MYERS MANAGEMENT CONSULTING LTD v. TOPMIX (INTERNATIONAL) CO LTD AND OTHERS

DCCJ 3051, 3052, 3053 & 3054/2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3051 OF 2014

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3052 OF 2014

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3053 OF 2014

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3054 OF 2014

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DECISION

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1.  There are 2 groups of summonses before me. The first in time is one single summons taken out on 7 July 2016 (“the security summons”) by the same 2 interveners (“the interveners”) in the captioned 4 actions (“the 4 DC actions”) applying for security of costs in sum of $679,500 from the same plaintiff in the 4 DC actions (“the plaintiff”).

2.  The second in time are 4 identical summonses taken out by the plaintiff on 18 July 2016 (“the stay summonses”) for all proceedings of the 4 DC actions be stayed pending the decision of High Court Action No.1265 of 2015 (“the 2015 CFI action”).

Background

3.  The defendant in DCCJ Nos.3501 & 3502 of 2014 is one company by name of Topmix (International) Co Ltd (“TICL”) while the defendant in DCCJ Nos.3503 & 3504 of 2014 is another company by name of Topmix Industrial Ltd (“TIL”).

4.  On 6 Aug 2014, the plaintiff issued writs in the 4 DC actions seeking to recover alleged arrears of consultancy and accounting service fees totaling $960,000 due fromTICL and TIL (“the 2 companies”) under alleged consultancy agreements dated 1 Dec 2011 and alleged accounting agreements dated 1 Apr 2013made between plaintiff and the 2 companies respectively (“the service agreements”).

5.  On 10 Nov 2014, judgment was entered against the 2 companies in default of notice of intention to defend in the 4 DC actions (“the default judgments”).

6.  On 2 Jan 2015, the plaintiff presented winding-up petitions against the 2 companies on the basis of the default judgments.

7.  On 6 Mar 2015, the interveners, minority shareholders of the 2 companies, took out summonses to intervene in the 4 DC actions to set aside the default judgments and to defend the plaintiff’s claims on behalf of the 2 companies.

8.  On 9 Jun 2015, the interveners as the 1^st & 2^nd plaintiffs commenced the 2015 CFI action against a total of 11 defendants, including Chan Yuk Lung and Chan Yuk Wai (“the Chan brothers”) as 1^st & 2^nd defendants, one Ng Chun Kai (“Ng”) as 7^th defendant, and the 2 companies as 10^th & 11^th defendants.

9.  On 23 Jun 2015, Deputy District Judge Ludwig Ng set aside the default judgments and gave leave to the interveners to intervene in the 4 DC actions to defend on behalf of the 2 companies (“the decision”).

10.  On 29 Jun 2015, the winding-up petitions against the 2 companies were dismissed.

11.  On 27 July 2015, 4 Defence were filed on behalf of the 2 companies by the interveners in the 4 DC actions.

12.  On 27 July 2015, an Amended Statement of Claim (“ASOC”) was filed in the 2015 CFI action.

13.  On 14 Aug 2015, Deputy District Judge Ludwig Ng granted leave to the plaintiff to appeal against the decision.

14.  On 21 Aug 2015, the plaintiff filed 4 notices of appeal against the decision in CACV 194 to 196 of 2015 (“the appeals”).

15.  On 25 Aug 2015, the interveners’ solicitors wrote to the plaintiff demanding security for their costs of the 4 DC actions in sum of $679,500. On the same day, they also wrote to demand the plaintiff to provide security for their costs of the appeals.

16.  On 10 Sep 2015, the interveners applied for security for their costs in the appeals in sum of $816,500 (“the security application”).

17.  On 9 Oct 2015, a joint Defence of 7^th, 8^th & 9^th defendants (7^th defendant being Ng) was filed in the 2015 CFI action.

18.  On 6 Jan 2016, the Court of Appeal ordered the plaintiff to provide$400,000 as security of the interveners’ costs in the appeals, and also ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of the security application in sum of $120,000 forthwith.

19.  On 4 Feb 2016, the plaintiff failed to provide security of interveners’ costs of the appeals and the appeals were dismissed with costs.

20.  On 5 Feb 2016, the interveners’ solicitors wrote to plaintiff’s solicitors demanding plaintiff’s payment of the interveners’ costs of the security application by 19 Feb 2016.

