LOK WAI KWAN AND OTHERS v. WONG CHI KAU, the executor of the estate of SIU OI CHU, deceased

HCMP 936/2022

[2025] HKCFI 269

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 936 OF 2022

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J U D G M E N T

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INTRODUCTION

1.  By the plaintiffs’ Amended Originating Summons re-filed on 28 December 2023 (“the Amended Originating Summons”), the plaintiffs applied, inter alia, for the following orders:

(1)  The defendant, being the executor of the estate of the Deceased, do exhibit by affidavit filed in the court, a true and perfect inventory and account of the movable and immovable property of the Deceased (“the Account Order”);

(2)  The defendant be removed as the executor of the estate of the Deceased (“the Estate”);

(3)  The 1^st plaintiff be appointed as the administratrix in place of the defendant.

((2)  and (3)  will be collectively referred to as “the Replacement Order”)

BACKGROUND

2.  The following background is undisputed or indisputable.

3.  The Deceased passed away on 14 July 2019. 

4.  The Deceased had three children – the 3 plaintiffs.

5.  The Deceased left a will dated 19 June 2013 (“the Will”), in which the defendant was named as the sole executor and trustee of the Estate. 

6.  Apart from the plaintiffs, Kwong Wah Hospital is also a beneficiary under the Will.  It was provided therein that the 4 beneficiaries shall each be entitled to ¼ of the Estate.

7.  On 16 January 2020, the defendant obtained Grant of Probate (“Probate”)  in relation to the Estate pursuant to the Will.

8.  According to the Schedule of Assets of the Grant of Probate, the Estate comprised the following assets:

(1)  Cash at bank in the sum of around $2.8 million;

(2)  Shares in no less than 10 listed companies;

(3)  A flat situated in Kowloon (“the Land Property”);

(4)  Management fee deposit;

(5)  Electricity deposit;

(6)  Water deposit;

(7)  Cash dividend; and

(8)  Deposits in an account with Public Finance Limited in the sum of around $1 million.

9.  The Land Property had been sold in August 2020 by the defendant as executor of the Estate at a consideration of $4.8 million.

10.  In the period between May and July 2020, 3 distributions had been made by the defendant as executor of the Estate, and under which the 4 beneficiaries had received a total of $1.3 million each.

11.  In the period between August 2020 and May 2021, the defendant had made 3 further distributions.  However, on those occasions, only the plaintiffs had received assets (in the total sum of $1.9 million each), whereas Kwong Wah Hospital has not received anything.

12.  It appears that further distributions have been made thereafter, but the exact amount of distribution is yet to be ascertained.

THE PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTS AND THE DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE

13.  I will now set out the correspondences between the parties which led to the commencement of this action.  Unless otherwise stated, the plaintiffs’ letters were issued by their solicitors.

14.  On 1 June 2021, the plaintiffs enquired with the defendant by letter as to how much was left in the Deceased’s Estate for further distribution.  They also asked for an account of a number of different types of transactions which the defendant had undertaken since the grant of the Probate.

15.  On 7 July 2021, the plaintiffs chased the defendant by letter for a response to the letter issued on 1 June 2021, and asked the defendant to clarify whether he was in a position to make further distribution of the Estate by 5 August 2021.  The said letter was also sent to the defendant via WhatsApp by the 3^rd plaintiff.

16.  On 7 July 2021, the defendant replied to the 3^rd plaintiff by WhatsApp that he had just received the aforesaid 2 letters, and that he would contact the plaintiffs’ solicitors.

17.  On 27 July 2021, the plaintiffs complained to the defendant by letter that no response had been received by the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs’ solicitors from the defendant, and asked the defendant to contact the plaintiffs’ solicitors by 3 August 2021.  The plaintiffs threatened that if the defendant failed to do so, they would make whatever application they thought fit.  The said letter was also sent to the defendant via WhatsApp by the 3^rd plaintiff.

18.  On 3 August 2021, the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs’ solicitors and alleged that he had not received the previous letters by post.  He also confirmed that he had not completed the administration of the Estate.  He further requested the 3^rd plaintiff to hand over certain golden ornaments and other luxurious items which the 3^rd plaintiff had taken away from the Deceased’s flat after her death.

