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HCA 2551/2024
[2026] HKCFI 6042
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTION NO 2551 OF 2024
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BETWEEN
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WISE CHOICE VENTURES LIMITED |
Plaintiff |
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(智擇創投有限公司) |
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and |
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HUANG YOULONG (黃有龍) |
Defendant |
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| Before: |
Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee in Chambers |
| Date of Hearing: |
4 August 2026 |
| Date of Decision: |
4 November 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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Introduction
1. This is D’s appeal against the decision of Master K W Wong dated 9 December 2025 (“the Order”). By the Order, the master acceded to P’s application by summons dated 3 July 2025 (“P’s Summons”) and entered judgment against D summarily in the sum of HK$731,711,601 together with interest on the sum of HK$371,596,000 at the judgment rate until payment and struck out D’s Counterclaim.
2. For the purpose of P’s Summons, Master Dick Ho imposed an unless order on D dated 6 October 2025 (“the Unless Order”) that unless D filed and served his evidence in opposition to P’s Summons by 4:00 p.m. on 15 October 2025, D be debarred from so doing. D filed no affirmation despite the Unless Order. It was not until a few days before the hearing of P’s Summons that he took out a summons dated 4 December 2025 (“the Relief Summons”) to seek relief from sanction so that he could file D’s Affirmation.
3. In reaching his conclusion on P’s Summons, the master considered D’s notarized affirmation filed on 21 November 2025 (“D’s Affirmation”) on a de bene esse basis. The master did not make a definitive decision on the Relief Summons.
4. It is trite that an appeal from a master is by way of a rehearing. I shall consider both P’s Summons and the Relief Summons afresh. Ms Chan together with Ms Kwok appeared for P and Mr Lo and Mr Ng appeared for D.
Undisputed/indisputable background facts
5. Mr Lo, in his skeleton submissions, provides an accurate summary of the background facts. I shall adopt his summary with some modifications as follows.
6. On 23 April 2017, the relevant parties in these proceedings signed the following documents (“the Transaction Documents”):
(a) The Subscription Agreement: Prominent Victory Ltd (“the Issuer”), D, Wealth Sailor Limited (“Wealth Sailor”) and Plenty Choice Investments Ltd (“Plenty Choice”) entered into a Subscription Agreement (“Subscription Agreement”) in respect of the notes issued by the Issuer (“the Notes”) in the aggregate principal amount of up to HK$450,000,000 (“the Sum”).
(b) The Notes Instrument: The Issuer executed a Notes Instrument regarding the terms and conditions of the Notes.
(c) The Guarantee: D executed the Deed of Guarantee in favour of Plenty Choice (“the Guarantee”).
7. Under these instruments, the Sum was paid on Plenty Choice’s behalf to D’s companies, namely, the Issuer and Wealth Sailor. The former is the wholly owned and solely directed company of D.
8. The Sum, though structured as “notes subscription price”, was in substance a loan.
9. As part of the consideration, D furnished assets with combined estimated value of HK$1,000,000,000 at the material time (far exceeding the Sum) as security (“the Securities”). The Securities included (i) charged shares of listed and private companies; (ii) charged convertible bonds issued by a listed company and (iii) a mortgaged yacht legally and beneficially owned by Grangalaxy Ocean Ltd (“Grangalaxy”) which is one of D’s companies. For present purposes, it is not necessary to go into the details of the Securities any further.
10. Plenty Choice was the original noteholder, and P is the noteholder by assignment: -
(1) P and Plenty Choice both belong to the Huarong Group, which engages in the business of direct investment in stocks, bonds, funds, derivatives and other financial products. To be exact, both P and Plenty Choice are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Right Select International Limited (“Right Select”).