21.  On 16 Mar 2016, the interveners’ solicitors wrote to plaintiff demanding payment of interveners’ costs of the security application or else winding-up petition to be presented against plaintiff.

22.  On 8 Apr 2016, the plaintiff ultimately paid the costs of the security application to the interveners.

23.  On 15 Apr 2016, the interveners’ solicitors again wrote to the plaintiff demanding security for their costs of the 4 DC actions in sum of $679,500.

24.  On 7 July 2016, the security summons was issued by the interveners in the 4 DC actions returnable on 19 July 2016.

25.  On 18 July 2016, the stay summonses were issued by the plaintiff in the 4 DC actions.

26.  On 19 July 2016, Registrar Lui gave directions for the hearing of the security summons and the stay summonses.

27.  On 18 Aug 2016, the interveners on behalf of the 2 companies filed list of documents and timetabling questionnaires in the 4 DC actions.

28.  A deadline of 13 Sep 2016 had been fixed for discovery in the 2015 CFI action.

29.  On 25 Nov 2016, Registrar Lung ordered the 2015 CFI action to be heard sequentially with related High Court Action No.1382 of 2011 (“the 2011 CFI action”) before the same judge.

30.  By the hearing before me on 30 Nov 2016, the plaintiff, it was agreed, had done nothing[1] to prosecute the 4 DC actions.

31.  A deadline of 3 Jan 2017 had been fixed for exchange of witness statements in the 2015 CFI action.

32.  27 Mar 2017 would be case management conference for the 2011 CFI action and the 2015 CFI action.

Analysis

33.  Mr Ronald Tang (“Mr Tang”) leading Ms Carmen Kei appeared for the interveners. Mr Hugh Kam (“Mr Kam”) appeared for the plaintiff. I have carefully and fully considered all evidence, authorities and submissions before me.

34.  By way of evidence for the interveners, Cheung Hang (“CH”), an associate of the solicitors for the interveners, had filed 3 affidavits before me.

35.  As for evidence for the plaintiff, Ng, the sole shareholder and director of the plaintiff, had filed his 2^nd and 3^rd affirmations before me, and Lui Pui Chung, a solicitor in the firm acting for the plaintiff, had also filed an affirmation before me.

Security summons

36.  Mr Tang applied for security for costs under O.23 r.1 of the Rules of District Court, Cap.336H(“RDC”), on the basis that the plaintiff is a foreign plaintiff.

Foreign plaintiff

37.  It is, I think, not disputed that the plaintiff was a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in Dec 2011. It had never been registered under Part XI of the old Companies Ordinance, Cap.32, or Part 16 of the current Companies Ordinance, Cap.622.

38.  Admittedly, the plaintiff is a corporate vehicle specifically set up to provide alleged management and accounting services to the 2 companies. It does not have a place of business in Hong Kong. It had only a representative office by way of the address of an accountant’s firm in Hong Kong. Its only revenue, and its only asset, was its alleged service fees due from the 2 companies.

39.  As such, it is the usual ordinary or general rule of practice thatthe court would order a foreign plaintiff to provide security for costs because it is ordinarily just to do so: Goal Setting Consulting Co Ltd v Unigraphics Solution Asia Pacific Inc [2006] 3 HKLRD 678, 683C.

40.  Coupled with the matters in para 15, 16, 18 to 22 above, the interveners, I am satisfied, run a risk of not being able to recover their costs if they are successful in defending the 2 companies in the 4 DC actions against plaintiff’s claim therein.

Bona fide claim & defence

41.  As to merits of plaintiff’s claim, and that of the defence, in the 4 DC actions, considering the materials and submissions before me, I do not find it appropriate at this hearing to make any preliminary assessment of their ultimate success or failure.

42.  For present purpose, I shall assume that both plaintiff’s claim and the defence of the 2 companies are bona fide: Sunchase International Group (China) Ltd v Vincor Group of Companies (Investment) Ltd [2004] 1 HKLR 731, 733D-F.

No delay in applying security for costs

43.  Mr Kam submitted that there had been delay in applying for security of costs on the part of the interveners, who had offered no credible or any explanation for the same. I disagree.

44.  First, nowhere in plaintiff’s affirmations before me was it complained that the interveners were guilty of any alleged delay in taking out the security summons and explanation demanded for the same.

