SALMAN KHALIQ v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOTHER

HCAL 588/2026

[2026] HKCFI 1801

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 588 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 17 March 2026, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge the Deportation Order made against him on 24 July 2025.

2.  The Form 86 named both the Director of Immigration and the Security Bureau as Putative Respondents. However, the Deportation Order was made, not by the Director, but by the Permanent Secretary for Security.

3.  Having considered the materials provided with the application, I was satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with it on paper. Therefore, I drafted the following Decision.

4.  After giving notice of handing down, I received a letter from the Applicant dated 19 March 2026 (posted 21 March 2026) saying he wished to withdraw the application because “my problem is solved in my home country and I want to go back as soon as possible”. However, in the circumstances, I refuse to allow the application to be withdrawn and I instead dismiss it for the following reasons.

B.  The Application

5.  The Applicant is currently detained at the Tai Tam Gap Correctional Institution (“TTGCI”), apparently pending removal from Hong Kong.

6.  In the materials appended to his affirmation the Applicant:

(1)  addresses the reasons for his late filing of the application for leave to apply for judicial review;

(2)  make submissions in support of his application for leave to apply for judicial review;

(3)  identifies what he says are the applicable principles; and

(4)  sets out some matters of personal background.

7.  I can address the various points below.

C.  Delay

8.  It is trite that an application for leave to apply for judicial review should be made promptly, and in any event within a long stop period of three months from the making of the decision the intended subject of review. An extension of time for making the application will be granted only if there is good reason to do so.

9.  In considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Court will take into account the circumstances, including (1) the length of the period of delay, (2) the offered explanation for the delay, (3) the merits of the application, and (4) issues of prejudice arising on the grant or refusal of the extension of time, including potential prejudice to proper administration.

10.  As to the delay, the Applicant states that:

(1)  He understands that a person who receives a deportation order can apply for judicial review against that decision within 90 days.

(2)  He received the Deportation Order dated 24 July 2025 when he was in prison at the Tai Lam Correctional Institution.

(3)  When he was transferred to the TTGCI on 19 August 2025, his documents (including a copy of the Deportation Order) were lost.

(4)  He did not know how or where to get a copy of the Deportation Order, so he failed to lodge an application for judicial review on time.

(5)  He received a habeas corpus bundle on 10 March 2026, and found a copy of the Deportation Order in that bundle.

(6)  So he is now lodging his application for leave to apply for judicial review.

(7)  He makes the humble request to accept his “reasonable request for JR”.

11.  Taking those matters into account, I see no good reason to extend the time for making the application:

(1)  The delay is significant, where the application has been made almost 9 months from the date of the making of the Deportation Order.

(2)  The explanation for the delay does not seem to me to be sufficient, where the Applicant plainly knew of the Deportation Order and could have commenced an intended challenge to it with or without a copy of the Deportation Order itself, or by asking for assistance in obtaining a copy. Rather, it seems that the Applicant has made an application for habeas corpus, and has found in the bundle provided for that purpose a copy of the Deportation Order, triggering his late intention to challenge it. It may be that this present application was an attempt to bolster the habeas corpus application (which I think he has since also withdrawn).

(3)  As will be seen below, the Application for leave to apply for judicial review in any event has no merit. There is no point in granting an extension of time for an application which has no merit.

(4)  Further, it seems to me that there is potential prejudice to proper administration if a challenge to a deportation order is not made promptly, but is only made in the context of the steps later being taken to give effect to the order by the removal of the person (and perhaps also involving his detention pending removal).

12.  Therefore, I refuse to grant the necessary extension of time for the Applicant to bring this application for leave to apply for judicial review. That is of itself fatal to the application.

D.  No Merit

13.  In any event, as already indicated above, the application for leave to apply for judicial review has no merit.

14.  The Deportation Order was made pursuant to section 20(1)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance Cap 115, on the basis that the Applicant is (a) a person who is not a Hong Kong permanent resident and (b) who has been found guilty in Hong Kong of an offence punishable with imprisonment for not less than two years.

15.  Neither of those two facts is in dispute. There is therefore no basis to challenge the power to have made the Deportation Order. Indeed, the Applicant makes no such challenge. Nor does the Applicant make any suggestion as to any procedural unfairness in the making of the Deportation Order.

