A SOLICITOR v. THE LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG

CACV 20/2014

and CACV 78/2014

(Heard together)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 20 OF 2014

(ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER MADE BY THE SOLICITORS

DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL DATED 17^TH DAY OF JANUARY 2014)

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________________________

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 78 OF 2014

(ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER MADE BY THE SOLICITORS

DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL DATED 17^TH DAY OF JANUARY 2014)

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________________________

________________________

(Heard together)

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JUDGMENT
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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court)：

1.  There are two appeals before us in respect of the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal [“the Tribunal”] on 17 January 2014. That was a decision on two complaints against a solicitor [“the Solicitor”], who practised at the time of the incidents in question as the principal partner of a firm of solicitors. The two complaints arose in two different time frames.

2.  The first complaint was in relation to the Solicitor’s handling of the conveyancing transaction of a property owned by two co-owners under the Home Ownership Scheme.  The relevant facts and background were set out by the Tribunal at §§12 to 20 of their Statement of Findings of 6 June 2013.  Instead of reciting the same at length in this judgment, bearing in mind that there is no appeal against the finding of guilt by the Tribunal on this complaint, for present purposes it suffices for us to summarise it as follows:

(a) The two co-owners were originally husband and wife when they acquired the property in 1994 as joint tenants.  In 1996, they divorced in Canada but no step was taken in those proceedings in terms of the disposition of the property. 

(b) In 1999, they reached agreement to have the property to be transferred to the sole name of the husband.  They instructed the Solicitor to handle that on their behalves in May 1999.  At that time, the other co-owner, the ex-wife, was in Canada.

(c) As it is a property acquired under the Home Ownership Scheme, the consent of the Hong Kong Housing Authority [“HA”] was required.  On 2 November 1999, approval in principle was given by the HA subject to some conditions set out in a letter of the same date.  One of the conditions was that the draft Assignment had to be approved by the HA.

(d) A draft assignment was submitted by the Solicitor to the HA for approval on 6 December 1999.  The Solicitor also prepared a will for the husband and he executed the same on that date.  Under that will, the father of the husband was the sole executor of his estate.

(e) The ex-wife came back to Hong Kong in December.  She and the husband went to the office of the Solicitor on 20 December 1999 and signed the draft Assignment which had yet to be approved by the HA.

(f) On 28 December 1999, the husband passed away. 

(g) The Solicitor did not inform the HA of the demise of the husband.  On 17 January 2000, the HA returned the draft Assignment with extensive amendments.  The HA required the assignee to endorse his agreement to the conditions imposed by it upon the letter of 17 January 2000 and the registration of that endorsed letter at the Land Registry before the assignment.

(h) In view of the extensive amendments, the Solicitor replaced pages in the copy of the Assignment signed by the parties on 20 December 1999 except the signature page and the backsheet.  He kept the date at 20 December 1999.  He then registered the replaced version of the Assignment at the Land Registry.

(i) Since the husband had already passed away, the Solicitor procured his father to endorse on the HA letter of 17 January 2000 in the father’s own name and had it registered at the Land Registry.       

3.  The Solicitor gave evidence before the Tribunal that when he arranged for the signing of the draft Assignment on 20 December 1999, he had told the parties that there would probably be amendments from the HA.  He asked them to give him the authority to change the draft by incorporating whatever amendments from the HA into the final version and they orally gave him authority to do so.  The Solicitor regarded this as execution in escrow.

4.  The Tribunal rejected the contention that there could be execution in escrow in such circumstances in view of the conditions laid down by the HA and the implications of s17B of the Housing Ordinance.  The Tribunal further referred to the implications of the demise of the husband whereupon his interest in the property devolved to the ex-wife by reason of the right of survivorship.  As such, the transaction could not proceed further lawfully after the death of the husband.

5.  It is not very clear from the Tribunal’s Statement of Findings whether they accepted or rejected the evidence of the Solicitor in respect of his explanation of the situation to the parties on 20 December and the giving of their authority to him to incorporate the amendments.  On the one hand, the Tribunal commented adversely at §33 on the explanations by the Solicitor on why it was essential to have the assignment executed on that date and that the parties could not withdraw from it.  They described these as “odd set of explanations for his actions” and “contradictory and nonsensical statement”.  On the other hand, at §38 the Tribunal appears to have accepted that the Solicitor had informed the parties of the likelihood of amendments by the HA. 

6.  In the end, the Tribunal found that in the transaction the Solicitor had acted in breach of Principle 6.01 of the Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct and Rule 2(a), (c) and (e) of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules, which was the 1^st Complaint in the Complaint Sheet.  The Tribunal imposed a fine of $40,000 by way of penalty in respect of this complaint.

7.  Though there had been an appeal by the Solicitor against the finding of guilt on this complaint, it had been abandoned by the time of the hearing before us.  The appeal in CACV 20 of 2014 by the Solicitor is confined to the appeal against the finding of guilt under the 2^nd complaint.

8.  There is, however, an appeal by the Law Society in CACV 78 of 2014 in respect of the penalty.  Leave was granted by another division of this court for that appeal to be brought.  The Law Society said the penalty imposed by the Tribunal was manifestly inadequate.  The Law Society submitted that the proper sentence is the striking off, or alternatively the suspension for a substantial period, of the Solicitor.

9.  The second complaint is about events in late 2006 to early 2007.  Those events stemmed from the transaction in the first complaint. On 22 November 2006, another solicitors firm [“WFC”] acting for the father wrote to the Solicitor complaining about the latter’s handling of the matter in 1999 to 2000.  Believing the assignment to be valid and that he had inherited the property as part of the estate of the deceased husband, the father paid off the mortgage over the property.  Subsequently, due to the defects in the assignment, the father could not sell it in 2003.  On 27 November 2006, WFC wrote another letter informing the Solicitor that due to concerns for the limitation period, legal proceedings had been initiated.  

10.  The Solicitor then reported the matter to the Hong Kong Solicitors Indemnity Fund Ltd [“the Insurer”] on 5 December 2006. The crux of the second complaint is in respect of the Solicitor’s dealing with the Insurer over this claim.  As the Solicitor is appealing against the finding of guilt in respect of this second complaint, we need to go into greater details regarding the relevant facts.

