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DCCC 933/2024
[2026] HKDC 1296
香港特別行政區
區域法院
刑事案件2024年第933號
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| 出席人士： |
陳哿弘先生，為律政司高級檢控官，代表香港特別行政區 |
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被告人沒有律師代表 |
| 控罪： |
處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產（Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence） |
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訟費判決理由書
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1. 這是就被告人被判無罪後，本席就他自行申請訟費的判決理由。
2. 本案是有關一項俗稱「洗黑錢」罪的控罪。事件源自一宗電郵騙案，而控方極力依賴一份銀行家誓章（證物P1）以支持[1]：
(1) 被告人是代表一間名為「大登」的公司申請開立戶口的人；
(2) 表格上填上被告人為公司「董事」、「授權簽署人」及「實益擁有人（100%）」。
3. 本席在《裁決理由書》之中亦指出：
「10. 話雖如此，控方沒有提出證據指銀行職員如何監辨到來開戶（如非不須露面的情況）的人士身份，包括步驟及準則和防偽措施；證物P1之中沒有包含開戶人的身份證明文件的副本以及例如公司註冊文件以支持開戶人與開戶公司（戶口正式的持有者）的關連。因此，為此戶口進行開戶操作的銀行職員是如何填寫有關開戶文件或表格是不得而知。證物P1相關的內容只有一句，「6. 文件所載資料是由可合理地假定對提供該資料所涉及的事宜有親身認識的人直接或間接地提供。」這一句不清楚的地方更在于究竟「親身認識的人」是哪位開戶人仕還是接收有關信息的前線銀行職員？但無論如何，所提及「合理假定」的基礎是什麼，始終是沒有證據說明。
11. 相反，被告人在控方依賴的錄影會面中（2024年1月17日），指出以下各點：
(1) 他時任護膚品公司的營銷總監，年收入有稅後20多萬元（記項153-166）；
(2) 開戶文件上所示，「常铠林」是他的名字，但（戶口）與他毫無關係（記項179-180）；
(3) 他對開戶文件上兩處簽名（#18及#21）毫無印象（記項187）；
(4) 他不記得這個戶口，所以更「不要說借給別人了」（記項216）；
(5) 他同意不曾遺失任何身份證明文件（記項221-223）；
(6) 但他一再強調，他不知道這個戶口（的存在）（記項168-170, 199-204, 212及216-219）；
(7) 他亦表示對「大登」完全沒有印象（記項224-229）。
12. 由此可見，控方只能依賴內容中，被告人確認 (1) 他的名字，(2) 其內地身份證號碼及 (3) 沒有遺失身份證明文件，來支持推論出當天出現在香港的被告人便是開戶的那個人。依前文後理，被告人沒有承認他是開戶人，也沒有承認他與「大登」有任何關鍵，他亦沒有被問及申請表裡所看到看來是與他有關的地址是否真的與他有關。當警員向他展示銀行收到的其餘「大登」文件，被告人也表現得莫名奇妙（記項262及相關錄像）。
13. 基於以上，本案的焦點其實在於被告人是否正如證物P1所顯示在2019年3月5日到涉案銀行開戶的人。「紀錄/文件顯示」亦是控方再三強調及倚賴的客觀事實。若成立，控方的案便可依賴被告人是涉案戶口的唯一授權人而要求法庭推論出，被告人本人便是「處理」涉案款項人士。所以整體而言，本案的爭議之處不是一旦被告是戶口實質持有人，他有沒有合理理由相信沒有收入的「大登」怎會合法地收取大額美元，而是控方如何在一早知道辯方的說法是被告人完全與戶口無關的先機下，反證成功以確立被告人的身份和參與開戶。」
4. 本席的結論是：
「57. 經小心考慮後，本席接納被告人有可能不知道他的個人資料被人利用作開設本案戶口。換句話說，本席接納被告人在會面中的回應可能是真，他對戶口的存在及操作／運作有可能不知情。
58. 本席有機會再三觀看涉案的錄像，無可否認，被告人表現直率，沒有修飾說話的痕跡。他的解答沒有內在不可能性或矛盾之處。縱然本席一再強調，隨便否認知情是不會為本席接受，而且更有被濫用的重大危險。但細心聆聽及觀看會面時被告人的談吐及反應，實在有驚訝、不解、不知就裡的情況。說到底，本席不能安心地否定他的否認。
