XIAO XIANG v. THE LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG

HCAL 1602/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4236

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1602 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  The approach taken by the Applicant in the underlying process and in the arguments deployed in these proceedings might be thought by some to indicate that – at least up to the time these proceedings began – the Applicant did not yet have sufficient experience and knowledge to qualify as an overseas lawyer in Hong Kong.  The case arises out of his intention so to qualify.

2.  By his Form 86 dated 14 July 2025, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision (“Decision”) of the Law Society of Hong Kong (“LSHK”), given by its letter dated 22 May 2025 (“Denial Letter”) to refuse his eligibility to sit the 2025 Overseas Lawyers Qualification Examination (“OLQE”) under the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules Cap 159Q (“OLQA Rules”).

3.  The Applicant filed an affirmation dated 14 July 2025 (“Affirmation”) in support of the leave application.

4.  I gave directions giving leave to the LSHK to file an Initial Response to the application, and leave to the Applicant to file a Reply to that Initial Response.  My directions also indicated that I would then decide whether to deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on paper, and if so that I would proceed to do so without further notice to the parties.

5.  The Initial Response was served by Clyde & Co, solicitors for the LSHK.  The position of the LSHK is that the application for leave to apply for judicial review should be dismissed on various bases (which I will consider below).  The Applicant filed a Reply in Chinese running to 122 pages (including 14 attachments).

6.  Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that I can appropriately deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on the papers.

7.  This is my Decision.

8.  The Applicant’s Form 86, Affirmation, and Reply were all filed in Chinese.  However, he obtained a Master of Laws degree from a law school in the USA (see background below).  Therefore, I do not think that there will be any disadvantage or difficulty to him in understanding this Decision handed down in English.

B.  Background

9.  The background can be ascertained from the Form 86, Affirmation, Initial Response and Reply, and can be restated broadly as follows.

10.  The Applicant obtained his Master of Laws degrees from the Central South University, China on 31 May 2016 and the Emory University School of Law, USA on 17 December 2022 respectively.  He obtained qualifications to practise law in the Chinese Mainland on 30 August 2019, and qualified as an Attorney and Counsellor at Law in the State of New York, USA on 16 January 2025.

11.  In March 2025, the Applicant submitted his application to take the 2025 OLQE under the ‘non-common law jurisdictions’ (Chinese Mainland) category, and paid the application fee of HK$6,600.

12.  On 22 May 2025, the LSHK rejected the Applicant’s application to take the 2025 OLQE, i.e. the Decision.  The substance of the Denial Letter (signed by Ms Angela Li, Assistant Director, Regulation and Guidance, LSHK) stated as follows:

I refer to your application to sit Heads I to VI of the OLQE.

You informed in your email of 24 March 2025 that your LLM study in Emory University, US was in-person, full-time program in the US from January 2022 to December 2022.  The academic qualifications such as LLM cannot be recognized as “experience in the practice of law” for the OLQE purpose (Remarks on page 24 of the 2025 OLQE Information Package).

Your PRC certificate of standing dated 20 February 2025 confirmed that you commenced legal practice on 30 August 2019.

You stated that your legal practice in Hunan Longguan Law Firm (“Longguan”), PRC started from 30 August 2019 to 14 March 2025 (the date of your OLQE application).  After deducting your 12-month LLM study in the US, you have accumulated 4 years and 6.5 months experience.  You have not had 5 years of experience in the practice of PRC law.  You are not eligible to sit the 2025 OLQE.

The Law Society reserves all our rights to raise enquires on your overlapping employments in Longguan and Xie Law Offices, LLC in your future OLQE applications.

Under Rule 9 of the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules, you have a right to ask for your application to be reviewed upon payment of the prescribed fee of HK$3,000 within one month of receiving this notification.  As stated in paragraph 6 on page 6 of the 2025 QLQE Information Package, a review will be determined on the basis of and only of the information previously provided to the Law Society.

