SOJOBI AKPEVWE JOYCE v. EDUCATION BUREAU (EDB)

HCAL 607/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4138

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 607 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 19 March 2026, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision (“Impugned Decision”) made by the Education Bureau (“EDB”), refusing to transfer her son (“Child”) to his younger brother’s school (“Brother’s School”).

2.  By way of relief, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the Impugned Decision, and an order mandating the EDB to transfer the Child to the Brother’s School, and to provide necessary Special Education Needs (“SEN”) support to that school as well.

3.  I gave directions permitting the EDB to file an Initial Response and for the Applicant to file a Reply to it, on a timetable which was slightly lengthened by further directions.  The EDB’s Initial Response was signed by Mr Alvin Hor, Senior Government Counsel (Ag.), and Mr Adrian Lau, Government Counsel.  The Applicant filed a Reply, together with lengthy further exhibits.

4.  Having considered the various materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on paper.  This is my Decision.

5.  In this Decision, I specifically do not name the Child, his brother, nor any of the individual schools involved.

B.  Background

6.  In the affidavit supporting the Form 86, the Applicant set out a description of the background of her application for judicial review.  However, Mr Hor criticised that as being “vague and incomplete” and has produced a further chronology of events.  I shall take the following background matters from the totality of materials – though it can be noted that it is clear from the Applicant’s Reply that some of the facts put forward by the EDB are not accepted by her.

7.  The Child was born on 25 July 2015.  He has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder with mild intellectual disability with SEN.  At the time of the 18 February 2025 Incident described immediately below, the Child was a Primary 4 student at his then school (“School 1”), and aided primary school in the Yau Tsim and Mong Kok District (“YTM District”).

8.  The Applicant says that on 18 February 2025, the Child was “arbitrarily driven” from School 1 by the new Principal. She reported the incident to the EDB, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Police and Social Worker, but the Child was not given a new school.

9.  By reference to Mr Hor’s chronology, further context is provided for the 18 February 2025 Incident:

(1)  During an Individualised Education Plan (“IEP”) conference held on 8 July 2024, when teachers reported the Child’s significant difficulties in adjusting to the Primary 3 curriculum, an EDB Educational Psychologist (“EP”) asked the Child’s parents whether they would consider special school placement.  The Applicant declined.

(2)  School 1 reported the Child’s SEN information and requirement for Tier-three support to EDB in each of four school years.

(3)  On 10, 11 and 14 February 2025, the Principal of School 1 reported to the YTM District School Development Section (“YTM SDS”) of EDB that the Child displayed disruptive behaviour, including hitting and spitting at teachers and classmates.

(4)  Owing to and to address that disruptive behaviour, School 1, the Child’s father (“Father”) and the Child agreed to an arrangement, under which a teacher of School 1 would discuss behaviour expectations with the Child before class so that he would have a better understanding of how to behave appropriately in the classroom.

(5)  When School 1 implemented that arrangement before class on 18 February 2025, the Applicant opposed it, claiming it discouraged the Child from attending school.

(6)  On the same day, the Child became emotional before class, hit the Principal and attempted to spit at both the Principal and the school social worker.

(7)  As a result, and having attempted to address the Child’s behaviour via the arrangement, the Principal told the Applicant that if such behaviour persisted, the school might call an ambulance to send the Child to hospital for professional treatment.

(8)  The Applicant and the Child then refused to enter the school for lessons.  The YTM SDS advised the Principal to seek further professional guidance from EDB specialist in special education.

(9)  The Child then began his absence from School 1, and remained absent since 18 February 2025.

10.  School 1 reported the case of the Child’s non-attendance to the Non-attendance Cases Team (“NACT”) of the EDB by written report on 28 February 2025, and made an official report via the electronic system on 7 March 2025.  On 11 March 2025, the NACT completed basic vetting and opened the case file for the Child.

11.  Thereafter there was telephone and written communication between the Applicant and Father and the NACT/EDB.  For example, on 3 April 2025, the Father wrote to EDB stating his disagreement over its written responses to his concerns, and indicating his intention to arrange homeschooling for the Child.  On 29 April 2025, EDB wrote to the Father to inform him that School 1 did not prohibit the Child from attending school, and was instead eager to collaborate with the parents to find ways to help the Child return to schooling as soon as possible.

