RE INJUM

CACV 5/2026, [2026] HKCA 501

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5507

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1345 OF 2020)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Cheung JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge YW Hew dated 24 December 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5507) (‘the Leave Decision’) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (and any related extension application) (‘the Leave Application’) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (‘the Board’) dated 27 January 2017 (‘the Board’s Decision’), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (‘the Director’) dated 9 February 2015, refusing his non‑refoulement claim (other than BOR 2 risk). The Director had invited the applicant to submit additional facts relating to his claim including BOR 2 risk. The Director on 3 November 2019 rejected his claim based on BOR 2 which was not appealed/petitioned upon^[1].

2.  This appeal was scheduled to be heard on 3 March 2026.  Despite the directions from the Court to the applicant dated 5 January 2026 (‘Directions’), the applicant failed to lodge written submission by the stipulated time. Accordingly, by [11] of the Directions, the hearing of the appeal was vacated and the Court will now deal with this appeal on paper.

3.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [1]‑[3], [5]‑[14], [29], [33], [38], [40] of the Board’s Decision.

4.  The applicant is a national of Pakistan^[2].  He claimed to have arrived in Hong Kong in April 2004 as a visitor but overstayed and was repatriated in May 2005.  In July 2005, he came to Hong Kong again illegally, and was eventually arrested in December 2007.  He made a torture claim was which expanded and to include non‑refoulement claim in January 2008 (except for BOR 2 risk), which was refused on 9 February 2015.  The basis of his claim is that if he returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by Mr Latif and Mr Iqbal and some unspecified people belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League‑N party because he had supported the opposition Pakistan People’s Party in the past^[3]. 

5.  The Judge sets out his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [9]-[19] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat the details herein.

6.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 January 2026, the applicant stated:

‘ I am disagree with the decision maker authorities. Sir decision maker not give me justice. They not proper investigation in my case. Sir decision maker give unfair decision. Sir my decision same like Torture Claims Appeal Board and Director of Immigration. Sir I want to stay in HK my wife long time here. I don’t want to go back my country. My marriage certificate is attached. Please grant my case. Thanks.’

I.     Discussion

7.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

8.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non‑refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

9.  In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

10.  However, nowhere in his Notice of Appeal did the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars.  His assertions are all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  The Court will not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence, country of origin information materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  No such error was demonstrated by the applicant.  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and lack substance.  We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.  The applicant attached a purported marriage certificate to the Notice of Appeal.  Nonetheless, the applicant had said to the Judge that he would not rely on the fact of his marriage in his leave application ([2] of the Leave Decision).  Further, the applicant has not identified any error of law of the Judge in this respect.  In these circumstances, the purported marriage certificate would not assist the applicant’s appeal.

11.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.