11.  On 6 December 2006, the Insurer replied and highlighted the obligation on the part of the Solicitor as insured:

“ Please note that you should always act as a prudent uninsured and take no steps which might prejudice Insurer’s position. Please keep us informed of any future developments. …

Please provide Managers with a draft of all letters for approval before they are sent. ”

12.  On 6 December 2006, the Solicitor wrote back to the Insurer setting out his comments on the claim by WFC.  Then on 7 December 2006, the Solicitor sent a draft reply to WFC to the Insurer for their approval before it was sent.

13.  Then there was a series of without prejudice correspondence between the Solicitor and WFC from 11 December 2006 to 25 January 2007 which the former did not copy or disclose to the Insurer (whether for approval beforehand or later, except the letter of 15 December from WFC which the Solicitor copied to the Insurer on 25 January 2007).  In the letter of 15 December 2006, WFC set out an offer for settlement of their client (viz the Father) in the sum of $644,707.60 with breakdown showing this to be the total amount of costs and expenses incurred by the Father in respect of the property.

14.  On 27 December 2006, the Solicitor made a counter-offer which he had not previously discussed or obtained approval from the Insurer.  In view of the significance of that counter-offer in the context of the 2^nd Complaint, we set out the terms of counter-offer in full:

“ We summarise the proposed settlement as follows:

On condition that your client or any third party has not in any manner created any incumbrances or charges whatsoever on the Property from 23^rd April 2004 onwards to date, we are prepared to fully and finally settle the above matter with your client (Mr Chan Yam Ping) on the following terms:

1. Without admission of any fault on our part or Mr Wan Hok Wai, Henry’s part, we are to pay to you HK$540,000 upon your client’s execution of the requested Deed/documents as herein mentioned. The amount of HK$540,000 is for the assignment of all your client’s interest in the amount spent on the discharge on the mortgage/legal charges registered by memorial no. TM657667. Your client shall execute a Deed of Assignment to give effect of such assignment in favour of our Mr Wan and/or his nominees.

2. Your client shall use his best endeavour and provide his full reasonable assistance/co-operation to us in procuring Ms Ma Suk Ching to liaise with us for further handling of the Property.

3. Forthwith upon receipt of our said HK$540,000, your client shall

i) deliver up the keys to and title documents and vacant possession of the Property to us (for the benefit of our Mr Wan Hok Wai, Henry);

ii) deliver to us the original duly signed and attested Power of Attorney in the form and substance as the Appendix hereto;

iii) not by himself or any third party raise any objection whatsoever to our Mr Wan’s dealing with the Property howsoever;

iv) deliver to us the Deed of Assignment as stated above; and

v) deliver to us a written acknowledgement/confirmation to be signed by your client and all your client’s immediate family members that they do not have any further claim/interest whatsoever in the Property nor in the redemption money spent on the Discharge of legal charge memorial no. TM657667.  The contents of this acknowledgement/confirmation is to be agreed between the parties.

In return of your client’s favouring our Mr Wan with the said Power of Attorney and the Deed of Assignment, our Mr Wan hereby agrees and undertakes to your client that he shall fully indemnify your client and keep him harmless for any loss or consequence arising out of or occasioned by Mr Wan’s exercising of any of the powers therein contained.

4. Receipt of payment of the said HK$540,000 signifies and represents your client’s irrevocable agreement, acknowledgement and declaration that:

i) whatever interest, legal and/or equitable, he or any other person, including without limitation, any of his family members, may have in the Property and/or the redemption money paid for the Discharge of mortgage/legal charge with memorial no. TM657667 and/or other money pay in respect of the Property shall cease belonging to him and those persons (if applicable) and shall forthwith be treated as if the same has been transferred or assigned or conveyed to our Mr Wan Hoi Wai, Henry and/or his nominees;

ii) he or his immediate family members or any third party whosoever shall have no further interest or claim on us or our Mr Wan Hoi Wai, Henry whatsoever directly or indirectly in the Property and/or on any of the issues or alleged loss stated in your letter to us dated 22^nd November 2006;

iii) he will disclaim all future income, whether in the nature of capital income or rental or licence fee arising out of or in relation to the Property and agrees and declares that the same shall belong to Mr Wan Hoi Wai, Henry absolutely; and

iv) he will not cause any incumbrance on the Property nor dispose of the same by Will nor grant any further Power of Attorney to any other third party.

Mr Wan Hok Wai, Henry shall in return bear all future taxes and outgoings whether capital or recurrent in nature relating to the Property.”

15.  A draft power of attorney was attached to that letter.  That power of attorney was to be executed by the father in favour of the Solicitor in relation to the property.

16.  WFC replied on the same date, 27 December 2006. Again, it is necessary to set out at some length their response:

“  We refer to your letter dated 27^th December 2006 and its enclosure.

  We wish to reiterate that the Housing Authority has expressly drawn our attention to s17B of the Housing Ordinance, Cap 238 that the Assignment registered without their prior approval is void. Our client is therefore neither the legal owner nor beneficially entitled to the Property. He has no right to appoint Mr Wan to do and perform acts and things in respect of the Property as stipulated in your draft Power of Attorney. We would like to further draw your attention to s27A of the Housing Ordinance. Any one enters into an agreement which relates to land commits an offence and is liable to a fine of HK$500,000 and to imprisonment for 1 year. In the light of the nature of this case, we do not consider it appropriate for our client to execute the said draft Power of Attorney.

   For the purpose of reaching a settlement, our client is willing to accept the terms subject to the following:-

1. Clauses 1, 2, 3(i) and 3(iv) are acceptable to our client;

2. Clause 3(ii) is not acceptable to our client.

3. Our client agrees to Clause 3(iii) on the condition that our client does not execute the Power of Attorney in favour of Mr Wan.

4. Clause 3(v) is acceptable to our client. Our client’s spouse and children will sign the acknowledgement.

5. Apart from Mr Wan’s undertaking to indemnity our client, Mr Wan shall comply with the Housing Ordinance, Cap 283 when exercising the rights under the Deed of Assignment.

