LEE KA LING v. WONG WING CHI

DCCJ 3420/2021

[2026] HKDC 624

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3420 OF 2021

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1.  Ironically as it is, the end of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant saw the beginning of their hard-fought legal battle. Ultimately, the matter turns on their respective credibility.

The plaintiff’s summons

2.  On 8 August 2025, the plaintiff took out a summons applying to file a 7^th supplemental list of documents relating to 6 pages of her HSBC passbook account number 557-6-064249.

3.  I accept that the omission of the pages was due to the inadvertence of the plaintiff’s solicitors. They should be included in order to complete the picture. The defendant would not thereby be prejudiced as her counsel would have the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff on them.

4.  I therefore allowed the plaintiff’s application.

The plaintiff’s case

5.  The plaintiff and the defendant came to know each other in early 1990’s and started cohabitation in 2014 until the break-up of the relationship in February 2021.

6.  On 14 February 2018, Fantasy Academy of Ballet Limited (“Fantasy Ballet”) was set up to run the business of ballet teaching. As the plaintiff had been fully engaged in ballet teaching, she requested the defendant to be her nominee shareholder and director.

7.  The plaintiff said that Fantasy Ballet was solely run by the plaintiff and all business and profits were generated by the plaintiff alone. The defendant held the shares of Fantasy Ballet on trust for the plaintiff.

8.  Between 2016 and 2019, the plaintiff transferred a total sum of $805,467 (“the investment money”) to the defendant for investment opportunities for securities on her behalf. In late February 2021, the defendant via WhatsApp messages confirmed to the plaintiff that she would return the said investment money but had failed to do so.

9.  In about August 2013, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the plaintiff would join as a shareholder of Onpop (日本代購店) (“Onpop”), an online purchasing agency business, at a consideration of $4,000 holding 50% shares thereof.

10.  The HSBC account No 614-024784-838 under the name of “I lLOVE bBlack wWorkshop” (“ILB account”); the Bank of China account No 012-695-1-0154919 under the name of the plaintiff (“P’s BOC account”) and a PayMe wallet account under the plaintiff with HSBC (“P’s Payme account”) were used for collecting the income of the Onpop.

11.  In about May 2021, the defendant directed that the income from Onpop to be deposited into her personal Payme wallet account with HSBC and a Payme business account under “I Love Black Workshop” with HSBC. At the same time, all expenses for purchasing products in Japan from February 2021were almost paid through P’s BOC account until about the end of March 2021 and from P’s Payme account until about the end of April 2021. As a result, the balance in relation to the Onpop business in the said 2 accounts was reduced to about $27,000.

12.  In about early May 2021, the plaintiff was informed by the defendant that the ILB account had a cash amount of $150,000. Also, the stock value of the Onpop products would be no less than $30,000. Subsequently in May 2021, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to use $150,000 as the base to split the proceeds of Onpop. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to $75,000.

13.  In about July 2020, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to purchase a property located at 2-18-20 Hakataekihigashi, Hakata-ku, Fukuoka, Japan (“the Japan property”) at the Hong Kong dollar equivalent price of about HK$350,000. $100,000 was paid by the plaintiff and $150,000 was paid by Onpop. For administrative convenience, the Japan property was purchased in the sole name of the defendant.

The defendant’s case

14.  The defendant said she created the brand “I Love Black Workshop” in 2010 for the business of graphic and media design and production.

15.  In around 2012, she founded Onpop which carried the business of procurement of the latest goods from Japan for consumers in Hong Kong. As of 2021, Onpop had accumulated over 25,000 followers on its Facebook page.

16.  As the defendant was regularly travelling overseas on business, she arranged for most of the payments made by Onpop’s customers to be deposited into the plaintiff’s Bank of China Macau account No 15-11-10-232903; the P’s BOC account and the P’s Payme account. The plaintiff would then repay the defendant from time to time. The defendant is the sole beneficial owner of the Onpop income.

