KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. WONG KONG HEUNG formerly known as WONG KWONG HEUNG CANDY

DCMP 4781/2022

[2026] HKDC 181

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 4781 OF 2022

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1.  By the Decision dated 7 May 2025[1] (“Discovery Decision”), I dismissed the Defendant’s application for discovery dated 19 February 2025 (“Discovery Application”). This is the Defendant’s application dated 22 September 2025 for leave to appeal against the Discovery Decision out of time (“Leave Application”).

BACKGROUND

2.  I have set out the background of the present case in the Discovery Decision. For easy reference, I will restate the background here with an update on events which have occurred since the Discovery Decision.

3.  The Plaintiff (“P”) is a licensed moneylender in Hong Kong and the Defendant (“D”) was its customer.

4.  On 13 January 2021, P lent to D a principal sum of HK$2,000,000 (“1^st Loan”) to be repaid by 180 monthly instalments, at interest rate of 16.80% per annum, pursuant to a loan agreement in Chinese (“1^st Loan Agreement”).

5.  On 8 December 2021, P lent to D another principal sum of HK$400,000 (“2^nd Loan”), to be repaid by 60 monthly instalments, also at 16.80% per annum, pursuant to another loan agreement in Chinese (“2^nd Loan Agreement”).

6.  The 1^st Loan Agreement and the 2^nd Loan Agreement (collectively referred to as “Loan Agreements”) were secured by mortgages in favour of P and granted by D over a property beneficially owned by D (“Property”).

7.  D defaulted in repaying the monthly instalments of the 1^st Loan on 10 August 2022 (i.e. the 19^th instalment) and of the 2^nd Loan on 5 August 2022 (i.e. the 8^th instalment). Accordingly, by reason of terms of the Loan Agreements, the whole balance of the 1^st Loan and the 2^nd Loan and all accrued interest became immediately due and payable.

8.  Despite repeated requests and demands by P, D had failed and/or refused to pay to P the outstanding balance.

9.  P commenced the present action on 15 December 2022.

10.  In D’s affirmations, D claims that she has a valid defence to P’s claim, on the basis that:-

(a)  P did not keep its alleged promise to cancel the registration of a mortgage dated 23 December 2029 over D’s Property prior to D’s entry into the 1^st Loan Agreement;

(b)  D was misleadingly persuaded by a staff member of P to enter into the Loan Agreements with P, such that D commercially lost out as she had to pay extra interest compared to another potential loan agreement with another finance company and the financing structure of the Loan Agreements affected her future borrowing power; and

(c)  The Loan Agreements were illegal for charging payment of compound interest.

11.  D counterclaims HK$10,000,000 for alleged financial hardship caused by P’s alleged actions.

12.  By the summons dated 15 December 2022, P applied for summary judgment against D. The application was heard by Master Andrea Yu on 23 September 2024 (“Master Hearing”).

13.  In the Decision dated 28 October 2024[2] (“Master Decision”), Master Yu found that there was no merit in D’s defence:-

(a)  The non-cancellation of the original mortgage bears no relation at all to D’s current liability under the Loan Agreements;

(b)  D’s allegation of P’s misrepresentation is not believable, with doubt that the facts relied upon by D constitute any valid ground for misrepresentation, when D did not dispute that she could read English, was commercially experienced in taking out loans and had signed the Loan Agreements; and

(c)  Factually, no compound interest was charged.

14.  Thus, Master Yu entered money judgment against D. D appealed against the Master Decision.

15.  Before the hearing of D’s appeal against the Master Decision, D took out the Discovery Application on 19 February 2025 for discovery of documents for the purpose of appeal.

16.  By the Discovery Decision dated 7 May 2025, I dismissed the Discovery Application but I allowed D to obtain the audio recording of the Master Hearing upon payment of the necessary fee.[3]

17.  D’s appeal against the Master Decision was heard by Deputy District Judge Alan Ng on 23 July 2025 but D was absent at the hearing. D alleges that she was admitted to hospital on 21 July 2025 and was only discharged in the afternoon of 23 July 2025.