45.  Secondly, having carefully considered the chronology of events in the background section above, I do not think the interveners were guilty of any delay as submitted by Mr Kam.

46.  It would, I think, be premature for them to apply for security for costs prior to given leave to intervene in the 4 DC actions. Not long after the decision was given, the plaintiff applied and was granted leave to appeal. Given that the plaintiff took no further steps in the 4 DC actions below[2], I find it reasonable for the interveners to focus on the appeal. For, if they lost it, they no longer enjoyed any locus to appear in the 4 DC actions. At any rate, by their 1^st letter dated 25 Aug 2015, they already put the plaintiff on notice their intention to seek security for costs.

47.  After the security application and the dismissal of the appeal for want of security for costs, with no action taken by plaintiff for the 4 DC actions, I also find it reasonable for the interveners to wait to see if plaintiff paid up the costs of the security application or risk wound-up proceedings by them. For, in the latter event, the 4 DC actions would likely come to a halt, if not an end. Once such costs were paid, the interveners followed up with their 2^nd letter of demand dated 15 Apr 2016. When it was not replied to, they took out their security summons before me.

48.  Granted that plaintiff took no steps to pursue the 4 DC actions, there was, I think, no urgency for the interveners to apply for security for costs in late 2015 or early 2016. By mid-2016 when they had to incur substantial costs to prepare for trial, it was, I think, understandable that they should then apply: Sunchase, supra, 734C-D.

49.  Despite the time taken by the interveners to apply for security for costs since the decision, no prejudice was, I think, caused to the plaintiff in all the circumstances. Such application can be made at any stage of the proceedings (Goal Setting, supra, 683I) and the trial of the 4 DC actions is nowhere near.

Insufficient evidence of claim stifled

50.  Mr Kam also submitted, and Ng suggested at para 9 of his 2^nd affirmation, that the plaintiff’s claim in the 4 DC actions, and Ng’s defence in the 2015 CFI action, would be stifled if security of costs was ordered against the plaintiff in the 4 DC actions.

51.  However, the onus is on the plaintiff to show that it will probably be prevented from continuing on with the litigation if security is ordered.The court considers not only whether the plaintiff company can provide security out of its own resources to continue the litigation, but also whether it can raise the amount needed from its directors, shareholders or other backers or interested persons.A bare assertion without sufficient particulars cannot suffice: Goal Setting, supra, 684B-685F.

52.  Claiming himself the only source of finance, and the sole investor, for the plaintiff at para 4 thereof, Ng said he had a tight budget at his 2^nd affirmation.

53.  At his 3^rd affirmation, Ng further said at para 5 thereof he does not have unlimited means and he repeatedly emphasized at para 6 to 8 thereof that his cash-flow or financial resources would be “locked-up” if plaintiff is ordered to provide security of costs to the interveners.

54.  Nevertheless, Ng gave no particulars of the financial resources of the plaintiff or himself. Not a single sheet of financial statement of Ng or the plaintiff was exhibited. He had not explained in details how he could have allegedly financed plaintiff’s litigations so far at District Court, the Companies Court and the Court of Appeal with different counsels appearing for it. He gave no details if plaintiff or he had attempted to seek finance elsewhere and the result thereof.

55.  Ng, I note, gave no clue of his occupation at his affirmations before me. However, at para 7(d) & 19(e) of his joint Defence with 8^th & 9^th defendants for the 2015 CFI action, it was pleaded that Ng was “a businessman of over 20 years and had experience in different trading sectors[3]” and “he had the necessary soft business skills and networks to provide alleged consultancy services to the 2 companies”. One begs to ask if an experienced business like Ng had tried to exploit his networks to continue financing plaintiff in its litigation.

56.  In any event, Ng nowhere said in his affirmations that he was “unable” to pay the costs sought. Rather, he was, I think, “reluctant” to do so (Chinacast Education Corp v Chan Tze Ngon, unreported, HCA 1062/2012, 15 Oct 2015, para 19-22) as he repeatedly stressed that he opposed “lock-up” of his cash and/or financial resources.

57.  Accordingly, on all evidence before me, the plaintiff fell, I think, far short of demonstrating that its claims in the 4 DC actions, and Ng’s defence in the 2015 CFI action, wouldprobably be stifled if an order for security for costs was made.

