SIR ELLY KADOORIE & SONS LTD v. SAMANTHA JANE BRADLEY

HCA 518/2022

[2026] HKCFI 4891

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 518 OF 2022

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DECISION

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A.   INTRODUCTION

1.  This Decision deals with the defendant’s application for stay/adjournment which was made by summons filed on 9 June 2026 (“the Stay/Adjournment Summons”).  The orders sought are as follows:

(1)  the Action and/or the plaintiff’s summons filed on 14 April 2026 (“the Amendment Summons”) be stayed generally pending the outcome of the defendant’s legal aid application or until a particular date; or

(2)  the hearing be adjourned generally or until a particular date for a hearing of the Amendment Summons and such further summons as the defendant shall in the meantime file; and

(3)  the costs of this application be reserved.

2.  This case has had a long procedural history which may be summarised as follows:

(1)  On 6 May 2022, the plaintiff, on its own behalf and on behalf of its current and former officers, employees and agents, including its legal representatives (“the Representees”), started this action and claims against the defendant for (i) an injunction to restrain her from continuing her acts of harassment complained of in the Statement of Claim, and (ii) damages for harassment;

(2)  By a Decision of this Court dated 31 May 2023 (“the CFI Decision” or “the CFI Order”), the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant were struck out and dismissed pursuant to Order 18 rule 19 and Order 14A rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap.4A, Laws of Hong Kong) (“RHC”) on the ground that the plaintiff, being a corporate entity, has no standing to make a claim under the common law tort of harassment in its own capacity, and does not have the “same interest” as, and therefore cannot sue in a representative capacity on behalf of, the Representees on the same cause of action;

(3)  The plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal on 27 June 2023 (CACV 194/2023) (“the Notice of Appeal”) which was served on GPS Legal LLP (formerly Georgiou Payne Stewien LLP), the defendant’s solicitors on record until she filed her Notice to Act in Person in CACV 194/2023 on 11 March 2026[1];

(4)  On appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted a new ground (on “freestanding injunction”) introduced by the plaintiff, and allowed the appeal on 26 August 2024.  It was held that:

(a)  on the pleaded facts, the court had jurisdiction to grant a “freestanding injunction” to the plaintiff restraining the defendant from continuing the alleged harassment directed at the Representees;

(b)  whether such relief should be granted was a matter for trial;

(c)  as both the plaintiff and the Representees were entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction for injunctive relief to restrain the alleged harassment, they had the same interest for the purposes of Order 15 rule 12 of the RHC.  Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to bring the present proceedings in a representative capacity as well as in its own right;

(d)  hence, the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief could not be struck out under Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC as disclosing no reasonable cause of action or as being plainly and obviously unsustainable, and that the claim, being fact‑sensitive, was not suitable for determination under Order 14A rule 1 of the RHC;

(e)  as regards the question of whether a corporate entity may sue in its own capacity for the tort of harassment at common law, the Court of Appeal considered that there was substance in the competing contentions of the parties.  Since the plaintiff’s position was reasonably arguable, its claim in its own right could not properly be struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or as being plainly and obviously unsustainable.  Nor was it appropriate to determine the point under Order 14A;

(5)  In light of the outcome of the appeal, the Court of Appeal further directed that the defendant’s summons filed on 8 September 2022 (“the Second Striking Out Summons”)[2], which was not disposed of by this Court in the CFI Decision, shall be remitted to this Court for fresh determination;

(6)  Upon the defendant’s further appeal, the Court of Final Appeal held on 9 January 2026 that, while the plaintiff has no cause of action in harassment, it is not precluded from seeking an injunction to restrain any interference by the defendant with its contractual or common law duty to provide a safe working environment for its current employees by harassment. The defendant’s appeal was therefore successful in part only, and the plaintiff was given liberty to apply for leave from this Court to amend its statement of claim accordingly;

(7)  Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the Court of Final Appeal, the plaintiff took out the Amendment Summons on 14 April 2026, which has been directed by this Court to be dealt with by way of paper disposal;

(8)  On 13 May 2026, in response to the defendant’s application for legal aid, the Director of Legal Aid filed a Memorandum of Notification that a Party has been Refused Legal Aid;

(9)  On 9 June 2026, the defendant filed the Stay/Adjournment Summons.