12.  Contact between the parents and the NACT continued in May, August and September 2025.

13.  On 25 September 2025, the Applicant commenced District Court proceedings DCCJ 5329/2025 (“DC Action”).  The named defendants were the Principal, School 1 (despite its lacking legal personality) and the EDB.  The statement of claim asserted that (1) the Child was arbitrarily refused attendance, (2) when that happened, the Principal stated explicitly that School 1 was not suitable for the Child, as she did not have support from EDB to meet his needs; (3) as a result of the refusal to permit the Child to attend School 1, he had been denied access to education for over seven months; (4) that was the result of the defendants’ breach of statutory duty, discrimination, negligence, breach of human rights and misconduct in public office.  The statement of claim also claimed various monetary damages under different heads of damage, as well as an order compelling the EDB to provide a suitable school for the Child at the level that avoids further educational loss and to provide all necessary support for his SEN.

14.  On 2 October 2025, the Applicant attended a meeting with the NACT and expressed her unwillingness to arrange for the Child to resume schooling in School 1.  The Applicant refused Educational Psychologist assessment and the arrangement of special school at that time, and requested a Primary 5 vacancy in a mainstream school.  At the meeting, the NACT noted the persistent non-attendance of the Child and issued verbal and written advice to the mother, reminding her of the legal consequence of not causing the Child to attend school.

15.  On 3 October 2025, the Applicant wrote to the NACT reiterating her reason of not arranging the Child to return to School 1.

16.  On 16 October 2025, the EDB wrote to the Applicant informing her of a placement offer for the Child at a new school (“School 2”).  School 2 was deemed appropriate and suitable for the Child given that it was located in the YTM District, the same district in which the Child was originally enrolled in School 1 through the Central Allocation of Primary One Admission (“POA”) in 2021.  This was on what is described by the EDB as an “exceptional and special case” basis.  The proposal by YTM SDS to place or reassign the Child to School 2 was expressly accepted by the Applicant on 29 October 2025, and the Child commenced schooling there on 3 November 2025.

17.  The Child’s attendance at School 2 was met with a range of support measures, including: deployment of additional manpower; individual training sessions; an IEP for the Child; special attention provided to the Child and in contact with his parents; and tailored SEN support.

18.  The Child last attended School 2 on 28 November 2025, and has been absent since 1 December 2025.

19.  On 17 December 2025, the Applicant sent a letter to EDB requesting that the Child be transferred to the Brother’s School (“Placement Request”).  The reason given was that the Applicant was not satisfied nor comfortable with the services provided by School 2, and the request for transfer was based on effectiveness, safety and peace, rather than proximity.

20.  By summons dated 23 December 2025, the Applicant (as plaintiff in the DC Action) sought an order from the District Court to transfer the Child from School 2 to the Brother’s School.  That application was dismissed on 22 January 2026, and the Applicant’s appeal against that dismissal was dismissed on 24 April 2026.

21.  I also note that an application to strike out the Applicant’s claim in the DC Action was due to have been heard on 6 July 2026, though I am unaware of whether the hearing went ahead and any determination of the strikeout application (though that does not matter for present purposes).

22.  In the meantime, on 6 January 2026, as the Child had not yet returned to school and no leave application was submitted, the social worker and the Child’s class teacher of School 2 attempted to pay a home visit to the Child.  Upon arrival, the class teacher notified the Father via instant messaging, but the Father replied that the visit was unwelcome.  Hearing the Applicant’s voice inside, the social worker knocked and explained the intention to conduct a home visit for about five minutes, and the wish to deliver a card from the Child’s classmates, a Christmas gift, and school notes.  The Applicant refused, stating that she did not welcome the visit, would not accept the items, and would call the Police.  The social worker and teacher departed, but left the items and school notice at the door. The Applicant said in the Form 86 that she made clear that she had refused the visit, yet they insisted and came so she called the Police.

23.  In light of the parents’ emotional response and the rejection of the home visit, any further attempted home visit was suspended for the time being.  As a result, School 2 was unable to ascertain from the parents the reason for the Child’s absence, or to gain a better understanding of the issues faced.