Stay summonses

58.  By way of his last argument, Mr Kam submitted if the stay summonses are allowed, there would not be any future costs to be incurred by the interveners for the 4 DC actions and, hence, the security summons should be dismissed.

59.  Mr Kam made his application under O.1B r.1(2)(e) of RDC. He also referred to s.48(5) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap.336 (“DCO”).

One common issue of facts

60.  Mr Kam first submitted that there are common issues of fact between the 2015 CFI action and the 4 DC actions whereas Mr Tang submitted that their issues are completely different.

61.  But one notices from ASOC of the 2015 CFI action that the interveners brought such derivative action in the Court of First Instance to redress various wrongdoings allegedly done to the 2 companies (i.e. the 10^th & 11^th defendants therein) by the Chan brothers (i.e. the 1^st & 2^nd defendants therein and alleged controlling director and shareholders of the 2 companies) and by the 4^th to 9^th defendants therein, including Ng (i.e. the 7^th defendant therein and a friend of the Chan brothers).

62.  Among many overt acts of conspiracy to injure and/or defraud the 2 companies pleaded in ASOC of the 2015 CFI action, it was pleaded at para 25 to 27, 29 to 32 thereof that the Chan brothers had set up the plaintiff and concealed their ownership of it by having Ng as their nominee, caused the service agreements which was a sham to be entered, caused the 4 DC actions to be brought and undefended, and caused petitions for winding-up of the 2 companies to be filed.

63.  At the same time, one notices from the 4 Defences filed by the interveners in the 4 DC actions that the common defence they run on behalf of the 2 companies against the plaintiff’s claim therein is that the service agreements was a sham.

64.  Moreover, the particulars pleaded at para 31 of ASOC in the 2015 CFI action for the said allegation of sham service agreements bear similarity to allegations one finds at the 4 Defences filed by the interveners in the 4 DC actions.

65.  To complete the picture, by his joint Defence with 8^th & 9^th defendants in the 2015 CFI action, Ng denied at para 16, 19 to 20 thereof that he was nominee of the Chan brothers in respect of the plaintiff and averred that the plaintiff did provide services to the 2 companies as per the service agreements and the 2 companies had failed to pay for the same. The service agreements, it was averred, were no sham and there was no conspiracy as alleged.

66.  As such, though the 2015 CFI action involves many and more factual allegations than the 4 DC actions, I agree with Mr Kam that there is one common dispute of facts between the two i.e. whether the service agreements was a sham. Such a factual allegation was run as the common defence in the 4 DC actions and it is at the same time one of many overt acts of conspiracy in the 2015 CFI action.

Avoid inconsistent findings/judgment

67.  Following on his submission of common issue of facts, Mr Kam submitted that a stay of the 4 DC actions pending the determination of the 2015 CFI action could avoid inconsistent findings/judgment, save precious time and costs for the plaintiff, the interveners and the court.

68.  In reply, Mr Tang cited the judgment of Ma J. (as he then was) in Linfield Ltd v Taoho Design Architect Ltd [2002] 2 HKC 204, 209I-210A and submitted that inconsistent findings between the 2015 CFI action and the 4 DC actions cannot be avoided as there is no identity of parties between the two and a stay should therefore not be granted.

No identical parties

69.  The 2015 CFI action involves, one notes, 4^th to 9^th defendants allegedly to be co-conspirators of the Chan brothers. And the 2 companies are named as 10^th & 11^th defendant therein as nominal defendants as they are alleged victims of the alleged conspiracy.

70.  Significantly, the plaintiff is not a party to the 2015 CFI action. As such, such findings of facts made in the 2015 CFI action are not binding on the plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s agreement to be bound by findings

71.  Nonetheless, Ng said at para 4 of his 3^rd affirmation that the plaintiff agrees to be bound by the findings of the 2015 CFI action. In contrast, in Linfield, supra, at 210G-211B, there was no evidence before Ma J. (as he then was) to suggest the parties before him had agreed to be bound by any findings made in the concurrent arbitration proceedings involving no identical parties.

72.  It appears to me likely that a finding of fact will, among others, be made whether the service agreements was a sham or genuine in the 2015 CFI action when it goes on trial for the interveners to prove their alleged conspiracy, and the various wrongdoings, against the 2 companies. Such finding, on the strength of plaintiff’s agreement aforesaid, will, I think, bind it in the 4 DC actions and avoids inconsistent findings/judgment between the 2015 CFI action and the 4 DC actions.

