CHAN YERK WANG v. TONY KAN & CO. (A FIRM)

HCMP 873/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 873 OF 2006

___________________________

BETWEEN

___________________________

----------------------------------

JUDGMENT

----------------------------------

1.  The Amended Summons by the Plaintiff is for a review of taxation done by Master Levy. There is a preliminary question as to whether or not the Plaintiff was out of time in seeking a review before a judge. The other issue is whether the Plaintiff should be permitted to raise in a review objections to matters that were never raised at the taxation.

BACKGROUND

2.  The Defendant was a firm of solicitors who acted for the Plaintiff in matrimonial proceedings.  A dispute arose between them on the fees.  The Plaintiff, through her then solicitors (JYJL) took out an originating summons to tax the Defendant’s bills.  The list of objections to the Defendant’s bill was professionally prepared by JYJL and a very experienced law costs draftsman.

3.  At the taxation call-over in October 2007, the Court ordered, by consent, the trial of 3 preliminary issues regarding the terms of the retainer (“the Preliminary Issues”). 

4.  The trial of Preliminary Issues took place in April 2008.  By then, the Plaintiff acted in person.  During the proceedings, the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the Plaintiff withdrew her allegation on terms of the retainer and agreed that the Defendant’s bill be taxed.

5.  In June 2008, the bills were taxed according to the list of objections.  The Plaintiff then filed an application for review (“the 1^st Review”).

6.  The Plaintiff’s current firm of solicitors came on record in November 2008.  An affirmation was filed on her behalf which raised objections to the taxation.  They can be classified into: those now before me relating to the breach of professional rules by the Defendant (“the New Grounds”); Category (A) those items taxed by the Master; Category (B) those in relation to specific items not objected at the taxation;  Category (C) those in relation to items conceded by the Plaintiff at the taxation.  (See order of Master Levy dated 16 September 2008.)

7.  Master Levy refused to let the Plaintiff review any items not objected to at the taxation, hence this Review before me (“the 2^nd Review”).

WHETHER THE PLAINITIFF WAS OUT OF TIME IN MAKING A REQUEST FOR REASONS ON REVIEW

8.  The Defendant has not objected to the Plaintiff’s application for extension of time.  However, having regard to the history of this review, it is better to re-state the procedure on review before a judge.

9.  Order 62, rules 33, 34 and 35 provide as follows:

“33.(1) Any party to any taxation proceedings who is dissatisfied with the allowance or disallowance in whole or in part of any item by a taxing master, or with the amount allowed by a taxing master in respect of any item-

(a) may apply to the taxing master to review his decision in respect of that item; and

(b) may not apply to a judge for an order to review the decision until after its review by the taxing master.

(2) An application under this rule for review of a taxing master's decision may be made at any time within 14 days after the conclusion of the taxation in which that decision was made or such shorter period as may be fixed by the taxing master:
Provided that no application under this rule for review of a decision in respect of any item may be made after the signing of the taxing master's final certificate dealing with that item.

(3A) If an applicant fails to comply with paragraph (3), the taxing master may dismiss the application.

(3) Every applicant for review under this rule must at the time of making his application deliver to the taxing master objections in writing specifying by a list the items or parts of items the allowance or disallowance of which or the amount allowed in respect of which, is objected to and stating concisely the nature and grounds of the objection in each case, and must deliver a copy of the objections to each other party (if any) who attended on the taxation of those items or to whom the taxing master directs that a copy of the objections shall be delivered.

 

…

34. (1) A review under rule 33 shall be carried out by the taxing master to whom the taxation was originally assigned.

(2) On reviewing any decision in respect of any item, a taxing master may receive further evidence and may exercise all the powers which he might exercise on an original taxation in respect of that item, including the power to award costs of and incidental to the proceedings before him; and any costs awarded by him to any party may be taxed by him and may be added to or deducted from any other sum payable to or by that party in respect of costs.

...

(4) A taxing master who has reviewed a decision in respect of any item shall issue his certificate accordingly and, if requested to do so by any party to the proceedings before him, shall state in his certificate or otherwise in writing by reference to the objections to that decision the reasons for his decision on the review, and any special facts or circumstances relevant to it. A request under this paragraph must be made within 14 days after the review or such shorter period as may be fixed by the taxing master.