24.  In letters dated 16 January 2026 and 13 February 2026, the Impugned Decision not to proceed with the Placement Request, but rather to urge the Child to resume schooling at School 2, was explained to the Applicant.  School 2 was, and continues to be, considered by the EDB as being suitable for the Child after extensive evaluation of all relevant factors and available support.  It was regarded to be premature for the Applicant to conclude that the school was not suitable for the Child, when he attended for less than one month.

25.  Nevertheless, the EDB informed the Applicant that it would not prevent the Child’s transfer arranged by his parents, if the Child were able to secure placement directly from the Brother’s School or any other school.  Though YTM SDS would normally not transfer the Child from School 2 to the Brother’s School, it was open to the parents to approach their preferred schools directly to seek admission.

26.  As it happens, during a hearing in the DC Action on 2 April 2026, the Applicant disclosed for the first time that the Child had in fact attended an interview at the Brother’s School on 31 March 2026 seeking admission/enrolment.

C.  Intended Grounds of Review

27.  It is trite that, in order to obtain leave to apply for judicial review, an applicant must identify public law grounds of review which are reasonably arguable and have a realistic prospect of success.

28.  In the Form 86, the Applicant identified four intended grounds of review, set out as follows (with changes only to adopt my preferred abbreviations and definitions):

(1)  Ground 1: Wednesbury unreasonableness and irrationality.  This is because (a) school staff ignored explicit refusals of entry, necessitating police intervention; (b) the continued presence of the school’s correspondent caused the Child such acute distress that he was unable to sleep until the “threat” (the envelope) was removed from the immediate domestic environment, and (c) the EDB has failed to account for the total breakdown of the trust and confidence essential to the educator-parent relationship.

(2)  Ground 2: Failure to consider the “best interests of the child”, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”) applicable to Hong Kong.  By forcing the Child to remain in the school where the staff’s conduct has caused him documented emotional instability, the EDB has failed to prioritise the Child’s psychological well-being over administrative convenience.

(3)  Ground 3: Breach of the right to privacy and home under Article 14 of the Bill of Rights (“BOR 14”).  School 2’s repeated attempts to enter the Applicant’s home against express instructions constitute an interference with the family’s privacy.  The EDB, as the regulatory body, acts unlawfully by failing to provide a remedy (the transfer) when a school under its supervision violates the constitutional protections of a student’s home life.

(4)  Ground 4: Breach of “Integrated Educated Policy”, legitimate expectation and duty of care.  Under administrative law principles, the EDB’s “Integrated Education” policy creates a legitimate expectation that once a child is assessed and placed, the necessary subventions (such as the Learning Support Grant) will follow the student.  Public bodies must act in accordance with their published policies.  If the EDB fails to provide the funding promised under its own SEN framework, the decision to place the child there becomes procedurally improper and irrational.

29.  These Grounds were addressed and expanded upon in the Applicant’s Reply.  In so far as is necessary, I can consider those matters in my analysis of the individual grounds below.

D.  Ground 1

30.  Establishing Wednesbury unreasonableness or irrationality is a high hurdle for a judicial review applicant to overcome. It requires the Court to conclude that the decision made was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come to it, or (put it another way) the decision was outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker.

31.  On the face of the Form 86, Ground 1 is clearly directed at or raises complaints about the attempted visit by the social worker and teacher to the Applicant’s/Child’s home.  With respect, that does not seem to me to be directly or sufficiently related to the Impugned Decision.  The attempted visit was simply part of School 2’s desire to re-establish appropriate contact with the Child, and to explore with the Child’s parents how best to address the situation.  In any event, (a) I also do not accept that school staff ignored explicit refusals of entry, or that police intervention was necessary; (b) the suggested distress caused to the Child merely from the fact that the school left correspondence does not establish any irrationality, and (c) it seems clear that the breakdown of the trust and confidence in the educator-parent relationship does not, and cannot, lie solely with the EDB.

32.  However, in her Reply, the Applicant sought to address an expanded analysis of Wednesbury unreasonableness by reference to a table which set out a number of certain “scenarios”, and how each scenario demonstrated “irrationality”, “disproportionate weight”, “irrelevant considerations” and “failure to consider relevant matters”.  It is not necessary to reproduce that table in this Decision, though I have had regard to the content of it.  The Applicant also made further points.  Perhaps some of her key points might be summarised as follows:

(1)  The prolonged refusal to transfer the Child to the Brother’s School, despite clear welfare grounds, is irrational and resulted from a mechanical application of the policy without regard to family circumstances and family unity.