59. 單憑這一點，在疑點利益歸於被告人的原則下，本席必須判他罪名不成立。」
5. 至於具體分析，請參閱《裁決理由書》全文。
6. 就是次申請，被告人有多次機會作出陳詞，唯被告人由有法律代表轉為沒有法律代表，中間又經歷過不少階段性的發展，本席特意容許被告人把零碎的陳述整合為一份綜合或所謂「最後書面陳詞」以示公允，亦讓被告人有機會充份表達自己的立場和論點 [2]。
7. 簡單而言，被告人的論點如下：
(1) 他並沒有自招嫌疑，由於：
(a) 本席接納他可能對涉案戶口「全不知情」，以至他「根本與涉案戶口的開設及操作毫無關係」；
(b) 基於裁定他可能對戶口沒有認知，加上證物P1的缺憾，所以脫罪不是「任何枝節性的技術問題」；
(c) 被告在所有程序中「如實，全面地披露其所知悉的一切相關情況」，以及「並無任何隱瞞、誤導或拖延程序的行為」，因此不應接納控方的陳詞，以免「根本是以「確實理由」之名行「懲罰被告清白行使抗辯權」。
(2) 控方調查不足，後果不應由他承擔，理由是：
(a) 證物P1有固有問題；
(b) 被告有向警方「主動提供」公司秘書公司資料但警方沒有「認真調查」；
(c) 控方有條件「避免或縮短整場審訊程序」；及
(d) 被告人沒有「任何不當行為、濫用程序或製造不必要的法庭工作」，而若果仍然拒絕訟費申請，等同於把控方「未有善盡調查職責」的過錯，轉嫁於他，有違公義。
8. 被告人補充，處理本案竟耗費多達190萬港元作律師事務所及大律師費用，這是他無法承擔的。即使本案其實十分簡單，審訊時間短，涉案真正的議題亦並不複雜，但面對此案，他已承受了十分重的經濟壓力。
9. 就以上論點，本席先有以下觀察：
(1) 只要留心閱讀本案的《裁決理由》便知道，本席從沒有接納被告人與涉案戶口毫無關係。明顯地，被告人誤把控方不能證實，或本席接納可能是真的，當成事實。本席不認為被告人與涉案戶口全無關連，只是證據層面上不能定奪而已。
(2) 誠然，本席裁定被告人可能對戶口沒有認知，但這不等於他事實上對戶口沒有認知，包括對其出現、存在、操作及戶口中數目的進出毫不知情。被告人現階段只是借題發揮，把判詞內容偏袒自己的立場來加以利用。事實上，他所謂「枝節性的技術問題」所指的是甚麼，實在難以觸摸，但毫無疑問，控方的案確實有不足之處才會導致脫罪的結論。
(3) 至於被告人是否如他所言，「如實，全面地披露」，甚至涵蓋「一切相關情況」是沒有證據支持；一則，被告沒有作供，二則，被告人在現階段的陳述只反映他的立場，本席毫無基礎去決定他現在是否「如實」、「全面」，就「一切」事情一一交代。他有多次機會陳詞及提出論點，所以即使本席可以放下「作供與否」的俱別，也因申請人（被告人）選擇仍然不提出進一步資料，有是客觀的限制。至於是否可信，更是另一層次的問題。就有關他是否有所「隱瞞、誤導」，本席則在下文詳述見解。他有沒有拖延程序則與本申請的要項毫無關連。唯本席必須緊記，拒絕訟費申請的法律原則，尤其是理應由控方令法庭滿意才可的規定，是故絕不會出現被告人所謂「以甚麼行甚麼之事」之手法。
(4) 有見控方證據不足，被告人以證物P1的缺憾來支持其申請，看來合理，但說到警方沒有「認真調查」則是毫無根據。就此，控方亦以書面回覆，本席認為被告人無的放矢。補充一句，被告人聲稱有向警方提供「公司秘書公司」[3]的「資料」，但本案的重點在於開戶文件是否反映事實，被告人理應對自己與任何本地公司及本地銀行戶口的連繫瞭如指掌，試問把「公司」或「涉案公司」的「公司秘書」的「資料」交出，怎樣會與控方已經作出甚至調查之後仍然向被告人作出檢控產生甚麼問題。假若文件已經證實被告人與涉案公司及戶口毫無關係，那被告人不可能在現階段仍然把所謂提供資料的事件的內容細節輕描淡寫；當初控方亦沒有繼續檢控的基礎。相反，若文件只顯示其他人與公司有關而被告人的名字沒有出現，那是無關重要的。先不執著於「公司秘書」的「資料」是代表「秘書公司（company secretary）」還是「公司秘書」就涉案公司所取得的或制作的資料。本席不認為名義上公司與被告沒有關連便等於被告人不是開戶的人，尤其是以「洗黑錢」案中常見會出現的千萬種假借身份行事的變化。依本席之見，問題不是被告人是否與那間公司有關，而是他是不是代表／利用公司之名義去開戶之人，所以重點不在於公司而是開戶人士。成功開戶的人是否必定屬公司的某某，視乎銀行一方的要求；銀行一方如何處理，根本毫無證據說明。另一方面，一旦被告人是開戶之人，而銀行又未有查核他竟然不是「公司秘書」公司的文件上所顯示的任何人只進一步指出，被告人只是轉移視線，把沒有關連的事情推給控方考慮。