(2) Plenty Choice had fully paid up the principal sum of the Notes of HK$450,000,000. Plenty Choice procured Right Select to advance the sum in 2 tranches on 24 and 25 April 2017 respectively: (1) HK$200,000,000 was transferred to Wealth Sailor’s securities account (after deducting the Arrangement Fees of HK$4,500,000), and (2) HK$245,500,000 was transferred to the Issuer. The Issuer issued two Note Certificates for the Notes on 24 and 25 April 2017.
11. On 16 March 2020, Plenty Choice assigned to P the full benefit of, and all its rights, title and interest in and under the Transaction Documents. Proper notices of the assignment were served on D and the other relevant parties on the same date and D consented to the assignment.
12. The original maturity date of the Notes of 23 April 2018 was extended to 23 April 2021 by three supplemental deeds.
13. The Issuer and D only made partial payment to P. As at the date of the Writ herein, P alleges that D is liable to repay P the sum of HK$752,750,335 being the outstanding principal of HK$371,596,000 and accrued interest of HK$381,154,335.
14. On 23 September 2025, 2,601,200,000 shares of Sino Golf Holdings Limited (“Listco”) and convertible bonds issued by Listco, both being part of the Securities, were sold for consideration of HK$74,679,852 and HK$18,661,350 respectively. After deducting fees and expenses, P eventually received HK$92,507,334.37.
15. Hence, the Issuer has not discharged its payment obligations and failed to comply with the redemption notices despite the extensions of the maturity dates.
The Relief Summons
16. For the Relief Summons, Ms Chan pertinently refers to the guidance given by Lam VP (as he then was) in China Shanshui Cement Group Ltd (中國山水水泥集團有限公司) and ors v Zhang Caikui (張才奎) and Anor (unreported, HCMP 863/2017, 10 May 2017). There, the Court of Appeal refused to accept the signed version of the affirmation of the defendant filed after the expiry of the permitted period in the unless order though its draft unsigned version was exhibited to a covering affirmation filed within. At §§4, 6 and 8, the following observations, as summarised by Ms Chan, were made:
(a) An unless order provides automatically for the consequence of default: §8.
(b) Affirmation evidence not filed before the unless deadline should not be permitted to be slipped in by other means: §6.
(c) One of the grounds on which the draft affirmation was struck out was that by virtue of the unless order the Defendants should not be allowed to slip in evidence by way of exhibits in the form of draft affirmation: §4.
(d) Further, the draft affirmation is not admissible as affirmation evidence since it did not comply with all the formal requirements for affirmation evidence: §6.
(e) When the defendant or his lawyers found that they had insufficient time to put in the affirmation, they should either apply for an extension of time or alternatively apply for relief against sanction: §6. If the defendant wishes to use the draft affirmation, again they should make the requisite applications: §8.
17. Order 2 r.4, Rules of the High Court provides,
“Where a party has failed to comply with a rule or court order, any sanction for failure to comply imposed by the rule or court order has effect unless the party in default applies to the Court for and obtains relief from the sanction within 14 days of the failure.”
18. Order 2 r.5 sets out the relevant considerations in an application for relief from sanction:
(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule or court order, the Court shall consider all the circumstances including—
(a) the interests of the administration of justice;
(b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly;
(c) whether the failure to comply was intentional;
(d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure to comply;
(e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules and court orders;
(f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party in default or his legal representative;
(g) in the case where the party in default is not legally represented, whether he was unaware of the rule or court order, or if he was aware of it, whether he was able to comply with it without legal assistance;
(h) whether the trial date or the likely trial date can still be met if relief is granted;
(i) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and
(j) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party.
19. In the present case, on the very day of the unless deadline, D filed an affirmation of his solicitor exhibiting an unsigned, unsworn and unnotarized version of D’s Affirmation (“the First Version”).
20. More than 1 month later, D sought to file D’s Affirmation and the Relief Summons was taken out more than 10 days thereafter.
21. The Relief Summons was supported by the 2nd Affirmation of Li Choi Ying. Mr Li is the solicitor acting for D. The only explanation given by Mr Li is that he has been informed by D that D was based in France at all material times and D only managed to secure the service of a French lawyer to do the notarization of D’s Affirmation after the unless deadline.