13.  In his intended judicial review challenge, the Applicant sought the following relief: (1) an order quashing the Decision, (2) an order for the LSHK to reconsider his eligibility and application for taking the OLQE, (3) an order for the LSHK to refund the application fee of HK$6,600 or handle the fee properly, subject to the outcome of reconsideration, and (4) costs of the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

C.  Grounds of Review

14.  Reading his Form 86, his Affirmation and Reply, the Applicant’s proposed grounds of review could be summarised as follows:

(1)  Ground 1: Breach of Article 8 of the Basic Law (“BL 8”).

(2)  Ground 2: Breach of Article 39 of the Basic Law (“BL 39”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).

(3)  Ground 3: Breach of Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR 22”).

(4)  Ground 4: Departure from the legislative purpose of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance Cap 159 (“LPO”).

(5)  Ground 5: Breach of the principle of proportionality.

(6)  Ground 6: Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(7)  Ground 7: Substantive and procedural unfairness in the LSHK’s system.

(8)  Ground 8: LSHK’s failure to reasonably recognise Mainland legal practice experience, reflecting insufficient understanding of the Mainland judicial system.

(9)  Ground 9: Disregard for Applicants holding multiple legal system qualifications.

(10)  Ground 10: Lack of reasonableness in international comparison; contrary to the trend of greater bay area mutual recognition and facilitation of legal talent.

(11)  Ground 11: Contrary to national-level policies on “Strengthening Training of Foreign-related Legal Talent” and the “Greater Bay Area Strategy”.

15.  As can be seen below, due to their overlapping nature and similar underlying rationale, it is logical to deal first with the intended Grounds 1-5, then Ground 7, Grounds 8-9, and Grounds 10-11, and lastly Ground 6 about the overall reasonableness of the Decision.

D.   Legal Principles and the LSHK’s OLQE Regime

16.  Before doing so, it is helpful to set out the relevant legal principles and the LSHK’s OLQE regime, which are relied upon by the Applicant in framing his challenge to the Decision in the present case.

D.1  Basic Law, ICCPR, BOR, and Statutory Provisions

17.  BL 8 provides that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained, except for any that contravene the Basic Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”).

18.  BL 39 guarantees that the provisions of the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the HKSAR.

19.  The principle that all persons are equal before the law is enshrined in Article 26 of the ICCPR:

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

20.  BOR 22, as set out in Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Cap 383, also provides for the equality before and equal protection of law:

Article 22

Equality before and equal protection of law

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

21.  Section 73(1)(da) of the LPO empowers the Council of the LSHK to make rules respecting the admission of persons under section 4(1)(b) of the LPO (i.e. persons seeking admission in Hong Kong based on qualifications acquired outside Hong Kong), including qualifications for admission, examinations and the fees to be paid for applications and examinations.  The material provision is as follows:

73.  Power of the Council to make rules

(1)  The Council may make rules—

...

(da)  respecting the admission of persons under section 4(1)(b), including the qualifications for admission, examinations and the fees to be paid for applications and examinations;

22.  Rule 4(2)(b)(ii) of the OLQA Rules sets out the minimum “2 years of post-admission experience in the practice of law” requirement for an applicant from a common law jurisdiction, as follows:

4.  Requirements for applicant from common law jurisdiction

…

(2)  For the purpose of section 2(c), unless the Society otherwise determines, an applicant whose jurisdiction of admission is a common law jurisdiction and who has had less than 5 years of experience in the practice of the law of any common law jurisdiction must have—

(a)  satisfied the requirements specified in subsection (1)(a) (except subparagraph (iii)) or subsection (1)(b);

(b)  satisfied any one of the following further requirements, that is to say—

(i)  the applicant has completed service as a trainee solicitor or articled clerk, or a course of practical legal training that the Society accepts in place of that service, as required for admission as a lawyer in the applicant’s jurisdiction of admission, the period of which is not less than 2 years;

(ii)  the applicant has had not less than 2 years of post-admission experience (other than as a pupil) in the practice of the law of the applicant’s jurisdiction of admission; or

(iii)  the applicant—

(A)  has completed service as a trainee solicitor or articled clerk, or a course of practical legal training that the Society accepts in place of that service, as required for admission as a lawyer in the applicant’s jurisdiction of admission, the period of which is less than 2 years; and

(B)  has had post-admission experience (other than as a pupil) in the practice of the law of the applicant’s jurisdiction of admission, the period of which is less than 2 years,

and the aggregate of those periods is not less than 2 years; and

(c)  passed the Examination in all the subjects referred to in section 7(1)(a).

