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HCAL 9/2005
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO.
9 OF 2005
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IN THE MATTER of an application for judicial review by LELALERTSUPHAKUN DUSANEE |
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| BETWEEN |
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LELALERTSUPHAKUN
DUSANEE |
Applicant |
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and |
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INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL |
Respondent |
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and |
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THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY |
Interested Party |
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Before: Hon. Hartmann and Reyes
JJ in Court
Date of Hearing:
2
September 2005
Date of Judgment:
2
September 2005
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Reyes J :
I. Introduction
1. The Applicant (also known as Ms. Lee)
seeks judicial review of a decision by the Insider Dealing Tribunal. The Financial Secretary, who has an
interest in the outcome of this matter, has been joined as a party.
2. In March 2004, after a long inquiry,
the Tribunal found Ms. Lee not guilty of insider dealing. But the Tribunal held that, by selling
a large block of 80 million shares in Siu Fung Ceramics Holdings Ltd.
(Holdings) in July 1996, Ms. Lee brought the inquiry upon herself. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded
that, under Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap.395) s. 26A (SIDO), Ms.
Lee was not entitled to claim her costs of the inquiry.
3. Ms. Lee says that there was no
evidence to support the Tribunal’s finding that she had brought the inquiry
upon herself. She contends that the Tribunal’s conclusion on her costs was
unreasonable and wrong. The issue
is whether Ms. Lee is right.
II. Background
4. SIDO s. 26A concerns the costs of an
insider dealing inquiry. The
section provides:
“(1) Subject to subsection (5), at the
conclusion of an inquiry or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, the
Tribunal may award to:-
(a) …
(b) any person whose conduct is, in whole
or in part, the subject of the inquiry,
such sum as it thinks fit in respect of the costs reasonably incurred by
him in relation to the inquiry.
(2) Any costs
awarded by the Tribunal under subsection (1) shall be charged on the general
revenue.
(3) The Tribunal
may order that nay costs awarded under subsection (1) may be taxed on the basis
of any one of the scales of costs set out in the Schedules to Order 62 of the
Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg.).
(4) …
(5) This section shall not apply to any person referred to in
subsection (1) who is:-
(a) a person who has been identified as an insider
dealer in a determination under section 16(3);
(b) …
(c) …
(d) any other person who and in respect of whom it appears to
the Tribunal has by his own acts or omissions caused or brought about (whether
wholly or in part) the institution of the inquiry under section 16.”
5. At the time of the transaction which
prompted the inquiry, Ms. Lee was the wife of Mr. Siegfried Lee.
6. Holdings is in the ceramics
business. Mr. Lee founded Holdings
in 1983. Holdings became a listed
company in 1993.
7. Prior to Holdings’ flotation, 20% of
the company’s shares were registered in Ms. Lee’s name. After Holdings’ listing, Ms. Lee held
10% of the company’s shares in her name.
8. 80 million shares in Ms. Lee’s name
were sold in 2 tranches of 40 million each on 2 and 8 July 1996. Mr. Lee arranged for the shares to be
sold by a broker on behalf of his wife.
9. The shares were sold at $1.30 per
share, when the market price for Holdings’ shares was $1.43. At the time of the sale, Holdings was
facing serious financial difficulty.
10. On 9 July 1996, in accordance with
disclosure requirements, Holdings issued an announcement that Ms. Lee had sold
her 80 million shares.
11. Ms. Lee transferred the proceeds from
the sale of her shares to Mr. Lee.
12. As far as Ms. Lee was concerned, the
Tribunal in March 2004 concluded:
“We have to say that we were not impressed with Mrs. Lee’s
evidence. We find it strange,
given that she had held her 80 million Holdings shares since the autumn of
1993, that her wish to see the Deep Water Bay Road house free of mortgage came
at the very time her husband and his companies were under severe financial
pressure. We are also aware that
there appears to be an inconsistency in her claims. On the one hand she spoke of wanting to gain the proceeds of
sale for herself, yet on the other hand expressed concern to see that the
mortgage was redeemed. This would
not have brought her any immediate financial gain, only the rather bourgeois
satisfaction of seeing the family unencumbered by debt.
The circumstantial evidence against Mrs. Lee is certainly very
strong, but we do not believe that the only reasonable inference which can be
drawn from it is that she was aware of the listing’s failure and the funding
problems that it caused, both of which pieces of information were relevant
information, when she sold her 80 million Holdings shares in two lots of 40
million on 2 & 8 July 1996.
Accordingly we have decided that it would be inappropriate and unjustified
to make a finding of insider dealing against her.”
13. The
Tribunal found Mr. Lee guilty of insider dealing in connection with (among
other transactions) the sale of Ms. Lee’s 80 million shares. The Tribunal stated:
“We are satisfied that Siegfried Lee engaged in insider dealing when
he, a person connected with Holdings and in knowing possession of relevant
information in relation to Holdings, counselled or procured Mrs. Lee to sell
the 80 million Holdings shares registered in her name on 2 and 8 July 1996,
knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe she would sell them.”