19.  On 21 January 2022, the plaintiffs confirmed by letter with the defendant that the 3^rd plaintiff was ready to hand over certain jewelleries, and urged the defendant to contact the plaintiffs’ solicitors by 28 January 2022 so that a time for hand over might be arranged. The said letter was also sent to the defendant via WhatsApp by the 3^rd plaintiff.

20.  On 21 February 2022, the plaintiffs reiterated to the defendant by letter again that the 3^rd plaintiff was ready to hand over the jewelleries and urged the defendant to contact the plaintiffs’ solicitors by 1 March 2022.  The said letter was also sent to the defendant via WhatsApp by the 3^rd plaintiff.

21.  On 6 April 2022, the plaintiffs’ solicitors demanded the defendant to contact them and arrange a time for hand over of the jewelleries, account for the transactions that occurred after the Grant of Probate, and render full and proper accounts.  The said letter was also sent to the defendant via WhatsApp by the 3^rd plaintiff.

22.  However, the defendant did not respond.

23.  The plaintiffs then commenced these proceedings on 18 July 2022.

THE PLAINTIFFS’ GROUNDS OF APPLICATION

24.  The plaintiffs submitted that the defendant should be removed on, inter alia, the following grounds:

(1)  The defendant has refused to provide a true and perfect inventory and account of the Estate;

(2)  There has been delay in the distribution of the Estate;

(3)  The plaintiffs have lost trust in the defendant and do not want him to continue to be the executor of the Estate;

(4)  The defendant, who was a practising solicitor at the time when the Deceased made her will, has been found to be in professional misconduct by the Law Society in failing to answer fully and promptly to correspondence from a client or former clients.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Duty to keep proper accounts

25.  Section 56 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap.10, Laws of Hong Kong)  (“the Ordinance”)  provides that:

“The personal representative of a deceased person shall, when lawfully required so to do, exhibit, by affidavit filed in the court, a true and perfect inventory and account of the movable and immovable property of the deceased, and the court shall have power as heretofore to require personal representatives to bring in inventories.”

26.  In Re Estate of Lee Da Kor [2010] 1 HKLRD 415, Poon J (as Poon CJHC then was)  explained that:

“17. It is the duty of an executor to keep clear and accurate accounts, and to be always ready to render such accounts when called upon to do so : see Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, 2008 Re-Issue, Vol.27, para.425.897. In order to provide a true and perfect account, the executor must provide details of the whereabouts of all properties (including cash)  which he is bound to administer : see Edwin Kwok Wing Yun v Lee Shuk Yee, HCMP3904/2001, unreported, 7 June 2002, per Chung J at para.19.

18. Further, under section 56 of PAO, personal representatives are, when so ordered by the court, to exhibit on oath in the court a full inventory of the estate and render an account of the administration of the estate to the court. Correspondingly, the court may under Order 85, rule 2(3)  of the RHC order executors to furnish and verify accounts.

[…]

20.  In opposing the application, Mr Lin first submitted that what the plaintiff is really after is the Monies.  The repeated inquiries for information about the estate were to pressurize the executors to cave in to his request for distribution of the Monies.  Once the Monies are ordered to be distributed to him, there is no need for an account.  I disagree.  The plaintiff is also entitled to share in the residue estate after the distribution of the Monies. A proper and full account is necessary for the due administration and distribution of the residue estate.”

27.  In Chow Chak Kiu v Chow Man Chit & Others (HCMP 797/2016, unreported, 17 January 2017), Chow J (as Chow JA then was)  stated at [40] that:

“Generally speaking, to render a proper account of the estate of a deceased person, the personal representative is required to:-

(1)  show the opening balance (including capital assets)  and closing balance;

(2)  give details of movement of assets, incomes and expenditure of the estate;

(3)  give details of the whereabouts of all properties (including cash)  of the estate which the personal representative is duty bound to administer; and

(4)  support the account with documentary evidence.

