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BETWEEN
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Muhammad Hafeez |
Applicant |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Putative
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Sabrina Ho:
1. The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the putative interested party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a Form 86 filed on 10 January 2022 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 30 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”). The Leave Applicant is supported by the Applicant’s Affirmation dated 10 January 2022 (the “Affirmation”), which enclosed the Board’s Decision as an exhibit.
2. The Applicant named the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) as the proposed Respondent of the Leave Application and did not name any interested party. I amend the Form on my own volition to name the Board as the putative Respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.
3. The Applicant requested an oral hearing of the Leave Application, which took place on 19 January 2026 (the “Hearing”).
Background
4. The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference.
Leave Application out of time
5. The Board’s Decision was issued on 30 August 2018. However, the Form was only filed on 10 January 2022, over 3 years later and substantially beyond the time prescribed for filing an application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision, which is 3 months from the date of the said Decision: see Order 53 Rule 4 RHC (Cap. 4A).
6. No application has been made by the Applicant for extension of time for him to bring the Leave Application. No explanation has been provided by the Applicant for the delay, whether in the Form or the Affirmation.
7. In considering whether time should be extended for an application for leave for judicial review, the Court will consider, amongst others things, the following:
a. The length of the delay;
b. The explanation of the delay;
c. The merits of the substantive application;
d. The prejudice to the applicant if time is not extended, and the prejudice to the respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed out of time; and
e. The question of general public importance.
See: AW Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63/2015, 3 November 2015 at para. 27
8. As I have pointed out above, the length of the delay was substantial and there was no explanation for the delay. Further, the Leave Application has no merits, for reasons which I will explain below. Hence, even if there had been any application by the Applicant for extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review, I would have rejected the same.
Leave Application unmeritorious
9. The relevant legal principles are well established. The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para. 14. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.
10. The Applicant has not identified any ground in the Form or the Affirmation to support the Leave Application.
11. At the Hearing, the Applicant said that he has sustained back injury in an accident and there is an ongoing litigation arising from the accident. He said that the litigation is handled by a law firm and he has no further information to submit. The Applicant also said that he has to attend a medical checkup of his back on 27 January 2026.
12. Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.
13. I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail. The Board had fully considered the Applicant’s grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing his claim for non-refoulment protection. The Board has considered the Applicant’s evidence comprehensively and reached a conclusion that the Applicant was not a witness of truth. On that basis, the Board did not accept that the Applicant would fear returning to Pakistan for any of the reasons which he raised with the Board, or for any other reasons. Therefore, the Board found that there was no real risk that the Applicant would face any of the proscribed forms of harm should he return to Pakistan: see the Board’s Decision paras. 73‑134. I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
14. As for the alleged accident and the litigation which the Applicant mentioned in the Hearing, they are irrelevant to the Leave Application.
15. Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para. 23. I have considered all the relevant documents and the grounds raised by the Applicant in reaching the present decision.
Conclusion
16. For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.
Dated the 10th day of February 2026
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(Annson Cheung)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 10/2/2026
Muhammad Hafeez
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 10/2/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 9910/18/1/183/P1913
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 3314/17 (formerly RBCZ 2000581/14)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1