(5) 至於被告人沒有「濫用程序」或「製造不必要的法庭工作」，他的代表大律師的舉措則可圈可點：他們一方面在審訊時同意把證物P1呈堂，之後又在中段程序提出反對其可呈堂性，及後提供案例支持其立場，但該案例則打倒自己的立場，為控方建設立案的基礎，即把證物P1呈堂及加以依賴提供法理依據。若說產生了不必要的法庭工作或濫用程序，那是辯方自己的行為所致。被告人沒有理由提出投訴。
(6) 綜合而言，把被告人提控表面上是合情合理的做法，更遑論有所謂把控方的不善轉嫁給被告人。
10. 當然，以上並非被告人有效地依據相關法律原則而提出的論點，但被告人沒有法律代表，本席應體恤他行文、語句及聚焦上的不足，一切還得依他有權得到的法律保障，依法處理本申請。
刑事案件訟費的基本法律原則
11. 按照第492章《刑事案件訟費條例》第5條和第15(c)條，凡被告人在區域法院接受審訊後獲判無罪，法院有酌情權根據案件的整體情況來判斷是否公正合理，從而決定是否將訴訟費用判給被告人。[4]
12. 參照終審法院在 Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531一案，一般而言，除非有正面／確切理由（positive reasons），否則法院應行使酌情權，將訟費給予未被定罪的被告人[5]。何謂確切理由，可綜合成以下4個經常被引用的範疇：[6]
(1) 被告人「自招嫌疑」引致被檢控（簡稱「自招嫌疑」）[7]；
(2) 被告人的行為誤導控方，令控方相信控方的案比實情更強（簡稱「誤導控方」）[8]；
(3) 控方擁有確鑿證據但因「技術原因 (technicality)」而令罪名不能成立（簡稱「技術原因」）[9]；及
(4) 被告人選擇不在較早的時間提出無罪辯解（簡稱「選擇不及時提出無罪辯解」）[10]。
13. 換言之，法庭必須整體審視被告人的行為，包括被告人在調查期間及審訊時的行為，而且不能超越裁決的觀點[11]。
「自招嫌疑」與「誤導行為」
14. 針對「自招嫌疑」，在 R v Kwok Moon-yan & Others [1989] 2 HKLR 396一案中，上訴庭表示「自招嫌疑」與「誤導控方」有其獨立之處（見 第401B-C）：
“On the first: positive reasons for not making such an order would be (i) where the B appellant's own conduct has brought suspicion on himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that the case against him is stronger than it is. We do not view this as meaning that there must be both a bringing of suspicion and a misleading before a successful appellant will be deprived of his costs. If it is the view of the Court that a man has brought suspicion on himself, or having done that, he has also misled the prosecution, either by the very bringing of that suspicion, or some other matter, into thinking the case against him is stronger than it is then these, either separately or combined, are factors which lie for the consideration of the Court in the exercise of its discretion.” （後加強調）
15. 在 HKSAR v Pang Hung Fai (No 2) (2018) 18 HKCFAR 1 一案中，終審法院參考上述法律原則並表明，法庭可以依據「自招嫌疑」或「誤導控方」兩個確切理由，拒絕訟費申請：
“4. The general rule may, however, be departed from where there is a positive reason to do so, such as where the appellant’s own conduct has brought suspicion on himself or has misled the prosecution into thinking the case against him is stronger than it is.” （後加強調）
