Case Details
Listing:
CHAU TAT WING, suing in his own capacity and as the sole executor of the estate of WONG TIM LUN, deceased v. WONG KWAI WAN AND ANOTHER
CHAU TAT WING, suing in his own capacity and as the sole executor of the estate of WONG TIM LUN, deceased v. WONG KWAI WAN AND ANOTHER
[2026] HKCA 1891 · CAMP 256/2025
Court of Appeal
CAMP 256/2025, [2026] HKCA 1891
On Appeal from [2025] HKDC 872 & [2025] HKDC 2087
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 256 OF 2025
(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCCJ NO 3244 OF 2022)
BETWEEN
CHAU TAT WING, suing in his own capacity Plaintiff
and as the sole executor of the estate of
WONG TIM LUN, deceased
and
WONG KWAI WAN 1st Defendant
SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE 2nd Defendant
(SUED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF
DIRECTOR OF LANDS)
________________
Before: Hon Au and Hon Coleman JJA in Court
Dates of Written Statements: 29 December 2025 and 27 January 2026
Date of Judgment: 26 October 2026
____________________
J U D G M E N T
____________________
Hon Coleman JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
A. Introduction
In a judgment dated 4 February 2026 in CAMP 130/2025, [2026] HKCA 63 (“CA
Judgment”), the Court of Appeal (G Lam and Chow JJA) dismissed the
Plaintiff’s renewed application for leave to appeal against the judgment of
HHJ Harold Leung (“Judge”) dated 12 December 2024 in DCCJ 3244/2022, [2024]
HKDC 2067 (“Main Judgment”) as amended or varied on 31 March 2025, [2025]
HKDC 517 (“Further Decision”). The Plaintiff’s intended appeal mainly
related to the Judge’s determination of the disputes between the Plaintiff
and the 1st Defendant.
Before this Court now is the Plaintiff’s renewed application for leave to
appeal against the Judge’s decision dated 6 June 2025, [2025] HKDC 872
(“Costs Decision”) refusing to vary the costs order nisi made by the Judge
at §98 of the Main Judgment, by which the Plaintiff was ordered to pay the
2nd Defendant’s costs of the Action to be taxed if not agreed, with
certificate for one counsel (“Costs Order”).
Having considered the papers, we consider that it is appropriate to deal
with the present application on the basis of written submissions only
without an oral hearing pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(5)(a) of the Rules of
the High Court Cap 4A (“RHC”).
B. Brief background
The basic facts have been set out in the Main Judgment, and summarised in
the CA Judgment. We do not propose to repeat them here, save to mention
the following:
1) The main dispute was between the Plaintiff and the
1st Defendant, concerning the boundary of their lands adjacent
to each other in DD 129 in Yuen Long, New Territories. Central
to their dispute was the issue of what the correct boundary line
is between the southern portion of the 1st Defendant’s Land and
northern portion of the Plaintiff’s Land. The contest was on
whether the boundary was correctly shown on the 2012 Survey Plan
prepared by an authorised land surveyor or the 2006 Survey Plan,
an earlier survey plan also prepared by the same surveyor.
2) The 2nd Defendant was joined to the Action by the Plaintiff
because the Director of Lands accepted the 2012 Survey Plan
deposited by the 1st Defendant on 10 September 2012, and the
Survey and Mapping Office subsequently updated the relevant lot
index plan on 19 October 2012 showing the boundary line between
the Plaintiff’s Land and the 1st Defendant’s Land was as per the
2012 Survey Plan. The Plaintiff claimed against the
2nd Defendant in negligence and sought declaratory relief in
respect of what he contended to be the true boundary line
between his Land and the 1st Defendant’s Land, as well as orders
for the removal of the 2012 Survey Plan and the 2016 Lot Index
Plan from the file(s) of the Lands Department.
