TOP EMINENT HEALTHCARE GROUP LIMITED (formerly known as CLSA PREMIUM LTD and KVB KUNLUN FINANCIAL GROUP LTD) AND OTHERS v. BANCLOGIX SYSTEM CO LTD

HCA 1416/2019 & HCA 452/2020
(Heard together)

[2026] HKCFI 568

HCA 1416/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1416 OF 2019

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AND

HCA 452/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 452 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is an application by the defendant by summons issued on 17 November 2025. When I say defendant, I mean the defendant in HCA 1416/2019, who is also the plaintiff in HCA 452/2020.

2.  There is an element of urgency about this application because discovery is sought by the 23 December 2025 and the trial is scheduled to begin on the 7 January 2026. Hence, I will only give brief reasons for my ruling quickly because the parties would need to have certainty about the further conduct of the proceedings.

3.  Now, the relevant chronology is as follows. The writ was issued on 5 August 2019. The statement of claim was filed on the 18 October 2019 and the amended statement of claim was filed on the 5 November 2020.

4.  A mutual discovery took place in March 2023. Notice of setting down for trial was filed on the 15 December 2023. And the trial dates were fixed in January 2024. And as I mentioned earlier, the trial will begin on the 7 January 2026, and we are at the 18 December 2025 today.

5.  The defendant first sought specific discovery of the Category 1 documents together with some other documents by letter of the 3 October 2025. And there was subsequent correspondence between the parties. On the 13 October 2025, Ince & Co for the plaintiffs wrote to object to the request by the defendant for specific discovery and also asked the defendant to explain why the application was made so late.

6.  The defendant’s solicitor, Li & Partners replied on the 16 October 2025, giving their arguments on the merits of the application, but gave no explanation about the lateness of the application. In that letter, Li & Partners also said that they would take out a summons to deal with the matter unless they had a satisfactory response from the other side by the 27 October 2025. And yet, no summons was issued until the 17 November 2025.

7.  In a letter from Ince & Co dated the 20 November 2025, they said this in paragraph 4 of their letter,

“Strictly without prejudice to our clients’ rights and without admitting the relevance of the requested materials under item 1 of the schedule to the summons as you alleged, we are instructed that insofar as item 1 is concerned, our clients are prepared to disclose the following documents and information subject to necessary redaction of sensitive confidential information:

1. PwC’s report to the audit committee of the 1st plaintiff dated March 2020;

2. The 1st plaintiff’s letter of representation to PwC dated 24 April 2020;

3. PwC’s resignation letter dated 23 October 2020; and

4. Notice of decision from FMA of New Zealand dated 18 September 2020.”

That is, of course, one of the documents sought to be disclosed under Category 1.

8.  And then they say, paragraph 5:

“We trust that our client’s proposed disclosure above would adequately address your client’s concerns and your client should immediately withdraw the summons with costs be to our clients.”

9.  In the letter from Li & Partners of the 24 November 2025, they said, in paragraph 2:

“In relation to item 1 of the schedule to the summons, we wish to clarify if your clients are willing to make an affirmation, confirmation that no regulatory, disciplinary, civil and/or criminal action have been taken by the SFC in Hong Kong against the 1st plaintiff. The ASIC in Australia against the 3rd plaintiff, and/or the FMA against the 4th plaintiff, apart from the notice of decision from FMA, dated 18 September 2020.

10.  And then, the affirmation of Wong Yuen Kiu Yuki, was filed on behalf of plaintiff on the 5 December 2025. And in paragraphs 37 and 38, she said:

“As already made clear to the defendant by way of Ince’s letter dated 20 November 2025, I was informed by the representatives of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are prepared to disclose a notice of decision from FMA dated 18 September 2020, subject to necessary redaction of sensitive confidential information. ”

38:

“Besides, I was further informed by representatives of the plaintiffs that no relevant regulatory, disciplinary, civil and/or criminal action have been taken by the SFC or the ASIC yet. So, no relevant determination, decision,

judgment, order, penalty, report, notice, original notice, process or press release exist.”

11.  Now, Mr Sim today made the point that it was not quite sufficient for the solicitor for the plaintiffs, as opposed to representatives of the plaintiffs themselves, to swear an oath that that was the position. But he also admitted that there had been no such point made previously.

12.  In my view, all that should be a good answer to the Category 1 request. There is no dispute between the parties on the well-settled legal principles. There is also no dispute that mere delay itself can be a ground for dismissal of the application. In my view, there has been inordinate delay on the part of defendant in issuing the summons. It is far too late, especially when discovery is sought to be made on 23 December 2025 and the trial is to begin on the 7 January 2026.

13.  It would be unfair to the plaintiffs, in my view, to have to deal with the matter of further discovery at this stage, which would certainly disrupt their preparation for the trial.

14.  There is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The fact that the information sought would have to be updated near the trial is no good explanation for why the application was not made much earlier. What could have been done was a formal application for specific discovery should be made earlier with the caveat that further discovery might have to be made subsequently.

15.  So in all the circumstances, in the exercise of my discretion, I dismiss the application just on the ground of inordinate delay. I will not give my view on the question of relevance because it may become an issue in the main trial and I will not prejudge the issue. So that is my ruling.