RE KC SHOVA

CACV 497/2018

[2019] HKCA 674

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 497 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 252 OF 2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Yeung Ag CJHC (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment dated 8 April 2019 ([2019] HKCA 416), the Court of Appeal (Yeung Ag CJHC and Lisa Wong J) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Campbell Moffat J (“the Judge”) dated 28 September 2018 in HCAL 252/2018 refusing to grant leave to her to apply for judicial review.

2.  By a Notice of Motion dated 9 April 2019, the applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  

3.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant set out the following grounds:

“1. The learned judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration on 8 April 2019 refusing my application for judicial review.

2. The learned judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle on procedural unfairness to the Decision of the Director (of the Immigration) whereby the Director was required to give reasons justifying the decision.”

4.  In compliance with the direction given by Master Au-Yeung on 15 April 2019, the applicant lodged her written submissions on 23 April 2019.  In her written submissions, the applicant cited some case authorities on human rights and torture claims without explaining how they can assist her case.  She also referred to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which concerns the late filing of notice of appeal for the Torture Claims Appeal Board.

5.  We have duly considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and her written submissions.  Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1, this application is processed on papers without any oral hearing.

6.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  Plainly, the applicant did not engage our reasons for dismissing her appeal.  We also cannot discern any relevance of section 37ZT in this application.  The grounds and complaints put forward by her in the Notice of Motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. 

7.  For the reasons that we gave in our judgment of 8 April 2019, we did not see any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judge’s order.  None of the questions raised by the applicant in the Notice of Motion and her written submissions involve an arguable point or a question of great general or public importance. We do not see any basis for granting leave under the “otherwise” limb either. The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) are not met.

8.  Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss her Notice of Motion.