17.  Since around 2013, the plaintiff had been a freelance ballet instructor for children at Lina Ballet. She resigned in late 2017. The defendant regarded that it would be commercially viable to provide ballet classes to children and teenagers, she decided to set up Fantasy Ballet and engage the plaintiff as a freelance ballet instructor. The ballet lessons were taught at (a) the rented premises at Unit 5, 4^th Floor, Fook Hong Industrial Building, No 19 Sheung Yuet Road, Kowloon; (b) Jockey Club Tseung Kwan O Youth S.P.O.T. and (c) the Clubhouse of Heng Fa Chuen. It was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would be entitled to all income generated from (a) classes taught at the Heng Fa Chuen Clubhouse and (b) the sale of ballet costumes to students.

18.  In respect of the investment money, the defendant said that those moneys, if at all transferred to her account, were profits and/or part of the Onpop reimbursements and/or for the purpose of covering the living expenses of herself and the plaintiff.

19.  The defendant denied that she had ever informed the plaintiff that the ILB account had a cash amount of $150,000.

20.  The defendant said that the Japan property was purchased and entirely funded by herself.

Findings of fact

21.  In view of the diametrical conflict of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s case, they stand or fall on their own credibility.

22.  Deputy High Court Judge H Au-Yeung (as he then was) in Hu Lan v David Golden [2023] HKCFI 873 usefully summarised the principles on credibility of witnesses as follows:

(1)  Generally speaking, contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged are of the greatest importance in assessing credibility;

(2)  Importance should be attached to the inherent likelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic of events;

(3)  The court will also attach importance to the consistency of the witness’ evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness’ evidence. The latter type of consistency is often tested by a comparison between the witness’ oral testimony and his or her witness statement;

(4)  The court should consider a witness’ motive for deliberately not giving truthful testimony. For example, telling the truth may prejudice his interest, or a just determination of the litigation may affect his interest;

(5)  It is essential to have regard to the entirety of a witness’ evidence. A witness can make mistakes, but the mistakes do not necessarily affect other parts of his evidence. Likewise, a witness may lie. However, lies themselves do not mean necessarily that the entirety of that witness’ evidence is to be rejected. A witness may lie in a stupid attempt to bolster his case, but the actual case nevertheless remains good irrespective of the lie;

(6)  On the other hand, where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has testified, this fact is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility; and

(7)  While the court is entitled to take demeanour into account when assessing testimony, it should be borne in mind that demeanour can be deceptive and is therefore to be approached with care.

Onpop

23.  There is no dispute that Onpop was started by the defendant. However, the defendant maintained that she was the sole owner at all times. The defendant said that it was the plaintiff who volunteered to receive the payments of customers on her behalf. She agreed as the plaintiff was by then her other half. The plaintiff would transfer part of such money to her account in accordance with her direction. The defendant said this arrangement might have led the plaintiff to think that she was entitled to half of the income of Onpop.

24.  On the other hand, the plaintiff said that as the defendant could not handle the business by herself alone, she began to assist the back office work of Onpop after a few months of its operation. In August 2013, it was the defendant who invited the plaintiff to join Onpop sharing the proceeds and income therefrom with her equally at a consideration of $4,000. She did pay the said $4,000 to the defendant in cash and became a 50% partner of Onpop.

25.  Whilst it is not uncommon for a wife to help out her husband’s business, the degree and extent of the plaintiff’s involvement in the business of Onpop calls for consideration.

26.  In the present case, the plaintiff not only took care of the payments of the customers of Onpop which indeed is part and parcel of the business operation, she also used 2 of her bank accounts, ie P’s BOC account and P’s Payme account, for receiving payments. It is the plaintiff’s evidence that by 13 December 2013, P’s BOC account had a minimal balance of $137.11, she regarded that it was suitable for the business purpose of Onpop and was used as such in the following month. I note that $10,000 was withdrawn from the said account on 13 December 2013. I believe that the withdrawal was done in order to reduce the balance to a minimum.

27.  If the plaintiff had no financial interest in Onpop, it is unlikely that she would have gone so far to do so. Conversely, the defendant would not have allowed the plaintiff to use her personal account to receive the business income of Onpop if she was the sole owner thereof. She could simply open bank accounts in her own name for the purpose of receiving payments from customers.