16.  Instead, the Applicant merely states:

(1)  He arrived in Hong Kong on 6 May 2009 and has been living in the city since then.

(2)  He believes the Deportation Order is not reasonable, because he faces being harmed or killed in his home country, though those matters were rejected when the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dismissed his non-refoulement claim (“NRC”).

(3)  He informed the same matters to the Director on making a subsequent claim.

(4)  He still has a legal impediment because of his appeal proceedings CAMP 23/2026, which have not yet been determined.

(5)  Prior to that determination, he has the right to stay in Hong Kong.

(6)  Therefore, the Deportation Order is unreasonable at this stage.

17.  These matters were all essentially repeated in the section of materials written by the Applicant about his personal background. The Applicant also set out certain legal principles. But, with respect, those principles are not relevant to the present application, though they may be relevant to an application for habeas corpus.

18.  The matters raised by the Applicant do not raise any arguable public law ground of review.

19.  The length of time spent by the Applicant as an illegal immigrant in Hong Kong prior to the making of the Deportation Order is not relevant. In any event, it can be noted that during that time the Applicant has pursued – at all times somewhat sporadically, and unsuccessfully – his NRC and subsequent appeal and intended legal challenge.

20.  Indeed, I note from the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 2 August 2024 [2024] HKCFI 2014, made in HCAL 1808/2019, that:

(1)  The Applicant was arrested by police on 6 May 2009, and raised a torture claim on 9 May 2009. However, he failed to attend an interview with the immigration officer, and the matter was kept in abeyance for four years.

(2)  In 2017, he applied to resume his application. The Director acceded to the request and advised him to complete the NRC Claim Form (“NCF”) within 21 days.

(3)  The Applicant failed to do so, and he was notified by the Director that the torture claim was treated as withdrawn.

(4)  The Applicant then applied to the Director for re-opening his claim. Having considered the explanations offered, the Director refused his request.

(5)  The Applicant appealed to the Board.

(6)  In its decision, the Board set out further background including that (a) the Applicant failed to provide his NCF despite reminders from the Director in April 2017 and May 2017, (b) the Applicant requested to re-open his claim in April 2018, (c) the Applicant explained that he could not return the NCF because he had to vacate his house and could not receive any letter from the Department of Immigration, and he had no contact with his family due to drug addiction, and (d) the Director had provided a reasoned decision for not re-opening the Applicant’s NRC.

(7)  The Board agreed with the Directors reasons, and dismissed the Applicant’s appeal on 3 October 2018.

(8)  On 28 June 2019 – i.e. well out of time for doing so – the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision.

(9)  DHCJ KW Lung found that the grounds advanced by the Applicant were irrelevant, and that there was no reason for the Court to interfere with the Board’s decision.

(10)  Therefore, the application for leave to apply for judicial review was dismissed.

21.  I also note that by his further Decision dated 30 December 2025 [2025] HKCFI 6133, DHCJ KW Lung dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal. The reasons were that the application was made more than one year out of time, and there was in any event no merit.

22.  These present proceedings are not the opportunity for the Applicant to seek to re-run his NRC. Further, the intended appeal proceedings do not create any legal impediment to the Applicant’s removal from Hong Kong. Any legal impediment ceased when the Court of First Instance dismissed his application seeking to challenge the decision of the Board, namely on 2 August 2024.

23.  In any event, the question of any legal impediment to removal as a result of extant legal proceedings is also irrelevant to the intended challenge to the Deportation Order made in these proceedings.

24.  The mere claim that the making of the Deportation Order was “unreasonable” in the circumstances the Applicant has sought to describe (see above) does not identify any reasonably arguable ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

E.  Result

25.  In the circumstances, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

26.  I have dismissed the application, rather than allowing the Applicant to withdraw it, because it seems to me that it needs to be made clear that applicants should not feel it appropriate to make a meritless application, which (despite the lack of merit) necessarily triggers the deployment of Court time and resources, and then simply seek to withdraw the application on a basis essentially irrelevant to the target of the proceedings.

27.  As there is no alternative, I make no order as to costs.