B.   THE DEFENDANT’S GROUNDS

3.  The defendant has set out her grounds in support of the Stay/Adjournment Summons in her 3^rd Affidavit which may be summarised below:

(1)  She is minded to apply to set aside the appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal (by contending, among other things, that the Notice of Appeal filed by the plaintiff has not been properly served on her) and for an order that the CFI Order made by this Court on 31 May 2023 be reinstated (i.e. the claims herein be struck out and dismissed) (“the Intended Application”), and she needs time to take legal advice on this matter;

(2)  If she takes further steps in the present proceedings, that may prejudice the Intended Application;

(3)  She is still applying for legal aid;

(4)  As her previous legal advisor has refused to act further for her without reasonable notice, she will need to appoint a new legal advisor who will in turn need time to read the case materials;

(5)  Her “security deposit” placed with the Court of Final Appeal is still tied up.

4.  The defendant has also lodged 2 sets of written submissions which are of 98-page and 41-page long respectively.  Attached to the first set of submissions dated 9 July 2026 is a draft summon for the Intended Application.  This draft summons was subsequently revised and attached to her written submissions in reply dated 6 August 2026 (“the Draft Summons”).

5.  In those written submissions as well as the 4^th Affidavit of the defendant, despite the fact that the Draft Summons was yet to be filed, she has included page after page of arguments in support of the Intended Application and asked this Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on the basis of her Intended Application.  Indeed, most parts of her written submissions concern the Intended Application rather than her application for stay/adjournment.

6.  I must say outright that the aforesaid approach adopted by the defendant is totally unacceptable and should be rejected.  The Court would only adjudicate on applications which have been properly taken out.  Indeed, in response to the defendant’s letter to this Court dated 19 July 2025 (i.e. more than a year ago) in which the grounds in support of her Intended Application had been set out (“the defendant’s July 2025 Letter”), this Court has already reminded her by letter dated 25 July 2025 that if she has any application to make, she should do so in the proper way.  Yet, she has failed to do so.

7.  I will therefore not refer to many of the arguments relied on by the defendant in her written submissions which are totally irrelevant to the Stay/Adjournment Summons.

8.  Coming back to her stay/adjournment application, despite the length of the defendant’s submissions, I am afraid her application is unmeritorious and should be dismissed.  The reasons are as follows.

9.  Firstly, as far as the defendant’s application for legal aid is concerned, it had been dismissed by the Director of Legal Aid back in May 2026. 

10.  At the time of the call-over hearing on 9 June 2026, the defendant told this Court (which was repeated in her 4^th Affidavit filed on 26 June 2026) that she was in the course of appealing against the Director’s decision and the appeal hearing had been fixed to be heard in late July 2026.  However, her appeal had since then been dismissed on 30 July 2026.

11.  In other words, her then pending application for legal aid can no longer be a valid reason in support of her Stay/Adjournment Summons.

12.  Secondly, it is evident that the defendant had been informed by a letter dated 8 May 2026 issued by the Court of Final Appeal that Registrar K W Wong had made an order on even date that the amount of HK$400,000 which she paid into court as security for costs of her appeal to the Court of Final Appeal be paid out to her.  It was only because of her own hesitation in collecting the money that the said amount was not paid out to her immediately.  In any event, the amount was subsequently ordered to be paid out by another order of Registrar K W Wong dated 10 July 2026.

13.  The effect of the above payment out is that this matter, again, cannot be utilised in support of her Stay/Adjournment Summons.

14.  I have not lost sight of the defendant’s allegation (which was made in her written submissions in reply only) that the amount had been “assigned to a lender some time ago as security for costs of the action”.  It is unclear what the defendant meant by that.  However, in any event, if the defendant decided not to use the returned fund for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, that is her own decision, and she cannot make use of this fact to support her stay/adjournment application.

15.  Thirdly, as far as her intended challenge to the appellate process is concerned, I do not think it would take long for her to obtain legal advice as the issue concerned is not complicated at all.

16.  Worse still, in the defendant’s July 2025 Letter, she had the following to say:

“I am writing to inform his Lordship of a serious issue that has recently come to light concerning [HCA 518/2022]. Specifically it is to tell him that I understand it is arguable that I am not properly the subject of the jurisdiction of this court and/or that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was predicated on bad faith in circumstances where the Plaintiff was obliged to come to equity with clean hands.