28.  Common sense dictates that any reasonable person doing business would use his or her best endeavour to control the finance, particularly the income, of the business. This is so for the simple reason that the consequence of losing control of the finance would undoubtedly lead to the failure of the business which every business person would try hard to avoid.

29.  The defendant described the plaintiff as her other half at the material time. Such emotional attachment, in my view, is unlikely enough to displace her rational need to keep her business afloat. On balance, I do not accept that the defendant allowed the plaintiff to receive the business income of Onpop just because she was emotionally attached to the plaintiff. I believe that it was so because the plaintiff was not only her lover but also her business partner. I also reject the defendant’s suggestion that the plaintiff thought that she was entitled to half of the income of Onpop because the defendant allowed her to use her personal accounts to receive customers’ payments as illogical.

30.  I prefer the plaintiff’s evidence that she became a 50% partner of Onpop in August 2013 after paying the defendant the consideration of $4,000. The utilisation of P’s BOC account a few months later and P’s Payme account from January 2015 for the Onpop business reflected her high degree of involvement in the business as a partner and her effort to respond to the needs of the customers.

31.  The plaintiff said that in May 2021, she decided to completely separate from the defendant and Onpop. She and the defendant agreed to use May 2021 as the calculation mark for the split of Onpop. By the end of May 2021, the cash balance of P’s BOC account was $27,514.07 and P’s Payme account was $2,270.40 by the end of April 2021. On 2 May 2021, the defendant told the plaintiff that the cash balance of ILB account was $150,000 in relation to Onpop and the stock balance would not be less than $30,000. Also, the plaintiff had discussed with the defendant on or about 17 February 2021 via WhatsApp about the cash position of the various bank accounts associated with Onpop. She was given to understand that aside of P’s BOC account, the cash balance of Onpop in various bank accounts was about $211,000. The plaintiff said she was prepared to use $150,000 as the base figure and therefore she is entitled to $75,000 from the defendant.

32.  The defendant denied that she had told the plaintiff that the ILB account had a cash balance of $150,000.

33.  The fallacy of the plaintiff’s claim of $75,000 is that it is largely based on unsubstantiated information. On the evidence before me, I am not prepared to find that as at the end of May 2021, Onpop had a net asset of not less than $150,000.

Fantasy Ballet

34.  Turning to Fantasy Ballet, the defendant said that she established her brand name “I Love Black workshop” (“ILB”) in 2010 specialising in product development, design and promotion. Starting from 2017 or so, the brand name transformed its business into DIY workshop using materials from Japan. In the beginning of 2018, she intended to promote and organise workshops for Japanese carpentry works, making of guitar and musical instruments, ballet class, Jazz class, Yoga class and painting class.

35.  As more space was required for the said classes, she incorporated Fantasy Ballet on 14 February 2018, which was solely owned by her. Her plan was that Fantasy Ballet was to be used as the vehicle to develop ILB and the aforementioned workshops including ballet class at the same time.

36.  The plaintiff said that she had been a part-time instructor of Lina Ballet since 2003. In 2018, she had a dispute with Lina Ballet on her salary. She decided to resign and to start up her own ballet school which had been her dream all along.

37.  The defendant told her that her income source may affect her status in living in public housing and suggested that it would be better to use the defendant’s name as the legal owner of Fantasy Ballet instead. That was why Fantasy Ballet was incorporated in the defendant’s name. However, the start-up capital was provided from the plaintiff’s own savings.

38.  After the tenancy of the defendant’s office in Ngau Tau Kok expired in the end of 2018, the business operation of Onpop was moved to the studio of Fantasy Ballet in Kowloon Bay. The defendant promised that Onpop would share the monthly rent of the studio but eventually nothing was forthcoming.

39.  According to the defendant, Fantasy Ballet was her business vehicle. Ballet class was only one of the many products her company was going to offer to her prospective customers. If that is the case, one would wonder why it was named as a ballet school giving people in the street the impression that it means what it said.

40.  I note that the defendant had established ILB as her brand name since 2010. Given the number of years the brand name had in the market, the goodwill that it had earned is a valuable asset. That being so, the defendant should have made the best use of the earned goodwill in her new business vehicle. But it is not the case here. Looking at the name of Fantasy Ballet, it does not have the slightest reference to ILB. No reasonable person could possibly relate the two together. I am doubtful of the defendant’s assertion.

