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CACV 25/2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 25 OF 2014
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 26 OF 2013)
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BETWEEN
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TOWN PLANNING BOARD |
Applicant |
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and |
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TOWN PLANNING APPEAL BOARD |
Respondent |
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NAM SANG WAI DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED
and
KLEENER INVESTMENT LIMITED |
Interested Parties |
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| Before : Hon Lam VP, Kwan JA and Poon JA in Court |
| Dates of Written Submissions : 24 August, 21 September, and 12 October 2015 |
| Date of Judgment : 4 November 2015 |
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JUDGMENT
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Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :
1.We will adopt the same nomenclature used in our judgment handed down on 18 June 2015.
2.By that judgment we dismissed the Developers’ appeal against the judgment of G Lam J dated 16 January 2014, granting the Board’s application for judicial review and quashing the Appeal Board’s Decisions.
3.The Developers now apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on the ground that the intended appeal involves questions which, by reasons of their great general or public important, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. They raised three questions, which they said, are of great general or public importance.
4.The first question is whether a decision by the Board other than one either refusing or granting planning permission under section 16(3) of the Ordinance or one granting permission with conditions under section 16(5) is a decision of the Board under section 16 reviewable under section 17(1), thus enabling the aggrieved applicant to apply to the Board for a review of that decision and if, necessary, to appeal further to the Appeal Board under section 17B.
5.The second question, which is related to the first, is whether or not, under the scheme of the Ordinance, there is a need for a merits-based review and appeal procedure for “incidental decisions” of the Board under section 16 regardless of their nature and importance, that is, procedural, substantive and those from which legal rights or obligations flow.
6.The third question is the converse of the second question: whether or not , under the scheme of the Ordinance, the availability of judicial review of “incidental decisions” of the Board under section 16 regardless of their nature and importance, that is, procedural, substantive and those from which legal rights or obligations flow, is adequate judicial control over such decisions.
7.We have read with care the written submissions (both in support and in reply) by Mr Neoh, SC, for the Developers and those in opposition by Mr Litton for the Board. We are grateful to counsel for their assistance. We are not persuaded by Mr Neoh’s submissions. For present purposes, we just want to highlight the following points to explain why we reject the Developer’s application.
8.First, to get the application off the ground, the Developers must satisfy us that their arguments on the construction of section 16 of the Ordinance are reasonably arguable. With respect, we are not persuaded by Mr Neoh’s arguments. We agree with Mr Litton that it is no more than a third attempt by the Developers to run essentially the same submissions on construction which have already been rejected by the courts twice. They just dressed it up as an application involving great general or public importance.
9.Second, Mr Neoh submitted that there are many applications granted with conditions and there is no decision yet by the Court of Final Appeal on the construction of section 16. However, we agree with Mr Litton that since the legislative intent of section 16 is so clear, there cannot be any real doubt about its proper construction. So the fact that there are many applications granted subject to conditions or that hitherto there is no decision by the Court of Final Appeal on this point carries little weight in our overall consideration if leave should be granted.
10.Third, while we accept Mr Neoh’s submission that the Ordinance is a frequently invoked statute which regulates important aspects of community life and proprietary rights in Hong Kong, such consideration of itself is not sufficient to ground an application for leave to appeal on the great general or public importance limb. Otherwise, every decision by a lower court involving the Ordinance will be appealable to the Court of Final Appeal. One has to look at the particular circumstances of the case in question to see if question of great general or public importance does arise. So it is a fact-sensitive exercise. Here, the facts are very unique. We do not accept that they involve any general or public importance as contended by the Developers.
11.It follows that we refuse to grant leave to the Developers to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.
12.We further order the Developers to pay the Board the costs of the failed application, to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.
| (Johnson Lam) |
(Susan Kwan) |
(Jeremy Poon) |
| Vice‑President |
Justice of Appeal |
Justice of Appeal |
Mr John Litton, instructed by Department of Justice, for the applicant
Mr Anthony Neoh SC and Mr Anthony Ismail, instructed by Lo & Lo, for the interested parties
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