ALI ARSHAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
[2026] HKCA 1597 · CACV 711/2025
Court of Appeal
CACV 711/2025, [2026] HKCA 1597
On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 3815
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 711 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 15 OF 2020)
BETWEEN
| |ALI ARSHAD |Applicant |
| |and | |
| |TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| |DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |Putative |
| | |Interested Party |
_____________________
Before: Hon Au and Chow JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 14 September 2026
JUDGMENT
Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is the Applicant’s appeal against the order of S T Poon J (“the
Judge”) dated 29 August 2025 (“the Order”) refusing to grant leave to
the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“the Board”) dated 30 December 2019, whereby the Board dismissed the
Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 8 November 2018.
BACKGROUND
2. The Applicant is a national of India. He entered Hong Kong as a
visitor on 24 July 2016, and was permitted to stay until 7 August
2016. On 8 August 2016, he surrendered himself to the Immigration
Department and lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that, if
refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over some
unpaid debts. Details of the Applicant’s claim have been summarised
by the Judge at §§1-6 of the CALL-1 Form.
3. By a Notice of Decision dated 8 November 2018, the Director dismissed
the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds: the
risk of torture[1], BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], and persecution
risk[4].
4. The Applicant appealed the Director’s decision to the Board. On 30
December 2019, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal, and
confirmed the Director’s decision (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s reasons for its decision were summarised by the Judge at §10
of the CALL-1 Form, as follows:
“In its decision the Board found that there was no evidence at all showing
that Applicant has received any kind of harm from his creditor and it
rejected his claim of fear of harm from his creditor that caused him to
leave his country to come to Hong Kong to seek protection, and that in any
event it was a private monetary dispute between the two of them without any
official involvement that state or police protection would be available to
the Applicant upon his return to India, and that his claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.”
THE JUDGE’S DECISION
5. On 2 January 2020, the Applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to
apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. He did not put
forward any ground for seeking relief in the Form 86 or in his
supporting affirmation of the same date, other than stating in his
supporting affirmation that he was not satisfied with the decision.
6. On 29 August 2025, the Judge refused to grant leave to the Applicant
to apply for judicial review, for the following reasons:
“[11] …in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or
procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in
its decision being clearly and properly identified by the
Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis for
his intended challenge.
…
[13] In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been
established by both the Director and the Board in their
respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if
real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or
unsafe for him to relocate to other part of India, there is
simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1
HKC 526.
[14] In the premises, and having considered the decisions of
both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination
and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or
procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on
their part to apply high standards of fairness in their
consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.”
THIS APPEAL
7. In his Notice of Appeal filed on 9 September 2025, the Applicant
states that he is not satisfied with the Judge’s decision which he
alleges is unfair to him. The Applicant also alleges generally that
the Judge made “some law error” in the decision, and failed to
consider his case thoroughly and carefully by taking into account all
relevant matters.
8. On 9 September 2025, the Applicant consented to his appeal being
disposed of on paper by the Court without an oral hearing.
9. The Applicant has failed to lodge written submissions in support of
his appeal contrary to the directions given by the Registrar of Civil
Appeals on 15 December 2025.
DISCUSSION
10. In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in
non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the
decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the
applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s
decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s role
is not to examine the Board’s decision afresh as if it was a fresh
application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14(6)).
11. Further, the assessment of evidence, country of origin information,
risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation
are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The
court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are
error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision
of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022. No such error of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board is
shown in the present case.
12. The matters raised in the Applicant’s Notice of Appeal are general
assertions without particulars, and do not constitute valid grounds of
appeal against the Judge’s decision.
13. The Applicant has failed to raise any viable ground of appeal against
the Order.
14. The Applicant’s appeal has no merits, and is dismissed.
|(Thomas Au) |(Anderson Chow) |
|Justice of Appeal |Justice of Appeal |
The Applicant, acting in person
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[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life
under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,
Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-
refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees.
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ALI ARSHAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
CA · [2026] HKCA 1597
This judgment