[…]”

28.  In Chan Yu Hong v Chan Kam Hong & Others (HCMP888/2013, unreported, 19 July 2017), B Chu J also held that:

“81. It is the duty of administrators to keep clean, clear and accurate account and to be always ready to render such account when called upon to do so, and it is no excuse that they are inexperienced in keeping account as in such cases it would be their duty to employ a competent accountant to keep them. To discharge the duty to account properly, there must be production of the relevant supporting documents and receipts, as well as proper breakdown of items.

82.  Further, as stated in Re Leung Kam Wah, HCMP 1473/2014, 11 August 2016, unrep, an administrator must at all reasonable times be ready to render a clear and accurate statement of account to a beneficiary, so that the beneficiary is able to see his entitlement under the trust.  It is essential for any accounting system to show at least the opening capital assets, details of the movements of capital assets, the present capital assets, details of income earned, and details of expenditure.”

Removal of executor

29.  Section 33(3)  of the Ordinance provides that:

“The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator)  and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate.”

30.  The court’s discretion under section 33(3)  of the Ordinance has been summarised in Law Wai Hay v Law Po Chong Priscilla [2021] HKCFI 3017 at [28]:

“(1)  The discretion to remove an administratrix under section 33 of the PAO involves an assessment and a value judgement in all the relevant circumstances of whether removal is required for the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries.

(2)  Not every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees will induce to court to remove the administratrix.

(3)  The acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to show a want of honesty, or want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.

(4)  Hostility between the administratrix and the beneficiary is not a ground for removal, unless the breakdown of the relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative.

[Tsang Wing Kwai v Tsang Wing Fai (No 2)[2019] 1 HKLRD 1300 (CA); Tsang Wing Kwai v Tsang Wing Fai [2018] HKCFI 1060 (CFI), §§27-32; Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee [2021] HKCFI 47, §§157-160].”

31.  In Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee & Another [2021] HKCFI 47, DHCJ To further explained the legal principles on the removal of administrators under section 33(3)  of the Ordinance as follows:

“159. In exercising its discretion, the court should have regard to the size of the estate, the nature of the assets that need to be administered, the background and education, training and experience of the remaining and substituted personal representatives and the interests of the beneficiaries: see Wong Tat Lun Eddie & Ors v Wong Chi Ho Jimmy & Ors [HCMP 2391/2013 (unreported), 21 October 2014 at §72]. The view of the majority beneficiaries is a relevant factor: see Chan Yu Hong v Chan Kam Hong [HCMP 888/2013 (unreported), 19 July 2017 at §108, per B Chu J]. The discretion is to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. In general, removal of a representative is not to be preferred unless the administration is still far from completion:Chan Yu Hong [Supra at §33 per B Chu J]. The courts are reluctant to exercise the discretion where the incumbent executor or administrator wishes to carry on, without allowing that incumbent an opportunity to repair or remedy any defects and progress promptly with due administration. The fact that administration of the estate could have been done better is not of itself sufficient ground:Wong Tat Lun Eddie & Ors [Supra at §85 per DHCJ B Chu (as she then was)]. Hostility between the trustee and beneficiaries as such is not a ground for removal of the trustee, unless the breakdown of relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative: Chan Sau Heung v Kwan Siu Fai [HCMP 2620/2012 (unreported), 17 April 2013 at 15, per Poon J (as he then was)]; Re Estate of Kwan Chung [[2013] 6 HKC 29]; Jones v Firkin-Flood [[2008] EWHC 2417 (Ch)].”

32.  In Chu Wing Chuen Paul & Others v Chu Oi Yan Irene [2022] HKCFI 804, Wilson Chan J also had the following to say:

“40. Although it is the duty of the administratrix to provide an account of the Estate upon request, I agree that a delay in doing so does not automatically calls for a removal, but may depend upon the circumstances of the case.

[…]

42. Further, in Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee (supra), at §186, the court explained that sincerity and intention of the administrator in performing his obligations would be taken into account by the court.”

33.  In Chan Kam Shing Alexander v Chan Yin Yau [2023] HKCFI 1092, Wilson Chan J further accepted at [62] that:

“It is not necessary to establish specific wrongdoing, misconduct or fault on the part of an executor before he can be removed: Li Choi Ping v Xie Yanxian [2022] HKCFI 3042 §§5-6. The main guide is the welfare of the beneficiaries.”