35. (1) Any party who is dissatisfied with the decision of a taxing master to allow or to disallow any item in whole or in part on review under rule 34, or with the amount allowed in respect of any item by a taxing master on any such review, may apply to a judge for an order to review the taxation as to that item or part of an item if, but only if, one of the parties to the proceedings before the taxing master requested that officer in accordance with rule 34(4) to state the reasons for his decision in respect of that item or part on the review.

(2) An application under this rule for review of a taxing master's decision in respect of any item may be made at any time within 14 days after the taxing master's certificate in respect of that item is signed, or such longer time as the taxing master at the time when he signs the certificate, or the Court at any time, may allow.

(3) An application under this rule shall be made by summons and shall, except where the judge thinks fit to adjourn into court, be heard in chambers.

(4) Unless the judge otherwise directs, no further evidence shall be received on the hearing of an application under this rule, and no ground of objection shall be raised which was not raised on the review by the taxing master but, save as aforesaid, on the hearing of any such application the judge may exercise all such powers and discretion as are vested in the taxing master in relation to the subject-matter of the application.

(5) If the judge thinks fit to exercise in relation to an application under this rule the power of the Court to appoint assessors under section 53 of the Ordinance, the judge shall appoint not less than 2 assessors, of whom one shall be a taxing master.

(6) On an application under this rule the judge may make such order as the circumstances require, and in particular may order the taxing master's certificate to be amended or, except where the dispute as to the item under review is as to amount only, order the item to be remitted to the same or another taxing master for taxation.

(7) In this rule "Judge" (法官) means a judge in person.” (all emphasis added)

10.  It is noteworthy that the Master’s certificate (usually called allocatur) and the reasons for his decision on the review (“the Reasons”) are 2 different things.  Issue of the former is mandatory.  Issue of the latter is on request of any party to the 1^st review (whether the applicant or respondent).  The request must be made within 14 days after the 1^st review or such shorter period as may be fixed by the taxing master: rule 34(4).

11.  Time for issue of the allocatur is governed, not by Rules but by Practice Direction 14.3, para 38(1) – (3).

12.  To apply for review before a judge, one of the parties (not necessarily the applicant) must have requested for the Reasons: rule 35(1).  The application must be taken out within 14 days after the signing of the allocatur (not the date of the Reasons): rule 35(2).

13.  In the present case, the 1^st Review took place before Master Levy on 21 August 2009.  Other matters including costs of the review were completely dealt with by 13 May 2010.  The time for requesting for the Reasons therefore expired on 27 May 2010.   It was not until 21 January 2011, that the Plaintiff’s solicitors requested the learned Master to state her reasons.  By a further letter dated 24 January 2011, the Plaintiff’s solicitors confirmed, at the Master’s request, that it was the decision made on 21 August 2009 that formed the subject matter of the 2^nd Review.

14.  I am satisfied that the failure to request for the Reasons within time was owing to a wrong interpretation of rules 34 and 35.  The Plaintiff’s wish to pursue the 2^nd Review was clear from the start, as it was unusual for her as a paying party to apply for an allocatur.  It is in my view appropriate to grant an extension of time for the Plaintiff to request for the Reasons.

WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ARGUE THE NEW GROUNDS BEFORE THE TAXING MASTER

The New Grounds in Summary

15.  The New Grounds are that the Defendant had failed to provide the Plaintiff with a fair and proper estimate of the likely legal costs or keep her informed of the costs as the matrimonial proceedings proceeded. Such a failure constituted a breach of the Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct (“the Guide”).  Had this breach been properly taken into account, the taxing master should have concluded that the reasonable costs of the Defendant should be substantially less than the taxed costs.   Further, by issuing only the 1^st interim bill and requesting costs on account on 10 occasions at unrealistically low amounts, the Defendant had misled the Plaintiff as to the true legal costs, thereby procuring the retainer or its continuation by improper means, in breach of the Guide.

16.  The factual background for raising the New Grounds were in the Plaintiff’s supporting affirmation for the originating summons.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant had estimated the fees to be no more than $300,000.  Despite the Plaintiff’s request that the Defendant do act through only one solicitor CCW, counsel had been engaged at various stages. Through obtaining costs on account on several occasions, the Plaintiff ended up paying $1,912,000.  She allegedly told CCW that that would be her last payment and she had no more money to pay her lawyers.  The matrimonial proceedings were settled after 8 days’ hearing on terms that each party do bear his/her own costs.  Allegedly, CCW confirmed with the Plaintiff that the costs on account was sufficient to cover all costs incurred and there was money left.  However, the Plaintiff was faced with a bill of about $3,500,000 (10 times over the original estimate).  The Plaintiff claimed that the estimation of costs shown to the Family Court had never been explained to her though she was informed by her solicitor during the matrimonial proceedings that he had overstated the costs to intimidate the respondent solicitors’ firm. 

