SALAUDIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6090 · HCAL 1731/2020
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1731/2020
[2026] HKCFI 6090
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1731 OF 2020
BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 6 March 2017 be refused;
Leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 29 May 2020 be refused; and
The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
The Applicant is a 56-year-old national of India who arrived in Hong Kong on 16 January 2009 as a visitor with permission to remain as such up to 30 January 2009 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and was arrested by police more than 4 months later on 16 June 2009. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by his in-laws who objected to his marriage with his wife and/or his cousins who blamed him for the death of one of their brothers killed by his in-laws for helping him with the marriage. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.
The Applicant was born and raised in Kidderpore, West Bengal, India. He never received any formal schooling while growing up, later worked as a salesperson to make his living, and in 2003 he ran his own garment shop in his home district.
In 2007 he met a girl named Sehnaz Khatoon (“Sehnaz”) in a wedding party who worked as a nurse in a hospital in Kalimpong, and where her family was said to be wealthy and powerful and that her father Shakil Ahmed was an senior government official.
Soon the Applicant and Sehnaz started dating, and in September 2007 when they decided to get married, but as his mother did not like her, and that she did not think that her family would approve their relationship either given the different social background between them, and so on 1 October 2007 the Applicant and Sehnaz went through a religious ceremony between themselves in a hotel in Siliguri, Darjeeling without their respective families and with only the Applicant’s cousin Mohammed Ibrar Ali who made all the arrangements for their marriage and acted as a witness to their marriage.
Upon learning about their marriage, both their families expressed their strong disapproval and rejection, with the Applicant’s mother stopped talking to him, while Sehnaz was beaten up by her parents who then forbade her from having any further contact with the Applicant, and later when they tried to run away together, they were stopped by her family who forced Sehnaz to return home while the Applicant was beaten by her father and his followers and with a warning that they would kill him if he did not put an end to his marriage with Sehnaz.
As a result the Applicant became fearful for his life and fled from his home for Kolkata to take shelter in a friend’s place, and on 16 January 2009 he departed India for Hong Kong and overstayed since 31 January 2009, and upon his subsequent arrest by the police he then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 25 August 2014 with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) but failed to attend any screening interview before an immigration officer due to various reasons.
While released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim, the Applicant met and formed a relationship with a Filipino woman who was also a non-refoulement claimant after overstaying her employment as a foreign domestic helper in Hong Kong, and in 2010 they were married under some Islamic ceremony and subsequently have a daughter and a son both born in Hong Kong, and for whom his wife as their next friend and guardian had also sought non-refoulement protection based on her own claim.
In 2011 the Applicant was also told by a friend in India that his cousin Mohammed Ibrar Ali had died from some electric shock which was suspected to have been arranged by Sehnaz’s father who held his cousin responsible for arranging the marriage between the Applicant and his daughter, whereupon the brothers of Mohammed Ibrar Ali blamed the Applicant for his death and threatened to kill him in revenge upon his return to India, and that of such risk the Applicant then also included as a further basis for his non-refoulement claim for protection.
By a Notice of Decision dated 28 January 2015 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all then applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his in-laws and/or his cousins upon his return to India as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of any of them to seriously harm or kill him other than just verbal abuses or angry words and empty threats, that in any event these were private and personal disputes between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.3 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as New Delhi where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.
On 10 February 2015 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 22 January 2016 with his lawyer from DLS before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board and with submissions made on his behalf by his lawyer. On 6 March 2017 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
In its decision the Board found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from his in-laws that caused him to leave his country to come to Hong Kong to seek protection, that there was no reliable evidence of any real intention of his in-laws to seriously harm or kill him over his marriage with Sehnaz especially now that he has married his Filipino wife that a simple divorce between him and Sehnaz would resolve the dispute, nor is there any reliable evidence of any real risk of threats from his cousins other than just suspicions and speculations, and that in any event these were private and personal disputes between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to India if resorted to as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by anyone that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
Meanwhile on 5 April 2017 the Director in writing invited the Applicant to submit additional facts which he considered relevant to his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection including any other absolute and non-derogable rights under the HKBOR including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 risk”), and after receiving additional information of his re-marriage in Hong Kong with his Filipino wife and their 2 children as well as those incidents of assaults that occurred to him while in Hong Kong of which he suspected were instigated by his former in-laws in India against him, the Director by a Notice of Further Decision dated 12 June 2017 also rejected his claim under BOR 2 risk upon finding that his claim clearly did not engage the BOR 2 risk on the factual bases of even his own case as claimed and concluded that he had failed to establish a personal and real risk of his absolute and non-derogable rights including right to life under Article 2 of HKBOR.