6. Clause 4(i) has the same effect as Clause 3(v).

7. Clause 4(ii) is acceptable to our client.

8. Clause 4(iii) is acceptable to our client save that he has no right to declare any capital income or rental or licence fee generated from the Property shall belong to your Mr Wan absolutely as Ms Ma is the beneficial owner.

   We are given to understand that Ms Ma will come to Hong Kong soon to discuss this matter with our client.  As previously mentioned, our client will made his best endeavours to bring Ms Ma to the negotiating table.”

17.  In the meantime, the Insurer indicated it had no comment on the draft open reply to WFC and the Solicitor issued the same on 8 January 2007.

18.  On 8 January 2007, the Solicitor also wrote another without prejudice letter to WFC to reiterate his demand for a power of attorney in view of his case that the assignment in 1999 was valid.  He further said:

“ The Power of Attorney is the only hindrance to the proposed settlement. Given our view as stated above, there is reasonable ground for your client to grant the necessary power to [the Solicitor]

Please re-consider the matter so that a speedy and amicable settlement can be reached.”

19.  As mentioned, this without prejudice letter was not disclosed to the Insurer.

20.  There was another letter dated 17 January 2007 in which the Solicitor urged WFC to reply to his offer.  

21.  In addition to the correspondence, the Solicitor called evidence from a junior partner in his firm and Cheng, a solicitor in WFC, with regard to the settlement negotiation during that period.  We have to consider their evidence in our analysis of the appeal on the 2^nd Complaint because a major ground of appeal is the failure of the Tribunal to assess the evidence of Cheng.  The up-shot of her evidence was that by mid-January 2007, the negotiations in December had come to an end because the terms offered by the Solicitor were simply not acceptable.  The negotiation in the latter part of January 2007 was conducted on a different footing.

22.  On 25 January 2007, the Solicitor wrote to WFC stating that his firm was seeking approval from the Insurer to settle.  He also said:

“ In the meantime, could you please provide us with [the ex-wife]’s (or her solicitors’) contact details. Alternatively, we shall be grateful if you would be kind enough to ask [the ex-wife] or her solicitors to contact us … with a view to make some efforts to resolve the matter in the best interest of all parties concerned.”

23.  On the same date, 25 January 2007, the Solicitor wrote to the Insurer asking for approval to settle the case at $540,000.  Again it is an important letter in the context of this complaint, and the relevant parts are as follows:

“ On 15^th December 2006, Mr Chan Yam Ping’s (“the Complainant’s”) solicitors in response to our enquiry indicated that the Complainant was prepared to settle for HK$644,707.60. A copy of the Complainant’s solicitors’ letter dated 15^th December 2006 is enclosed.

On a without prejudice and subject to contract basis, and without compromising your position at all, we managed to bring the settlement amount down to HK$540,000.

We now seek your approval to settle for HK$540,000 and indemnify us this amount pursuant to Rule 10 of the Solicitors’ (Professional Indemnity) Rules.

In the interest of the fund, your prompt reply is requested because the Complainant has indicated that he was to put up a further claim for interest on the basis of his loss.  This could be considerable because of the long lapse of time and the high judgment rate.  In order to avoid this additional claim, a prompt deal with the Complainant is desirable.”

24.  The Insurer made a complaint to the Law Society on 22 December 2008.  In respect of the dealings between the Solicitor and the Insurer, it summed up its allegation against the Solicitor as follows at p.5 of that letter:

“ By selective disclosure to the [Insurer], the [Solicitor] attempted to broker a deal in which they asked the [Insurer] to pay the Claimant HK$540,000 to settle the claim but did not disclose to the [Insurer] that as part of the proposed settlement [the Solicitor] … would take a personal interest in the Property under the … proposed terms of settlement.”

25.  Based on these facts, the Law Society laid a complaint against the Solicitor for breach of Principle 13.01 of the Guide and Rule 2(a) of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules by concealing or failing to disclose to the Insurer that in a proposed settlement, the Solicitor would obtain a personal interest in the matter.

26.  After a contested hearing, the Tribunal found the complaint established. The Tribunal imposed a fine of $80,000 in respect of this complaint.

27.  The Solicitor appealed against the finding of guilt under this complaint in CACV 20 of 2014.  With the leave of another division of this court, the Law Society appealed against the penalty imposed on this complaint in CACV 78 of 2014.

The finding of guilt under the 2^nd Complaint: CACV 20 of 2014

28.  We will deal with the Solicitor’s appeal first.  

29.  Before we consider the evidence and the reasoning of the Tribunal in finding guilt established, we must examine the charge in the Complaint Sheet. The Solicitor was charged with the complaint as framed and it was on that basis that the case was conducted before the Tribunal.  Had a different charge been laid, the conduct of the defence case may well have been different and the evidence might have taken a different course.  Hence, it is not open to the Law Society to support a finding of guilt in respect of a charge that had not been laid, whether before the Tribunal or this court.

30.  The main allegation of the 2^nd Complaint was stated in the Complaint Sheet as follows:

“2^nd Complaint

That you, Wan Hok Wai, Henry, have been in breach of Principle 13.01 of the Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct (“the Guide”), Volume 1, 2^nd Edition and Rule 2(a) of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules by concealing or failing to disclose to the Hong Kong Solicitors Indemnity Fund Limited (“the Fund”) that as part of your proposed settlement with the Claimant, you would obtain a personal interest in the Property.”

