AHMED SHABBIR v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 2064/2025

[2025] HKCFI 5295

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2064 OF 2025

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 2 September 2025 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds.

2.  The Applicant is a 51-year-old national of Pakistan who previously entered Hong Kong illegally on 10 March 2014 and was arrested by police on the same day. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan he would be harmed or killed by certain supporters of the political party Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML(N)”) as he supported their rival Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“PTI”).

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.  By a Notice of Decision dated 12 April 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 31 March 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.  In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from those local PML(N) supporters upon his return to Pakistan as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Pakistan with a large population of 199 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 796,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Islamabad where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

5.  The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions was dismissed by the Board on 2 June 2017 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 15 March 2019 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 330/2017 [2019] HKCFI 665).

7.  The Applicant never sought any appeal against the Court’s decision, and was subsequently on 2 July 2019 repatriated to Pakistan.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

8.  Sometime in June 2023 the Applicant sneaked back into Hong Kong from China, and was arrested by police more than one year later on 22 August 2024, and on 7 March 2025 in writing to the Immigration Department he requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that if refouled to Pakistan he fears of being harmed or killed by his wife’s uncle Malik for refusing to let Malik’s son marry his daughter.

9.  There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

10.  Accordingly, the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) with the following information and his answers to a list of questions raised by the Director of his intended subsequent claim:

(1)  That his wife’s uncle Malik is a very wealthy and influential man with political connections in the Applicant’s home district;

(2)  That in June 2019 Malik made a proposal for the Applicant’s daughter to be married to his son, but was declined by the Applicant due to his son’s bad reputation of dealing in various illegal activities;

(3)  That subsequently the Applicant arranged for his daughter to marry the son of another family, but on the day of his daughter’s engagement, Malik together with his brother and son tried to stop the event but were driven away by the Applicant and relatives;

(4)  On the night of his daughter’s wedding on 3 November 2019, some unknown men fired gun shots outside the Applicant’s home but the wedding took place without further incidents;

(5)  However, on the following morning the Applicant received a message from Malik threatening to kill him for refusing to marry his daughter to his son;

(6)  As a result the Applicant became fearful for his life and shortly thereafter in November 2019 departed Pakistan for China, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic he was unable to leave China until sometime in June 2023 when he was able to travel to Hong Kong to made his request to raise a subsequent claim of fear of being harmed or killed by Malik who according to his wife has been looking for the Applicant everywhere in Pakistan.

11.  By a Notice of Decision dated 2 September 2025 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon doubting the credibility of his intended subsequent claim as inconsistent and implausible, that the credibility of his such claim is further undermined by his failure to raise it upon first arriving in Hong Kong until more than one year later and only after his arrest by the police, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim even if real any realistic prospect of success given the unchallenged findings by both the Director and the Board in his previous claim of the availability of both state protection and reasonable internal relocation alternatives to the Applicant upon his return to Pakistan to similarly negate whatever risk that may arise from his intended subsequent claim which on the factual basis of even his own case and if true is a private and personal dispute between him and Malik only without any official involvement at all.

12.  On 12 September 2025 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or supporting affirmation of the same date to which he just attached a copy of the decision but without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application.

13.  In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review given the correct finding by the Director on the factual basis of even the Applicant’s own case that it is a private personal dispute between him and Malik within their family without any official involvement that whatever risk arising therefrom will similarly be negated by both state protection and internal relocation alternatives available to the Applicant upon his return to Pakistan as correctly found by both the Director and the Board in his previous claim, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

14.  Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of this Court dated 15 March 2019 without any appeal, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim premised essentially on unreliable and invalid basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

15.  Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

16.  Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

17.  In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

18.  His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

19.  In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] –[40]).

20.  In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claims without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, to which he was unable to answer or raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

21.  Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(11)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

22.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

23.  A RPO in terms of paragraph 21 be made against the Applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1