41.  It is not in dispute that the monthly rent of ILB’s office in Ngau Tau Kok was $2,800 whereas that of the studio of Fantasy Ballet in Kowloon Bay was $14,000. Bearing in mind that ILB was just transforming its business model to DIY workshops in 2017 and planning to organize classes in 2018, it was uncertain that such plan would work out. The drastic increase in costs on rental, in my view, does not sit well with logic.

42.  The defendant said Fantasy Ballet was solely owned by her. The plaintiff was only a ballet instructor of Fantasy Ballet. Apart from the ballet classes in the Kowloon Bay studio, Fantasy Ballet also held ballet classes at Jockey Club Tseung Kwan O Youth S.P.O.T. and the Clubhouse of Heng Fa Chuen. The plaintiff was responsible for the teaching of all those classes. However, the plaintiff was not paid according to the amount of work (ie teaching) done. The defendant said on account of the plaintiff’s teaching of the ballet classes of Fantasy Ballet, she agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to the income arising from the Heng Fa Chuen Clubhouse teaching and the selling of ballet costumes designed by the defendant.

43.  By the time the plaintiff was teaching the ballet classes of Fantasy Ballet, she had already left Lina Ballet. For obvious reason, she must be very conscious of the income that could be derived from ballet teaching.

44.  According to the defendant, the plaintiff was not remunerated for all the teaching of the Fantasy Ballet classes. This does not make sense at all if the plaintiff was an employee of Fantasy Ballet. No reasonable person would agree to work for his or her employer without pay. Furthermore, no documentary proof of the employment status of the plaintiff, eg Tax returns or MPF contributions, was produced by the defendant.

45.  I have grave reservations on the truthfulness of the defendant’s evidence.

46.  Compared with the defendant’s evidence, I find the plaintiff’s evidence more credible.

47.  The plaintiff left Lina Ballet in June 2018, ie a few months after the incorporation of Fantasy Ballet. She then started operating Fantasy Ballet. Due to the infancy of Fantasy Ballet, she also taught ballet lessons in Parsons Music and the Heng Fa Chuen Clubhouse at the same time in order to secure her income. These are the logical progression of an employed person who just started his or her own business.

48.  From the audited financial statements of Fantasy Ballet for the period from 14 February 2018 to 31 March 2019, the operating expenses on salaries and allowances was $63,000. This corroborated the plaintiff’s evidence that she only drew salary for the first 4 months of operation from September to December 2018 as the company was required to pay rent from January 2019. The plaintiff said she again received salary for 3 months in February, March and April 2021. The audited financial statements for the year ended on 31 March 2020 did show that there was no outgoings on salaries and allowances in that financial year.

49.  If Fantasy Ballet was not beneficially owned by the plaintiff, she would not have contributed to it in the way she did.

50.  I believe the plaintiff’s evidence and find that Fantasy Ballet was wholly owned by her as it was the realisation of her dream. The plaintiff used the defendant’s name in the incorporation of the company because she was led by the defendant to believe using her own name would affect her status of living in public housing.

51.  As a side issue, the defendant said that she paid out of her pocket $60,000 on 10 March 2020 in the purchase of a Mini Clubman car registration No VC9429 by Fantasy Ballet.

52.  The plaintiff said that Fantasy Ballet did reimburse the defendant the said $60,000 by a cheque which was cleared on 21 August 2020. The current account statement of Fantasy Ballet with Dah Sing Bank dated 31 August 2020 did show the said item of withdrawal. The audited financial statement of Fantasy Ballet for the year ended on 31 March 2020 showed that the company owned the said vehicle at the costs of $140,000. I am satisfied that the defendant was reimbursed of the said $60,000 by Fantasy Ballet.

The investment money

53.  The defendant said she had never received money from the plaintiff for investment purpose. She said the moneys the plaintiff transferred were income of Onpop because they were paid into the plaintiff’s personal accounts. When she needed money for trips to Japan or for use for herself and the two of them, she would ask the plaintiff to transfer money to her for such purposes.