23.  For an applicant whose jurisdiction of admission is a non-common law jurisdiction, the requirement of “not less than 5 years of experience in the practice of law” is stipulated in rule 5(1) of the OLQA Rules, as follows:

5.  Requirements for applicant from non-common law jurisdiction

(1)  For the purpose of section 2(c), unless the Society otherwise determines, an applicant whose jurisdiction of admission is a non-common law jurisdiction and who has had not less than 5 years of experience in the practice of the law of any non-common law jurisdiction must have—

(a)  passed the Examination in all written subjects; and

(b)  passed the Examination in the oral subject of Principles of Common Law.

24.  Rule 9 of the OLQA Rules provides for the statutory appeal procedure for an applicant who is not satisfied with the LSHK’s decision on the eligibility for sitting the OLQE:

9.  Appeal procedure

An applicant seeking the issue of a certificate by the Society under section 3 may—

(a)  within one month of receiving notification from the Society of any decision of the Society under that section, ask for his application to be reviewed upon payment of the prescribed fee; and

(b)  within 3 months of receiving notification from the Society of its decision on a request for review under paragraph (a), apply to the Court of First Instance which may—

(i)  affirm the decision of the Society; or

(ii)  make such other order as the Court thinks fit.

25.  In short, an applicant is required to file an application to the LSHK for review of its original decision (“Review Mechanism”) first, and if unsuccessful, he or she may then apply to the Court of First Instance (“CFI”), which may affirm the LSHK’s decision or make such other order as it thinks fit.

D.2  The OLQE Regime

26.  The relevant regulations, requirements and policies of the OLQE set and adopted by the LSHK can be found in its ‘2015 Information Package for Admission as a Solicitor in Hong Kong for Overseas Lawyers’ (“Information Package”).

27.  Part I Section C.1 of the Information Package sets out the requirements for candidates admitted in common law jurisdictions and non-common law jurisdictions to sit the OLQE:

1.  Requirements for post-admission experience

If you are admitted in a common law jurisdiction, you must satisfy the Law Society that you have at least 2 years of post-admission experience in the practice of the law of your jurisdiction of admission (including any period credited in respect of trainee solicitor training or equivalent) in order to be eligible to sit the Examination.  The post-admission experience in the practice of the law of your jurisdiction of admission can include any period credited in respect of trainee solicitor training or articled clerkship or where there is no statutory requirement for you to gain admission through trainee solicitor training or articled clerkship in your jurisdiction of admission, experience gained during a practical legal training course which is the statutory requirement in lieu of such trainee solicitor training or articled clerkship.  Please see rule 4(2)(b) of the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules on page 75. This requirement can be satisfied by working as a qualified lawyer in your home jurisdiction, or as a registered foreign lawyer in Hong Kong.

If you are admitted in a non-common law jurisdiction, you must satisfy the Law Society that you have had not less than 5 years of experience in the practice of the law of the jurisdiction of your admission in order to be eligible to sit the Examination.  Please see rule 5(1) of the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules on page 76.

Rule 8 of the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules provides that if an applicant was admitted in more than one jurisdiction, he or she may elect any one of those jurisdictions as his or her jurisdiction of admission for the purpose of the Rules.  If you are admitted in both common law and non-common law jurisdictions, and you elect the common law jurisdiction as your jurisdiction of admission for the purpose of the Examination, you must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Law Society that you have had at least 2 years’ experience in the practice of the law of such common law jurisdiction to be eligible to apply.

Applicants must demonstrate that they have already gained the necessary experience at the time when they submit their applications.  No prospective application will be accepted.  The cut-off date for calculation of experience is the date of the application to sit or the application for exemption, as the case may be (“the cut-off date”).  Please refer to the meaning of "experience in the practice of law" on pages 22-24.

