SHILPE FARHANA EASMIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 298/2025

[2025] HKCFI 1152

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 298 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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J U D G M E N T

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THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 October 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2022 of 2023 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  The applicant appeared before the Court on 10 March 2025 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application as her enemies are the same.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant, aged 40, is a national of Bangladesh. She came to Hong Kong in 2015 to work as a domestic helper but when her employment contract was prematurely terminated on 30 June 2015, she did not depart and instead overstayed since 15 July 2015. She was arrested by police and in due course, lodged her non-refoulement claim, which was rejected by both the Director’s decision dated 23 October 2018 and the Board’s decision dated 23 October 2019 (Board’s Decision).

5.  The applicant further made an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus in HCAL 2022/2023 which was dismissed in a decision dated 21 December 2023 by Jonathan Wong J.

6.  The applicant applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 9 January 2024.

7.  By letter dated 30 August 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.

8.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

9.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

10.  The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. In support of her subsequent claim, the applicant changed her core claim of her fear of being ill-treated or killed by supporters of the Awami League (“AL”) because she was a member of the Bangladesh National Party to saying that her husband was actually a member of the AL and the president of the AL Volunteer League. She now stated that she would be at risk of domestic violence from him. Details of her claim are set out at paragraphs 8-12 of the Director’s Decision.

11.  In summary, the Director found that there were serious doubts on the applicant’s credibility as echoed in the Board’s Decision [13]; state protection was available [18-19]; and internal relocation alternatives were available and reasonable [20-24]. For those reasons, the immigration officer refused her application for subsequent claim.

12.  The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

13.  The applicant filed Form 86 on 27 January 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

14.  In her affidavit in support of her application, the applicant said that the Director’s Decision was wrong and Wednesbury unreasonable.

Discussion

15.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

16.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reason of her previous claim.

17.  For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions in support of her application for subsequent claim.

18.  The reasons given under paragraph 14 are the applicant’s bare assertions without any evidence in support. The applicant has not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision.

19.  I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

20.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

21.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

22.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

23.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. She asked the Court to help her to stay in Hong Kong, which is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.

24.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say.

25.  Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

26.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

27.  RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant.