YUNG MEI CHUN, JESSIE v. MERRILL LYNCH (ASIA PACIFIC) LTD

HCMP 244/2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 244OF 2016

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCCJ NO 3068 of 2013)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  The court handed down a judgment on 14 March 2016 dismissing the Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal against the decisions of Judge A Li in DCCJ 3068 of 2013 on 3 November 2015 [“the November Decision”] and 18 January 2016 [“the January Decision”].

2.  The November Decision of the judge was his refusal to set aside his earlier decision on 2 September 2015 dismissing the Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal [“the September Decision”] against his yet earlier decision on 29 July 2015 [“the July Decision”] refusing the renewal of the writ.  In our judgment, the court has adequately explained why the July Decision must have been correct in light of our decision on 25 August 2015 in HCMP 1648/2015.  It follows that the September Decision must also be correct.

3.  The January Decision of the judge was the refusal of leave to appeal against the November Decision and the making of what in substance, as it was held in our judgment of 14 March 2016, a RPO.

4.  The Plaintiff issued a Notice of Motion on 11 April 2016 seeking leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  Notwithstanding the submissions of the Plaintiff of 28 April 2016, we are of the firm view that the application in the Notice of Motion is incompetent by reason of Section 14AB of the High Court Ordinance. By reason of that section, and its equivalent in Section 63B of the District Court Ordinance, there cannot be any appeal against our refusal of leave, see The IO of Po Hang Building v Sam Woo Marine Works Ltd HCMP 415 of 2014, 8 April 2016 applying Hong Kong Housing Society v Wong Nai Chung HCMP 880 of 2009, 22 September 2010.

6.  There is no merit in the Plaintiff’s submission that the court did not wait for any submission from her before it decided the matter on 14 March 2016.  Her summons in HCMP 244 of 2016 was filed on 1 February 2016.  According to Order 59 Rule 2A(1), the Plaintiff must support her summons by a statement setting out the reasons why leave should be granted.  Instead of doing so, the Plaintiff set out her grounds in the summons of 1 February 2016 and referred to her “original affirmation” filed in the District Court.

7.  The application was processed in accordance with Order 59 Rule 2A.  The court has considered the application accordingly and reached a clear and firm view that the application for leave had no merit.  The court therefore disposed of it on paper as it was entitled to do under Order 59 Rule 2A(8).

8.  We dismiss the Notice of Motion of 11 April 2016.

9.  As can be seen from the history of this case, the Plaintiff repeatedly heaped one unmeritorious application upon another and in the process occasioned substantial waste of judicial resources which could have been more meaningfully utilised on other cases.  In the circumstances, we reiterate what had been said at paragraph 15 of our judgment of 14 March 2016.