Transfer to CFI & consolidation

73.  Mr Tang alternatively submitted on the authority of Linfield, supra, at 210C and other authorities[4] that the proper course of dealing with concurrent proceedings having common issue of facts or law is to have them consolidated under O.4 r.9 ofthe Rules of High Court, Cap.4A (“RHC”), or RDC. That involves transferring the 4 DC actions under s.42 of DCO to the Court of First Instance.

74.  In this respect, he pointed out that Registrar Lung had recently on 25 Nov 2016 ordered the 2015 CFI action to be heard sequentially with the 2011 CFI action before the same judge, despite objection advanced by Mr Kam for, inter alia, Ng therein as the 7^th defendant.

Result of one proceedings determinative of another

75.  Mr Kam instead relied on Re Chimp Corp, unreported, HCMP 4146 of 2001, 11 Mar  2005, Kwan J. (as she then was), para 14, and authorities following it[5] to argue that a temporary stay of proceedings ought to be granted in this case. It is a matter of “case management” of “using the court procedures in a logical, fair and cost-efficient manner”. The court needs to “consider the balance of convenience and fairness as between the parties”.

76.  Such finding on the service agreements in the 2015 CFI action would, it is submitted, be determinative of the outcome of the 4 DC actions. To stay the 4 DC actions pending the determination of the 2015 CFI action is, it is said, too obvious a choice for saving unnecessary costs and court resources.

77.  While the authorities cited by Mr Kam are, Mr Tang pointed out, cases where the result of one proceedings would be determinative of the outcome of another not involving common issues of facts or law, given plaintiff’s agreement to be bound by findings in the 2015 CFI action, the result of the 2015 CFI action (including the finding on the service agreements) would, I agree, also be determinative of the outcome of the 4 DC actions. As such, one should not, I think, exclude the option of stay in the matters before me on mere account of no common issue of facts or law in such authorities.

Underlying objectives

78.  As I see it, the basic principles of “what would serve the end of justice between the parties to the litigation and as far as the administration of justice is concerned” in Linfield, supra, at 208E-F, put forward by Ma J. (as he then was) was in no substance different from the underlying objectives of O.1A r.1, RDC, which this court is required to give effect to by exercising its case management powers under O.1B r.1(2), two of them being stay of proceedings and consolidation. Such aforesaid principles of Re Chimp Corp, supra, cited by Mr Kam serve, I think, also to give effect to the same underlying objectives.

Equal saving of time and costs

79.  Had the 4 DC actions been transferred and consolidated with the 2015 CFI action (be it tried sequentially or at the same time before the same judge), it equally serves, I think, to avoid inconsistent findings/judgment, save precious time and costs of the parties and the court as stay of proceedings suggested by plaintiff.

80.  Given that the 4 DC actions is but one issue within many to be resolved in the 2015 CFI action, I do not think their transfer and consolidation would add, if at all, much to the preparation required and to the time and costs to be spent by the relevant parties (like the interveners and Ng) in the 2015 CFI action. Their preparation in the 2015 CFI action might have, one thinks, already covered all the same ground. And I notice that the solicitors for the plaintiff in the 4 DC actions are the same firm acting for Ng in the 2015 CFI action.

81.  Equally, in such transfer and consolidation, witnesses will be called to give evidence once, and not twice, before the same judge (with such evidence admissible in all proceedings before him/her) so as to spare repetition of evidence and duplication of costs and time.

82.  The fact that the 4 DC actions is at their early stage is, I think, no obstacle to their transfer and consolidation. Their preparation, if any extra is called for, can catch up with those in the 2015 CFI action. Though discovery was not completed for them, as I was informed at the hearing, it was equally not completed in the 2015 CFI action[6].

Application not in good faith

83.  Moreover, Mr Tang submitted that the stay summonses were not taken out in good faith. Had plaintiff been “genuinely” concerned about avoiding inconsistent findings/judgment or saving costs or time of the parties and the court as Mr Kam submitted, the stay summonses, it was said, would not have been taken out as late as they were. Or the plaintiff could have taken out summons to transfer the 4 DC actions to the Court of First Instance with a view to their consolidation with the 2015 CFI action but the plaintiff elected not to do so. I agree.