3) The 2nd Defendant denied the Plaintiff’s claim by contending,
amongst other matters, that there was no duty owed by the
Director to the Plaintiff, and the 2nd Defendant or the Director
was protected by section 33 of the Land Survey Ordinance,
Cap 473 (“Ordinance”) from any liability arising from the
deposit with the Director of plans and records resulting from
any land boundary survey by a party, from the inaccurate
information in the deposited plans and records or their
inconsistency with the result of the relevant land boundary
survey or the land boundary record, or from the Government’s or
Director’s supply of any plan or record or information under the
Ordinance.
4) The 2nd Defendant counterclaimed for a declaration as to the
correct boundary line of part of Lot 2451 in DD 129, which was a
piece of land owned by the Government (“Government Land”) and
abutting the southern boundary of the 1st Defendant’s Land and
western boundary of the Plaintiff’s Land. The area
counterclaimed by the 2nd Defendant takes up approximately
2.2 m2 in size (“Counterclaimed Area”).
On 12 December 2024, the Judge handed down the Main Judgment after trial.
Insofar as the disputes between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant were
concerned, the Judge dismissed both the Plaintiff’s claim against the
2nd Defendant and the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim, and made the Costs
Order (originally nisi), for the following reasons:
1) The Judge considered that the Plaintiff was bringing a claim of
negligence against the 2nd Defendant, but failed to show that
the 2nd Defendant owed to the Plaintiff a duty of care, or to
prove any breach of such duty of care on the part of the
2nd Defendant.
2) The Judge considered that the Plaintiff’s contention that the
2006 Survey Plan was more accurate than the 2012 Survey Plan was
irrelevant to establishing the liability on the part of the
2nd Defendant due to the exclusion of the 2nd Defendant’s
liability by virtue of section 33(1) of the Ordinance as regards
the accuracy of the plans and records deposited with the
Director.
3) The Judge also considered that the proper course of action for
the Plaintiff to recover any loss he claimed to have suffered
from the inaccurate land survey record which disturbed the
correct boundary lines of his land was to sue the surveyor, but
he did not do so in the Action.
4) The Judge held that the failure to join the surveyor as a
defendant to the Action, or to follow the proper procedures in
the appropriate forum by seeking a review by the District Survey
Office in Yuen Long to clarify the boundary line, and his choice
of commencing the Action against the Defendants in a wrong
forum, and in the case of the 2nd Defendant, by raising a
groundless negligence claim, showed that the commencement of the
Action may amount to an abuse of process.
5) In respect of the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim, the Judge held
that the Action was not judicial review proceedings and did not
involve a negligence claim against the relevant authorised land
surveyor, and the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the
accuracy of the survey plans in dispute, or to grant a
declaration that the 2012 Survey Plan was accurate.
The Main Judgment was amended or varied by the Judge in the Further
Decision, where the Judge acknowledged that although the court had no
jurisdiction to merely adjudicate on which survey plan was “more accurate”,
it had jurisdiction to enforce the boundary according to the survey map
maintained by the Director under section 4(a) of the Ordinance.
In refusing leave to appeal on 30 June 2025, [2025] HKDC 1044, the Judge
held that based on the factual findings in the Main Judgment, even if he
did not make such an error of law on the court’s jurisdiction, he would
still not have made a declaration that the boundary between P’s Land and
D1’s Land was as shown in the 2006 Survey Plan as the Plaintiff claimed,
and would have granted a declaration that the common boundary should be
shown in the 2012 Survey Plan, which was the remedy sought by the
2nd Defendant (but not the 1st Defendant).
By the Costs Decision refusing to vary the Costs Order originally made
nisi, and in exercising his discretion on costs in favour of the
2nd Defendant, the Judge took into account the matters set out in Order 62
rule 5 of the Rules of District Court Cap 336H (“RDC”), which he considered
appropriate. In coming to his conclusion, the Judge considered that
(1) the Plaintiff’s claim and the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim were
essentially intertwined, (2) the Plaintiff’s claim against the
2nd Defendant to dispute the accuracy of the survey records was
misconceived because he acted in disregard of section 33 of the Ordinance
and failed to claim against the right defendant or through the appropriate
forum, (3) a substantial amount of the court’s time at trial was spent on
hearing experts’ evidence on the accuracy of various survey plans or
records, in which the Plaintiff failed to adduce convincing evidence to
substantiate his claim, and (4) the Plaintiff’s conduct in the proceedings
was questionable.
