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FATIMAH NUR MILLAWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
FATIMAH NUR MILLAWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6139 · HCAL 2360/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2360/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6139
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2360 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Fatimah Nur Millawati |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial | |
| |Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 | |
| |r. 3) | |
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observation for the Applicant:
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review”
in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 28 December 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave
Application”). The intended judicial review was against the
decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement
Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 14 December 2023 (“Board’s
Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of
the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 25 August 2023
rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all
applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision is set out in the
following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL002360_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to
Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her husband and his
loan shark for an unpaid loan which the applicant acted as a
guarantor. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in
the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 15 February
2026, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and
Deportation) Section (3) of the Immigration Department faxed a
letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant would
like to withdraw her judicial review application. Enclosed with the
said letter was the applicant’s signed memo dated 13 October 2026
written in English to the case officer of the Castle Peak Bay
Immigration Center in which the applicant was detained. In the
memo, the applicant stated that she would like to withdraw the
Leave Application as it was safe for her to go home. In the
circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on
paper.
Discussion
4. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s
materials adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the
grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further
to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be
verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 provided no such
grounds. In the supporting affirmation, the applicant made
identical averments which this court had seen in many other leave
applications, alleging the Board’s refusal to accept untranslated
documents and the conduct of the interpreter.
6. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is
exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a
judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding
involved an error of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found the
applicant’s evidence regarding the Loan, including her claims of
domestic violence inflicted by the husband, was not reliable. The
Board did not accept that the husband had taken the Loan at all as
well as the truthfulness of her past experience of domestic
violence from her husband. The Board therefore concluded that the
applicant would not face any risk of harm if refouled. These are
findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not
interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.
7. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied
that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the
grounds and observed a very high standard of fairness. The grounds
the applicant set out in her supporting affirmation were general
and vague, and cannot be accepted as valid grounds in support of
the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of
law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s
Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of
success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Withdrawal application
8. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application
referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In
the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave
Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave
Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo
Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
9. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Dated the 10th day of November 2026.
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 10/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Fatimah Nur Millawati|Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |10/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 22112 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |723/23 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5000700/23) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 3㌸⠠䢓䉋剏⦔83 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk
(this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This
refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement
principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong
Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3
March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a
detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v
Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst
v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.