31.  Then in the particulars, a series of events and the course of correspondence between the Solicitor and WFC as well as his non-disclosure of some of the correspondence to the Insurer were recited.  We shall not set out those particulars at length here.  We however note the following:

(a) Under §(12), the complaint referred to the offer of the Solicitor in the letter of 27 December 2006 as “your proposed settlement terms”;

(b) Then at §(17), referring to the letter of 25 January 2007 to the Insurer, the case of the Law Society was put this way,

“ By this letter, you claimed ‘on a without prejudice and subject to contract basis, and without compromising [the Fund’s] position at all, we manage to bring the settlement amount down to HK$540,000’ and urged the Fund promptly ‘… to settle for HK$540,000 and indemnify [you] this amount pursuant to Rule 10 of the Solicitors’ (Professional Indemnity) Rules’. You deliberately concealed or failed to notify the Fund that as part of this settlement, you would obtain a personal interest in the Property, thereby concealing or would have the effect of misleading the Fund as the true extent of your loss for which the Fund was liable to indemnify.” (our emphasis)

(c) We placed emphasis on the words underlined because they highlight two elements of the complaint which are essential for the proper understanding of the charge;

(i) The relevant settlement was the one which the Solicitor recommended the Insurer to accept on 25 January 2007.  As explained below, this is significant in light of the defence case that there had been a substantial change in the settlement negotiations after mid-January and by 25 January 2007, the terms offered by the Solicitor in the letter of 27 December 2006 were no longer viable;

(ii) An important component of the charge (which, as set out at §(18), contains an allegation of fraud and deceit) is that the Solicitor would obtain a personal interest in the property under the settlement.  And the benefit is couched in terms of a personal interest in the property.    

(d) Lastly, at §(18) the gravamen of the complaint was summarized:

“ By reason of the matters set out above, and in particular your selective disclosure of your proposed terms of settlement with the Claimant, you acted towards the Fund in a way which is fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to your position as a solicitor and/or you committed acts which compromises or impairs or is likely to compromise or impair your independence or integrity.”

32.  As the charge had been brought by reference to Principle 13.01 of the Guide and Rule 2(a) of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules, we need to analyse how those rules are applicable in the present circumstances.  The Guide is binding on every solicitor in Hong Kong by reason of a Practice Direction issued by the Law Society on 1 June 1995.

33.  Principle 13.01 of the Guide reads:

“ 13.01 Fair dealing

A solicitor must not act, whether in his professional capacity or otherwise, towards anyone in a way which is fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to his position as a solicitor, nor must he use his position as a solicitor to take unfair advantage either for himself or another person.”

34.  Rule 2(a) of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules says:

“ A solicitor shall not, in the course of practising as a solicitor, do or permit to be done on his behalf anything which compromises or impairs or is likely to compromise or impair his independence or integrity.”

35.  The Rules were made under s 73 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance Cap 159.  Under that section, the Council may make rules providing for, amongst other things, “the professional practice, conduct and discipline of solicitors”, see s73(1)(a)(i).

36.  In the context of the dealing between the Solicitor and the Insurer (which, as discussed earlier, is the focus of the 2^nd Complaint), it is debatable whether the Solicitor acted in a professional capacity when he, as an insured person, urged the Insurer to accept the recommended settlement.  The Insurer was advised by another firm of solicitors and the Solicitor did not give any legal advice to the Insurer.  Though the Solicitor was only able to make a claim under the Solicitors’ (Professional Indemnity) Rules because he incurred liabilities in his practice as solicitor, and as such one may say that the making of a claim under the professional indemnity scheme falls within the scope of acting “in the course of practising as a solicitor”, it is difficult to see how the Solicitor owed a duty to act independently under Rule 2(a) in his dealing with the Insurer. 

37.  Likewise, it is difficult to see how for the purpose of Principle 13.01 the Solicitor could be said to have made use of his position as a solicitor to take unfair advantage for himself since he did not act as the legal advisor, or in his professional capacity in anyway, when he dealt with the Insurer.

38.  But we accept that a solicitor acting in a capacity other than his professional capacity can be found guilty for acting in breach of Principle 13.01 if he acted towards anyone in a way which is fraudulent or deceitful. 

39.  We also accept that the Solicitor could be found guilty for acting in breach of Rule 2(a) if he had done anything in his dealings with the Insurer which compromises or impairs or is likely to compromise or impair his integrity.

40.  Obviously, fraud and deceit requires proof of dishonest intent on the part of the Solicitor.  For compromise or impairment of integrity, in our view something more than negligence, breach of contractual duties or error of judgment has to be shown.

41.  The Tribunal correctly understood that the proposed settlement which the 2^nd Complaint focused upon was the proposed settlement which the Solicitor recommended to the Insurer on 25 January 2007.  They expressly said so at §40 of the Statement of Findings.

42.  The Tribunal also correctly appreciated that fraudulent intent has to be proved in respect of the 2^nd Complaint. Though they only referred to the failure to act fairly and with integrity at §49 of their Statement of Findings, at §3 of the Reasons and Order of 17 January 2014, the Tribunal said the concealment was necessarily fraudulent.

43.  The crucial issue in this appeal is whether the Tribunal had properly assessed the evidence and the defence case before they came to this view. 

44.  The defence case was that though the Solicitor had reported the potential claim to the Insurer on 6 December 2006, he initially intended to settle out of his own pocket and he would only claim for indemnity from the Insurer if he failed to reach a settlement on his terms[1]. Thus between end of December 2006 and mid January 2007 he pursued settlement negotiations without reference to the Insurer.  Later, when he understood matters could not be settled on his terms, he put forward a settlement on other terms which did not give him any personal benefit for the Insurer to consider on 25 January 2007.  In support of his case that the terms of settlement had changed, he called Cheng to testify on the settlement negotiations.

45.  In that respect, the evidence of Cheng, the solicitor of WFC who acted for the father at that period, is of great significance as she had no apparent personal interest in helping the Solicitor in his defence.  On the whole, her evidence supports the defence case. 

46.  In her affirmation, she gave evidence to the effect that the negotiations regarding the terms set out in the letter of 27 December 2006 had been terminated in early January 2007.  She stated at §10 and 11. 

“ 10. To the best of my recollection, following my letter of reply, I told Mr Yuen over the phone that the parties could not settle as our firm would not advise our client to agree to sign the Power of Attorney and I urged him to drop the terms proposed in the said letter. I told him Ms Ma would come to Hong Kong soon. Messrs HWY should sort out the matter with Ms Ma and simply paid us compensation and our client would be cooperative to sort out the mess.

11. Some time in early January 2007, the negotiation had come to a halt as my client’s son started to interfere with the proposed settlement.  He demanded that we should claim in full plus interests albeit the claimant agreed to accept HK$540,000.”