54.  It must be remembered that P’s BOC account and P’s Payme account were used for the Onpop business. If what the defendant said is true, the transfers of moneys to her should be from the said two accounts. However, none of the transfers was from the said two accounts. Rather, they were from the plaintiff’s other personal accounts with Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank and HSBC. The defendant’s evidence is at odds with the real situation.

55.  The plaintiff said that from 2011 onwards, she began saving a few thousands to about $10,000 a month. Occasionally, she would follow the defendant in investing in securities in Hong Kong. The defendant opened a bank account with Standard Chartered Bank in 2016 which offered welcome award for securities trading users. The defendant told her that she could accumulate wealth for her via trading Hong Kong securities and would invest on her behalf. As they were cohabiting couple at that time, she had complete trust in the defendant. Therefore, she transferred the investment money to the defendant’s account from her own bank accounts between 2016 and 2019 for investment purpose. During the time, the defendant told her that the return would be larger if the capital was bigger. The defendant even persuaded her to advance cash from credit card for securities investment. Also, she took the defendant’s recommendation to borrow money from HSBC for $150,000 in January 2019 and transferred the same to the defendant for investment.

56.  Looking at the various transfers, most of them were in the range between $10,000 and $50,000. However, the transfers on 17 July 2017 and 11 January 2019 were for the sums of $153,985 and $150,000 respectively. The plaintiff said that the former was borrowed from Hang Seng Bank for a credit card low interest loan, the latter was borrowed from HSBC aforesaid.

57.  Further, the transfers were sporadically and intermittently done:

Months	No of transfers
7/2016	4
9/2016	3
1/2017	3
2/2017	1
5/2017	1
6/2017	1
7/2017	1
9/2017	2
1/2018	1
3/2018	5
6/2018	1
1/2019	1

58.  As such, the transfers could not possibly cater for the defendant’s Japan trips and the living expenses of herself and the two of them as the defendant asserted. To my mind, the frequent transfers shortly after the defendant’s opening of the Standard Chartered Bank account supports the plaintiff’s evidence that she was encouraged by the defendant to give her saved up moneys to the defendant for investment. The two transfers mentioned in paragraphs 56 above which were comparatively larger in amount were borrowings rather than the plaintiff’s own savings. In my view, the pattern of the transfers sits well with the evidence of the plaintiff.

59.  Accordingly, I find as a fact that the investment money was transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant for investment on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant held the investment money on trust for the plaintiff.

The Japan property

60.  The defendant said that she used her own money in the purchase of the Japan property. That is why it was in her sole name. The plaintiff had nothing to do with the Japan property.

61.  As to the $100,000 the plaintiff said was her contribution to the price of the Japan property, the defendant said that in June 2020, her beloved dog Bing Bing died. She was very depressed and wanted to leave Hong Kong and to live in Japan. The plaintiff, in order to soothe her heart, gave her the said $100,000. The plaintiff never said that the money was to be used to buy the Japan property. She also denied that the said $100,000 was actually transferred to her account.

62.  The plaintiff said that in order to facilitate the business development of Onpop, she and the defendant decided to buy the Japan property. They agreed that the property would be owned by them in equal shares but the legal title was to be registered in the defendant’s name for administrative convenience. Due to lack of cash, Onpop could only provide $150,000. She and the defendant would each contribute $100,000 making up the purchase price of $350,000. She did transfer 2 sums of $50,000 each from her HSBC account to the defendant’s Hang Seng Bank account on 3 and 9 July 2020.

63.  The plaintiff’s integrated account statement with HSBC No 534-872924-833 dated 1 August 2020 did show that 2 sums of $50,000 each were transferred to the defendant on 3 and 8 July 2020.

64.  The aforesaid transfer of $100,000 to the defendant was over and on top of the investment money. Had it not been for the purpose of buying some valuable item like the Japan property, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would have paid money of this scale to the defendant in the matter of 5 days. Given the relatively meagre income of the plaintiff and Fantasy Ballet was running at a loss, I do not believe that she was so generous as to give $100,000 to the defendant just because the defendant was in a low mood due to the death of the dog Bing Bing. In this respect, I reject the defendant’s evidence as unbelievable.