(2)  The use of “fetish things” on the Child by school staff placed disproportionate weight on superstition (culture, or ritual) over safety and failed to consider the Child’s dignity, psychological harm and safety.

(3)  Home visit without parental consent, leaving items behind, violated privacy and legal boundaries and overemphasised school authority over proportional respect for family autonomy.

(4)  “Assigning” parents to look for school admission is an improper delegation of the statutory placement duties.

(5)  EDB’s failure to account for breakdown of trust and confidence placed bureaucratic continuity above relational integrity and was disproportionate.

(6)  It is irrational to refuse to place the Child in the Brother’s school even if it is in another school district.

(7)  Persisting with standard procedures despite relational collapse is illogical and irrational.

(8)  Asking the Child to go back to School 2 neglect safeguarding duties and psychological harm done to the Child.

(9)  The policy adopted prioritised administrative convenience over the welfare and development of the Child, and was contrary to the best interests of the Child.

(10)  Irrelevant factors outside legitimate educational purposes were considered, such as treating a home visit without parental consent as legitimate educational engagement.

(11)  There was a neglect of statutory or welfare obligations on the part of the EDB.

33.  I do not accept that these matters, whether individually or cumulatively, establish a reasonably arguable case of Wednesbury unreasonableness or irrationality.  Indeed, on the materials, it seems to me that Mr Hor is correct in his submissions, which I broadly accept.  In my view, the papers demonstrate that:

(1)  Even prior to the Child’s transfer to School 2, School 1 had attempted to assist the Child and his parents with their complaints and concerns.  The option of a placement at a special school, explored at the IEP conference held on 8 July 2024, was declined by the Applicant.  School 1 also sought to address the Child’s disruptive behaviour on several occasions, including by coming to an arrangement with the Father, but that was rejected by the Applicant.

(2)  School 1 monitored and continuously reported the Child’s SEN information and requirements to EDB in each of the Child’s four years at that school.

(3)  After the 18 February 2025 Incident, and in light of the Child’s sudden and then continued absence, YTM SDS made a special arrangement to place the Child at a different school.  School 2 was decided upon after careful consideration and in consultation with the Applicant.  School 2 was considered appropriate, as it was in the same YTM District to which the Child was originally allocated a place via POA, and it had a Student Support Team for planning, coordinating and implementing a whole-school approach to foster an inclusive culture and enhance support for students with SEN.  Indeed, the Applicant expressly accepted the Child’s place at School 2.

(4)  Despite the Applicant’s complaints, the materials available demonstrate adequate support provided (or attempted to be provided) to the Child at School 2.  The Applicant has not explained how the support – which she does not deny – was unsuitable or inappropriate, and she has not explained how it was or would be detrimental to the Child (who attended for less than a month anyway).  In any event, the support programme was formulated and considered by experts and professionals in a better position to assess the needs and interests of the Child.

(5)  The proposed home visits, planned by School 2, were also seeking further to understand and address the concerns of the Applicant and the Child.  Notice of a visit was given, and in the absence of a reply or constructive communication from the parents, the home visit was attempted.  Despite that attempt, the parents refused the home visit.  It seems to me to be at least unfortunate for the Applicant to complain about poor communication or a breakdown in trust when she in effect refused to engage in the communication offered and the chance to build or rebuild trust.

(6)  There was nothing remotely arguably unreasonable in leaving at the Applicant’s home the items and correspondence which the social worker and teacher had intended to hand over in person.

(7)  Further, the EDB continued repeatedly to remind the Applicant that enquiries could be made about vacancies at the Brother’s School if that is where the Child desired to seek placement.  Despite that, the Applicant proceeded with the DC Action, and her summons seeking court ordered transfer, without informing the EDB that the Child had indeed attended an interview at the Brother’s School on 31 March 2026.

(8)  The Impugned Decision was made expressly without barring the Applicant from seeking to approach the Brother’s School for admission of the Child – as that interview showed.

(9)  The Applicant’s own dissatisfaction – however strongly felt or expressed – does not identify any reasonably arguable irrationality in the public law sense.