22. D did not make the application for relief from sanction within time pursuant to O.2 r.4. There is no explanation as to why his application could not have been made earlier.
23. Moreover, I am unable to accept his purported explanation. Once the Unless Order was made in the presence of his solicitors, D should be immediately advised about the serious effect of any breach of the Unless Order. D should inform his solicitors of his difficulties in complying with the Unless Order. If D needed more time, he should have asked for an extension of time to comply with the Unless Order or for relief from sanction at the earliest opportunities available. D should not have waited until the long lapse of the unless deadline to take any remedial steps.
24. There is no evidence that D has made a genuine effort to comply with the Unless Order.
25. On the other hand, the contents of D’s Affirmation are largely consistent with the Defence and Counterclaim already filed before P took out P’s Summons. P is able to deal with the same allegations in its supporting affirmation and needs no leave to file any further evidence if D’s Affirmation is admitted.
26. I have heard no complaint about any material differences between the First Version and D’s Affirmation. P has been aware of what D would say to oppose P’s Summons.
27. D did not require an adjournment of the substantive hearing of P’s Summons if the relief from sanction was granted to D.
28. If D’s Affirmation is ruled to be inadmissible, D is seriously handicapped in his opposition to P’s Summons. Conversely, the prejudice caused to P if relief is granted should be minimal.
29. Having taken all the circumstances into account, I am inclined to exercise my discretion to grant D the relief from sanction. I grant his application by the Relief Summons but he must pay P all its costs of and occasioned by his application, to be taxed if not agreed.
P’s Summons
30. As regards the summary judgment application, the relevant governing principles are well-settled and the parties have no disputes about the same. The following key principles cited in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 Vol.1 (Notes under O.14) should suffice:
(a) Summary judgment should only be granted in clear cases.
(b) If the defendant shows that it has a “real or bona fide defence” or there exists a “triable issue” or that for some other reason there ought to be a trial, summary judgment ought not be entered.
(c) In deciding whether a “real or bona fide defence” / a “triable issue” exists, the court would not accept the assertions of the defendant at face value. Bare assertion is insufficient and the defendant must condescend upon particulars.
(d) The court must not embark on a mini trial on affidavits.
(e) Leave to defend ought to be given unless there is clearly no defence in law and no possibility of a real defence on any question of fact.
31. With these principles in mind, I embark on the assessment of the merits of the parties’ respective cases.
32. P’s case is simple and straightforward. It only seeks to enforce the Guarantee against D. In addition to the undisputed facts narrated above, Ms Chan highlights the following provisions in the Guarantee:
(a) Clause 2.1 (Guarantee): “In consideration of the Investor (Plenty Choice) agreeing to enter into the Transaction Documents to which it is a party, the Guarantor (D) hereby unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees, as a continuing obligation in favour of the Investor: (i) the due and punctual payment of all or any sums (whether principal, interest, fees or otherwise) which are or at any time may become due and payable by the Company (the Issuer) to the Investor (or their respective Affiliates) under the Transaction Documents; and (ii) the due and punctual performance and observance by the Company of its obligations to the Investor (or their respective Affiliates) under the Transaction Documents (the 'Guaranteed Obligations').”
(b) Clause 2.2 (Primary Obligor): “If and whenever the Company defaults for any reason whatsoever in the performance of any of the Guaranteed Obligations, the Guarantor shall forthwith upon demand unconditionally perform (or procure performance of) and satisfy (or procure the satisfaction of) the obligation or liability in regard to which such default has been made in the manner prescribed by the Transaction Documents and so that the same benefits shall be conferred on the Investor as they would have received if such primary obligation or liability had been duly performed and satisfied by the Company.”