17.  After taxation, the costs were allowed at about $3,000,000.  Even after review, she had to bear $2,700,000.

18.  Her supporting affirmation, however, did not specifically mention professional misconduct or refer to any professional rule that had been breached.  The Plaintiff did point out that there was gross difference between the costs stated in the interim bill, interim payment and the estimation of costs given to the Family Court.  She also attacked the quantum of costs on various items of work.

19.  More details were given in her affirmation filed in support of the 1^st Review.  A comparison of the interim bills, costs estimates to the Family Court and the bills of costs in question shows that the actual profit costs at different stages greatly exceeded the accumulated billed amount.  There was nothing to show that the Plaintiff was forewarned of her likely costs liability of over $3,000,000. 

20.  The Defendant’s case was that costs were charged on time basis.  It was impossible to give an estimate of costs as it would depend on the time spent, the complexity of the case and the stance taken by the Plaintiff’s former husband.  Legal costs could range from a few thousand dollars to several millions and assistance from counsel might be needed.  The Defendant promised to do pre-trial work and receive payment on completion of the case; but hearings would be attended by counsel and there must be costs on account for their fees.

21.  The Defendant also avers that by entering into an agreement to pay the taxed costs by instalments, the Plaintiff is barred from pursuing the 2^nd Review.

The Master’s Decision

22.  At the 1^st Review hearing, the Plaintiff was represented by her present counsel Ms Chan.   In persuading the learned Master to allow her to argue new grounds that have not been advanced at the taxation, Ms Chan relied on the decision of Saw J in A Solicitor v. Law Society of Hong Kong [2007] 4 HKC 165.

23.  In A Solicitor’s case, the paying party’s solicitors had failed to file any list of objections and were absent at the hearing.  The taxing master taxed the bill as drawn.  He also dismissed the paying party’s application to review under Order 62, rule 33. He took the view that the rule “would only apply when there was (sic) objections raised to the receiving party’s bill and both parties have argued at the taxation as to the allowance and disallowance of items involved in the bill.  And the taxing master had made express ruling as to such objections.”  (at page 171 E-F)

24.  Saw J ruled that the taxing master’s construction of rule 33 was too narrow.  He held that “powers to review given to judges, magistrates or masters are designed in part to provide a simple means to remedy or revisit decisions without recourse to the full appellate process.”  The learned judge allowed the paying party’s appeal, set aside the allocatur and allowed him to file a list of objections by enlarging the time under Order 62, rule 16.

25.  Rule 33(1) clearly refers to a party’s dissatisfaction with the “allowance or disallowance” of any “taxed” item. The necessary implication is that those items must have been the subject of dispute at the taxation hearing. 

26.  The learned Master, in my view, correctly distinguished A Solicitor’s case.  There, Saw J was dealing with a paying party who had never filed a list of objections and was absent from the hearing.  In the present case, the Plaintiff had filed a 24 page long list of objections which was prepared by a very experienced law costs draftsman.  There were detailed objections (110 items).  The Defendant’s bill was taxed according to that list of objections.  The Plaintiff was acting in person and present at the taxation hearing throughout.  She was in a position to supplement and clarify the objections.  This was not a case where the Plaintiff had failed to raise any objections through either inadvertence or absence.  The learned Master held that rule 33 was not engaged and dismissed the 1^st Review.

27.  Ms Chan had referred to rule 16(1) which gives a taxing master power to extend time to do anything in or in connection with proceedings before that master.  However, the Reasons for Review did not refer to rule 16 and the reasons the Master’s failure to exercise her discretion thereunder. 

28.  Before me, there was a dispute between counsel as to whether or not Master Levy’s decision only refused to review Category B or the New Grounds as well.  In my view, the Master’s decision clearly did not permit the New Grounds to be raised.