34.  Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

E.  Ground 2

35.  Ground 2 was advanced by the Applicant with a focus on consideration of what is in the “best interests of the child”, pursuant to the UNCRC.  Nevertheless, this ground overlaps with Ground 1, because it relies to a considerable extent on the same factual underpinning.

36.  In the Form 86, the Applicant suggested that by forcing the Child to remain in the school where the staff’s conduct has caused him documented emotional instability, the EDB failed to prioritise the Child’s psychological well-being over administrative convenience.  From my analysis of Ground 1, it will be seen that I do not accept the factual basis for that suggestion.  First, whilst the Child was encouraged to return to School 2, and the parents were warned about the problem of absenteeism, I do not think that amounts to forcing the Child to remain at that school. Secondly, I am not sure it can be properly said that any staff conduct has caused the Child any documented emotional instability (unless the Applicant means simply documented by her asserting it).  Thirdly, the overall approach adopted towards the Child tends rather to show that the Child’s general well-being, psychological and otherwise, has not in fact been ignored for the purpose of administrative convenience.

37.  In her Reply, the Applicant additionally sought to place reliance on aspects of the breakdown in trust.  First, she suggested that the reassignment to School 2 was made despite that breakdown of trust, and ignored the fact that teachers or staff at School 2 were pessimistic about the Child’s readjustment and, she said, indifferent to his development. However, that suggestion ignores the fact that the Applicant was involved in the consideration and expressly agreed to the placement of the Child in School 2 – though I think it also fair to say that the Applicant hardly gave the school much opportunity to demonstrate its full abilities to assist, when the Child stopped attending the school after less than a month, and never returned.

38.  Secondly, the Applicant suggested that the EDB ignored the breakdown of trust with both School 1 and School 2, and treated parental concerns as secondary.  However, that suggestion is not borne out by the materials, which instead identify that the parents’ loss of trust was recognised and sought to be addressed.  With respect, it is difficult to reconcile the Applicant’s suggestion that her concerns about trust were ignored when she rebuffed several attempts to establish proper communications between her and the Father and School 2.

39.  Thirdly, the Applicant suggested that the EDB actions show disproportionate weight given to policy uniformity and placement guidelines.  However, first, a complaint about the weight given to individual features of a given set of circumstances is not usually fertile ground for judicial review, and it is not in this case either.  Instead, the EDB identified the ordinary policy approach, then made special arrangements in finding the place at School 2, and continued to provide advice to the Applicant of the other options available to her which she might pursue (and which the EDB certainly did nothing to obstruct).

40.  In the circumstances, I do not accept that it is reasonably arguable that the best interests of the Child was not uppermost in the mind of the schools and the EDB.

41.  Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

F.  Ground 3

42.  Ground 3 – as identified in the Form 86, and expanded in the Applicant’s Reply – suggests breaches of rights to privacy and home as well as criminal offences, contrary to (1) BOR 14, (2) the Crimes Ordinance Cap 200,(3) the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance Cap 486, and (4) the Education Ordinance Cap 279.

43.  With respect, this ground is misguided, or based upon a misunderstanding of applicable principles.  Indeed, on the facts, the alleged rights are not engaged.

44.  As correctly identified by Mr Hor, the proposed home visit by School 2 was consistent with the Circular on ‘Upholding Students’ Right to Education’, in investigating the reason for the Child’s non-attendance, especially when that began abruptly and was otherwise unexplained (and immediately following and contrary to the arrangement made between the school and the Father).  Any attempt to conduct home visits could not amount to a breach of BOR 14.  They were no arbitrary or unlawful interferences with either the Applicant’s or the Child’s privacy or home life.  The proposed visit failed when the visitors were denied entry by the Applicant, and they left when asked to do so.  There was no intrusion to home or privacy.  There was no attempted entry without lawful authority or consent, and there was no remaining on property with intent to intimidate, insult or annoy.  There was no reasonably arguable criminal trespass.  Contrary to the suggestion made by the Applicant, there was no dropping of “fetish items”, and though the Applicant might regard the materials left in the mailbox as “unsolicited”, there was nothing contrary to any ordinance in the provision of those materials.