(c) Clause 2.3 (Demands): “Subject to Clause 2.2 above, demands may be made under this Deed by the Investor to the Guarantor from time to time after any default or failure to pay any sum, or perform, observe or satisfy any of the Guaranteed Obligations by the Company and shall be enforced against the Guarantor irrespective of whether any steps or proceedings are or will be taken against the Company or any other person to recover the indebtedness claimed under this Deed or any other Transaction Documents.”
(d) Clause 2.6 (Absolute and Unconditional Obligations): “The obligations of the Guarantor hereunder are absolute and unconditional, irrespective of any circumstance which might otherwise constitute a legal or equitable discharge of a surety or guarantor. The liability of the Guarantor shall be direct and not conditional or contingent on the pursuit of remedies against any person or entity.”
(e) Clause 3 (Continuing Guarantee): “This Deed shall be a continuing guarantee and shall remain in full force and effect... This Deed is in addition to, and independent of any guarantee or other security or right or remedy now or at any time hereafter held by or made available to the Investor in respect of the Guaranteed Obligations.”
33. I agree with Ms Chan that the combined effect of Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 is that D’s liability under the Guarantee is concurrent with that of the Issuer: see Southwest Securities (HK) Brokerage Limited v Nieumarkt Investments Ltd and Anor. [2021] HKCA 740.
34. P has complied with Clause 2.3. D does not demur.
35. There being no dispute about the liability of the Issuer, prima facie, D has a concurrent liability under the Guarantee. It is incumbent on D to show triable issue(s) and a bona fide defence.
A summary of D’s defence
36. D’s core defence pleaded in his Defence and Counterclaim dated 16 April 2025 is premised on the verbal representations made to him by Mr Qin Ling (“Qin”), who is the chairman of Plenty Choice.
37. D has another partial defence (“the Penalty Defence”). He contends that the contractual provision for default interest at 20% per annum in the Notes Instrument constitutes an unenforceable penalty under Hong Kong law.
38. His defence based on the alleged oral representations (“the Representations Defence”) is supported by D’s Affirmation.
39. I shall first deal with the Representations Defence.
40. In D’s Affirmation, D first explains how he got into a very close relationship with Qin. He says that in late 2016 and early 2017, D was in need of financial assistance to acquire shares in the Listco through his companies. Qin then offered to help him.
41. Mr Lo summarises the evidence of D relating to the alleged oral representations as follows.
42. On or about 10 April 2017, Qin invited D to an in-person meeting at his office in Two Pacific Place, Admiralty, Hong Kong, and requested that D should provide a personal guarantee to secure the performance of the repayment obligations. It should be noted that in the pleaded case, D alleges that the meeting was held around March or April 2017.
43. When questioned, Qin made the following representations to D (“the Representations”) by saying to him:-
(a) A personal guarantee was required because the ultimate parent company of Plenty Choice was a state-owned enterprise. Therefore, it was a matter of formality when providing loan facilities required a guarantee from a key director in the form of a standard deed.
(b) Qin assured D that Plenty Choice had no intention to enforce the personal guarantee against D unless and until all the Securities had first been enforced.
(c) Finally, Qin said to D that recourse under the Guarantee would arise only if a shortfall remained between the total outstanding secured obligations and the net proceeds actually recovered from enforcing and selling all the Securities.
44. Given Qin’s family background and the personal trust D reposed in Qin, D did not carry out independent checks on Qin’s reason for requiring a guarantee. Instead, relying on the Representations, D simply signed the Guarantee and the other transaction documents on 23 April 2017.
45. On 24 and 25 April 2017, the Issuer issued 2 note certificates in favour of Plenty Choice for a principal amount of HK$204,500,000 and HK$245,500,000 (totalling HK$450,000,000).
46. The maturity date of the Notes Instrument (which originally fell on 23 April 2018) was eventually extended to 23 April 2021 (and interest increased to 10.3% during the extended term) by three supplemental deeds.
