KRISWIDIANTO, STEPHANUS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6152 · HCAL 673/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 673/2026
[2026] HKCFI 6152
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 673 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Kriswidianto, Stephanus |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 1 April 2026, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 19 March 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0673_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”), and that the applicant’s
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 8 December 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) was
not substantiated. Accordingly, the Board confirmed the Director’s
Decision, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “Director of Immigration / T.C.A.B” as
both the putative respondents and the putative interested parties,
when only the Board should be named as the putative respondent, and
only the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
4. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the
name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and
the name of the putative interested party to “Director of
Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
5. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
6. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, he would be ill-treated or even killed by
his eldest sister Reni, his elder sister Ria, his younger sister
Nika, and Madius Tukimin, who was the head of Santo Yousef, a Catholic
church which the applicant and his family attended. The applicant
claimed that they threatened to kill him because he wanted to marry
Dia Ramania, whose religion was Islam, and he would convert from
Catholic to Islam due to the intended marriage.
Disposal on paper
7. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
8. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
9. The applicant did not advance any grounds for judicial review in Form
86, nor in his supporting affidavit dated 1 April 2026. In the said
affidavit, the applicant only stated that the Board’s Decision was
biased and unfair.
Discussion
10. First of all, the applicant’s mere comment in his supporting affidavit
that the Board’s Decision was biased and unfair cannot help him. He
did not state why the Board’s Decision was biased and unfair or how
the Board had erred in its determination of the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim and/or his appeal/petition.
11. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
12. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize
the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
13. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 2 February 2026. The applicant was present and was
thus given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.
14. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its analysis
on the applicant’s credibility and his evidence were laid out in
paragraphs 15 to 44 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
15. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s description of past
events was untrue and unreliable. The Board considered that the
applicant had fabricated a substantial part of his evidence in order
to make out a case for non-refoulement protection. The Board rejected
the applicant’s claim that he would be harmed or killed by his sisters
and/or Madius Tukimin due to his intention to convert to Islam. The
Board did not accept that there was a real risk that the applicant
would be seriously harmed or killed by his sisters and/or Madius
Tukimin because of the claimed reasons.
16. Further, the Board found that on the applicant’s own evidence, Madius
Tukimin was only the head of the members who attended Santo Yousef.
The Board also found that the applicant’s sister Ria, whom the
applicant claimed to be a leader of Wanita Katolik Republik Indonesia
in Sumatera, was only responsible for secretarial work and should be
working part time or on a voluntary basis. Their views on the
applicant’s intended conversion from Catholic to Islam did not
represent the stand of the Indonesian Catholic church. Thus, the
Board found that the applicant’s dispute with his sisters and Madius
Tukimin was only a private dispute.
17. The Board also found that the threats the applicant received were
merely verbal threats issued via phone calls or videocalls. The
applicant was never physically harmed by his sisters and/or Madius
Tukimin. The applicant’s fear of them did not reach a minimum level
of severity that warranted international protection.
18. The Board also found the applicant’s assertion that Ria and Madius
Tukimin could utilise the Catholic network to locate him anywhere in
Indonesia was only the applicant’s own speculation without evidence in
support. The Board found that even if Ria and Madius Tukimin were
influential, their influence was limited to the Catholic community in
the local area. The Board considered that if the applicant was
returned to Indonesia and relocated to other areas, the chance that he
would be located was low. The Board agreed with the assessment of the
Director that Bali and Surabaya were suitable places where the
applicant could relocate without undue hardship to avoid the risk he
feared (see paragraphs 68 of the Board’s Decision).
19. With regards to state protection, the Board found that the applicant’s
claim that the police or authorities would not protect him as they
were corrupt, was again the applicant’s own speculation. The
applicant had never sought assistance from the police or authorities
in Indonesia. After due consideration of relevant country of origin
information (“COI”) and the applicant’s circumstances, the Board found
that sufficient state protection was available to the applicant upon
his return to Indonesia (see paragraphs 59 to 67 of the Board’s
Decision).
20. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
21. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within
the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s
appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in
the way the Board reached its decision.
22. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
23. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
24. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 04/11/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Applicant’s ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Nil |04/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 27761 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 2212/25 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5002101/25) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1