SINGH NARINDER PAL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1294/2020

[2026] HKCFI 86

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1294 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions from the Applicant in open court;

1.  The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, substituting “/Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office” in place of “Director of Immigration”, and naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party; and

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a national of India. By a Form 86 filed on 24 June 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also filed on 24 June 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of a decision which describes itself as one of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”), made on 25 May 2020 (“the BOR Decision”)[1].

2.  I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the BOR Decision and the USM 1521 Decision (defined below) unless otherwise specified herein.

3.  The Applicant sought an oral hearing of his application, which took place and which he attended on 28 August 2025. He made some submissions, which I will set out below.

4.  I have amended the Form 86 of my own motion to reflect the identities of the proper Putative Respondent and the Putative Interested Party.

Background

5.  This is set out in the BOR Decision and in the USM 1521 Decision. While I will not repeat the contents thereof, in summary and in relation to the assessment of his claim:

(1)  The Applicant claimed non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to India he would be harmed or killed by Munnu and his people;

(2)  The claim was assessed on the grounds of Torture Risk[2], BOR 3 Risk[3], and Persecution Risk[4] and was rejected by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) in a decision dated 30 April 2015 (“Director’s 1^st Decision”);

(3)  The Applicant appealed/petitioned to the TCAB/NRCPO. The latter determined after a hearing that the Applicant’s claim for non-refoulment protection failed, rejected his appeal/petition, and confirmed the Director’s 1^st Decision in a decision dated 25 April 2017 (“USM 1521 Decision”)[5]. No further steps were or have been taken by the Applicant in relation to the USM 1521 Decision;

(4)  The Director by a letter dated 18 May 2017 invited the Applicant to submit additional facts relating to an assessment of BOR 2 Risk[6]. As no such submissions were received by the deadline of 1 June 2017 (or indeed by 14 June 2017), the Director in a decision dated 14 June 2017 (“the Director’s Further Decision”) found that the Applicant had failed to establish BOR 2 Risk in relation to his non‑refoulement claim; and

(5)  The Applicant then filed an appeal/petition for relief against the Director’s Further Decision. The petition was dealt with by the same adjudicator who had earlier issued the USM 1521 Decision. He issued the BOR Decision dated 25 May 2020, in which he held that the Applicant had not made out a case of BOR 2 Risk, rejected the appeal/petition, and confirmed the Director’s Further Decision.

Legal Principles

6.  An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

7.  It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

8.  In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Discussion

9.  The Form 86 and the Affirmation do not identify any grounds of judicial review, as they do not advance any allegation of procedural unfairness in relation to, and/or of any error of law in, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the BOR Decision.

10.  Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the BOR Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness.

11.  The decision-maker set out the Applicant’s procedural history, including the background leading up to and the making of the USM 1521 Decision (which was annexed to, and which was also clearly considered in the process of reaching, the BOR Decision), the Applicant’s failure to submit further facts in relation to BOR 2 Risk to the Director, and the contents of his Notice of Appeal. He had regard to the high standard of fairness and decided that there was no need to hold a hearing since no additional facts had been put forward by the Applicant in support of a claim for protection against BOR 2 Risk, found that the Applicant’s case was not relevant to BOR 2(2) to 2(6), and found that the Applicant had failed to establish a real and personal risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life, in violation of BOR 2(1), if he were refouled India. The appeal/petition was accordingly dismissed, and the Director’s Further Decision was confirmed.

12.  I do not, from my examination and scrutiny, see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test that is sufficient to vitiate the BOR Decision, and that justifies the grant of leave. The decision-maker’s findings in the USM 1512 Decision as to the Applicant’s evidence, credibility, risk of harm, and that the Applicant had hence failed to establish BOR 3 Risk, were clearly determinative of the Applicant’s claim against BOR 2 Risk (see Kulwinder Kaur [2022] HKCA 49 at §§58-60, Sandhu Vinny [2022] HKCFI 2327 at §§24-26, [2023] HKCA 1261 at §§30, 32-33).

13.  At the hearing before me, the Applicant asked me to “rethink” his case and that the TCAB/NRCPO be asked to “rethink” his case, as he did not want to leave Hong Kong, and wanted to live in Hong Kong safely and not return to India. He also alleged that he had ongoing matrimonial proceedings. However, I do not see how such claims are relevant in any way to the application before me, or that they give rise to any grounds of judicial review, which is not an appeal.

14.  There is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

Conclusion

15.  In the circumstances, I have made the orders above, including that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1