47. On 19 September 2019, Plenty Choice received HK$78,404,000 from the sale proceeds of the yacht owned by Grangalaxy (which forms part of the Securities). The outstanding principal amount was accordingly reduced to HK$371,596,000.
48. On 15 March 2020, the contractual rights and obligations under, inter alia, the Guarantee were subsequently assigned to P.
49. Extensions of payment obligations were granted by Plenty Choice and later by P, with no mention of enforcing the Guarantee.
50. On 1 August 2022, the Issuer received P’s demand letter, followed by a second demand on 13 December 2024 (collectively “the Demand Letters”).
51. Following an inquiry by D’s representatives, D was again informed by Plenty Choice’s representative, Mr Zhang Li (“Zhang”) that the demand letter was a formality and that the Guarantee would not be enforced.
52. Mr Lo submits that, on the evidence of D, there is at least a triable factual issue as to whether the Representations were indeed made by Qin. D should be entitled to unconditional leave to defend and the alternative relief of interim payment should be rejected. There is simply no basis to strike out the Counterclaim premised on the Representations.
53. Mr Lo further submits that the Representations provide a firm base for the defence of estoppel by convention. He explains that given the Representations, both D and Plenty Choice entered into the Guarantee on the basis of a shared assumption that the Guarantee would not be enforced unless and until all the Securities had first been enforced. The Representations being made by Qin acting for Plenty Choice to D, there is no question of the communication of the shared assumption between the parties. When P accepted the assignment of the contractual rights and obligations under the Guarantee, P should also have assumed the shared assumptions or the Representations which underlie such contractual rights and obligations.
54. Mr Lo points out that P is an assignee of the Guarantee and it is not privy to the communication of the Representations between Qin and D. P is unable to adduce direct evidence to validly rebut the existence of the Representations.
55. Mr Lo submits that P did not take recovery action until the lapse of over 3.5 years after the extended due date of 23 April 2021. He says that this is only consistent with the existence of the Representations.
56. Lastly, Mr Lo relies on the similar oral representations of Zhang made shortly before the commencement of these proceedings. He criticises the evidence of Zhang that he could not produce documentary evidence to contradict D’s account. Mr Lo then submits that their differences can only be resolved at the trial.
57. I have studied D’s Affirmation. Ms Chan has made an all-out effort to attack the Representations Defence. I agree with her analysis generally. I opine that D’s allegation of the Representations is incapable of belief and the Representations Defence can, and should, be rejected summarily without a trial for the following reasons.
58. First and foremost, as admitted by D himself in D’s Affirmation, D is a seasoned investor having vast experience in various business sectors primarily in the Mainland and Hong Kong. He held senior positions in listed companies in Hong Kong. He should be cognizant of the legal effect of the Transaction Documents including the Guarantee under which he assumed personal liability.
59. D, however, seeks to paint the picture that he had no experience in borrowing funds and dealing with guarantees despite his extensive investment portfolio. He claims that he does not understand the terms of the Guarantee and solely relied on the Representations.
60. His evidence is flatly contradicted by the evidence of Mr Hu, the director of P. Mr Hu, in his 2nd affirmation, pointed out that D was actually sued by his creditor on loan agreements made in August and October 2016 in a High Court action under HCA 983/2021. Mr Hu exhibited a copy of the Statement of Claim filed in HCA 983/2021 to his affirmation and it can be seen that D was the borrower under 2 loan agreements and the loans, totalling HK$150,000,000.00, were secured by the personal guarantees provided by his co-defendant. D’s evidence is obviously not truthful.
61. D could not have lightly believed Qin no matter how close he thinks their personal relationship was. If the Representations had been made, to protect himself, at the very least, D should have procured an audio or written record of the Representations with his mobile phone. A simple voice message or text message can serve the purpose. Without any corroborative evidence, D’s allegation of the Representations lacks credence.
