織(俗稱黑社會)的證據。由2017年開始控方第一證人化名「華仔」跟隨一個名為B哥的「大佬」。在三合會裡的意思「大佬」是指三合會保家。

5.  2018 年5 月8 日早上6 時30 分他與一名叫國崩的人及約十名男子在九龍橫頭磡東道集合，準備前往元朗出席天后誕巡遊。國崩是控方第一證人三合會的「二叔」，即控方第一證人大佬B哥三合會的同輩分兄弟。期間控方第一證人與國崩有以下的對話：

控方第一證人︰「我哋天后誕要做乜嘢？」

國崩︰「呢啲社團曬馬活動嚟，你大佬未到。」

控方第一證人︰「天后誕有咩嘢著數㗎？」

國崩︰「呢啲係一個聚會，其實大家都借機會曬人馬同搞關係。」

在三合會用語「曬馬」的意思是表示對外展示實力。這段說話在審訊和上訴聆訊的時候，都稱之為「國崩對話」。

6.  大約早上8 時30分，他們一眾約二十人到達聯合道及杏林街交界與約五名男子會合。一名男子駕車到達，有數人恭敬地稱呼他為漢哥或大佬。沒有爭議他是第二申請人。漢哥跟其中一名名為Tommy的男子確定在場的都是他們的人後，說：「有廿幾個我支水嘅，計埋其他都okay，少航哥嚟緊，等陣見到佢就叫人。」「我支水嘅」在三合會用語的意思是「我分支嘅人」。

7.  未幾，第二申請人和一名其他人稱呼為少航哥的男子到達。沒有爭議他是第一申請人。在他詢問下，第二申請人向他表示人已差不多到齊。第一申請人指示到齊後就前往元朗，並對眾人說：「兄弟，今日辛苦下，跟大隊行得㗎嘞，有人問你哋邊邊嘅，就話勝和少航嘅。如果差佬問，就梗係話村民嚟遊行喇。」這句話三合會用語的意思是：「兄弟，今日辛苦下，跟大隊行得㗎喇，有人問你哋屬於邊個三合會社團嘅，就話自己係和勝和少航分支嘅人，如果警察問就梗係話自己係村民嚟遊行喇。」

8.  約早上10時，他們到達元朗西菁街紅爵酒樓時，一個名為黑柴星的男子指示各人拿取一件前後分別印有「黃泥墩村三和堂」及「寶穎工程(發展)有限公司」的白色T-shirt，說：「着住佢，有兄弟同人嘈就幫拖，差佬問就話代表呢條村，隔籬水問就響自己勝和少航線嘅。」這句話三合會用語的意思是：「著住佢，有三合會同門兄弟同人爭執就幫手，警察問就話代表呢條村，其他分支問就表露自己係和勝和少航支派嘅人！」

9.  於約11時20分，眾人穿著所派發之白色T-shirt離開紅爵酒樓，其中包括B哥、國崩、兩位申請人、另一被告人及控方第一證人。之後，B哥說很累，所以控方第一證人跟B哥離去，沒有參與天后誕巡遊。

10.  國崩沒有被警方拘捕或檢控，亦沒有在審訊中作證。

申請理據

11.  第一及第二申請人主要是倚賴英國上議院的一個案例，即R v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228。在這案例中，警務人員搜查被告人的住所時，發現少量毒品。在搜查期間，有11人致電被告人的住所，要求與被告人對話和要求提供毒品，另有7個人親臨被告人的住所，要求購買毒品，其中一些甚至拿着現金在手。上議院的大法官以三比二的大比數裁定這些人購買毒品的要求不可以接納為證供，理由是這些人認為被告人可以供應毒品給他們，只是他們的意見和或信念，因此與被告人是否一名供應毒品的人無關，及如果以這些說話作為被告人是一個供應毒品的人的隱含指稱(implied assertion)的話，則違反傳聞證供不可被接納的原則。

12.  第一及第二申請人指「國崩對話」與這個案例中這些人的要求性質相同，而裁判官的做法正是這案例中所不容許的，因此有必要由香港終審庭決定香港應否跟隨Kearley的判決。

討論

13.  其實，在這個上議院案例中所提出的兩個原則是已經長久確立了的法律原則，即與案無關的證據及違反傳聞證供原則的證據不可以被法庭所接納。在案例中，上議院的裁決基本上是指陪審員不可以在這些人的要求的基礎上作出推斷被告人的居所是供應毒品的地方，而供應毒品的人就是被告人。

14.  正如Lord Ackner所說〔第254頁D至E〕：

「An oral request or requests for drugs to be supplied by the defendant, not spoken in his presence or in his hearing, could only be evidence of the state of mind of the person or persons making the request, and since his or their state of mind was not a relevant issue at the trial, evidence of such a request or requests, however given, would be irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The jury would not be entitled to infer from the fact that the request(s) was made, that the appellant was a supplier of drugs.