28.  Regarding an applicant’s request for review on the LSHK’s decision on the eligibility to sit the OLQE, the details of the Review Mechanism are set out in Part I Section C.6 of the Information Package, as follows:

6.  A review of the Law Society’s decision under Rule 3(2)

Rule 9 of the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules provides that an applicant may ask for his application to be reviewed by the Law Society within one month of receiving notification from the Law Society of its decision and upon payment of the fee of HK$3,000.00 (see the details of the payment methods in paragraph 2 of this Section).  You will have one opportunity to have your application reviewed and the time limit specified in the Rules will be strictly followed.  A review will be determined on the basis of and only of the information previously provided to the OLQE Eligibility and Exemption Committee.  You should therefore ensure that all documents are placed before the OLQE Eligibility and Exemption Committee within the specified time limit in paragraph 2 of this Section.

You may apply to the Court of First Instance of the High Court for review of the Law Society’s decision within 3 months of receiving notification from the Law Society.

E.  Available Alternative Remedy

29.  It is trite that the public law nature of judicial review and the type of remedies which may be granted identify that applications for leave to apply for judicial review should be taken only as a last resort.  An applicant should exhaust all appeal procedures or alternative remedies before resorting to judicial review.  Where alternative remedies have not been exhausted, the Court may in the exercise of its discretion refuse to grant leave to apply for judicial review.

30.  Though a degree of flexibility exists to cater for exceptional cases for the Court’s immediate intervention if substantial injustice is to be avoided, I do not think the present application falls into that category.

31.  In the Reply, the Applicant submitted that there are exceptional circumstances in the present case, including (1) OEEC (as defined below) procedural and substantive flaws, (2) questionable validity and professionalism, (3) insufficient independence and operability, and (4) public elements and continuity.  He alleged that the Review Mechanism is not a “prerequisite” that must be pursued first before filing an application for leave to apply for judicial review.

32.  As canvassed above, an applicant who is not satisfied with the LSHK’s decision on eligibility is required to follow the appeal procedure as prescribed by the OLQA Rules and the OLQE Regime.

33.  With respect to the Applicant, I do not find that there exist any special or unusual circumstances in the present case.

34.  I accept the LSHK’s submission that the Applicant’s challenge to the Decision is plainly inapt, where he had a clear and effective alternative avenue of redress by use of the Review Mechanism and review by the CFI.  It does not matter that he did not actually pursue that available alternative remedy, nor that he might be out of time for doing so.  This alone is fatal to the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review.

F.  Grounds 1-5: Discrimination, Unequal Treatment, Disproportionality, and Departure from the LPO

35.  Although the Applicant advanced substantial parts of his arguments by five separate grounds, they boil down to the alleged discriminatory and/or unequal treatment between applicants from common law jurisdictions and those from non-common law jurisdictions.

36.  The gist of the Applicants’ submissions under Grounds 1 to 5 on the alleged breaches of the Basic Law, ICCPR, BOR, LPO and principles of proportionality as summarised in the Initial Response (in a way with which I agree) is as follows:

(1)  Breach of BL 8 – the LPO does not authorise the LSHK to distinguish between common law and non-common law applicants by imposing different minimum years of practice experience, which are without a legal basis and have imposed unreasonable restrictions on specific groups without authorisation (Ground 1).

(2)  Breach of BL 39 and Article 26 of the ICCPR – the LSHK’s imposition of an additional 3-year legal practice requirement on applicants with a non-common law background constitutes discrimination based on “legal system of origin” (Ground 2).

(3)  Breach of BOR 22 – the LSHK’s Decision is in breach of the principles of equality before the law and entitlement to equal protection of the law without any discrimination (Ground 3).

(4)  Departure from the legislative intent of the LPO – the OLQE itself is sufficient to achieve this legislative purpose, and that requiring an additional 3 years of experience from non-common law background applicants clearly departs from the intended purpose (Ground 4).