A Judge’s Power under Rule 35

29.  On a taxation review, a judge exercises the discretion afresh as though the matter comes before him for the first time, without being fettered by the manner in which the taxing master dealt with the matter.  In Tung Ka Hung v. Wan King Chun Daniel & others, HCCW 726/ 2002, (unreported, 29.7.2004, Tang J (as he then was)

“…… I believe it is now settled that the approach to this kind of appeal should be no different from other interlocutory appeals. In other words, the principles which govern this appeal are those stated by Lord Atkin in Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473. In the words of Lord Atkin at page 478 :

“… His own discretion (referring to the judge’s discretion) is intended by the rules to determine the parties’ right, and he is entitled to exercise it as though the matter came before him for the first time. He will, of course, give the weight it deserves to the previous decision of the master, but he is in no way bound by it. …” 

On an appeal against the quantum of fees allowed by a taxing master, the master’s views, in my opinion, deserves more than the usual weight. After all, they deal with taxation on a regular basis.”

30.  The primary provision under rule 35 is that no new evidence should be adduced and no ground of objection should be raised before a judge on review unless the judge allows it: In the matter of Greater Beijing Region Expressways Limited, HCCW 399/ 1999, 12.5.2004, Barma J.

Reasons for the 2^nd Review

31.  The reasons Ms Chan gives were that the bill was unusually complex and the Plaintiff did not have the chance to go through each and every item of the objections with JYJL.  Upon investigation, JYJL omitted to list certain obvious items in the list of objections.  The Plaintiff took over the taxation herself but the complexity of the documents was beyond her comprehension and competence.

32.  With respect, that the bill was unusually complex and beyond the Plaintiff’s competence was already anticipated by Master Levy who tried hard to impress upon her to seek legal assistance.  

33.  The Plaintiff had little education and could not speak English.   At the hearing of the Preliminary Issues, the learned Master explained the rights to the Plaintiff very carefully.  She pointed out that the taxation was not easy and not something the Plaintiff could handle.  The Plaintiff confirmed that her English affirmations had been explained to her. The learned Master carefully explained to her the right to establish by evidence the existence of the terms of the retainer and the right to tax the hourly rate despite any agreement.  When the Plaintiff appeared to be confused the learned Master asked if she needed time to consider.  She explained that the hearing on 1.4.2008 was limited to determination of the preliminary issues and would not dispose of the whole taxation. She explained that if the Plaintiff ceased pursuit of the Preliminary Issues, she would not be allowed to revive them at the formal taxation hearing.  The learned Master explained that the Court would not give legal advice to her.  When the parties agreed on how to dispose of that hearing, the matter was stood down for a draft order to be prepared. The learned Master did not force the Plaintiff to accept the terms of the draft order but allowed her to continue should she want to change her mind.  The learned Master noticed her tendency to change her mind.  She asked the Plaintiff to remember that the taxation would be based on her list of objections.  The Plaintiff reiterated that she would not instruct a lawyer and she did not trust one.

34.  The learned Master’s conduct of the hearing was perfectly proper and can hardly be attacked as being unfair to the Plaintiff.  Indeed there is no such complaint.  The learned Master’s concerns turned out to be correct. The Plaintiff admitted in her affirmation filed in support of the 1^st Review that:

“After the preliminary issues hearing on 1 April 2008 and the taxation hearing on the 16^th and 17^th June 2008, I realized that taxation was a matter far more complicated than I could handle. I could not even relate to my present legal representatives what exactly happened in these 2 hearings.”

35.  Therefore, if the Plaintiff had sought to raise the Category B grounds, I would not have allowed her to do so in the circumstances of this case.  She had been given ample opportunity to consider her state of representation.  Her status as a litigant in person carries no weight.  It was thus wise for her not to pursue those grounds in the 2^nd Review.

Different Considerations for the New Grounds

36.  The New Grounds are of a different kind.  They concern alleged professional misconduct on the part of the Defendant.  The raw facts in support of have been stated in the Plaintiff’s very first affirmation in support of the originating summons.  The Defendant had been given the opportunity to respond although it only filed an affirmation for the purpose of the hearing of the preliminary issues and a limited affirmation on review.  The Plaintiff’s allegations were not bare assertions or fanciful arguments but were particularized.  The Plaintiff had shown her concern as to legal costs at various stages of the matrimonial proceedings.      