18.  The hearing of D’s appeal proceeded in D’s absence. After hearing the submissions from P’s Counsel Mr. Tommy Cheung, the learned Deputy District Judge agreed with the Master Decision and dismissed D’s appeal against it.

19.  On 22 September 2025, which is about 4.5 months after the handing down of the Discovery Decision, D took out the Leave Application seeking leave to appeal against the Discovery Decision out of time.

20.  On 5 November 2025, D applied for leave to “set aside” the decision of Deputy District Judge Alan Ng out of time.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

21.  The relevant legal principles are well-settled. I would adopt the following summary helpfully set out by Mr. Cheung in his submissions:-

(a)  For interlocutory appeals, leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard; Jose Miranda Da Costa Junior v Lorenzo Yih, HCA 156/2010, 28 April 2014 at §8; Yan Yu Ying v Leung Wing Hei [2025] HKCA 971 at §15;

(b)  When the decision under challenge is an exercise of discretion and a case management decision, the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless the Judge “misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of his discretion was plainly wrong such that it was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible”; Yan Yu Ying at §16;

(c)  As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeal has emphasised more than once that “an appeal against a case management decision should not be lightly brought”, as it is “contrary to a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy promoted as one of the underlying objectives in Order 1A rule 1 of the RHC, not to mention that the resources of the court must be distributed fairly such that the appeal court should not be concerned with unmeritorious appeals against the exercise of judicial discretion”. In this regard, the appellant faces a “very high hurdle”; West Coast International Trading Ltd v Chelesa Art Co Ltd, HCMP 1228/2014, 3 September 2014 at §5; K&L Gates v Navin Kumar Aggarwal [2019] HKCA 350 at §15;

(d)  In considering whether to grant an extension of time for leave to appeal, the Court will consider the following factors: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) whether there were any satisfactory reasons for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended appeal; and (iv) whether the other party will suffer any prejudice if an extension is given (although the absence of any prejudice does not mean that an extension should be granted); Chow Kin Hang Ali v Secretary for Justice for and on behalf of Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1814 at §17.

DELAY

22.  The application for leave for an interlocutory appeal should be made within 14 days after the decision. In other words, there is a delay of 4 months in the Leave Application which is not insubstantial.

23.  D confirms that she received a copy of the Discovery Decision a few days after handing down and knew that the Discovery Application was dismissed.

24.  Despite knowing the outcome of the Discovery Application, D did not apply for leave to appeal but instead proceeded to prepare for the Appeal Hearing. Pursuant to the directions given at §21 of the Discovery Decision, on 23 June 2025, D sent the transcript of the selective part of the audio recording of the Master Hearing to P for agreement.

25.  D explains that she did not immediately apply for leave to appeal because she did not realize that audio recording of the Master Hearing was “incomplete”. According to D, the said audio recording does not include the conversation between Mr. Cheung and his instructing solicitor Ms. Chan about the cheque given by Da Sing Bank’s solicitors to P’s solicitors, representing the net sale proceeds of the Property. D says that, as the Master Hearing was conducted in English, it took her a long time to understand the content and find that such part was missing and made the decision to appeal.

26.  With respect, I am unable to understand D’s explanation.

27.  Firstly, the audio recording of the Master Hearing was provided by the Judiciary and there is nothing to show that it had been tampered with. The so-called “missing part” concerns the conversation between Mr. Cheung and Ms. Chan at the Master Hearing. This conversation is privileged and D is not entitled to obtain it even if it was recorded.

28.  More importantly, it is difficult to see the causal relationship between the alleged incompleteness of the audio recording of the Master Hearing and D’s decision whether to appeal against the Discovery Decision or not. If D considered that I was wrong in dismissing the Discovery Application, she should apply for leave to appeal regardless of whether the audio recording of the Master Hearing was incomplete or not. If her concern was only on the content of the audio recording, she should seek clarification or assistance from the Judiciary, rather than bringing the Leave Application.