16. 上訴法庭副庭長麥機智法官在HKSAR v Rahman Md Sheikh Mojibur [2020] HKCA 53 一案中則有以下看法：
“26. …Be that as it may, the fact that such a defendant chooses to remain silent does not mean that he is entitled to recover his costs if, as a result of his silence (or, in this case, partial silence), he brings suspicion on himself and/or misleads the prosecution into thinking the case against him is stronger than it is. Whether or not the defendant brings suspicion on himself and/or results in the prosecution being misled does not logically depend on the defendant’s state of mind.”（後加強調）
17. 在香港特別行政區對李敏華 [2025] HKCFI 2075 一案中，原訟法庭就「自招嫌疑」和「誤導控方」兩個概念加以解說：
「[55] 由此可見，「誤導控方」可以是被告「自招嫌疑」的結果而與之同時出現，亦可以是獨立存在為拒絕脫罪訟費的基礎，但並非「自招嫌疑」的一部分或必然的延伸，如上述多個案例，有關原則清楚確立只要其一已可構成正面理由作為法庭行使酌情權時拒絕辯方訟費的理由。」 （後加強調）
18. 換言之，若被告人的行為已達到「自招嫌疑」，即使未有「誤導控方」，法庭可拒絕給予其訟費，反之亦如是。
19. 至於何謂「自招嫌疑」的行為，正如上述，法庭需要整體地考慮被告人的行為，而該行為必須與所被控的罪行有著緊密和直接的關連（close and direct nexus）[12]。
「技術原因」
20. 上訴法院早在Kwok Moon Yan一案第401F中確立「技術原因」這個確切理由[13]。
21. 終審法院在 Tsang Wai Ping v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 80 一案判詞第9至16段中，討論了「技術原因」一詞的演變，並確認若控方擁有確鑿證據但因「技術原因」導致罪名不成立，在不抵觸「無罪假定」（presumption of innocence）的情況下，法庭可不頒佈訟費命令給予被告人。
22. 就此，常任法官包致金法官（現為非常任法官）在 Tsang Wai Ping的判詞第16至17段中，以缺乏「同意檢控」為例，解釋何為「技術原因」：
“...Suppose a scenario like this. The bringing of a prosecution for the offence involved requires the prior consent of the Secretary for Justice. But there is an inadvertent omission to obtain such consent. The defendant is convicted at trial without anybody noticing the omission. Then the omission is noticed for the first time. There is no other good ground of appeal. But the appellate court acquits the defendant solely on the technical ground of that omission. It would not violate the presumption of innocence to deprive the acquitted defendant of costs for the reason that he was acquitted on that technicality alone and would otherwise have had his conviction affirmed.