On 20 June 2017 the Applicant again lodged an appeal to the Board against this Further Decision of the Director, and for which the Board did not hold any further oral hearing for the appeal and dealt with it on paper, and by a Decision dated 29 May 2020 the Board also dismissed his appeal upon finding no substantial ground for believing that his perceived enemies in India would still have any adverse interest in him even if his claimed threats were true, and that in any event these were private disputes between him and his former in-laws and his cousins without any official involvement that state protection and internal relocation options as found in its earlier decision would still be available to the Applicant upon his return to India that the Board concluded that his claim also failed on the BOR 2 ground.
On 27 August 2020 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of this second decision of the Board, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or his supporting affirmation of the same date other than a regurgitation of his claim as before without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge.
At the hearing of his application the Applicant also claimed to have wanted to challenge the earlier decision of the Board as well, but as his application was prepared for him by his friend, he did not realize that his friend had omitted to include it in his Form 86 until when it was raised by the Court, and for which he would like to amend his Form 86 to include his application as regard the earlier decision of the Board.
Even accepting what he said about his application being prepared by a friend who omitted his intended challenge of the earlier decision of the Board as true, the Applicant would be seriously out of time with that application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.
As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his Form 86 as regard that earlier decision dated 6 March 2017 of the Board would fall on 6 June 2017, the Applicant was therefore more than 3 years late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.
In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 3 years must be considered as extremely substantial and inordinate, for which he as noted above just blamed it on his friend who prepared his application which of course can never be accepted as any valid reason or justification for non-compliance of the procedural rules, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 6 March 2017 to his lawyer without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for his such serious delay.
As for the merits, if any, of his intended application as regard either decisions of the Board, as noted above the Applicant has failed to put forward any proper grounds for his intended challenge of either decisions, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application other than a regurgitation of his claim as before. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in either decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis for his intended challenge of either decisions of the Board, or any merits in his intended application.
As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in both of its decisions with the benefit of hearing him in his oral evidence and his answers to questions raised of his claim during the hearing of his first appeal, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the findings of the Board in either decisions.
Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risks of harm in the Applicant’s claims even if real are all localized ones and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of India, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
It is also of note that the non-refoulement claims of his Filipino wife and their 2 children eventually ended up in the Court of Appeal as the case of Fabio Arlyn Timogan & Ors v Evan Roth [2021] 2 HKC 458 in which the Court laid down the proper approach and principles for dealing with the non-refoulement claims of minor children but which is not relevant to the Applicant’s own claim or his present application, and while the appeal of his wife was dismissed by the Court, those of his children were allowed and have subsequently been remitted to a differently constituted Board for re-hearing of their non-refoulement claims, and upon the subsequent passing of their mother due to her illness in October 2022, the Applicant has since taken over their case as their remaining guardian and next friend to proceed with their appeals to the Board now premised on his own claim and on his alleged risks that they may face upon their return with him to India, of which as noted above in the Board’s decision on his own claim that the assessment of the availability of internal relocation was obviously then being made on the basis of his return to India by himself without his children, and while this may form a basis for a subsequent claim by the Applicant, it is however not relevant to his present intended challenge of the Board’s decision based on the facts relied on by the Applicant in his appeals before the Board at that time.
As such, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
In the premises, as I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I refuse to extend time as regard his intended challenge of the first decision of the Board or to grant leave for his intended application as regard the Board’s second decision, and accordingly dismiss his leave application.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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