34.  In Lau Tung Hoi Kent v Lau Tung Kuen [2022] HKCFI 1921, the learned Judge discussed the weight to be given to the choice of executor of the deceased.  It was held that:

“31. The statutory criteria governing the removal of an executor is whether it is required having regard to the due and proper administration of the estate, and the interests of persons beneficially entitled in the estate. This involves an assessment by the court having regard to all the relevant circumstances with this touchstone in mind. Each case must be decided on its own facts and the assessment involves a value judgment on the part of the first instance judge. Although there are cases referring to the importance of choice by the testator, and that the power to remove an executor should be exercised cautiously and sparingly, it would go too far to regard these statements as setting out legal principles which supplant the statutory criteria: Tsang Wing Kwai v Tsang Wing Fai (No 2) [2019] 1 HKLRD 1300 at §27 per Lam VP (as he then was).

[…]

33. A court is entitled to take into account the choice of executor by the testator. The testator is taken to have chosen the executor with personal knowledge of family dynamics and relationships. The testator’s choice also necessarily implies that the executor was trusted and believed to be suitable by the testator to perform the duties required of an executor. Equally, there is a limit to the weight to be attached to this factor, especially where the removal is based on conduct or circumstances after the death of the testator or arises from a situation which the testator could not have reasonably foreseen at the time when the executor was chosen.

34. This is explained in Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate (21^st ed., 2018)  at §57-20 as follows:

‘The fact that the testator has chosen the executors in question is capable of being relevant, for no other reasons that he may be expected to have had knowledge of the characters, attitudes and relationships involved, although if circumstances have changed radically since the appointment, that would be a countervailing consideration.’ ”

THE HEARING ON 4 JUNE 2024

35.  While the defendant had filed an affirmation to oppose the plaintiffs’ applications, he agreed at the hearing on 4 June 2024 (“the June Hearing”)  to exhibit by affidavit a true and perfect inventory and account of the Estate by 31 July 2024.  In other words, he agreed to the making of the Account Order pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Amended Originating Summons.

36.  On the other hand, the plaintiffs agreed that, in the light of 3 cashier orders which the defendant produced in the Court at the June Hearing for further distribution of the Estate, the application for the Replacement Order be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

THE HEARING ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2024

37.  Despite the defendant’s confidence that he could fully discharge his duty shortly after the June Hearing, he informed the Court by letter dated 26 August 2024 that he could not do so as expected, as he allegedly had lost some of the required information. 

38.  Another hearing was therefore fixed to be heard on 11 September 2024 (“the September Hearing”)  to deal with the matter.

39.  Despite the plaintiffs’ initial stance that the defendant should be removed forthwith, they agreed at the September Hearing that a last chance should be given to the defendant as requested, as it was the defendant’s representation that the only missing documents were in relation to a securities account which would be made available to him shortly, and that he should be able to complete the account by mid-October 2024.  This apparently is a sensible approach for the plaintiffs to take, because the replacement of the defendant would no doubt lead to further legal costs to be incurred, and it would take time for the 1^st plaintiff to take over the administration matter from the defendant.

40.  The time for the defendant to comply with the Account Order was as a result extended to 31 October 2024.  He was further directed to report to the Court the progress of the matter by 8 November 2024.

THE HEARING ON 30 DECEMBER 2024

41.  On 11 November 2024, the plaintiffs’ solicitors wrote to the Court and reported that the defendant has breached the Account Order.  In the light of the defendant’s repeated breach of the Account Order, they requested to restore their application for the Replacement Order.

42.  It was further noted that the defendant did not write to the Court as directed at all.

43.  Another hearing was therefore fixed to be heard on 30 December 2024 (“the December Hearing”).

44.  At the December Hearing, the defendant admitted that he had breached the Account Order.  Be that as it may, he asked that a very last chance be given to him.  He was willing to accept an unless order with a deadline to be fixed for 28 February 2025, with the consequence of breach being the grant of the Replacement Order.