65.  The plaintiff also relied on a handwritten note (“the written note”) which she said was written by the defendant around July 2020. The plaintiff said at the left bottom, the Chinese character “老” stood for “老婆” (ie wife) was referring to her. The sum “100000” meant that $100,000 would come from her. The “Me” under “老” was referring to the defendant. The figure of “10000” was an error in writing which should be “100000” instead. The figure of “50000” with the words “I Love onpop” on the left hand side meant $50,000 would come from the I Love Black Workshop account of the defendant. The “100000” with “Onpop HSBC” on the left hand side meant $100,000 would come from the HSBC account of the plaintiff for Onpop. The aforementioned sums were the source of fund in the purchase of the Japan property.

66.  The defendant said that she had the impression that there were several versions of handwritten note. In any event, the handwritten note did not reflect the eventual contribution of fund.

67.  Obviously, the written note was about the contribution of funds in the purchase of the Japan property. If the defendant was the one who borne all the costs, the existence of the handwritten note is unnecessary and superfluous. I believe that the plaintiff and the defendant were planning to buy the Japan property together. The handwritten note was written in the course of their discussion on the source of fund.

68.  As can be seen in the written note, the plaintiff and the defendant would each contribute an equal sum of $100,000. The rest would come from the business accounts of Onpop as its name was both by the side of the remaining sums of $50,000 and $100,000. I have found that Onpop was owned by the plaintiff and the defendant equally. Such distribution of funds clearly shows that the plaintiff and the defendant intended to own the Japan property equally.

69.  In my judgment, the fact that the legal title of the Japan property was in the sole name of the defendant does not advance her case. As the defendant frequently travelled to Japan and the parties were on good terms at the material time, it is more likely than not that the Japan property was registered in her sole name for convenience sake only.

70.  Mr Sean O’Reilly, counsel for the defendant, argued that the plaintiff’s claim on the Japan property is requiring this Court to rule on title to property situate in Japan, which is a matter of Japanese law for the Japanese courts. Mr O’Reilly submitted that the Mozambique rule from The British South Africa Company v The Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602 has the effect that the Hong Kong courts will not exercise their jurisdiction to decide title to foreign property, citing James Chor Cheung Wong v Hark Chung Wong, HCA 469/2013, 4/7/2017, unreported in support.

71.  Mr Edward Lun, counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that the defendant had taken no step to dispute the jurisdiction. By serving a defence the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction. Further, Mr Lun submitted that the claim of the plaintiff is an action in personam rather than in rem.

72.  The point was only raised by the defendant through her counsel Mr O’Reilly at the opening submission. She has no doubt submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court by service of her defence and counterclaim.

73.  Furthermore, I agree with Mr Lun’s submission that the plaintiff’s claim is an action in personam.

74.  Marlene Ng J in Chan Pui Sze and Mak Hau Yin (The Joint and Several Trustees of the property of the Bankrupt) v Wang Jue [2019] HKCFI 2515 in holding that the claims of the trustees in bankruptcy’s claim of the US properties in the name of the defendant was asking the Hong Kong Courts to exercise in personam rather than in rem jurisdiction, explained at para 95 on the basis of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation) by Dicey, Morris and Collinson on The Conflict of Laws 15^th Ed (2012) Vol 2:

“In Webb v Webb, the European Court rules that in an action for a declaration that a person holds immovable property as a trustee and for an order requiring the person to execute such documents as are required to vest legal ownership under the lex situs in the plaintiff does not involve rights in rem within the meaning of Art. 16(1) of the Brussels Convention. It was held to be irrelevant that the ultimate purpose of the plaintiff was to obtain ownership of an immovable; what is important is whether rights in rem are the object of the proceedings. Since the plaintiff did not claim that he already enjoyed rights directly relating to the property which were enforceable against the whole world, but sought only to assert rights against the defendant, the action was not an action in rem within the meaning of Art. 16(1) of the Brussels Convention, but an action in personam. This ruling suggests that, even if the object of the proceedings is to vindicate equitable rights against a third party (for example, where a claimant seeks to establish that a purchaser of trust property holds it as constructive trustee), the proceedings should not be regarded as involving rights in rem. ……”

75.  In James Chor Cheung Wong (supra), the plaintiffs claimed that they had a right to redeem the advance made to them by the defendant and to a re-conveyance of the property from the defendant which the defendant said was sold to him without the agreement to redeem. As the learned Master pointed out that the subject matter in issue is the legal title to the property (hence a right in rem), the Mocambique rule applied. James Chor Cheung Wong (supra) is therefore distinguishable from the present case.

