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CACV 1178/2025, [2026] HKCA 1343
On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 441
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 1178 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1141 OF 2025)
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| RE: |
NGUYEN XUAN BO |
Applicant |
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| Before: |
Hon Au JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Judgment: |
31 July 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 10 April 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to
apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 24 March 2026 (“the
Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 441). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the
decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 2 December 2025, by which the Judge
refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 5782).
2. The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s
reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. After
reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application
on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.
3. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the
discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by
reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final
Appeal for decision.
4. In his Notice of Motion, the
applicant alleged that his life would be in danger if he returned to Vietnam and that creditors and gangsters in Vietnam were cruel and violent and would be willing to kill people to
satisfy their anger and ferocity. He also alleged that internal relocation would not be feasible
because there would be many difficulties and obstacles that he would have to face in the new location.
He further contended that the nationwide social network of gangsters and clandestine connections
with corrupt people in the government and police apparatus made it quite possible for those creditors and gangsters to find out his new address. He also alleged that the Immigration
Department did not consider his human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise his
complaint.
5. Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged
written submissions on 20 April 2026. In those submissions, he reiterated the factual and procedural
background of his non-refoulement claim and cited various general proposition and legal authorities on the high
standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness, but failed to particularise how they were relevant
to his case.
6. In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of
merit. His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General
assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. His allegations are just a mere regurgitation of those
submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected
in full: see [5] ‑ [11] of the Judgment. He fails to identify any specific error in the
Judgment. It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to
be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho
Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].
Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.
7. Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest,
his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.
8. Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any
question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. We also do
not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.
9. For these reasons, the applicant’s
intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.
(Thomas Au) Justice of Appeal |
(Simon Leung) Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The applicant acting in person
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