Case Details
Citation
THE QUEEN v. IP TAT SHING AND OTHERS, DCCC 90A/1971
Case Number
DCCC 90A/1971
Court
District Court
(DC)
Parties
Applicant(s):

admissibility and exercise of discretionary powers in respect of statements by accused persons is not sufficiently distinguished. They are distinct matters though related and to a degree overlapping and interwoven. However there is a vital distinction. The question of discretion only arises if the evidence is admissible. If it is not admissible then the question of discretion does not arise. 6. In referring to cases one must of necessity be selective. I, myself think the law is most clearly set out in the decision of the High Court of Australia in R. v. LEE (1950) 82 Commonwealth Law Reports 133, which I consider demonstrates a full knowledge and understanding of the law. It sets out the Common Law and the decision is not dependent on local legislation. I also find of particular assistance the decisions in R. v. Corr 1968 Northern Ireland Reports 193 and R. V. LI Wai-leung 1969 H.K.L.R. 642. 7. For a confession made by an accused person to be admissible in law there are two rules to which it must conform:- (1) It must be relevant; and (2) It must be voluntary. There is an exception as to the necessity for voluntariness where one accused seeks to have admitted in evidence a confession made by a co-accused R. v. Attard, R. v. Mifsud (1970) 1 New South Wales Reports 750, but in such circumstances a special direction to the jury is necessary as to the purposes which for which confession is admitted. The rules apply also to admissions which do not amount to confessions. 8. Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Mars 1967 2 H.K.L.R. 297. The wording of the Judges’ Rules referred to at page 304 therein, as emphasised by Lord Reid, would indicate that the rule as to voluntariness also applies to an exculpatory statement made by an accused if the Crown wishes to lead it e.g. to show a concocted story. This has been specifically held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Piche v. R. (1970) Canadian Criminal Cases 27, and there is a similar implication in Lee’s case at page 146 and page 152, and it was so assumed without being decided in A.G. v. McCabe 1927 Irish Reports 129. It is not clear from the report whether or not this test was applied to the statement in Mawaz Khan v. R. 1966 3 W.L.R. 1275. 9. I do not propose to deal with the question of relevance which seldom causes difficulty, but pass on to the matter of voluntariness. Many of the cases and authors treat voluntariness as if it is merely a matter of whether or not there were threats or inducements held out by a person is authority. However those are simply one class of matters that show involuntariness, and the rule is not thereby fully stated. These cases and authors are too narrowly construing the words of Lord Sumner is Ibrahim v. R. 1914 A.C. 599, 609 where he said “It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority. The principle is as old as Lord Hale. The burden of proof in the matter has been decided by high authority in recent times in R. v. Thompson [1893] 2 Q.B. 12 ………… The

Respondent(s):

see remarks of Huggins J. in R. v. LI Wai-leung 1969 H.K.L.R. 642. However, as regards voluntary confessions, the discretion to exclude appears to be on a somewhat wider principle than risk of prejudice, and is apparently based on fairness. In some cases, the distinction between admissibility and exercise of discretionary powers in respect of statements by

THE QUEEN v. IP TAT SHING AND OTHERS

DCCC 90A/1971

District Court

Citation

Court

Procedural posture

Issues

Holdings

Legal principles

Disposition

Key citations