NG MEI NA v. HONG KONG HOUSING AUTHORITY

HCAL 551/2025

[2025] HKCFI 1057

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 551 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  The Applicant is or was a tenant of the Hong Kong Housing Authority (“HKHA”), which issued a Notice to Quit to her on 28 June 2024. The Applicant lodged an appeal, which was apparently determined against her by the Appeal Tribunal (Housing) (“Appeal Panel”) on 21 November 2024. The Appeal Panel notified the Applicant on that date of the confirmation of the Notice to Quit.

2.  The HKHA subsequently sent her a letter dated 5 December 2024, requiring the Applicant to pay mesne profits for the flat from the date following the expiration of the Notice To Quit (i.e. 1 August 2024), and requesting the Applicant to vacate the flat and return it to the HKHA as soon as possible. Together with rent underpaid between 1 April 2019 and 30 June 2024, and the outstanding mesne profits, the stated amount owed by the Applicant up to and including the date of the letter 5 December 2024 was $170,269. The Applicant was also warned that if the arrears had not been fully paid on the day she returns the flat, the HKHA would take legal action against her for recovery of those monies.

3.  By her Form 86 dated 4 March 2025, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review, naming the HKHA as the putative respondent and the Appeal Panel as the putative interested party. The description of the impugned decisions given by the Applicant is (in English translation):

(1)  The Appeal Panel’s unreasonable rejection of my application for adjournment of the appeal. The hearing date that the Panel set on its own for the appeal.

(2)  To overturn the determination made by the Appeal Panel on the 5^th day of December 2024.

4.  Together with the Form 86, the Applicant filed an affirmation which contained no information save to identify that there was an attachment to it. That attachment was the HKHA’s letter dated 5 December 2024.

5.  Having considered the papers, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on paper. This is my Decision.

B.  No Merit

6.  There is no merit in the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

7.  First, whilst the Applicant has suggested that the Appeal Panel “unreasonably” rejected her application for adjournment of the appeal, setting its own date, no further information has been provided. This is in breach of the mandatory requirement under Rules of the High Court Order 53 rule 3(2) that an applicant for leave to apply for judicial review should (amongst other things) state the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and provide an affidavit/affirmation verifying the facts relied on. It is not for the Court to seek to devise potential grounds of review from the materials provided by the applicant.

8.  Secondly, the letter dated 5 December 2024 was not a determination made by the Appeal Panel, but the letter from the HKHA dealing with the consequences of the dismissal of the Applicant’s appeal to the Appeal Panel. Even if it is assumed that there has been a typographical error and the Applicant meant to refer to the Appeal Panel’s determination dated 21 November 2024, again there is breach of the mandatory requirement to set out any grounds on which relief is sought, or any other factual basis underpinning those grounds.

9.  These failures to comply with the mandatory requirement are themselves sufficient to lead to a dismissal of the application.

10.  Further, it is extremely unlikely that a Court exercising its judicial review function would interfere with a tribunal’s case management directions relating, amongst other things, to the hearing date set. The Court does not micro-manage the procedural steps taken in or directed by a tribunal. Nor does the Court act as a further tier of appeal.

C.  Result

11.  For the above reasons, and in particular the Applicant’s failure to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with a realistic prospect of success, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.