YATINI-SAROH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5565 · HCAL 1230/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1230/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5565
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1230 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Yatini-Saroh |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The summons filed on 15 June 2026 be dismissed.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 July 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 11 December 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
1230_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board confirmed the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 24
November 2022, which rejected her non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board and “Non-Refoulement claims Petition
office” as both the putative respondents and the putative interested
parties in Form 86, when only the Board should be the putative
respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which
provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of
the Board and should not be named as a putative party at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 29 July 2024, which was more
than 7 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 11 December 2023).
The applicant was hence late for more than 4 months in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
8. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave
Application.
10. At the oral hearing before this court on 24 September 2026, the
applicant explained the delay by saying that she did not know the
procedures and her friends told her to wait for the letter. However,
the applicant confirmed that she received the Board’s Decision by post
at her reported address around 2023. The applicant further explained
her delay by saying that she was sick at the material time and she was
confused.
11. A delay of more than 4 months is substantial, and the applicant’s
explanations for the delay are clearly unsatisfactory. Ignorance of
the court’s procedures is generally not an excuse. The applicant in
fact confirmed that she received the Board’s Decision by post in 2023.
Even if she was sick at the material time, there was no reason for
her not to make the Leave Application for all these months. More
importantly, there is no merit in the Leave Application at all as
discussed below.
12. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
13. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
The applicant’s case
14. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
15. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be at risk of being harmed or
killed by Roji, her husband’s creditor, as her husband owed Roji a
loan that she failed to repay.
Oral hearing
16. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and her case was heard on 24 September 2026.
17. As the applicant had on 15 June 2026 filed a summons together with her
affirmation dated 15 June 2026 requesting to submit a certificate of
marriage, this court first asked the applicant for the purpose of the
summons.
18. The applicant confirmed that the purpose of the summons was to show to
this court that she is now married to a Hong Kong resident. The
applicant said that her husband is now fully responsible for her.
19. This court then explained to her that the summons was irrelevant to
the Leave Application, which was dealing with her challenge against
the Board’s Decision regarding her non-refoulement claim.
20. As to the grounds for the applicant’s intended judicial review, she
merely said that she is now married in Hong Kong, her husband is in
Hong Kong, she is staying in her husband’s home, and her husband and
his family have responsibility for her and her children. She added
that she does not have anything in Indonesia, as her ex-husband had
taken all her properties and there was nothing left.
Grounds for judicial review
21. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
22. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
23. In her supporting affirmation dated 29 July 2024, the applicant only
mentioned that she did not want to go back to Indonesia because her
life was in danger, the loan sharks would kill her as she did not have
money to repay the debt.
24. What the applicant said at the oral hearing before this court were not
valid grounds for judicial review at all.
Discussion
25. First of all, this court will deal with the applicant’s said summons
filed on 15 June 2026 and her affirmation dated 15 June 2026.
26. As aforesaid, the applicant confirmed that the sole purpose of the
summons was to prove that she is married in Hong Kong to a Hong Kong
resident. However, the fact that she has a family here in Hong Kong
is simply irrelevant to the Leave Application.
27. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang & Ors v Director of
Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10, family unity rights were not a bar to
refoulement of foreign nationals without a right of abode, even when
they have a spouse and children who are permanent residents of Hong
Kong. Thus, separation with her husband was not a basis on which the
applicant could establish her non-refoulement claim.
28. As it would not be relevant to her non-refoulement claim by adducing
the document mentioned in the said summons and her affirmation dated
15 June 2026, this court is not prepared to admit it and hence the
said summons is dismissed.
29. As to the problem that her ex-husband had taken all her properties
from her, this matter was not presented to the Board for consideration
of her claim for non-refoulement protection. The Court of Appeal has
held in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA
1090 that the Board had no duty to make investigation into any matter
without the applicant raising it and it should not be considered by
this court at this stage.
30. Her danger in her home country had been duly assessed but rejected by
the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding
of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.
31. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
32. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
33. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 5 July 2023. The applicant was present and hence she
was given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
34. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had discussed the
applicant’s risk from her husband’s creditor with her at the Board’s
hearing. The Board’s assessment on the credibility of the applicant’s
claim were laid out in paragraphs 34 to 40 of the Board’s Decision,
and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
35. In gist, the Board found that the applicant had only made bare
assertions and provided no objective proof of her assertions on the
loan and the threats by the creditor. In fact, the loan was made by
her husband and the applicant had not met the creditor, nor heard from
him directly. The applicant’s husband who actually borrowed the loan
remained safe, and so did the applicant’s family. The Board
considered that the harm, actual or perceived, from the creditor was
not imminent and the ill-treatment by the creditor, if any, had not
attained a minimum level of severity. The future risk as suggested by
the applicant was her own speculation only.
36. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the creditor was a state
actor. There was no evidence to show that the Indonesian government
was involved in her private dispute with the creditor, or that the
creditor had ill-treated the applicant with an intention listed in the
definition of torture in section 37U of the Immigration Ordinance.
The applicant’s fear of the creditor was not related to any of the
RC[1] reasons.
37. The Board had also discussed the issue of state protection to the
applicant in paragraphs 41 to 46 of the Board’s Decision. In short,
the Board found that despite setbacks such as the existence of
incompetence and corruption in the government authorities, reasonable
state protection would be available to Indonesian citizens and the
applicant.
38. Moreover, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 91 to 93 of
the Board’s Decision for its view that it would not be unreasonable or
unduly harsh for the applicant to live anywhere in Indonesia to avoid
any perceived risk.
39. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her
claims for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds
under the USM.
40. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of
harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the
applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
41. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
42. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
43. For reasons aforesaid, the summons filed on 15 June 2026 is dismissed,
and the Leave Application is dismissed for being made out of time and
devoid of merits.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 30/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |30/09/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21218 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 1059/22 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000948/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol