HOSSAIN MD SADDAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
[2026] HKCA 1870 · CACV 879/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 879/2026, [2026] HKCA 1870
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 4117
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 879 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2166 OF 2025)
__________________________
BETWEEN
| |Hossain Md Saddam |Applicant |
| |and | |
| |TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ |Putative |
| |NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE |Respondent |
| |and | |
| |DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |Putative |
| | |Interested Party|
__________________________
Before: Hon Au JA and Mimmie Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing: 13 October 2026
Date of Judgment: 30 October 2026
________________
J U D G M E N T
________________
Hon Mimmie Chan J (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge
Michael Wong (“the Judge”) given on 21 July 2026[1] (“the Leave
Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for
judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the
decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-
Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 22 August
2025 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal
against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21
January 2025 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
2. The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the
Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out
therein[2] as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [8],
which will not be repeated.
3. After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as
the oral submissions he made with the assistance of a Bengali
interpreter at the hearing of the leave application on 2 July
2026[3], the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated
at [14] – [32] of the Leave Decision.
Appeal to this court
4. In a Notice of Appeal dated 19 August 2026, the applicant stated:
“1. Procedural Impropriety > The TCAB and the Director failed
to consider the country of origin condition that the
authority of my country could not protect me.
2. Procedural Impropriety > failure to conduct the country
situation and failed to properly apply my claim under BOR 2
and BOR 3 risk.” (sic)
5. By written submissions dated 31 August 2026, the applicant
claimed that his life would be in danger upon refoulement and that
the Board failed to take into account relevant considerations and
to follow the high standard of fairness. The applicant then claimed
the Board acted outside the scope of the Immigration Ordinance and
erred in law in applying non-refoulement principles. The applicant
also asserted that the decision makers had been procedurally
unfair, irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable, failed to consider
material evidence, misapplied the burden and standard of proof,
failed to consider country information or changed circumstances and
the Board’s Decision conflicted with the Basic Law or rights under
ICCPR as applied in Hong Kong. He also complained that the Judge
erred in treating credibility findings as conclusively
determinative.
6. We heard the appeal on 13 October 2026, at which the
applicant appeared in person and was assisted by a Bengali
interpreter. At the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had
nothing to add to his written materials. Accordingly, we will
determine the appeal on the basis of the materials already filed
with the court.
Discussion
7. As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of
Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review. It is
necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that
would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director
of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. The court will not
intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law
or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the
Board. An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments
advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which
could and should have been raised but were not raised before the
judge. In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal
focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only
reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the
judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant
matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly
wrong.
8. The applicant’s assertions are mainly directed at the Board’s
Decision and he has failed to identify any error committed by the
Judge with specific particulars and thus has failed to raise any
viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant are
general and bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.
General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper
grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at
[6].
9. In the present case, as noted by the Judge at [14] to [30] of
the Leave Decision, after considering all the evidence, the Board
found material inconsistency and discrepancies in the applicant’s
evidence and considered that he had exaggerated the extent of his
alleged injuries. The Board also found that the applicant’s alleged
membership in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party doubtful and it was
not believable that the Awami League members would want to target
the applicant personally. The Board also found that state
protection and internal relocation were available to the applicant
and there was no real risk of the proscribed harm on the available
evidence. These were factual findings open to the Board to make on
the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and thoroughly
considered by the Judge. There is thus no substance in the
applicant’s assertion that the Judge “treated credibility findings
as conclusively determinative”. As the Judge properly observed,
there was no error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality
in the Board’s Decision. We see no basis to interfere with the
Leave Decision.
10. For the above reasons, there is no merit in the applicant’s
appeal. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.
|(Thomas Au) |(Mimmie Chan) |
|Justice of Appeal |Judge of the |
| |Court of First Instance |
The applicant appearing in person
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[1] [2026] HKCFI 4117
[2]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL00
2166_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[3] See [9] of the Leave Decision.
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Appeal history
HOSSAIN MD SADDAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
CA · [2026] HKCA 1870
This judgment