On 12 December 2025, the Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal
against the Costs Decision was refused by the Judge, [2025] HKDC 2087
(“Leave Decision”), on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of
success on any of the Plaintiff’s intended grounds of appeal. The Judge
also held that the 2nd Defendant would have succeeded on its counterclaim
but for the error of law committed by the Judge in relation to the court’s
jurisdiction to enforce the correct boundary in accordance with the survey
map maintained by the Director.
C. The Present Application
C.1 Introduction
By summons filed on 29 December 2025, the Plaintiff renewed his application
for leave to appeal against the Costs Decision. In the draft Notice of
Appeal attached to the Summons, the Plaintiff advanced four intended
grounds of appeal (“Ground 1” to “Ground 4” respectively) – see below.
There is some overlap among the intended grounds of appeal, but the core
contention is that there was no basis or justification for the Judge to
deprive the Plaintiff’s costs of the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim dismissed
by the Judge.
The relevant principles for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of
the District Court, and for granting leave to appeal against a costs order
made by a judge at first instance, are well established and have been
previously summarised by the Judge. They need not be repeated here.
C.2 Ground 1
The Plaintiff complains under Ground 1 that the Judge erroneously
characterised the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim because the relief sought by
the 2nd Defendant in its counterclaim was not a declaration on the accuracy
of the 2012 Survey Plan, but on the ownership of the Counterclaim Area.
The Plaintiff also contends that the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim is
distinct from and unsupported by the 2012 Survey Plan.
In our view, it is reasonably arguable that the Judge’s characterisation of
the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim did not fully apprehend the scope of the
declaratory relief which the 2nd Defendant was seeking in its counterclaim.
That said, we consider that the Judge’s possible mischaracterisation at
most amounts to an over-simplification in paraphrasing 2nd Defendant’s
counterclaim, but not to a misapprehension of fact in reaching the Costs
Decision.
There is no merit in the Plaintiff’s contention that the 2nd Defendant’s
counterclaim was unrelated to or unconnected with the Plaintiff’s claim in
which the Plaintiff put the accuracy of the 2012 Survey Plan at the center
of the parties’ disputes. We agree with the Judge’s view that the
2nd Defendant’s counterclaim was not based upon any new plan produced ‘out
of thin air’, but referred to and based upon the 2012 Survey Plan, in
particular in relation to the material portion.
At trial, the 2nd Defendant adduced expert opinion to establish that the
2012 Survey Plan was accurate: see §93 of the Main Judgment. It is also
clear from §96 of the Main Judgment that the Judge did not lose sight of
the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim as pleaded before he looked at the
substance of the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim, which the Judge continued to
adopt in his consideration of varying costs. We therefore do not consider
the Judge’s holding that the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim was in substance
seeking a declaratory relief on the accuracy on the 2012 Survey Plan was
plainly wrong, or that the Judge’s characterisation of the 2nd Defendant’s
counterclaim gives rise to any reasonably arguable basis for the Court of
Appeal to find it sufficient to interfere with the Costs Decision.
C.3 Ground 2
The Plaintiff complains under Ground 2 that the Judge erred in conflating
the disputes between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant with those between
the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, and contends that the Plaintiff’s
failure to pursue his claim against the 1st Defendant was irrelevant to the
determination to the costs on the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim.
The Plaintiff’s complaint is directed at the Judge’s holding at §11 of the
Costs Decision that the Plaintiff’s expert failed to show the 2006 Survey
Plan was more accurate than the 2012 Survey Plan, which relates to §92 of
the Main Judgment. In our view, this has no reasonable prospect of
success.
