Case Details
Listing:
TARTI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
TARTI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5529 · HCAL 1829/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1829/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5529
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1829 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Tarti |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 12 October 2023, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 6 October 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of
Immigration (“Director”) dated 24 August 2022 rejecting the
applicant's non-refoulement claim on the applicable grounds[1]. The
Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlinks: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00182
9_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia,
she would be harmed or killed by (1) the creditor for an outstanding
loan of which the applicant acted as a guarantor; (2) her husband due
to her lesbian orientation. The Board’s reasoning and findings were
set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for
me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the
Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. Pursuant to the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave
Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 24 September 2026. A
notice of hearing with a reminder[2] of the consequence of absence
dated 2 September 2026 was sent to the applicant’s last known address
by ordinary post. The applicant was absent from the hearing. Before
the hearing, phone calls were made to the applicant’s given telephone
number before the hearing but to no avail. Since the information
before this court shows that the said notice of hearing has not been
returned undelivered through the post, this court will dispose of the
Leave Application according to the materials already placed before the
court.
Discussion
4. A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[3] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[4], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In her Form 86 no such grounds were provided. In the
supporting affirmation, the applicant made allegations in relation to
some un-translated documents that the Board allegedly refused to
accept, and the conduct of the interpreter.
6. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[5] In the present case, the
Board accepted that the applicant acted as the guarantor for the
husband’s loan. However, it found that the applicant would not be
subjected to any risk of harm from the moneylender as there was no
reliable evidence that the moneylender was still pursuing the
applicant. As for the fear of harm form the husband, and even the
family at large, the Board found that the evidence of the husband’s
alleged death threats incredible and implausible. The Husband was
found to have no real intention to kill or severely harm the
applicant. The Board also found that there was no reliable evidence
that her neighbour, family would harm or kill her for being a lesbian.
Thus, the Board found that the applicant would not be subjected to
risk of harm if refouled. The Board also found that reasonable state
protection and internal relocation would be available.
7. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant’s grounds raised
in the supporting affirmation are general and vague. Hence, they
cannot constitute valid grounds. The applicant’s intended challenge
to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic
prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant
leave[6].
Order
8. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is
dismissed.
|Dated the 6th day of October 2026 | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 6/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Tarti |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |no: |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 20889 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |723/22 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5000623/22) (T1I104) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] “If the Applicant does not appear at the hearing, he/she will be deemed
to have waived his/her right to make oral submissions at the hearing and
the Court will deal with his/her application according to the paper already
placed before the Court”.
[3] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[4] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at [142].
[5] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676