14. In
October 2004, upon Ms. Lee’s application (through her counsel Mr. Mak) for her
costs of the inquiry, the Tribunal held:
“It was the sale of her 80 million Holdings shares on 2 & 8 July
[1996] that brought upon [Mrs. Lee] and Holdings the attention of the HKSE
[Hong Kong Stock Exchange] and ultimately the attention of the SFC [Securities
and Futures Commission]. We agree
with Mr. Davies that in effect her sales started the whole of this
Inquiry. She was also Siegfried
Lee’s wife with whom he was living in June and July 1996, and he was very much
involved in insider dealing.
Mr. Mak argued that Mrs. Lee stuck by her account of the reasons for
her sale throughout the SFC investigation and the Inquiry and that we
ultimately decided that it would be inappropriate and unjustified to make a
finding of insider dealing against her.
It is however the case that we were not impressed by Mrs. Lee’s evidence
... We reached the decision we did
because there was no direct evidence that she sold her shares because she was
in possession of relevant information concerning Holdings and although the
circumstantial evidence against her on that issue was very strong, we did not
believe that it was the only reasonable inference which could be drawn.
Given her relationship to Siegfried Lee, whose wife she was, and
with whom she was living in the spring and summer of 1996, she should have been
aware that the sale of 80 million Holdings shares registered in her name could
incur suspicion and cause an inquiry into the circumstances of that sale to be
instituted. It was in fact the
sale of those shares that first aroused the interest of the [HKSE’s] Listing
Division. Although she may not
have done any other provable positive act to mislead the investigating
authorities into thinking the case against her was stronger than it was she was
in our view caught by the provisions of [SIDO] subsection 26A(5)(d) and is not
entitled to her costs.”
III. Discussion
15. Mr. Dykes SC (appearing for Ms. Lee)
criticises the Tribunal’s finding that Ms. Lee knew or ought to have known that
the sale of her shares would prompt an inquiry. How (Mr. Dykes asks rhetorically) could Ms. Lee have so
known, if she had no inside information (as the Tribunal concluded) about
Holdings’ financial difficulties?
16. There
is nothing odd (Mr. Dykes says) about liquidating one’s shares. It is only
with hindsight (Mr. Dykes contends) that Ms. Lee’s sale came to be regarded as
suspicious. This suspicion arose because of the later collapse of Holdings’
share price.
17. But at the time of the sale (Mr. Dykes
points out), Ms. Lee could not have foretold that Holdings’ sale price would
drop. There was simply no direct evidence that Ms. Lee was privy to information
that (if made public) would have the effect of depressing Holdings’ price. There would then have been nothing (Mr.
Dykes reasons) to alert Ms. Lee to the possibility that her sale of shares
might trigger an inquiry.
18. It follows (Mr. Dykes concludes) that
the Tribunal’s reasoning is flawed and based on a failure properly to assess
the available evidence.
19. I disagree with Mr. Dykes.
20. The sudden disposal of a large block
of a listed company’s shares within a week by a person closely related to the
company’s chairman, is by itself bound to raise eyebrows, whenever such event
takes place.
21. The Tribunal was entitled to regard
the magnitude of shares sold by Ms. Lee over a brief interval as something
which called for explanation and which, especially where explanation was weak
or unconvincing, could trigger an inquiry into possible insider dealing. Note that here the Tribunal found the
explanation proffered by Ms. Lee to have been contradictory: on the one hand
Ms. Lee says she wanted cash, on the other hand she says that she needed the
sale proceeds to redeem a mortgage.
22. Ms. Lee may not have known much about
her husband’s business. She claims
to have been minimally involved in Holdings’ affairs. But on her own evidence she had herself engaged in some
property speculation for fun and so cannot have been regarded as wholly naive
in financial matters.
23. She must at least have realised that
the sale of 80 million shares out of the blue in the course of a single week
could prompt speculation as to her motives, whatever might happen to Holdings’
share price subsequently.
24. The Tribunal therefore reasonably
concluded on the evidence that Ms. Lee knew or ought to have known that her
status as wife, coupled with the sale of her 80 million shares, would likely
prompt an inquiry. I am unable to
fault the Tribunal’s rejection of Ms. Lee’s claim for costs by reason of SIDO
ss. 26A(1) and (5)(d).
IV. Conclusion
25. In my
view, Ms. Lee’s application for judicial review fails. I would dismiss her application.
Hon
Hartmann J:
26. I
agree.
(M.J.
Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
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(A.T.
Reyes)
Judge of the Court of First Instance |
Mr. Philip Dykes SC, leading Mr.
Bernard Mak, instructed by Messrs. Anthony Siu & Co., for the
Applicant.
The Respondent, absent.
Mr. Nicholas Cooney, for Secretary
for Justice, for the Interested Party.
Appeal by the applicant to Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV350/2005 dated 17 August 2006 |