62. In light of the undisputed realisation of other Securities, the fact that P waited for 3.5 years to start this recovery action cannot be cogent evidence to support the allegation of the Representations. Quite on the contrary, it is unreasonable and improbable that D did not say anything about the Representations after his receipt of the Demand Letters in December 2024 and only mentioned them for the first time in April 2025.
63. Ms Chan refers to Clause 4.1(bb) of the Guarantee to show that the Representations could not exist. By this provision, D represented and warranted to Plenty Choice that prior to the execution of the Guarantee, he had been advised that he had the choice not to proceed with the transaction in connection with the Guarantee. This provision literally destroys the very basis of the Representations Defence and D should know that he was not obliged to provide the Guarantee as a matter of formality as allegedly claimed by Qin.
64. Even if the Representations were indeed made by Qin, which I do not accept, I am convinced by Ms Chan’s submission that the Representations cannot give rise to any estoppel.
65. Ms Chan heavily relies on Clause 7.3, which is commonly known as an entire agreement clause. It provides,
“This Deed constitutes the whole agreement between the Parties relating to the subject matter hereof and supersedes any prior agreements or understandings relating to such subject matter.”
66. The Representations, once communicated to D, gave rise to a shared understanding of the scope and extent of D’s liability under the Guarantee. Clause 7.3 renders the Representations, if ever existed, meaningless because any shared understandings resulting therefrom would be superseded by the Guarantee.
67. Two points can be made. First, as a matter of fact, this provision must cause serious concern to D and there is no reason why he signed the Guarantee without raising any queries about this provision. If the Guarantee were a mere formality, the removal of this provision should be plausible and would not affect the integrity of the Guarantee. D should have asked for the deletion of this provision so that there is still some room for the Representations.
68. As a matter of law, similar entire agreement clauses have been held to be able to effectively invalidate any claim of estoppel by representations or by convention.
69. Ms Chan draws my attention to Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) [2010] 2 CLC 705. There, the English Court of Appeal dealt with an agreement which contained an express provision to the effect that a party had not relied on and acknowledged that the other party had not made any representations or warranty. At §144, Aikens LJ held that such a clause was effective to exclude any allegations of pre-contract representations and further observed that there is commercial utility in such clauses being enforceable, so that parties knew precisely the basis on which they are entering into their contractual relationship.
70. Further, in JMW Solicitors LLP, etc v Injury Lawyers 4U Ltd, etc [2024] EWHC 3103 (Ch), HHJ Cawson KC, at §93, first referred to the decision of Christopher Nugee QC (as he then was) in Sere Holdings Limited v Volkswagen Group United [2004] EWHC 1551 (Ch) at §25 in which it was held that a suitably worded entire agreement or non-reliance clause can prevent an estoppel by convention arising where the alleged common assumption was as to the future conduct of the defendant and was alleged to be shared at the time of entering into the contract.
71. Then the deputy judge went on to say at §96 that the contractual estoppel created by the entire agreement clause will preclude reliance upon the pre-contract representations or assumptions.
72. Despite these English authorities, Mr Lo submits that such an entire agreement clause does not prevent D from relying on the doctrine of estoppel. He relies on the following local authorities to support his proposition.
73. First, Mr Lo refers to Edwin John Philips v Sa Sa International Holdings Limited (unreported, HCA 5190/2001, 2.4.2002). In that case, DHCJ Andrew Cheung (as the Chief Justice then was) at §33 said this,
“… it would be totally unjust and inequitable to allow that party to take advantage of the very oral agreement between the parties that they would leave out from the written contract one of the agreed terms to subsequently argue that the term left out did not form part of their whole contract, by relying on the entire agreement clause in the written contract; and he should be estopped from asserting that the agreed term that was omitted deliberately from the written contract did not form part of the whole contract between the parties, particularly if the deliberate omission was suggested by that party for its purpose. In those circumstances, I consider it at least arguable that an estoppel would arise, notwithstanding the presence of the entire agreement clause. No fraud need be pleaded or relied on.”