A similar situation could arise at first instance. Suppose the trial is in the Magistrates’ Court or the District Court so that, there being no jury, the tribunal of law and the tribunal of fact are constituted by one and the same person. There would therefore be no problem, such as could occur in a jury trial, of the tribunal of law deciding on the question of costs without knowing what view the tribunal of fact took on the question of guilt or innocence. Suppose all the evidence and arguments on the merits have been received, and the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. And suppose that the court then realises, just before giving its verdict, that the requisite consent for the bringing of the prosecution has not been obtained. So an acquittal results. It would not violate the presumption of innocence to deprive the acquitted defendant of costs for the reason that he was acquitted on that technicality alone and would otherwise have been convicted.”
23. 在上述例子當中，控方均擁有充分的證據支持被告人的定罪，但因程序上的缺憾，最終以「技術原因」判被告無罪。
24. 在本案中，控方引援 HKSAR v Renucci [2008] 1 HKLRD 663一案支持針對「技術原因」的說法。控方指，該案有關一份根據第494章《航空保安條例》附表三所載之文件存在缺陷，但即使上訴人最終脫罪，以上缺陷被視為「技術理由」，故此訟費申請被拒。[14]
25. 在該案中，被告人涉嫌在法國航空的客機上襲擊一名空中服務員，在裁判法院經審訊後被裁定罪名成立，之後提出上訴。該案的關鍵在於，按照第494章《航空安全條例》第12C(1)(b)(ii)條規定，飛機的機長和營運者法國航空須同時保證（undertake）不會請求法國當局進行檢控程序以防止一罪兩審。但由於缺乏相關保證（undertaking），原訟法庭便因此而撤銷對被告人的定罪。由此可見「技術原因」不限於純粹審訊程序上的缺陷，法庭是可更靈活運用這個概念來拒絕訟費申請。
26. 本席留意到終審法院在 Qamar Sheraz v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 696一案指控方證據上的缺陷並不屬於「技術原因」：
“8. Following the acquittal, defence counsel asked the magistrate to award the appellant costs. This was opposed by the prosecution on the basis that the acquittal was due to the ‘technical incorrectness between PW2, 3 and 4’ and the evidence being ‘not as perfect as [the magistrate] might consider that is deemed a conviction’. This acquittal was not on a technicality.”
27. 綜合而言，若控方以「技術原因」為拒絕訟費的確切理由，看來也需要提出確鑿證據顯示被告人本應有罪。但若控方本身的證據存有缺失或缺陷，則即使也出現「技術原因」而致使被告人脫罪，結果也不容拒絕訟費申請。
「選擇不及時提出無罪辯解」
28. 有關被告人選擇不及時提出無罪辯解的確切理由，上訴庭最早亦在Kwok Moon Yan & Others一案中確立。簡單而言，若被告人在被調查時有一個合理及有效的無罪辯解，被告人是否盡早通知調查機構，讓他們考慮是否繼續提告，是可以列入考慮的因素。在該案判詞第401C-F指：
“The manner in which an appellant originally meets the charge will be a factor. We are aware that in R. v. Lee Tsat-pin Crim App No. 315 of 1985 (unreported) the Court took the D view that the non-advancing of an explanation to the investigating authority did not fall within the rubric of bringing suspicion or misleading . We entirely accept that the principle that no man should become his own betrayer must remain inviolate. But we do not think this to mean that, if an appellant had a good and valid explanation which he neglected to bring forward at an early and appropriate moment this should not be a factor in considering his contribution to the prosecution bringing the charge in the first place. It is unlikely that a case of that nature would ever reach the Court of Appeal but if it did then no costs of anything other than the proceedings in that Court should be allowed. It might be preferable, were these circumstances to arise, if a Court of Appeal were to fix a sum itself rather than referring it to the Registrar for him to ascertain it.”