(5)  Breach of the principle of proportionality – since both common law and non-common law background applicants must ultimately pass the same examination, the LSHK’s addition of 5 years of legal practice for non-common law background (which exceeds that for common law background 3 years) is clearly unnecessary, not the least restrictive, and constitutes an excessive restriction (Ground 5).

37.  The Applicant repeated and further elaborated some of his arguments in the Reply, which I take into account but need not rehearse here.

38.  With respect, none of the arguments advanced by the Applicant have any merit.  I accept the LSHK’s submission that there is no unfair or unlawful discrimination under the regulatory framework of the OLQE against applicants from non-common law jurisdictions, let alone the existence of any disproportionate treatment, for the following reasons.

39.  First, the differentiated eligibility criteria based on the legal background of the applicants under the OLQE Rules are not unfairly discriminatory, but reflect the practical necessity to ensure that the candidates possess sufficient familiarity with common law principles underpinning the Hong Kong legal system.

40.  The legitimacy and substantive rationale in the separate differential treatment of candidates from common law and non-common law jurisdictions for the OLQE are reasonably founded upon the following well-known differences between the two legal systems:

(1)  Legal reasoning and methodological shift: Common law practice involves inductive reasoning, where lawyers extract principles from case law and apply judicial precedent.  This shift therefore require civil law-trained lawyers to develop fluency in analysing judicial decisions, understanding the doctrine of stare decisis, and anticipating how courts might interpret ambiguous clauses in order to navigate the captured differences.

(2)  Procedural and advocacy skills: Civil law systems are typically inquisitorial, with judges actively investigating facts. Common law systems are adversarial, placing a premium on oral advocacy, cross-examination, and persuasive argument.  Civil law lawyers often do not have experience in adversarial settings, making it relatively more difficult to meet the expectations of common law jurisdictions, especially in litigation and arbitration.

(3)  Contractual drafting and interpretation: Fundamental principles in substantive law also differ between common law and civil law jurisdictions.  Different mindsets and skill sets would be required for transaction lawyers moving between different legal systems.

(4)  Cultural and institutional expectations: Common law jurisdictions often have unwritten norms and professional traditions (including informal expectations around client interaction, billing practices, and law firm culture), together with a greater emphasis on precedent-based mentorship and networking, that civil law lawyers may find opaque.

41.  Secondly, the introduction of the OLQE qualification process and criteria, including the different periods of practical experience between applicants from common law and non-common law jurisdictions, was intended to focus on (a) the difference between common law and non-common law systems of law and (b) the transition between the two systems, which was the original motivation and remains so today.

42.  I accept the LSHK’s submission that this objective was included in the draft syllabus of the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test provided to the LSHK’s Foreign Lawyers Accreditation Sub-Committee (“Sub-Committee”) on 16 October 1990, with the expectation that all candidates are sufficiently trained and experienced so as “to demonstrate an ability to apply the principles of statutory interpretation and the doctrine of precedent” and “appreciate the major differences between the codified civil law system and the non-codified common law system”.

43.  As agreed by the Sub-Committee, the examination subjects would be designed to enable applicants from any jurisdiction to be admitted in Hong Kong (though exemptions would be granted having regard to the nature and extent of the applicant’s professional qualification and practical experience in the law), and a scheme categorising jurisdictions according to the nature of their legal systems would be prepared.

44.  Candidates from the Chinese Mainland have never been the focus of attention or specifically differentiating treatment.  Instead, the paramount motivating factor was recognition of the practical differences between the practice of law in common law jurisdictions and non-common law or civil law jurisdictions, and the impact that potentially has upon professional standards and the high standing of Hong Kong’s legal system.  That was reflected in the Sub-Committee’s Final Report dated October 1991 titled “Scheme for Admission of Non-Hong Kong Qualified Lawyers”.  The Final Report explained and stated that:

(1)  the admissions mechanisms would, for the first time, enable non-common law lawyers to become Hong Kong solicitors;

(2)  the over-riding objective is to protect the integrity of Hong Kong’s legal system, while facilitating an openness to admission of qualified lawyers from any jurisdiction and from any system of law; and

(3)  the core distinction and differential treatment was founded upon an applicant’s qualifications and degree of experience from a common law or non-common law jurisdiction.