74. Next, Mr Lo refers to William So v Critchley Group Plc (unreported, HCA9803/2000,1.12.2002). He submits that there, DHCJ Fung (as he then was) held that the entire agreement clause therein, which is similar to Clause 7.3 in the present case, did not preclude the operation of estoppel.
75. I have perused Edwin John Philips and William So. I agree with Ms Chan that neither of these two authorities can assist D.
76. In Edwin John Philips, the agreement in question contained an entire agreement clause which expressly provided that the agreement supersedes and cancels in all respects all previous agreements and other matters between the parties with respect to the subject matter of the agreement, whether such be written or oral. Despite this provision, the plaintiff alleged that there was a binding pre-contract agreement made orally and it was enforceable despite the absence of documentation for it.
77. The deputy judge, at §17, first held that the wording of the entire agreement clause in the agreement was sufficiently clear to exclude the pre-contract agreement.
78. The deputy judge then went on to consider the argument based on estoppel.
79. Importantly, at §27, at the outset, the deputy judge held that if a previous representation is superseded and cancelled subsequently by the party making the representation, which supersession and cancellation are agreed to by the representee, then it is not open to the representee to thereafter rely on the superseded and cancelled representation to mount a case of estoppel. This is exactly the case here.
80. Then the deputy judge pointed out at §33 that if there was an agreement reached between the parties that they would leave out from the written contract one of the agreed terms, it would be totally unjust and inequitable to allow either party to take advantage of the entire agreement clause to argue that the term left out did not form part of their whole contract. Given their agreement, the parties should be estopped from asserting that the agreed term that was omitted deliberately from the written contract did not form part of the whole contract between the parties, particularly if the deliberate omission was suggested by that party for its purpose.
81. In the present case, there is simply no allegation that the parties had reached such a pre-contract agreement that the Representations would survive the entire agreement clause in the Guarantee.
82. In William So, DHCJ Fung (as he then was) considered Edwin John Philips and merely agreed that whether an estoppel will arise depends on all the prevailing circumstances of the case. I am unable to see how D can derive any assistance from William So.
83. I, thus, come to the conclusion that by the application of Clause 7.3, the Representations, if ever existed, were effectively superseded and cannot be used to mount a case of estoppel.
84. Even if the Representations had not been superseded by the operation of Clause 7.3, Ms Chan submits that P, as the assignee of the Guarantee, in the absence of any evidence of its knowledge of the Representations, actual or constructive, cannot be bound by the Representations. D actually consented to the assignment without raising any concern about the Representations.
85. Ms Chan must be right and I accept her submissions.
86. Ms Chan also points to other provisions in the Guarantee and makes forceful submissions to the effect that such provisions negate the existence of the Representations. I do not think that it is necessary to go through those provisions and I have sufficient grounds to support my conclusion on the Representations already.
87. In the premises, I find that the Representation Defence is utterly unmeritorious and it is not a bona fide defence. There is no triable issue at all.
88. D’s Counterclaim is solely based on the Representations Defence. It is plain and obvious to me that it is doomed to failure. It follows that it should be struck out.
89. Now I turn to the Penalty Defence.
90. D contends that the default interest at the rate of 20% per annum based on Clause 10 of the Notes Instrument constitutes an unenforceable penalty.
91. Mr Lo submits that there is no evidence that the default interest rate was fixed to reflect the lender’s genuine assessment of the borrower’s creditworthiness in the event of default. Therefore, it is at least arguable that a 20% default interest rate, which is 2.4 times of the original 8.3% when the Notes were signed, is extravagant, exorbitant and oppressive as to constitute a penalty. Rather, it appears to suggest that the default interest functions more as a penalty designed to coerce payment.