DISCUSSION

45.  The 1^st question is whether further time should be granted to the defendant for his compliance of the Account Order.

46.  In my view, the answer must be “No”:

(1)  The previous 2 deadlines for the compliance of the Account Order were fixed on the basis of the defendant’s own estimation of the time required.  Yet he was unable to comply with the same.  There is no reason why he should be trusted further;

(2)  One of the main concerns of the Court is the timely administration of the Estate, particularly when Probate had been granted back on 16 January 2020, that is, nearly 5 years ago.  The further extension of time means that the defendant would not be replaced if he is able to comply with the Account Order by 28 February 2025.  This is undesirable for it is unknown as to when he would complete the administration of the Estate. Moreover, there is an urgent need to look into the whereabouts of some of the assets of the Estate (see below);

(3)  The defendant had breached not only the Account Order but also the direction that he had to report to the Court on the progress of the matter by 8 November 2024.  He explained that he had misunderstood the order in that he mistakenly thought that there was no need for him to write to the Court in the event he could not comply with the Account Order in time. With greatest respect, this explanation was made to be rejected.  The direction made by the Court was clear.  As a solicitor, he should have no problem in understanding what it meant.  In my view, his conduct only shows that he has paid no regard to court orders.

47.  While the only issue raised by the defendant in the December Hearing was whether further extension of time should be granted, I think I should also explain why I am of the view that the Account Order and the Replacement Order should be made anyway with or without the defendant’s consent, which I will do below.

48.  As far as account of the Estate is concerned, it is undeniable that the plaintiffs have enquired with the defendant time and again as to the transactions which the defendant had conducted for the Estate after the Grant of Probate.  However, many of those repeated requests have fallen on deaf ears.  As a result, the plaintiffs had been kept in the dark as to the progress of the defendant’s administration of the Estate.  Neither were they informed as to their entitlement under the Estate.  This is unsatisfactory, particularly when the Deceased has passed away in July 2019 and the Probate was granted in January 2020. 

49.  Furthermore, as aforesaid, it has been nearly 5 years since the defendant has obtained the Grant of Probate.  However, it appears that there are quite a lot of assets yet to be distributed.

50.  Worse still, it has not been explained as to why the defendant has failed to make any distribution to Kwong Wah Hospital after July 2020, even though he had made further distributions to each of the plaintiffs since August 2020.  In this regard, it is noted that the defendant had sent the plaintiffs’ solicitors for reference photocopies of 2 cashier orders dated 3 June 2024 and 6 June 2024 for the respective sums of $1,828,000 and $339,000 payable to Kwong Wah Hospital (“the Cashier Orders”). However, the Hospital Authority’s solicitors have since then confirmed with the plaintiffs’ solicitors that neither Kwong Wah Hospital nor the Hospital Authority had ever received any of the Cashier Orders.  This is a serious matter which requires investigation as soon as possible.

51.  Under all these circumstances, it is understandable that the plaintiffs had lost their trust on the defendant and did not want him to continue to be the executor of the Estate.

52.  Pausing here, I note that the plaintiffs have also relied on the fact that the defendant had been found to be in professional misconduct by the Law Society, and one of the proved allegations made against the defendant by the Law Society was that he had failed to answer fully and promptly to correspondence from a client or former clients.  On my part, I do not think that that per se would assist the plaintiffs’ case, because the defendant apparently is not discharging his duty as executor as a practising solicitor herein, but rather as a friend of the Deceased. 

53.  I now turn to the defendant’s grounds in opposition which may be summarised as follows:

(1)  He has been chosen by the Deceased as the executor of her Estate;

(2)  The plaintiffs’ relationship with the Deceased was bad;

(3)  The Deceased did not wish to have immediate distribution of the Estate;

(4)  Appointing the 1^st plaintiff would not be in the best interest of the beneficiaries of the Estate.

54.  With respect, I do not think it is relevant to consider the Deceased’s relationship with the plaintiffs during her lifetime. 

55.  Neither do I think it relevant that the Deceased trusted the defendant.  No matter how close he was to the Deceased and how he was trusted by the Deceased, the Court would not lower the standard required of him in the discharge of his duty as the executor of the Estate.

