SRI YULIASIH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5870 · HCAL 1913/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1913/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5870
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1913 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Sri Yuliasih |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 22 September 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1913_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s application for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the
applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 December 2022 and confirmed the
same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board and “non-refulement Claims
Petition office” as both the putative respondents and the putative
interested parties.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative party at all.
6. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by YUSUP, the
creditor of the applicant’s late mother. The applicant claimed that
her late mother borrowed 40 million Indonesian rupiah from YUSUP but
was unable to repay the debt. Three months after the applicant’s
father’s death in 2021, YUSUP threatened the applicant’s mother that
if she could not repay the debt, the applicant would have to marry
him, and if the applicant refused, the applicant would be killed upon
her return to Indonesia.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 15 October 2026.
10. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
11. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
12. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
13. The applicant did not identify any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86. She merely stated in her supporting affirmation
dated 24 October 2023 that she could not go back to Indonesia because
her life was in danger as her loan sharks would kill her, and she
could not pay the debt as she did not have money to pay the debt.
Discussion
14. First of all, the applicant’s danger in her home country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review unless there were errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
15. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
16. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
17. In assessing the appeal by the applicant, the Board arranged an oral
hearing on 25 July 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board
in person.
18. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board accepted the basic
facts of the applicant’s case, namely that her mother obtained a loan
from a moneylender, she was not able to repay the loan, and the
moneylender made verbal threats to kill the applicant. Moreover, the
Board accepted that the applicant had no news of the moneylender after
her mother’s death in October 2022.
19. However, the Board found that despite her mother’s failure to repay
the moneylender before she died, the moneylender had never harmed her
mother or anyone in the family. The applicant had never had any
direct contact with the moneylender. The applicant in fact agreed at
the Board’s hearing that the moneylender should only want the money
back, and the moneylender might not have a real intention to harm or
kill her.
20. In its assessment of the applicant’s claim against all the applicable
grounds under the USM, the Board found that the applicant’s dispute
with her mother’s creditor was only a private and financial dispute
that had nothing to do with the state or any of the Convention
reasons. The Board did not accept that the ill-treatment the
applicant suffered had attained a minimum level of severity that
required international protection.
21. The applicant’s evidence was that she had never seen the moneylender
and had no background information in relation to him. In fact, the
moneylender had never contacted her or seen her before, and had never
threatened her directly. The applicant suffered no injury, both
mental and physical, at all. There was also no evidence to show state
acquiescence in the moneylender’s threat towards the applicant.
22. Moreover, the Board found from reliable country of origin information
(“COI”) that despite shortfalls, the Indonesian government had already
tried their best to combat corruption and improve police
professionalism. The Board found that reasonable state protection was
available to the applicant.
23. Despite its findings as summarised above, the Board further stated in
paragraphs 109 to 110 that it had considered viability of internal
relocation for the applicant, and was of the view that given the
applicant’s profile, she could reasonably live in bigger cities like
Jakarta and Surabaya.
24. Thus, the Board found that the applicant faced no genuine risk of any
of the proscribed forms of harm under the USM if she were refouled to
Indonesia.
25. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
26. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
27. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
28. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |21/10/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |21/10/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |The putative |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |respondent’s ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21326 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |The putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 1120/22 (formerly|
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000959/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1