45.  In fact, providing those materials was plainly intended to help safeguard the Child’s welfare, not harm it.  Further, even after the failed attempt to engage with the Child and parents at their home, School 2 properly sought to maintain communication with the Child’s parents, to ensure that they were informed of school policies through other channels such as email and instant messaging, and providing the Child with tailor-made learning materials suited to his needs.

46.  There was no reasonably arguable breach by the EDB of a statutory duty of oversight.

47.  Ground 3 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

G.  Ground 4

48.  Ground 4 is based upon the Integrated Education (“IE”) policy, though there is no challenge made by the Applicant to the policy itself.  Instead, the Applicant submitted that the policy gave rise to a legitimate expectation and duty of care.

49.  In her Reply, the Applicant identified what she said were failures in this case, namely:

(1)  funding delay, because the Principal and SENCO confirm no funding until the next academic session, leaving the Child unsupported during critical transition;

(2)  for extracurricular activities, denying equal participation and undermining inclusion;

(3)  absence of 3-Tier intervention model, permitting the Child to fall further behind academically;

(4)  lack of intensive language support, disadvantaging the Child in communication and learning; and

(5)  no remedial or after-school care, denying the Child holistic support essential for recovery and reintegration.

50.  However, the allegation that no SEN support was provided by School 2 is not only unsubstantiated, it is evident that SEN support was in fact provided to the School 2 in accordance with the IE policy. I also accept Mr Hor’s submission that – under the IE policy, the EDB provided resources and professional support to School 2 in order to support students with SEN in the 2025/2026 school year.  That included providing substantial Learning Support Grant, Grant for Supporting NCS (non-Chinese-speaking students) with SEN, additional posts concerning SENCO and SENCT and school-based EP services, school-based speech therapy services.

51.  In the circumstances, I reject as unarguable the Applicant’s suggestion that any legitimate expectation or duty of care was breached.  Further, with respect, it is also difficult to reconcile the complaints made by the Applicant about what services and support were or were not available to the Child at School 2, when it was the Applicant who either caused or permitted the Child to cease attending after less than a month, and to remain absent from that school throughout the remainder of the academic year.

52.  Further, even if there were a proper basis for concerns as to the level of support available to the Child at School 2, there is no evidential material which can properly support the requested order mandating the EDB immediately to assign the Child to the Brother’s School.  It is perhaps understandable that, if only for logistical reasons, the Applicant might prefer the Child to attend at the same school as his brother (who is apparently settled in that environment).  But, nothing in the evidence suggests that that is the only school which might properly cater to the Child’s needs.

53.  Ground 4 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

H.  Prematurity

54.  Mr Hor also submitted that because the Applicant had already approached the Brother’s School for admission – as she was entitled to do, of which she had been informed at the time of the Impugned Decision – the current application for judicial review is premature, in the sense that the Impugned Decision was never a bar to the Child’s transfer to the Brother’s School, provided that school is willing to take the Child in accordance with its own policies, vacancies and admission practices.  Mr Hor submitted that the decision of the Brother’s School, still pending, may dispose of the application in its entirety where the substantive relief sought by the Applicant would possibly be achieved.

55.  In her Reply, the Applicant stated that an interview is not a school placement, and the current application for judicial review is relevant and not premature, where it is the EDB’s duty to provide a school for the Child.  She also stated that the decision of the Brother’s School is not pending, because the Judge in the DC Action was against the Child going to the school and ordered her to pay the costs of the hearing relating to the transfer of the Child to the Brother’s School.

56.  The first point ignores the fact that the EDB has provided a school for the Child, and has made special arrangements for a placement at a second school for the Child.  The second point is also obviously incorrect.  The Judge simply dismissed the Applicant’s appeal from the decision of the Master, refusing to order a transfer to the Brother’s School.  The Judge’s order did nothing to prevent such a transfer being arranged or effected in any manner other than by Court order in the DC Action.

57.  Hence, it seems to me that there is real force in the submission that the current application is premature.  Nevertheless, it has not been necessary for me to reach a concluded view in that regard, where (1) I do not know the outcome of the approach made by the Applicant to the Brother’s School directly, and (2) I have decided that there is no reasonably arguable public law ground of review advanced by the Applicant.

I.  Result

58.  Though no doubt well-intentioned and genuinely concerned about the Child, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law failures on the part of the EDB, with any realistic prospect of success.

59.  Therefore, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.  I make no order as to costs.