This complaint is merely an extension of his contention under Ground 1 that
the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim is totally unconnected with the
Plaintiff’s claim, which we have rejected. Whether or not a party has
succeeded on part of his case was a relevant factor which the Judge was
entitled to take into account in exercising his discretion on costs
pursuant to Order 62, rule 5(1)(f) of the RDC. The Plaintiff’s failure to
establish that the 2006 Survey Plan was the accurate record in showing the
correct boundary line plainly had the effect of disposing of the
2nd Defendant’s counterclaim substantively, and was also relevant to
determining the amount of time and costs incurred by and attributable to
the Plaintiff in the proceedings involving substantial use of expert
evidence.
Further, Order 62 rule 5(1)(e) of the RDC states that the court in
exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may
be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account the conduct of all
parties, and under sub-paragraph (2)(a) and (b), consider the
reasonableness of a party in pursuing his claim and the manner in which he
has pursued his case. The 2nd Defendant in pursuing its counterclaim acted
fairly by putting forward a case that was less favourable to its interest
and more favourable to that of the Plaintiff without blindly following the
result as delineated on the 2012 Survey Plan. This was the type of conduct
of a litigant that the Judge was entitled to consider in exercising his
wide discretion on costs.
C.4 Ground 3
Under this ground, the Plaintiff complains that there was no legal basis
for the Judge to hold that the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim was
necessitated by the Plaintiff’s dispute, or that the 2nd Defendant should
be awarded costs of its unsuccessful counterclaim even if its counterclaim
was necessitated by the Plaintiff’s dispute.
First, the Plaintiff contends that the 2nd Defendant raised its
counterclaim out of its own free will in the proceedings, and had acted
unreasonably in pursuing its counterclaim despite the Plaintiff’s
confirmation of abandoning his negligence claim against the 2nd Defendant’s
before trial. The Plaintiff points to the pre-trial correspondence
exchanged between his solicitors and the Department of Justice for the
2nd Defendant between 15 March 2024 and 15 April 2024 to show that his
claim against the 2nd Defendant was effectively abandoned before trial.
But without taking out any formal application for leave to withdraw or even
securing a joint letter with the 2nd Defendant to the like effect, we do
not consider the Plaintiff’s withdrawal to be necessarily effective.
Further, the proposal in those two letters had left open the issue of costs
between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant in the event of withdrawal.
In fact, the 2nd Defendant had explained in its letter to the Plaintiff
dated 25 March 2024 as to why its counterclaim was to be pursued in the
proceedings by stating that even if the boundary disputes between the
Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant were eventually decided in favour of the
Plaintiff, there remained the unresolved issue of whether the
Counterclaimed Area would form part of the Plaintiff’s Land or the
Government Land, and the issue in dispute would most conveniently and
appropriately be heard and determined by the Court together with the
Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant, unless the Plaintiff and the
Government were able to resolve the question by way of consent.
Second, the Plaintiff contends that the mere fact that the 2nd Defendant’s
counterclaim was connected with the Plaintiff’s claim did not give rise to
any valid or sufficient basis for the Judge to deprive the Plaintiff of his
costs incurred on defeating the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim.
We think the Plaintiff’s contention has no merit. It is trite that a trial
judge has a wide discretion on costs. In the present case, the Judge
awarded the 2nd Defendant costs of its counterclaim not solely because its
counterclaim happened to come under the same set of the proceedings
commenced by the Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant, but mainly because
the Judge found that the issues in dispute between the Plaintiff and the
2nd Defendant were essentially intertwined. The Judge was entitled to do
so as a matter of principle.