47.  She then said that the subsequent negotiation about $540,000 was one without conditions at §13:

“13. To the best of my collection, on or about 24 or 25^th January 2007, I telephoned Mr Yuen again and told him to offer HK$540,000 without conditions, as otherwise no settlement would be reached and the Claimant’s son would demand interests and the original sum claimed. I urged him to make an offer for HK$540,000- without imposing any conditions as soon as possible. This was the last offer made to HWY. However, I did not receive any offer. On 30^th January 2007, I had no further instructions to act for the Claimant.”

48.  In her oral testimony, she confirmed the evidence in her witness statement.  She further corroborated the Solicitor’s evidence that at the initial stage, she was told that the Solicitor intended to pay out of his own pocket[2].  She confirmed that the initial negotiations ended in early January 2007 and the term proposed on 25 January 2007 was the unconditional payment of $540,000 and the son of her client was pressing for more[3]. She stood firm on such evidence under cross-examination[4].

49.  In light of the charge laid against the Solicitor in respect of the 2^nd Complaint as analysed above and the evidence before the Tribunal, in our judgment in order to establish that the Solicitor acted with fraudulent or deceitful intent, it is necessary to resolve the following factual issues:

(a) Whether there had been a breakdown in negotiations in respect of the terms offered by the Solicitor in the letter of 27 December 2006 and the negotiation in the end of January 2007 was conducted on a separate footing that there had to be unconditional payment of $540,000 to the father for settlement;

(b) At the earlier stage of the negotiations based on the terms in the letter of 27 December 2006, whether the Solicitor intended to pay out of his own pocket without resorting to any indemnity from the insurer.

50.  Further, there was also a question of law in terms of whether the Solicitor could be said to have obtained any personal interest in the property from the settlement (even assuming that the terms of settlement include the execution of documents by the father to assist the Solicitor in his subsequent negotiation with the ex-wife).  This has to be considered against the background that by that stage, the HA had confirmed to WFC and the father that the 2000 Assignment was invalid (thus the father could not have assigned any interest in the property to the Solicitor), and this stance was reiterated by WFC in their letter of 27 December 2006.

51.  On the factual issues, the Tribunal should have had regard to the evidence of Cheng in making the necessary findings of fact.

52.  With respect to the Tribunal, we do not think the Tribunal had properly grappled with these issues in their Statement of Findings.  The Tribunal did not reject the evidence of Cheng.  At §44, the Tribunal referred to her evidence that by 24 or 25 January 2007, the term of settlement on the table was $540,000 unconditional payment.  Then they dealt with the matter in this way at §§ 47 and 48:

“47. The evidence before the Tribunal shows that the deadlock between the Respondent and the Claimant through WFC was the Power of Attorney requirement. The final written position of the Claimant was set out in WFC’s letter dated 27^th December 2006 on acceptance of which the Respondent would gain personal interest in the matter. It does not seem to the Tribunal that the Claimant ever changed that position to one which would extinguish the Respondent’s proposed personal interest.

48. That the Claimant might be persuaded to go along with all except one (relating to the Power of Attorney) of the terms set out in the Respondent dated 27^th December 2006 to WFC appeared to be possible to the Respondent on 25^th January 2007. This is seen from his letter that day to WFC indicating the possibility of settlement on the basis of “earlier correspondence”. In other words, he considered it possible for him to acquire personal interest in the matter if the Fund acceded to his funding request and the Claimant agreeing to the terms set of in the letter dated 27^th December 2006. What Ms Cheng said to Mr Yuen over the telephone on 24^th or 25^th January 2007, if at all known to the Respondent, did not seem to affect the Respondent, given the way he wrote the two letters dated 25^th January 2007. If, as he claimed in his testimony before the Tribunal, when he wrote the letter to the Fund dated 25^th January 2007, he was looking at having the Claimant paid without anything in return, there would be no point in getting in touch with Ma. Also, he did not make it clear that he anticipated that with funding from the Fund, he would simply pay a settlement sum to the Claimant without obtaining the personal interest he had been bargaining on.”

53.  In several respects, the reasoning in these paragraphs is unsatisfactory:

(a) The reference to the “final written position of the Claimant” as per WFC’s letter of 27 December 2006 could not have taken the matter further in light of Cheng’s evidence about what happened afterwards.  Unless the Tribunal rejected her evidence, that written position had been overtaken by subsequent events;

(b) Yet, the Tribunal did not discuss her evidence about these intervening events in the Statement of Findings and it did not give any reason for rejecting such version of events;

(c) It is not clear at all why the Tribunal said at §47 that the father had not changed his position since 27 December 2006.  That was directly contradicted by the evidence of Cheng and her explanation how this came about and the intervention of the son.  It appears that the Tribunal had, with respect, utterly failed to assess such evidence;

(d) The Tribunal seems to have cast doubt at §48[5] on whether the Solicitor had been apprised of the intervening events between 27 December 2006 and 25 January 2007.  But given that the junior partner was given the responsibility to negotiate on behalf of the firm against the background that the Solicitor (as principal) intended to pay out of his own pocket, it would be most unlikely that the Solicitor had not followed closely all the developments.  There is no rational basis for such a doubt;

(e) Further at §48, the Tribunal had put the cart before the horse by referring to the subjective belief of the Solicitor in terms of what he might be able to achieve as opposed to making the necessary finding of facts.  What had actually happened in the negotiations must have a direct bearing on the extent to which the Solicitor could have believed as to the agreement he might ultimately achieve.  Thus, the Tribunal should have made a finding on what were the actual terms for settlement on the table as at 25 January 2007 in light of the evidence of Cheng and the Solicitor before they proceeded to consider the subjective belief of the Solicitor;

(f) In any event, we are of the view that the Tribunal had read too much into the last paragraph in the letter of 25 January 2007 from the Solicitor to WFC.  It is not possible to infer from the request for having the contact details of the ex-wife that the Solicitor still believed that the settlement with the father would be on the terms set out in the letter of 27 December 2006 despite the intervening developments;