29.  In any event, D’s explanation accounts only for the delay from the handing down of the Discovery Decision to 23 June 2025. As indicated above, D sent the transcript of the selected part of the audio recording to P’s solicitors for their agreement on 23 June 2025. By that time, she must have reviewed the audio recording and realized the alleged incompleteness of the same. There is no explanation on this 3 months’ delay from 23 June 2025 to 22 September 2025.

30.  Having considered D’s explanation, I agree with Mr. Cheung that there is no good reason for the delay and her present application for leave to appeal out of time can be dismissed on this ground alone.

MERIT

31.  In addition to the lack of reasonable explanation for delay, I am of the view that leave should not be granted as D’s intended appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.

32.  As rightly pointed out by Mr. Cheung, the Discovery Decision is a case management decision involving the exercise of discretion and it is well established that the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless the judge misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of his discretion was plainly wrong such that it was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible; Yan Yu Ying §16; K&L Gates §15.  

33.  In D’s submissions, she simply repeated the same arguments advanced at the hearing of the Discovery Application and failed to explain why the Discovery Decision was plainly wrong.

34.  In the supporting affirmation filed on 22 September 2025, D made numerous serious allegations against the Judges, Mr. Cheung and Ms. Chan:-

(a)  At §9, D alleges that “this is the individual case where the Judges prejudiced against [Mr. Cheung] (sic), because they are all in the same professional field as legal sector”[4];

(b)  At §18, D alleges that “I deeply realize a judge wanted to protect another judge’s own interests, can go to great lengths to tamper with evidence and hand it over to the [P], which is extremely unfair and disrespectful behaviour to [D]”;

(c)  At §19, D alleges that “Mr. Cheung, and Ms. Chan presented false testimonies in court, therefore, The Judge wanted to protect the dignity of the court and the criminal suspicions of the lawyers, thus erasing the related parts of evidence [of] the audio recording”;

(d)  At §40, D alleges that “Judges’ intention is solely to assist the plaintiff in winning this case, preserving the Dignity of the barrister while sacrificing fairness” and “It is extremely unfair, cruel, and tyrannical, and it also oppresses a defendant who has no legal representation. Their actions, aside from being illegal, also represent a tremendous disgrace to the judicial system”.

35.  These are very serious allegations but D has failed to provide any evidence, let alone cogent and compelling evidence, in support. The allegations are speculative and totally unfound. I have no hesitation to reject them.

36.  I wish to point out that Mr. Cheung conducted the two hearings before me with upmost fairness to D. Despite D was acting in person, Mr. Cheung never took any advantage of the situation and I failed to see any sign of oppression over D as alleged.

37.  In the recent case of Norman Guy Donald v Li Pak Heun [2025] HKCA 898, Chow JA firmly stated at §59 that the making of “serious allegations against the Administrators and the Judge by [the 3^rd defendant] without the slightest of foundation is reprehensible”.

38.  Similar strong comments were made by To J in Park Young Sook v Melloy [2010] 5 HKC 329 as follows:-

“26. Ms Park also inferred a conspiracy from the fact that HH Judge Bebe Chu had worked in the same law firm as Mr Chu before she joined the Family Court and Ms Park suspected they are related as they have the same surname. She produced photographs depicting Judge Chu in a dinner reception with Mr Chu. Through that connection, she inferred that Judge Melloy had colluded with Mr Chu. That is speculation to the extreme and can hardly justify the very serious allegation against two judges acting in the performance of their judicial function.” (emphasis added)

39.  In my view, these serious but unfound allegations should not have been made by D.

CONCLUSION

40.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I have no hesitation to dismiss the Leave Application for the reasons that there is no explanation for the substantial delay and the application itself is wholly unmeritorious. There is also no reason in the interest of justice why an appeal against the Discovery Decision should be heard.

41.  Costs should follow the event. I therefore order that D shall forthwith pay P’s costs of the Leave Application with certificate for counsel, to be summarily assessed. I direct that P shall file and serve the Statement of Costs within 7 days from the date of this Decision and, D shall file and serve the Statement of Objections, if any, within 7 days thereafter. The assessment of costs will be made on papers without a hearing.

42.  Lastly, I thank Mr. Cheung for his very helpful assistance to the Court.