It will be apparent from what I have already stated that the application of the hearsay rule does not, on the facts so far recited, fall for consideration. The evidence is not admissible because it is irrelevant. It is as simple as that. But in case I have been guilty of oversimplification, let me consider the position upon the assumption that the very nature of the request or requests carries with it a permissible implication that the appellant was a supplier of drugs. It is only in such a situation that the request, spoken not in the appellant's presence or hearing and by a person not called as a witness, that the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence falls to be considered.」

15.  Lord Ackner繼續說〔第255頁E至H〕：

「Such being the law…..if the inquirer had said in the course of making his request, 'I would like my usual supply of amphetamine at the price which I paid you last week' or words to that effect, then although the inquirer could have been called to give evidence of the fact that he had in the past purchased from the appellant his requirements of amphetamine and had made his call at the appellant's house for a further supply on the occasion when he met and spoke to the police, the hearsay rule prevents the prosecution from calling police officers to recount the conversation which I have described. This is for the simple reason that the request made in the form set out above contains an express assertion that the premises at which the request was being made were being used as a source of supply of drugs and the supplier was the appellant.

If, contrary to the view which I have expressed above, the simple request or requests for drugs to be supplied by the appellant, as recounted by the police, contains in substance, but only by implication, the same assertion, then I can find neither authority nor principle to suggest that the hearsay rule should not be equally applicable and exclude such evidence. What is sought to be done is to use the oral assertion, even though it may be an implied assertion, as evidence of the truth of the proposition asserted. That the proposition is asserted by way of necessary implication rather than expressly cannot, to my mind, make any difference.」

16.  Lord Oliver的說法也是大同小異〔第263頁G至第 264頁B〕：

「To put it, perhaps, more succinctly, a fact to be relevant must be probative, and if one asks whether the fact that a large number of persons called at the premises seeking to purchase from 'Chippie' renders probable the existence of a person at the premises called 'Chippie' who is willing to supply drugs, the answer can, I think, only be in the affirmative. But the difficulty here is that it is only the combination of the facts (a) that persons called, (b) that they asked for 'Chippie' and (c) that they requested drugs which renders the evidence relevant. The mere fact that people telephoned or called, in itself, is irrelevant for it neither proves nor renders probable any other fact. In order to render evidence of the calls relevant and therefore admissible there has to be added the additional element of what the callers said, and it is here that the difficulty arises. What was said—in each case a request for drugs—is, of course, probative of the state of mind of the caller. But the state of mind of the caller is not the fact in issue and is, in itself, irrelevant, for it is not probative of anything other than its own existence. It becomes relevant only if and so far as the existence of other facts can be inferred from it. So far as concerns anything in issue at the trial, what the caller said and the state of mind which that fact evinces, become relevant and probative of the fact in issue (namely, the intent of the appellant) only if, or because, (i) what was said amounts to a statement, by necessary implication, that the appellant has in the past supplied drugs to the speaker (as in two cases in which requests were made for 'the usual') or (ii) it imports the belief or opinion of the speaker that the appellant has drugs and is willing to supply them.」

17.  由此可見這案例與本案的情況完全不相同。「國崩對話」從來都沒有用作推斷第一及第二申請人以三合會社團成員身份行事。裁判官將「國崩對話」納入為證據，並不用以證明其內容的真確性，只是作為國崩以一個資深黑社會成員的經驗和認知就元朗天后誕巡遊引導後輩所說的話。這一點，也令本案與Kearley有顯著的分別。案例中並沒有任何證據這些提出要求供應毒品的人是什麼人，特別是那些通過電話提出的人，而在本案中國崩是控方第一證人大佬的同輩三合會兄弟，毫無疑問是資深的三合會社團成員，對三合會活動一定有認知。他所說的不單是他的思維，更是他作為資深黑社會成員就黑社會的活動的經驗和認知。

18.  正如答辯人所指出「國崩對話」是作為理解整件案件來龍去脈的其中一個環節。裁判官亦指出法庭可以根據發生的事情的來龍去脈，發生的環境及全盤局面，包括「國崩對話」，作出考慮。這完全符合Subramaniam v PP [1956] 1 WLR 956 的原則（第 970 頁）：

「Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.」

19.  裁判官的做法也沒有偏離Secretary for Justice v Lui Kin Hong (1999) 2 HKCFAR 510及Oei Hengky Wiryo v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 98兩個香港終審庭的裁決。雖然這兩個裁決涉及的是文件上的內容，但是本席認為沒有任何理由當中的原則不適用於口頭的陳述。正如在Subramaniam這一件案中根本就沒有將文件上的內容及口頭的陳述加以劃分。誠然，兩個香港終審庭的案例都沒有處理Kearley的情況，理由其實很簡單，因為這個兩個案例的情況，正如本案一樣，與Kearley的不相同。

20.  第一及第二申請人要求本法庭所證明涉及重大而廣泛重要性的法律觀點，根本就並不反映本案的情況，因為「國崩對話」並沒有用作推論兩位申請人以三合會成員身份行事，及有別於Kearley的情況。當中的法律則已是清晰及確定的。兩位申請人提出的問題與本席的裁決不符。

結論

21.  本席駁回兩位申請人的動議，不予頒令證明本案涉及重大及有廣泛重要性的法律觀點。