37.  A solicitor should keep the client informed of the likely costs.  A client may set a ceiling on the costs to be incurred. According to the Guide,

“4.01 Inform client about costs

Commentary

3. Wherever possible, a solicitor should when requested by a client give an estimate of the likely cost of acting in a particular matter. If, because of the nature of the work, a solicitor cannot give even an approximate estimate of his fees and disbursements, he should inform his client accordingly and in that case should give such a general forecast as he can, with the indication of the method by which his fees will be calculated, taking care that his client is kept informed about the costs as the matter proceeds.

4. When giving estimates, a solicitor should take care to ensure that he is not binding himself to an agreed fee unless such is his intention. Clear and appropriate words should be used to indicate the nature of the estimate. To give an estimate which has been pitched at an unrealistically low level solely to attract the work and subsequently to charge a higher fee is improper because it misleads the client as to the true or likely costs. Regard should also be had to principle 4.03 and its commentary. (emphasis added)

…

4.04 Oral estimates

Commentary

A solicitor should inform his client from the moment it appears that his estimate will be or is likely to be exceeded. He should not wait until he submits his bill of costs.

4.05 Limit on costs may be set

Commentary

1. A solicitor must not exceed any limit without the authority of his client. Further, a solicitor must, as soon as possible, inform his client where the limit imposed on the expenditure is insufficient and obtain the client’s instructions as to whether he wishes the solicitor to continue with the matter.

2. Where a solicitor continues to act after the costs have exceeded the limit which his client has fixed and then presents a bill for a sum which substantially exceeds that limit he may be guilty of professional misconduct. The excess may also be disallowed on taxation in which case the solicitor may be liable for the costs of the taxation.

…

4.12 Overcharging

A solicitor must not overcharge.

Commentary

4. If a solicitor requires a client to pay a sum on account of costs to be incurred, that sum must be a reasonable amount in all the circumstances.”

38.  Where estimates of costs have been given, the Court can have regard to them in assessing the reasonableness of the solicitors’ costs.

“In a case, where an estimate had been provided, but the costs subsequently claimed exceeded the estimate, it would not follow in every case that the solicitor would be restricted to recovering the sum specified in the estimate. The court could have regard to the estimate, which was a factor in assessing reasonableness, and the greater the difference between the estimate and the final bill, the more it called for an explanation. Similarly, any reliance placed upon the estimate by the client was a factor which could be taken into consideration when determining what was reasonable for the client to pay.

...

To give an estimate which has been pitched at an unrealistically low level solely to attract the work and subsequently to charge a higher fee is improper because it misleads the client as to the true or likely costs.”

Wilkinson and Sandor on The Professional Conduct of Lawyers in Hong Kong, Chapter VII.

39.  There was some basis to assert that the Defendant had pitched the fees at unrealistically low level for the purpose of keeping alive the retainer.  The allegations of the Plaintiff, if established, do show a case of professional misconduct.  It will be an affront to justice if the Court were to ignore it because the Plaintiff acting in person technically failed to argue it.  If the Plaintiff can successfully establish her case, the Court may have regard to the costs estimates she was given and allow the solicitor to recover only the amount of the estimates plus a margin of a certain percentage.  Mastercigars Direct Ltd v Withers LLP [2008] 3 All ER 417, Garbutt v Edwards [2006] 1 All ER 553.  This can have substantial impact on the quantum of taxed costs.

40.  I am aware that the Plaintiff had complained to the Law Society about the professional misconduct of the Defendant (e.g. giving her only one interim bill, exceeding the costs estimate of $300,000 and failure to refund costs on account to her).  The Law Society found the complaint unsubstantiated.  The Law Society’s finding is not binding on the Court, especially since there were no reasons given and not all the allegations against the Defendant contained in the New Grounds have been included in that complaint.

41.  The New Grounds were not amongst the Preliminary Issues.  They did not appear in the list of objections but the affirmations.  They were not objections to specific item(s) allowed or disallowed.  They applied to the whole amount allowed on taxation. 

42.  Anyone familiar with taxation will know that after the taxation hearing, the exact amount which a paying party has to bear is yet to be computed.  In an appropriate case, an experienced solicitor or law costs draftsman will ask the taxing master for an order nisi that the costs be taxed and allowed as he/she has ruled.  After calculation of the quantum of costs, the parties may then come back to argue consequential issues (like sanctioned offers).