76.  I therefore hold that as the plaintiff’s claim of the Japan property is asking this Court to exercise in personam jurisdiction, the Mocambique rule does not apply. This Court has jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiff’s claim of the Japan property.

The public housing residency of the plaintiff

77.  Mr O’Reilly made it a point that due to the fact that the plaintiff was living in a public housing unit, she deliberately lied in her evidence. Mr O’Reilly submitted that the “administrative convenience” stated in the pleadings was inconsistent to the explanation in her witness statement that it was the defendant who suggested to her to use the defendant’s name as the legal owner of Fantasy Ballet or else her income source may affect her status in living in public housing. They were mutually contradictory and both cannot be true at the same time.

78.  At the oral closing submission, Mr O’Reilly confirmed that he was making the submission on whether the plaintiff is to be believed, not on the defence of illegality as Mr Lun thought it was.

79.  With respect, I do not think the two are mutually contradictory and cannot be true at the same time. “Administrative convenience” is a term phrased by the drafter of the pleadings which, in the plaintiff’s own words, was meaning that the defendant told her that the money earned from Fantasy Ballet would not be counted as her income. They are both referring to the same thing.

80.  The plaintiff was repeatedly cross-examined by Mr O’Reilly on the same issue at the trial to which she gave the same answer. In my view, the plaintiff was truthful in answering.

81.  In respect of the Japan property, when asked the plaintiff could name as a co-owner, she said as the defendant was the one who negotiated with the Japan company about the property, it was for administrative convenience that the purchase price to be paid by the defendant in one go. At that time, she had not thought that their relationship would turn sour. Again in my view, the plaintiff’s answer is logical, truthful and believable.

82.  With due respect, I am not in agreement with Mr O’Reilly’s submission.

Conclusion and Order

83.  By reasons of my findings aforesaid, the plaintiff is entitled to the following Orders:

(1)  a declaration that the defendant holds the entire interest in the shareholding in Fantasy Ballet on trust for the plaintiff;

(2)  an Order that the defendant to re-assign to the plaintiff the said entire interest in the shareholding in Fantasy Ballet;

(3)  an Order that the defendant doth transfer the signatory of the Dah Sing Bank accounts as described in paragraph 5 of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim to the plaintiff;

(4)  an Order that the defendant doth account to the plaintiff for the income and accounts of Fantasy Ballet since May 2021;

(5)  a declaration that the defendant holds the Investment Trust Money as pleaded in paragraph 14 of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim (“the Investment Trust Money”) on trust for the plaintiff;

(6)  an account for the Investment Trust Money and an Order that the Investment Trust Money and the returns and interests thereon be returned to the plaintiff;

(7)  a declaration that the defendant holds the Japanese property as described in paragraph 17a of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim on trust for the plaintiff in equal shares;

(8)  an Order that the defendant doth return the value of half share of the Japanese property to the plaintiff, the value of which to be assessed; and

(9)  damages to be assessed.

84.  By reasons as stated in paragraph 33 above, the plaintiff’s claim for under prayer (8) for the return of HK$75,000 under Onpop is dismissed.

85.  In respect of the counterclaim, I make the following Orders:

(1)  a declaration that the defendant and the plaintiff are the beneficial owners of OnPop Income as defined in paragraph 6 of the Re-Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim in equal shares;

(2)  an account of all dealings in respect of the OnPop Income; and

(3)  an Order for the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant or vice versa of all sums found due on the taking of the said account.

Costs

86.  The plaintiff being the major winner, I make a costs order nisi that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff 90% of the costs of this action with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

87.  In the absence of any application for variation by summons within 14 days from the date of this Judgment, the costs order nisi shall become absolute.