This issue having now come to my attention, I have promptly secured senior counsel to give me urgent independent advice, including on the impact on my Appeal and I am writing to his Lordship as I am obliged to do.

[…]

Yet despite this the Plaintiff inexplicably on 27 June 2023 sent a Notice of Appeal to my legal representative on record for [HCA 518/2022] naming him as my solicitor for the Appeal. This was not valid service as an appeal is a separate action. […]

[…]

Having now sourced senior counsel I am taking urgent advice from him as to the impact of the foregoing acts and omissions and potential relevance to the appeal.

Meanwhile I am writing to his Lordship to put on record my objections to any jurisdiction being asserted over me since 27 June 2023. As well as my concern as to the circumstances in which I was wrongly subjected to an Appeal of his Order dismissing the Action owing to a late addition of a free standing injunction that could not have been sought had O11 in fact been complied with as required and an applicable gateway sought.

[…]”

17.  In other words, back in July 2025, the defendant had already been seeking legal advice from senior counsel on the Intended Application.  There is simply no reason why the plaintiff should be asked to wait further before it may proceed with the present action.

18.  Fourthly, while it is understandable that the defendant may want to have a longer time for her new legal advisors to get familiar with the present case, the Court must bear the underlying objectives of the RHC in mind, and ensure that the case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.  In this regard, one must not lose sight of the fact that this action was commenced in 2022.  It is therefore desirable to have this action proceeded with (in the event the parties cannot settle between themselves) as soon as practicable.  In my view, staying this action or adjourning the Amendment Summons is not conducive in achieving the aforesaid underlying objective.

19.  Fifthly, I do not think any weight should be placed on the defendant’s concern that her further steps to be taken in this action would prejudice her intended challenge to the appeal process.  In this regard, it should be borne in mind that she has taken a lot of steps in the present action since the alleged problematic service of the Notice of Appeal, including but not limited to:

(1)  Filing a Respondent’s Notice on 18 July 2023 and an Amended Respondent’s Notice on 21 August 2023;

(2)  Instructing counsel and solicitor advocate to represent her in the appeal hearing before the Court of Appeal on 8 March 2024;

(3)  Filing a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on 23 September 2024;

(4)  Filing a Notice of Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on 17 December 2024;

(5)  Filing a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on 11 July 2025; and

(6)  Instructing counsel and solicitor advocate to represent her in the appeal hearing before the Court of Final Appeal on 20 – 21 November 2025.

20.  Furthermore, it is evident that the defendant has never taken any issue on the service of the Notice of Appeal during the appeal process. 

21.  The defendant has also pursued the Second Striking Out Summons pursuant to the directions of the Court of Appeal, which was given consequential to its decision to allow the plaintiff’s appeal. 

22.  Indeed, in light of the above steps, the defendant should consider carefully whether it is really advisable for her to take out the Intended Application as per the Draft Summons.  While no leave from this Court is required for her to file the said summons (as requested by her), legal advice should be sought in this regard if necessary.  As I mentioned, in the circumstances set out above, I do not think it is difficult for a competent legal advisor to advise the defendant on the matter.

23.  To conclude, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the defendant’s application for stay/adjournment should be refused.

C.  ORDER

24.  I therefore order that the Stay/Adjournment Summons be dismissed.

D.  COSTS

25.  I make a costs order nisi that the defendant shall bear the plaintiff’s costs of the Stay/Adjournment Summons (including all costs reserved).

26.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.

27.  The plaintiff’s costs shall be summarily assessed in lieu of taxation.  Unless any application for variation of the aforesaid costs order nisi is made within time, the plaintiff shall lodge and serve its statement of costs within 7 days after the expiry of the said 14-day period.  The defendant shall lodge and serve her statement of objection within 7 days thereafter.  Summary assessment of the costs of the Stay/Adjournment Summons will be conducted on paper (no matter whether any statement of objection is lodged by the defendant within time) thereafter.  The costs assessed shall be paid by the defendant within 14 days after assessment.

E.   POSTSCRIPTS

28.  On 21 August 2026, the defendant, without leave, wrote to this Court and gave further reasons as to why the Amendment Summons should be stayed. This is not permissible. Such a letter is therefore disregarded in this Decision.