(g) Also, the crucial issue is what were the terms of settlement as opposed to what the Solicitor could have achieved by means of his efforts extraneous to the proposed settlement.  Negotiation with the ex-wife and whether it could lead to the Solicitor acquiring some interest in the property were extraneous to the settlement with the father.  The charge as framed, as we have seen, put the case of the Law Society on the basis that the Solicitor would acquire an interest in the property by the terms of the settlement; 

(h) The Tribunal had not dealt with the defence case that at the earlier stage, the Solicitor intended to pay out of his own pocket without resort to indemnity from the Insurer and simply proceeded on the basis that the character of the negotiation had not been changed.  This issue has a bearing on whether the Solicitor acted with a fraudulent or deceitful intent when he did not disclose that earlier correspondence to the Insurer; and

(i) The Tribunal unduly focused on what they found (without fully addressing the issues in the evidence as discussed in the preceding sub-paragraphs) to be what the Solicitor might have obtained as a possibility instead of what he would have obtained under the settlement, see also §49 of the Statement of Findings.  In so doing, the Tribunal had not properly analysed what would be the interest in the property that he could obtain from the father upon the payment of $540,000 despite the father’s lack of title in the property.  As discussed above, it is an element of the charge that the Solicitor would obtain a personal interest in the property under the settlement. 

54.  From the way in which the Tribunal referred to the evidence of Cheng at §§ 44 and 48, it seems to us that the Tribunal was minded to accept her evidence. Having reviewed her evidence, including her oral evidence and the cross-examination by the representative of the Law Society, and in view of her role in the whole incident, we cannot find any cogent reason for rejecting her evidence.

55.  In our judgment, the Tribunal failed to consider the defence case adequately.  The reasons given in the Statement of Findings do not address the crucial issues properly.  Though we do not expect a Statement of Findings in proceedings of this kind to be as sophisticated or well-written as a judgment of the High Court, in view of the serious consequences that the proceedings might have on the career of a professional man, it must at least deal with the major issues in the proceedings cogently and make the necessary findings on material factual disputes.

56.  Mr Karas, appearing for the Law Society in these appeals (but not below), defended the finding of guilt under the 2^nd Complaint by the following contentions:

(a) The Solicitor acted in breach of the directions of the Insurer in failing to disclose the letters from 27 December 2006 to 17 January 2007;

(b) Cheng’s evidence was irrelevant to the charge against the Solicitor because she had never spoken with the Solicitor;

(c) The Tribunal was entitled to give little weight to the evidence of Cheng because what she said around 25 January 2007 did not affect the Solicitor;

(d) Even on Cheng’s evidence, the Solicitor was hoping to have the assistance of the father in the negotiation with the ex-wife; and

(e) The 2^nd Complaint is not about the viability of the proposed settlement but about the concealment of some of the terms of the proposed settlement which might or might not be realized.

57.  In his oral submissions, Mr Karas further identified the interest in the property that the Solicitor would acquire under the proposed settlement as an equitable interest emerging from the father’s payment of the mortgage and other expenses in relation to the property.  He submitted that the interest need not be a perfect title.  He cited the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Cheuk Shu Yin v Yip So Wan (2012) 15 HKCFAR 344 to support his argument that the Solicitor could acquire an interest in the property from the father.

58.  We do not accept these submissions could support the finding of guilt by the Tribunal.  Cheng’s evidence is important for the reasons we have given above.  Unless the Tribunal properly assessed the evidence of Cheng, it could not have reached a proper conclusion on the defence case that the settlement proposed to the Insurer on 25 January 2007 did not include any term for the father to transfer any rights to the Solicitor as a condition for the payment of $540,000.  If there was a break in the continuity in the negotiations, whilst the non-disclosure of the earlier correspondence could be a breach of the Solicitor’s contractual obligations towards the Insurer, they could not be evidence of fraudulent or deceitful intent on the part of the Solicitor when he communicated to the Insurer the offer according to the terms on the table as at 25 January 2007.  The charge is not established simply because the Solicitor had concealed the earlier correspondence.

59.  We do not think the uncertain prospect of the intended negotiations with the ex-wife can be elevated into an interest in the property.  The charge specified acquisition of an interest in the property from the settlement.  The co-operation of the father in the intended negotiations with the ex-wife was not an interest in the property.  And according to the evidence of Cheng, whilst the Solicitor might have a hope in procuring the co-operation of the father, that was not a term for the payment of the $540,000.

60.  The Tribunal did not reach any conclusion on the interest in the property stemming from the various payments by the father towards it.  We do not have the full picture in that regard and we are not going to speculate whether the father could have claimed an equitable interest in the property by reference to Cheuk Shu Yin v Yip So Wan (2012) 15 HKCFAR 344. 

61.  For these reasons, we do not find ourselves able to uphold the finding of guilt in respect of the 2^nd Complaint.  We shall allow the appeal by the Solicitor on this complaint.  We have considered whether we should remit the matter to a differently constituted tribunal for retrial.  However in light of the following, we do not think we should make such order:

(a) As we have said above, it appears to us that the Tribunal had no reason to disbelieve Cheng. Having reviewed her evidence and the cross-examination of her and the extent she was challenged, the fair course to take in the circumstances is to regard her evidence on the facts as being accepted as true;

(b) On her evidence, and in view of what we said about the unlikelihood of the Solicitor being ignorant of her discussion with the junior partner, the Solicitor knew that the only offer on the table as at 25 January 2007 was the unconditional payment of $540,000;

(c) We do not see any cogent basis for holding that the offer he recommended to the Insurer on 25 January 2007 was an offer with those conditions set out in the letter of 27 December 2006;

(d) In our judgment, the Solicitor would not derive any personal benefit in terms of interest in the property from the offer he commended to the Insurer on 25 January 2007;

(e) Thus, it would be futile to remit the case back to the Tribunal; and

(f) Another consideration is the lapse of time between the events in question and now, though this is not conclusive in view of the seriousness of the charge.  Yet, the weakness in the case of the Law Society under the 2^nd Complaint strongly militates against the remitting of the case after such lapse of time.