56.  I do not accept that the Deceased had ever expressed that there should not be “forthwith” distribution as alleged:

(1)  If there was indeed such clear instruction given by the Deceased, it is difficult to understand why such instruction was not expressly provided for in the Will.  It should be noted that the Will was prepared by a solicitors’ firm of which the defendant was a partner;

(2)  The defendant’s own conduct was not consistent with such an allegation, as it can be seen that the defendant has made a distribution in the total sum of $2.3 million to each of the 3 plaintiffs within 7 months after he has obtained the Grant of Probate.  In particular, it appears that the defendant had made a further distribution once the Land Property was sold in August 2020.  In other words, there was no sign of the defendant withholding distribution;

(3)  According to the defendant, the reason why there should not be “forthwith” distribution was because of the character of the 3^rd plaintiff.  However, it is evident that when the defendant made previous distributions, he did not distinguish between the 3^rd plaintiff and the other 2 plaintiffs at all, but made equal distributions to all of them at the same time.

57.  Hence, in all the circumstances of the present case, I consider that the Court should exercise its discretion in removing the defendant as the executor of the Estate:

(1)  The defendant has failed in his duty to account;

(2)  There has been substantial delay in the defendant’s administration of the Estate;

(3)  There is concern as to why the defendant had failed to distribute to Kwong Wah Hospital when he made distributions to the plaintiffs in the period between August 2020 and May 2021;

(4)  Investigation is required in relation to the Cashier Orders;

(5)  There are quite a lot of assets which are yet to be distributed;

(6)  It is the wish of all the beneficiaries that the defendant be removed (Kwong Wah Hospital has indicated by solicitors’ letter to the Court back on 6 November 2023 that they have no objection to the orders sought by the plaintiffs herein even though they did not wish to be added as a party);

(7)  It is in the interest of the beneficiaries that the defendant be removed;

(8)  While the defendant was the person picked by the Deceased herself, what happened after the Deceased’s death has apparently changed the whole circumstances.

58.  The next question is whether the 1^st plaintiff should be appointed in place of the defendant as the administrarix of the Estate.

59.  While it was the defendant’s stance that 1^st plaintiff should not be appointed in the light of the possible future disputes among the plaintiffs, it appears to me that even if there had been any quarrel among the plaintiffs, that was water under the bridge.  The present situation is that the plaintiffs have joined force since at least June 2021 when they engaged solicitors together to chase the defendant for an account and explanation.  The 1^st plaintiff’s proposed appointment is not only supported by the other 2 plaintiffs but also Kwong Wah Hospital. 

60.  Further, given the nature of the remaining assets (mainly shares and cash at bank), the administration of the Estate should be relatively straight forward, and there should not be much room for argument. 

61.  In these circumstances, I am of the view that it is appropriate to appoint the 1^st plaintiff.

ORDER

62.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I make the following orders:

(1)  The defendant, being the executor of the Estate of the Deceased, do exhibit by affidavit filed in the court no later than 14 February 2025, a true and perfect inventory and account of the movable and immovable property of the Deceased;

(2)  The defendant be removed as the executor of the estate of the Deceased and the 1^st plaintiff be appointed as the administratrix in place of the defendant pursuant to section 33(3)  of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap.10, Laws of Hong Kong).

COSTS

63.  Costs should follow the event. 

64.  The plaintiffs’ counsel asked for indemnity costs against the defendant. 

65.  While I accept that the defendant has indeed failed in his duty as executor of the Estate, I hold the view that this is not a case which warrants indemnity costs.  I therefore order on nisi basis that the defendant shall personally pay the plaintiffs the costs of and occasioned by these proceedings, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

66.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, shall be made by letter, and will be disposed of on paper)  within 14 days hereof.

67.  The Hospital Authority has instructed solicitor to attend the December Hearing in an attempt to apply for various orders. However, neither the Hospital Authority nor Kwong Wah Hospital has applied to join the present proceedings as a party.  There was therefore no standing for the Hospital Authority to make the said applications at all.  With the consent of Ms Chan who appeared for the Hospital Authority, I make no order as to the costs of the Hospital Authority.