43.  In the present case, the Plaintiff, being a litigant in person would hardly have known immediately at the taxation whether or not the taxed amount would be above or below the $1,912,000 which she had paid to enable her to decide whether or not, or how, to pursue the New Grounds. It was thus understandable that she raised it only on review before the Master.

44.  Exercising the discretion afresh, I would thus allow the Plaintiff to review the New Grounds.

45.  However, unlike In the Matter of Greater Beijing Expressway,HCCW 399/ 1999, 12.5.2004, Barma J, I am unable to proceed further.  In that case, although new grounds were raised before the judge, the opposing party could deal with them and no real prejudice would be caused.  The judge permitted the new grounds to be argued (at para 9).  Those new grounds concerned matters like quantum of counsel’s brief, counsel’s fees for settling an affidavit and a letter, reasonableness of time spent by solicitors in doing certain pieces of work and delay between the making of the costs order and the issuance of the bill of costs.  Those involved, principally, arguments on law and its application.

46.  Here, there are factual disputes to be resolved, e.g. whether estimates of costs have been explained to the Plaintiff, whether she relied on the estimates if she believed the costs would not exceed $300,000, why did she pay so much costs on account etc.    The best course is to remit the matter to Master Levy for taxation pursuant to Order 62, rule 35(6).

47.  There is a dispute as to whether all factual assertions have been put on affidavit.  Mr Lee for the Defendant claims that the Defendant had not.  Ms Chan says that the Defendant had not taken the opportunity I gave to file evidence for review.  In my view, it is best not to fetter Master Levy’s discretion to investigate the facts but leave her to give directions.

IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT TO PAY TAXED COSTS BY INSTALMENTS

48.  Subsequent to the taxation, the parties have, after a series of correspondence in February 2011, reached an agreement on payment of the taxed costs and interests by instalment.  The Defendant agreed to the Plaintiff’s proposal to pay by 13 instalments on condition that the latter delivered 13 post-dated cheques on or before 1 March.  The Plaintiff did comply.  In the meantime, the present summons for review was issued on 24 February but was not served until 3 March.  The Defendant, as one could reasonably expect, took great issue on the Plaintiff’s conduct in entering into unilateral communications with the Master since May 2010 and finally issuing the Summons for the 2^nd Review.

49.  The explanation of the Plaintiff’s solicitors was that the 2^nd Review would not operate as a stay of execution of the Master’s order on taxation.  They confirmed that the Plaintiff would continue performing her payment of the balance sum of taxed costs by instalments.   The arrangement was to cut down her exposure to interests.

50.  This explanation was correct in law but it did not explain why the Plaintiff chose to serve the present Summons on the Defendant only after delivery of the 13 post-dated cheques.  The long lapse of time between the completion of the 1^st Review in May 2010 and the proposal for settlement would have misled the Defendant into believing that the taxation would not be taken further.  Clearly, the Plaintiff or her solicitors anticipated that the Defendant might refuse to accept instalment payments if they were aware of the 2^nd Review.

51.  Such conduct on the part of the Plaintiff was less than honourable but there certainly was no evidence of her waiver of a right to review.  Balancing delay and prejudice to the Defendant which can be compensated for by money, against that which the Plaintiff might suffer as a result of being deprived of the chance to advance the New Grounds, I am in favour of allowing the 2^nd Review. 

Conclusion

52.  I grant leave to the Plaintiff to make a request out of time to the Master Levy for the Reasons.

53.  I allow the Plaintiff to raise the New Grounds on this review.  The allocatur is set aside and the matter shall be remitted to Master Levy for her taxation limited to consideration of the matters covered by the 4 Grounds set out in the Amended Summons.

54.  The Plaintiff shall apply to Master Levy for directions within 14 days of the handing down of this judgment.

55.  Each party shall lodge and serve written submission on costs within 14 days of the handing down of this judgment. Submission in reply shall be lodged and served within 7 days thereafter.  Costs of this review shall be dealt with on the papers on 18 August 2011 at 9:30 am without a hearing.

56.  I warn the Plaintiff to proceed expeditiously with the taxation before Master Levy.  She should work closely with her legal representatives or, if she chooses to act in person again, to prepare her case promptly.  Any delay (even during the time she acts in person) is unlikely to attract sympathy from the Court, given the whole history of the matter. Substantial costs and time have been spent on the taxation in the past and she should carefully review the merits of her case before the taxation re-commences.

57.  I thank counsel for their assistance.