62.  We shall allow the appeal in CACV 20 of 2014 and set aside the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the 2^nd Complaint.  We will also dismiss the 2^nd Complaint.  In view of the abandonment of the appeal on the 1^st Complaint at the time when the Solicitor lodges his skeleton submissions, we shall order the Law Society to pay 85% of the costs of the Solicitor in this appeal.

63.  We do not find it necessary to deal with the 2 summonses of 26 February 2015 taken out on behalf of the Solicitor.  We make no order on them and there shall be no order as to costs in respect of the same. 

Penalty under the 1^st Complaint: CACV 78 of 2014 

64.  In view of our decision on the 2^nd Complaint, we shall confine ourselves to the question of penalty on the 1^st Complaint.

65.  We have summarised the facts of this complaint at the beginning of this judgment.

66.  As regards the ambiguity in the Tribunal’s finding over the Solicitor’s evidence on his explanation to the parties on 20 December 1999, bearing in mind that the Tribunal manifestly eschewed making a finding of fraudulent or dishonest intent on the part of the Solicitor in relation to the 1^st Complaint, and the nature of the appeal before us (being an appeal against penalty but not against finding of guilt), we think the proper course for us to take is to proceed on a basis more favourable to the Solicitor, viz that his evidence in that respect was accepted by the Tribunal.

67.  Even on that basis, we are of the view that the penalty imposed by the Tribunal was clearly wrong.  Though this court will give recognition and attach great weight to a penalty imposed by a disciplinary tribunal, the scope for intervention is no longer restricted to those where “a very strong case” for doing so is established.  In Salsbury v Law Society [2009] 1 WLR 1286, Jackson LJ said at p.1296:

“ … It is now an overstatement to say that ‘a very strong case’ is required before the court will interfere with the sentence imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The correct analysis is that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest. Absent any error of law, the high Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the tribunal. Nevertheless if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere. …”

68.  This has been cited with approval by Fok JA (as he then was) in Hong Kong in Chan Cheuk Chi v The Registrar of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants CACV 38 of 2012, 8 February 2013. In that case, the court adopted the “clearly wrong” test.

69.  In A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong [2004] 2 HKLRD 490, at §61 the Court of Appeal distilled the following principles from earlier decisions on penalty in solicitor disciplinary matters:

“ 1 .An order that the solicitor be struck off the Roll of Solicitor is appropriate where dishonesty is involved.

2. Although a striking off is almost invariably the penalty for dishonesty, there may be cases where a suspension is the appropriate penalty when dishonesty is involved.

3. Where a solicitor has not acted dishonesty but has fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, then suspension is the appropriate sentence.

4. It is only in the most exceptional cases that orders other than suspension should be imposed in cases covered by paragraph 3 above.

5. The rationale for these heavy sentences is four-fold:

(a) To punish the solicitor.

(b) To deter others from acting in the same way.

(c) To ensure that the offender will not have the opportunity to repeat the offence.

(d) To maintain the reputation of the profession and to sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession.

6. If suspension is the appropriate remedy then it will not be an objection to impose it even though the solicitor may be unable to re-establish his practice when the period of suspension is past.

7. Each case has to be determined on its own facts.  The professional body entrusted with the task of professional discipline is in an uniquely advantageous position to discharge its duty.”

70.  We would make the following observations with regard to these principles.  Subject to the question whether striking off could be the appropriate sentence in a case not involving dishonesty (which we shall elaborate below), we are in general agreement with these guidelines.  As for the rationale for these sentences, for our part we would place more emphasis on the need to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession.  We respectfully reiterate what was said by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 concerning the purpose of these penalties.  In particular, what His Lordship said at p.519B to E is illuminating and bears repetition:

“ Because orders made by the tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic. Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again. … All these matters are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness. Thus it can never be an objection to an order of suspension in an appropriate case that the solicitor may be unable to re-establish his practice when the period of suspension is past. If that proves, or appears to be likely, to be so the consequence for the individual and his family may be deeply unfortunate and unintended. But it does not make suspension the wrong order if it is otherwise right. The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price.”

71.  Further, the principle at (7) in  A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong, supra, should now be read together with what we said above on the scope for intervention by this court.

72.  Mr Karas submitted on behalf of the Law Society that we should re-visit the question whether striking off should be confined to cases involving dishonesty.  He referred to the case cited in A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong, supra, and rightly pointed out that in none of them was such restriction laid down.  In Bolton, supra, the Master of the Rolls said at p.518D to E:

“ If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust. A striking off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well. The decision whether to strike off or to suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.”

73.  There are cases in England where striking off was deemed to be appropriate even without any finding of dishonesty on the part of the defaulting solicitor.  In Law Society v Emeana [2013] EWHC 2130 (Admin), Moses LJ said at §§25 and 26:

25. ...The essential principle is that which was identified by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 1286.  The profession of solicitor requires complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness.  Lapses less serious than dishonesty may nonetheless require striking off, if the reputation of the solicitors' profession "to be trusted to the ends of the earth" is to be maintained. 

26. The principle identified in Bolton means that in cases where there has been a lapse of standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness a solicitor should expect to be struck off.  Such cases will vary in severity. It is commonplace, in mitigation, either at first instance or on appeal, whether the forum is a criminal court or a disciplinary body, for the defendant to contend that his case is not as serious as others.  That may well be true.  But the submission is of little assistance.  If a solicitor has shown lack of integrity, probity or trustworthiness, he cannot resist striking off by pointing out that there are others who have been struck off, who were guilty of far more serious offences.  The very fact that an absence of integrity, probity or trustworthiness may well result in striking off, even though dishonesty is not proved, explains why the range of those who should be struck off will be wide.  Their offences will vary in gravity.  Striking off is the most serious sanction but it is not reserved for offences of dishonesty.”

74.  Mr Karas also referred us to the judgment of the President of the Queen’s Bench Division in Iqbal v Solicitors Regulations Authority [2012] EWHC 3251 (Admin), where His Lordship said at §§ 21-23:

“21. …In those circumstances I accept that it must be right for us to consider again the penalty on the basis that there was no dishonesty.