92. In this regard, Mr Lo invites the attention of this court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Law Ting Pong Secondary School v Chen Wai Wah [2021] 3 HKLRD 185. There, at §67, Chu JA (as she then was) referred to Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co [1915] AC 79, which is the leading authority on liquidated damages and penalty. The judge adopted the holding in the Dunlop case that the question whether a sum stipulated is a penalty or liquidated damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged as at the time of the making of the contract and not as at the time of the breach.
93. Mr Lo then goes on to submit that this question is not one for summary determination but a proper one for trial and hence there is a triable issue on quantum in any event.
94. Ms Chan refers to Houssein v London Credit Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 721. At §§32-43, the English Court of Appeal held that whether a default interest clause amounts to a penalty depends on “whether the borrower has demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the default interest rate applied because of the increased credit risk presented by a defaulting borrower is nevertheless, in all the circumstances, extravagant, exorbitant, or unconscionable”.
95. Ms Chan highlights that whether the borrower can demonstrate that a default interest clause amounts to a penalty can be determined summarily without a trial. She refers to the following local authorities to show that the Hong Kong courts are able to make such determinations summarily: China Life Insurance (Overseas) Co Ltd v Li Xiaoming (李晓明) (unreported, HCA 570/2017, 11.12.2017), Provada Ltd v Douglas Mulcock also known as Mulcock Douglas John (unreported, HCA 862/2013, 21.8.2013), Silvercord Ltd v The Swatch Group (Hong Kong) Ltd [2022] HKCFI 362 and Beauty Sea International Ltd v Seazen Resources Investment Ltd and Ors. [2023] HKCFI 1813.
96. In my view, the starting point must be whether D has adduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case that the default interest rate is penal in nature.
97. As held by Lisa Wong J in China Life Insurance (at §60), the defendant has to do more than just barely assert that the contractual provision is a penalty clause to discharge the burden to show a fair probability or reasonable grounds that a bona fide defence exists.
98. Ms Chan further refers to the following authorities to show that default interest at much higher rates has been upheld by the courts: South China Strategic Ltd (formerly known as Mandarin Dragon Holdings Ltd) v Celsion Corp (formerly known as Cheung Laboratories Inc)(a body corporate according to the Laws of the United States of America) (unreported, HCA 9963/2000, 7 August 2001), The Incorporated Owners of Winner Building (祥發大厦) v Wai Mau Sze and ors (unreported, HCA 20180/1998 & HCA 7564/1999, 2 June 2006) and Houssein v London Credit Ltd [2015] EWHC 2749 (Ch).
99. In the present case, D does not say anything about the default interest rate in the Notes Instrument, let alone adduce evidence to demonstrate its alleged penal nature. D has not started to discharge his burden and the Penalty Defence does not come off the ground.
100. I unhesitatingly conclude that there is no substance in the Penalty Defence.
Conclusion and order
101. For the reasons given, I conclude that P is entitled to summary judgment against D and D’s Defence and Counterclaim should be struck out. The decision of the master is unassailable.
102. For the Relief Summons, I conclude that D should be allowed to file and serve D’s Affirmation despite the breach of the Unless Order.
103. Accordingly, D’s appeal against the Order falls to be dismissed. I note that D’s Affirmation was not excluded by the Order.
104. Costs of this appeal should follow the event. I make a costs order nisi that D should pay P its costs of this appeal, to be summarily assessed by this court on paper if not agreed.
105. Ms Chan has already lodged with this court P’s statement of costs. I direct that, in the event of disagreement, D should file and serve a list of objections (no more than 2 pages), if so advised, within 28 days from the date of this Decision.
106. Last but not least, I thank Ms Chan, Ms Kwok, Mr Lo and Mr Ng for their helpful assistance.
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(Kent Yee)
Deputy High Court Judge
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Ms Tiffany Chan and Ms Valerie Kwok, instructed by Messrs Haiwen & Partners LLP, for the Plaintiff
Mr Benny Lo and Mr Edward K H Ng, instructed by Messrs Charles Wilson LLP, for the Defendant
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