29. 在Cheng Kam Kuen v HKSAR（未經輯錄，HCAL 92/2004，2005年5月17日），原訟庭法官張舉能法官（現為終審法院首席大法官）討論了被告人緘默權和「無罪辯解」這項確切理由的關係，並同意上訴庭在Kwok Moon Yan的法律原則並不抵觸被告人行使其緘默權：
“27. Both on first principles and authorities, I totally agree that the right of silence is a fundamental part of the common law and the criminal law (I include here the absence of any affirmative duty of disclosure of the defence prior to trial – indeed an accused may choose to keep silent even at trial and simply put the prosecution to proof of its case). The right must be jealously guarded. It cannot be taken away or watered down, whether in form or in content, and whether directly or indirectly. This has been recently reaffirmed by the Court of Final Appeal in Lee Fuk Hing v. HKSAR [2005] 1 HKLRD 349.
28. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances can the refusal or failure to disclose one’s defence or proffer an explanation at the investigation stage, done in the exercise of the right of silence, be taken into account by the court in considering costs following an acquittal. The Court of Appeal in Kwok Moon-yan, supra, has said so in terms. The Australian cases have both explained why and demonstrated in what circumstances this may be done. Quite apart from the fact that Kwok Moon-yan as a decision of the Court of Appeal is binding on this Court, I agree with the conclusion that has been reached in these authorities.”
30. 同時，張法官亦討論了多個澳洲法院針對「無罪辯解」的分析，當中的案例指，法庭可考慮，被告人沒有在審訊前把握機會自證其說，但僅僅在審訊中提出「無罪辯解」而脫罪的情況。綜合而得出的意見認為，若法庭認為被告人能夠在審訊前及早提出「無罪辯解」但選擇不披露這方面的資料，法庭便可因此而拒絕訟費申請[15]。
31. 同樣地，在上文摘錄自Rahman Md Sheikh Mojibur一案判詞第25段的內容顯示，被告人選擇緘默或部分緘默也可以構成合法地被考慮為拒絕訟費之理由。至於另一段落中，上訴庭副庭長麥機智指，被告人完全有權不回答問題或向調查機關披露他的辯護，但若被告人選擇行使這一項權利，選擇不透露關於其無罪辯解的任何線索，例如披露了商業交易及其支持無罪的文件證據等，法庭便有權拒絕被告人的訟費申請。[16]
32. 因此，若法庭認為被告人在調查期間已有能力提供一個「無罪辯解」或有關的資料，卻選擇拒絕或不及時提供該「無罪辯解」予調查人員或控方，法庭便可拒絕被告人的訟費申請。[17]
33. 綜合來說，本席認為Kwok Moon Yan所引述的Lee Tsat Pin的相關部分顯示，「選擇不及時提出無罪辯解」是無需構成「自招嫌疑」或「誤導控方」也獨立地足以支持拒絕訟費的確切理由。是故上文以4個範疇來分類。
34. 當然，當中有重疊或互相影響之處，本席會格外留神。況且，保持緘默是受查人士固有及極具重要性的權力，本席絕不會忽略其界線。
35. 經小心考慮後，本席拒絕申請人的申請。
36. 除以上的觀察[18]，本席希望先表明證物P1的缺陷並非「技術原因」。表面上看來這是關於一份誓章的不完善，所以引致控方未能證明一些要項。但本席認為不要把「一份文件」，「一項證物」甚至「缺漏」的標籤過份放大。誓章其實只代替證人出庭作供，他／她說及的內容則以書面形式交代而控辯雙方都沒有問題向他／她發問而已。與運用所謂第65B條引入證供的性質固然不同，可證明的程度（符合證案水平）也不盡相同，但實質上也只是把證據呈現的方式的一種，所以誓章內容的缺漏只代表證人缺乏就一些具關鍵性的內容作出解釋。這是證據質素的課題，不是程序上的問題，不屬於「技術原因」的一種。當然本席必須說明，這個進路不能函蓋所有處理誓章的情況。所以以上分析及決定，只因應本案的證供及議題而論，沒有泛用性的。
37. 至於裁決時的分析，根本不代表本席認為被告人無辜，只是以當時的議題及證案標準而論，理應把案件以無罪作結。
38. 被告人可能對戶口的出現等情況不知情是本席的裁決，但事實上只有他自己知道。另一方面，他選擇在調查階段作出回應，但其內容極之簡單。即使本席不認為被告人的行為或回應有明顯「自招嫌疑」或「誤導控方」，本席認為他有刻意隱瞞大量與他是否與涉案戶口「無關」的資料，這即使不及「自招嫌疑」也必定構成「選擇不及時提出無罪辯解」的一種。根據以下分析，本席甚至認為他有「自招嫌疑」及「誤導控方」。
39. 本席重申，只有被告人知道他在開戶日為何到訪香港、為何他與這個涉案戶口毫無關係（假設他真的與戶口事實上毫無關係）。因此，他大可以向警方及時提出以下任何一項情況，以助釐清他沒有嫌疑。有助了解他有「無罪辯解」之處包括：