The authorities relied on by the Plaintiff were not intended to lay down
any general legal principle – let alone an inflexible rule – on how the
court should exercise its discretion on costs, but were decided on their
own facts and circumstances. In this case, the 2nd Defendant’s
counterclaim was dismissed merely on a technical ground, and the Judge was
entitled to take the view that the Plaintiff was not a de facto successful
party to the 2nd Defendant’s counterclaim despite the dismissal. Further,
there was plainly justification for the Judge to depart from the starting
point of “costs follow event” in respect of the dismissal of the
2nd Defendant’s counterclaim by taking into account the substance of the
disputes between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiff’s
conduct in pursuing his claim against the 2nd Defendant with the main
objective to resolve his land boundary dispute with the 1st Defendant, how
the trial was conducted, and the overall outcome of the proceedings.
C.5 Ground 4
The Plaintiff complains under Ground 4 about the lack of reasoning or
adequate reasoning to deal with various matters raised by the Plaintiff
below.
This ground may be disposed of briefly. First, the Judge rejected the
Plaintiff’s complaint alleging the inadequacy in the Judge’s reasoning in
the Costs Decision for reasons given at §§39-43 of the Leave Decision,
where the Judge correctly identified the legal principles applicable to an
intended appeal based on inadequate reasoning. The Plaintiff has not
engaged with the Judge’s reasoning, but merely repeated the same complaint,
which in substance was an attempt to re-argue the points he had raised
before, but which were rejected by the Judge.
In any event, the points set out in Ground 4 largely overlap with the
Plaintiff’s contentions raised in Grounds 1 to 3 above. Further, as an
example only, the Judge had given detailed reasons at §§80-92 of the Main
Judgment in rejecting the Mid-Line Practice advanced by the Plaintiff’s
expert as a new theory at trial to explain the boundary line of the
Plaintiff’s Land, the 1st Defendant’s Land, the Government Land and another
piece of adjoining land in the disputed area, and concluded that the Mid-
Line Practice, even if accepted, the Plaintiff’s claim depending on the
accuracy of the 2006 Survey Plan would have failed. We do not consider the
Judge fell into any palpable error in not repeating his reasons in the
Costs Decision when the Plaintiff sought to rely on Mr Tang’s expert
opinion on the Mid-Line Practice again, but this time for the purpose of
the sought variation. All the points are untenable in substance.
The Plaintiff also complains that the Judge erred in re-deciding the case
in favour of the 2nd Defendant’s proposed boundary line at §25 of the Leave
Decision, without giving any proper reasons. This complaint was not raised
in the draft Notice of Appeal, and the Plaintiff is not permitted to raise
it by way of submissions. In any event, we consider it is totally
misconceived. There is no variation to the Judge’s ruling on the
2nd Defendant’s counterclaim which remained dismissed despite the Judge’s
acknowledgment of his error committed in relation to the court’s
jurisdiction in determining the present case. The Judge’s view at §25 of
the 2nd Leave Decision was merely in response to the Plaintiff’s invitation
to the Judge to take into account his ruling in the Leave Decision, and to
illustrate that the Plaintiff would still be considered as the losing party
in the proceedings for the purpose of determining costs.
D. Disposition
In all, we are of the view that none of the intended grounds of appeal have
any reasonable prospect of success. We do not see any reason why in the
interests of justice the appeal should be heard.
The Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs to
the 2nd Defendant, to be summarily assessed. The Plaintiff shall have
leave to file and serve within 14 days from the date of this judgment a
statement of objections (limited to 2 pages) to the 2nd Defendant’s
statement of costs dated 27 January 2026.
Lastly, since the Plaintiff’s application is without merit, we make a
further order under Order 59, rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the High Court
that no party may under rule 2A(7) request the present determination to be
reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal
(Russell Coleman)
Justice of Appeal
Li, Kwok & Law, Solicitors for the Plaintiff
Ms Tessa Chan, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the
2nd Defendant
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Appeal history
CHAU TAT WING, suing in his own capacity and as the sole executor of the estate of WONG TIM LUN, deceased v. WONG KWAI WAN AND ANOTHER
CA · [2026] HKCA 1891
This judgment