Delay in applying for stay

84.  It is apparent to me that Ng (and plaintiff) realized that the 2015 CFI action was litigating “the same matter” of the 4 DC actions soon after the 2015 CFI action was begun in June 2015. I refer to para 5 & 13 of Ng’s affirmation dated 23 Oct 2015 filed with the Court of Appeal for the security application[7].

85.  Notwithstanding that, the plaintiff did not apply to transfer the 4 DC actions to the Court of First Instance but applied to stay the 4 DC actions pending the determination of the 2015 CFI action only one day before the security summons of the interveners was returnable before Registrar Lui for directions.

Tactical move to escape from paying security for costs

86.  The plaintiff’s stay application, as Ng admitted at para 6 of his affirmation, “is made in response to the interveners’ application for security for costs (italics supplied)”.

87.  In the ordinary course of events, it would, I think, be most unusual for a plaintiff like the plaintiff to apply for a stay to put a halt to the claim it pursued, all the more so such simple and straightforward claim as the plaintiff mounted in the 4 DC actions for alleged service fees. It makes no commercial sense for the plaintiff not to press ahead to obtain judgment as soon as it could.

88.  Having carefully considered, the stay summonses were, I cannot but conclude, taken out plainly with a view to escape from paying security for costs sought by the interveners and, had the security summons not been taken out, they would never have been taken out as well.

Prejudice or injustice to the interveners

89.  The stay summonses were, I agree with Mr Tang, a tactical move taken by the plaintiff to deprive the interveners of such proper security of costs they are ordinarily entitled to from a foreign plaintiff like the plaintiff. The submission of Mr Kam that the stay application caused no prejudice to the interveners is, with respect, wrong and such aforesaid prejudice or injustice to the interveners cannot, I think, be disregarded in deciding on the stay summonses.

90.  It should of course be noted that the plaintiff not being a party, let alone a plaintiff, of the 2015 CFI action, the interveners as the 1^st & 2^nd plaintiffs therein cannot seek security for costs from it therein.

Discretion exercised

91.  All things considered and balanced, while stay of the 4 DC actions and their transfer and consolidation equally serve the underlying objectives of avoiding inconsistent findings/judgment and saving costs and time of the parties and the court in this case, the former was made to the prejudice of the interveners to deprive them security for costs they are ordinarily entitled to from a foreign plaintiff such that I do not find it fair and appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to allow the stay summonses when there is another equally logical and cost-effective option open to the parties.

92.  Granted that I disallow the stay summonses, there is no longer any valid objection to the security summons and I decided to allow it for such reasons I gave above.

Quantum of security

93.  Finally, it was submitted by Mr Kam that no costs should be ordered for those incurred to date given the delay the interveners were guilty of. For reasons I gave above, they had, I think, acted expeditiously and reasonably. This complaint is not made out.

94.  In any event, the quantum awarded should, Mr Kam argued, begreatly reduced as the amount put forward was excessive and exorbitant. In this connection, I do not intend to repeat all criticisms made by him on the interveners’ statement of costs in the 4 DC actions. I have carefully considered each and every one of them. Taking a broad brush approach, I consider a total sum of $320,000 to be reasonable amount of security to be awarded to the interveners.

Disposition

95.  On the security summons, I make orders in terms of para 1, 2 & 3 of the summons save that the words “HK$679,500 or such other sum as the Court may direct” at para 1 thereof are to be replaced with the words “HK$320,000”.

96.  For the stay summonses, I dismiss each one of them in the 4 DC actions.

Costs

97.  By way of costs order nisi, I order costs of and incidental to the stay summonses (including all reserved costs), and costs of and incidental to the security summons (including all reserved costs), be paid by the plaintiff to the interveners to be taxed if not agreed, with one certificate for counsel.

98.  If none applies by summons to vary the aforesaid orders within 14 days from the date hereof, the same shall become absolute.

Future case management

99.  I further order, in the event the plaintiff giving the security as ordered, the 4 DC actions be brought up before this court for directions as soon as reasonably practicable on notice given to plaintiff, the 2 companies and the interveners to consider if the 4 DC actions should be transferred to the Court of First Instance with a view to their consolidation with the 2011 and 2015 CFI actions.

100.  Finally, it remains for me to thank counsels for the interveners and counsel for the plaintiff for their valuable assistance.