(1) 他從沒有在香港開過戶口；
(2) 他從來沒有在港開設公司；
(3) 他從來沒有參與任何公司的運作；
(4) 他以往來港的目的；
(5) 他當天來港的目的；
(6) 他所提供的文件如何幫助到他釐清自己與公司的關係（或沒有關係）或文件所示之人物與他之關係（或沒有關係）；
(7) 他在內地生活及工作的情況；
(8) 他的內地地址和聯絡方法是否與銀行文件所示不同；若同，有甚麼理由曾被人利用；
(9) 資金流的去向如何和他無關；
(10) 他有沒有其他證人提供（在聆訊時，辯方大律師一度透露被告人當時有3名事實證人但最終均沒有傳召）；及
(11) 他在港及內地的財力。
40. 以上是被告人一定能夠回答而又與釐清他的位置有關的事項。相比他在會面時只輕輕帶過調查所針對的課題，實在是個人選擇，不能怪責控方或調查人員。
41. 相反，被告人在警誡下的陳述極為簡單，與他可以及有足夠掌握的實況偏差很遠。
42. 再者，被告人只選擇簡單地回應，本席亦認為在本案中有「自招嫌疑」成份。客觀來說，被告人當時的反應也可以單單是「空洞的否認（bare denial）」。基於整體考量，控方面對被告人所選擇的態度，確實有理由認為被告人有刻意隱瞞，具「自招嫌疑」及／或「誤導控方」的成份。
43. 經小心考慮後，本席拒絕接納被告人的申請。
[1] 裁決理由書第3段
[2] 詳見法庭於2026年4月21日發出的信函及控辯雙方作出了的書面陳詞及回應
[3] 申請人的用字。
[4] 見 HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (No 2) (2022) 25 HKCFAR 181，第6段：“The courts are given a broad discretion regarding such costs. Thus, s.15(c) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance provides that in any criminal proceedings “an order as to costs shall be such as a court or a judge considers just and reasonable”.
[5] 見Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531，第535D-F：“What then are the governing principles? When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costs incurred in defending those charges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising the discretion must obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced”。
[6] 不同法院在引用 Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (Supra) 一案時的詮釋各有不同，但無論如何終審法院在該案中提出的確切理由時至今日仍然有效：見 HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (No 2) (Supra)。同時，控辯雙方亦有引援 Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (Supra) 一案，並在各方陳辭中同意上述「自招嫌疑」及「誤導控方」的確切理由。
[7] 見Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (Supra)，第534G：“Where the defendant’s own conduct has brought suspicion on himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking the prosecution into thinking that the case against him is stronger than it really is. In such circumstances the defendant can be left to pay his own costs”。亦見 HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (No 2) (2022) 25 HKCFAR 181，第6段。
[8] 同上。
[9] 見Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (Supra)，第534H：“Where there is ample evidence to support a verdict of guilty but the defendant is entitled to an acquittal on account of some procedural irregularity. Here again, the defendant can properly be left to pay his own costs”。亦見 Tsang Wai Ping v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 80，第9至17段。
[10] 見 Tong Cun Lin (Supra), 第535F-G, “Generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant’s conduct during investigation and at trial: how he first responded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations and the consistency of those answers with his subsequent defence”.