22. I turn to do so on an understanding as to the position of the solicitor.  It is not necessary to set out statements as to the position and esteem in which the profession is held and the importance of the highest professional standards.  Those are set out in the judgments of Sir Thomas Bingham MR, as he then was, in the well-known case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 and again in his decision in Weston v the Law Society reported in the Times 15 July 1998, when Sir Thomas Bingham spoke of standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness.  In Western he made clear that trustworthiness did not merely refer to honesty, but also the duty arising from holding someone else's money. 

23. It seems to me that trustworthiness also extends to those standards which the public are entitled to expect of a solicitor, including competence.  If a solicitor exhibits manifest incompetence, as, in my judgment, the appellant did, then it is impossible to see how the public can have confidence in a person who has exhibited such incompetence.  It is difficult to see how a profession such as the medical profession would countenance retaining as a doctor someone who had showed himself to be incompetent.  It seems to me that the same must be true of the solicitors' profession.  If in a course of conduct a person manifests incompetence as, in my judgment, the appellant did, then he is not fit to be a solicitor.  The only appropriate remedy is to remove him from the roll.  It must be recalled that being a solicitor is not a right, but a privilege.  The public is entitled not only to solicitors who behave with honesty and integrity, but solicitors in whom they can impose trust by reason of competence.”

75.  On the facts of A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong, supra, the complaints which were upheld on appeal related to incompetence.  There was no allegation of dishonesty.  For the charges which were sustained on appeal, the sentence imposed by the tribunal was suspension of 2 years and a fine of $30,000 respectively.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence for the first complaint to a suspension of 1 year and there was no change to the sentence for the second complaint.  The court was of the view that the solicitor had fallen below the required standard of integrity, probity and trustworthiness[6].  

76.  It is not clear from the report whether striking off was argued as an option in that case.  Since it was an appeal by the solicitor against the penalty of 2-year suspension and the court reduced it to 1-year suspension, it would appear that the proper criteria for ordering a striking off might not have been subject to full arguments in that case.  We therefore regard the comments in those regards at §61 of that judgment as obiter.  Even so, what had been said in that paragraph deserved great respect.

77.  Though Mr McCoy SC submitted that we are bound by Hong Kong authorities but not English authorities, counsel did not put forward substantive arguments to challenge the submissions of Mr Karas in this respect.

78.  With great respect, we are of the view that there is room for flexibility in relation to the circumstances under which a striking off penalty is appropriate and it should not be straight-jacketed to cases involving dishonesty.  We find the reasoning in the English cases cited above compelling.  Since what was said in A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong, supra, in term of striking off is, strictly speaking, only obiter, we do not have to say that it is plainly wrong before we depart from it.

79.  Hence, we are of the view that in an appropriate case of a solicitor being found to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, the tribunal could impose a penalty of striking off from the roll of solicitors.

80.  However, on the facts of the present case, though we are of the view that the penalty imposed by the Tribunal is clearly wrong, we do not think it is appropriate to order a striking off.  Instead, in our judgment, the appropriate penalty should be a suspension for two years with the condition that when the Solicitor resumes practice after the suspension, he is prohibited from practising as a sole proprietor or partner or manager of a solicitors firm until the Law Society is satisfied that he is fit to do so.

81.  In coming to this conclusion, we have taken account of the mitigating circumstances set out in the submissions placed before the Tribunal.  However, we are of the firm view that the penalty of a fine of $40,000 imposed by the Tribunal is clearly wrong.  As we said, we are dealing with the matter on the basis that there was no dishonesty on the part of the Solicitor and he had indeed explained to the parties who executed the assignment that there could well be amendments to the document by the HA.  Even so, it is a very serious matter to change the contents of the assignment without first apprising the parties as to what those amendments were.  It is all the more serious when, at the time of the swapping of the pages, one of the party had passed away.  Moreover, the document was an assignment which the Solicitor subsequently registered with the Lands Registry.  In doing so, the Solicitor had created a false impression in a public registry as to the title of a property.  It is a serious breach of the public trust placed upon the Solicitor.  As observed by the President in Iqbal v Solicitors Regulations Authority, supra, the public is entitled not only to solicitors who behave with honesty and integrity, but solicitors in whom they can impose trust by reason of competence.  What the Solicitor did was also a gross dereliction of his duty towards the HA. 

82.  If a solicitor can escape lightly with such a serious breach of duties and gross incompetence, the public would lose confidence in our conveyancing system which depends substantially on high and uncompromising standards of both integrity and competence on the part of the solicitors involved in such transactions. 

83.  In our view, the fact that the Solicitor did not derive personal benefit out of the transaction carries little weight in the circumstances.  If there was an element of personal benefit, it would be an aggravating factor and most likely there would also be an element of dishonesty.  However, even without such elements, as in the present case, it is still a very serious matter for a solicitor to swap pages in a conveyancing document and then have it registered at the Land Registry.  The Solicitor should appreciate that there are other people who would rely on the document and the fact that it was prepared and registered by a solicitor.  It should have been obvious to any solicitor that under no circumstances should this be done. 

84.  Obviously, the errors of the Solicitor had caused the father to suffer financial loss.  He had also created problems in respect of the title to the property which the ex-wife and the father had to go through litigation to resolve (with costs and time engaged in the process as well).  This is by no means a minor victim-less infraction.  Substantial public as well as private resources had to be incurred as a result of his wrongdoing. 

85.  For these reasons, we allow the appeal by the Law Society in CACV 78 of 2014, set aside the penalty imposed by the Tribunal in respect of the 1^st Complaint and instead make an order of suspension as per §80 above.  We also make a costs order nisi that the Solicitor shall pay the Law Society’s costs of this appeal, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

86.  Before we leave this case, we wish to make an observation as to the title of these proceedings.  By reason of Order 106 Rule 12(1), the Solicitor is not named in the title of the proceedings.  However, there is no similar restriction in respect of appeals from disciplinary tribunals of the other professions like doctors, accountants, dentists.  It is doubtful if the restriction is in line with the current concept of open justice and the High Court Rules Committee should review the position.