[11] 見 Tsang Wai Ping v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 80，第27段：“The discretion is to be exercised having regard to the defendant’s conduct “during the investigation and at the trial” but the judge must not take a view of the facts “palpably different from that taken by the jury”。亦見Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (Supra)，第535D-H。亦見 Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 730，第16段。
[12] 見 HKSAR v Li Siu Tong & Others（未經輯錄，HCMA 547/2000，2000年10月20日），第9、10和13段；及香港特別行政區訴范順及另外3人 [2010] 4 HKLRD 347，第18段。
亦見 Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2) (Supra)，第16段：
“16. It may often be the case that a defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial is such that it brings suspicion on himself, providing a ground for refusing him costs. Such conduct has been described as “most relevant” to the discretionary exercise. However, it is incorrect to suggest (and the authorities give no warrant for suggesting) that a defendant can only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise. The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, provided always that the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence, and in particular, provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.”
見 HKSAR v Li Siu Tong & Others（未經輯錄，HCMA 547/2000，2000年10月20日），第9、10和13段；及香港特別行政區訴范順及另外3人 [2010] 4 HKLRD 347，第18段。
[13] 其原文指：“(ii) No order of costs should be made where there is ample evidence to support a conviction but it is quashed by this Court on a technicality which has no merit and that covers both costs in the Court of Appeal and elsewhere.”
[14] 見 控方陳詞第9段。
[15] Cheng Kam Kuen第19至21段引援 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 一案：
“19. ...I agree with Toohey J that, if a defendant has been given an opportunity of explaining his or her version of events before a charge is laid and declines to take up that opportunity, it may be just and reasonable to refuse costs. Likewise, if a defendant conducts his or her defence in such a way as to prolong the proceedings unreasonably, it would be just and reasonable to make an award for a proportion of the defendant’s costs…
20. …To return to the examples given earlier in this judgment, if a defendant has been given the opportunity of explaining his or her version of events before a charge is laid and refuses the opportunity, and it later appears that an explanation could have avoided a prosecution, it may well be just and reasonable to refuse costs: see, by way of illustration, Reg. v. Dainer; Ex parte Milevich. This has nothing to do with the right to silence in criminal matters. A defendant or prospective defendant is entitled to refuse an explanation to the police. But if an explanation is refused, the successful defendant can hardly complain if the court refuses an award of costs, when an explanation might have avoided the prosecution.
21. …Thus, non-disclosure to investigatory police of a tape recording later successfully used in cross-examination of the informant’s witnesses may be a relevant matter to be taken into account in determining whether the defendant should be awarded costs: cf. Reg. v. Dainer; Ex parte Milevich.”
[16] 在該案判詞的第25段：“Again, we must emphasise that a defendant is perfectly entitled not to answer questions or disclose his defence to the investigating authorities. That is his right. But if he chooses to exercise it, it does not mean that he cannot be deprived of costs if he had a perfectly good defence but chose not to give the slightest hint as to its existence, as happened in the present case. After all, it is possible that had the respondent disclosed his business dealings and the documentary evidence in support of them, the prosecution might have considered that they did not have enough evidence to proceed; in which case, the costs which were occasioned to the public and his own purse would have been saved. As it was, the judge accepted that “without telling the police that the defendant was engaged in second hand mobile phone trading (it) would be impossible for the police to know of this fact”.
[17] 見Cheng Kam Kuen v HKSAR (Supra) 第36至37段：
“36. As a matter of principle, if there really was no causal connection between the refusal or failure to explain or non-disclosure (in the exercise of the right of silence) and the prosecution and/or the attendant costs in a particular case, then as presently advised, I see no justification whatsoever for taking the refusal or failure to explain or non-disclosure into account.
37. This is so, however, not so much because one is concerned with a refusal or failure to explain or non-disclosure in the exercise of the right of silence, but rather that that fact has no factual relevance to the matter under consideration and should not be taken into account; in other words, it is a factually irrelevant consideration to the exercise of discretion in question.”
[18] 上文第9段。
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