45.  Thirdly, in respect of the difference in treatment between candidates from common law jurisdictions and non-common law jurisdictions, there exist the legitimate aim to be pursued and justifications for the difference.  The LSHK provided submissions on this at some length, but I do not think it necessary to repeat them.  I accept the thrust of the submissions, which can be summarised as follows:

(1)  The LSHK is charged with statutory responsibilities, including regulating the legal profession, upholding the rule of law, preserving and protecting the integrity of Hong Kong’s legal profession, and applying stringent standards of competence and performance – consistent with the global status of Hong Kong as an international legal and dispute resolution centre (“Legitimate Aim”).

(2)  There are material and important differences between the practice of law between common law and non-common law jurisdictions, warranting reasonable and proportional differences in treatment for applicants to qualify and practise as Hong Kong solicitors, which are rational reasons for the application of different periods of the practice of law.

(3)  The distinction is not discriminatory, but reflects the practical necessity of ensuring that candidates possess sufficient familiarity with common law principles.

(4)  The differentiation is lawful, rational and proportionate to uphold the integrity and standards of the legal profession in Hong Kong, goes no further than necessary to achieve the Legitimate Aim, and cannot be said to be manifestly without a reasonable foundation.

(5)  There is no unfairness or disproportionality in the Decision because the assessment process is governed by transparent, published criteria that apply equally to all applicants, regardless of jurisdiction.

(6)  The eligibility framework is calibrated to ensure that only suitably qualified candidates are admitted to the profession, thereby protecting the integrity of legal practice and the interests of the public.

(7)  The Decision was made after a detailed review of the submissions and employment history of the Applicant, who was notified of the outcome in writing with reasons.

46.  It is also clear that there was no departure from the LPO.

47.  Grounds 1 to 5 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

G.  Ground 7: Substantive and Procedural Unfairness

48.  The assertion made by the Applicant is that the LSHK’s Review Mechanism lacks independence and fairness.  He was given no fair opportunity to present arguments, respond, or submit new evidence, because in the LSHK’s Denial Letter, it explicitly stated that if an applicant seeks a review, not only must a HKD3,000 fee be paid, but no new evidence will be accepted.  The Review Mechanism amounts to a review by the same decision-making body of its own decision, effectively maintaining the original decision in substance, making it difficult for the applicant to recover or gain meaningful redress for the application and review fees already paid.

49.  With respect, I do not think that the Applicant’s claim on the alleged unfairness could reasonably arguably be substantiated.

50.  I accept the LSHK’s submission that there are sufficient procedural safeguards in the Review Mechanism for the following reasons:

(1)  The Review Mechanism is available and accessible by all applicants, under which the OLQE Eligibility and Exemption Committee (“OEEC”) of the LSHK would revisit the application, and make recommendations to the Standing Committee on Standards and Development (“SCSD”) for final determination.

(2)  The Review Mechanism is a 2-tier review mechanism – the OEEC currently consists of 13 members, and the SCSD currently consists of 18 members, and the members of each are senior solicitors.  These two committees make their collective decisions independently.  It is incorrect for the Applicant to say that the Review Mechanism is a review by the same decision-making body of its own decision.

51.  As to the materials or information to be used on the review, they are properly limited to those originally provided.  The process is not intended to be some rolling process where an applicant can supply materials said to show eligibility on a piecemeal basis.  It is up to the applicant to show by documents/information the eligibility claimed, and if he or she disagrees with the view first taken by the LSHK on those materials, then a review can be sought.  The applicant is expressly warned that the review will be on and only on the information originally provided.

52.  Further, it is important to keep in mind that the Review Mechanism is only part of the available process by which a disgruntled applicant might seek redress from a decision as to eligibility adverse to him or her.  Any question of substantive and procedural fairness is properly viewed in that wider context.  The Review Mechanism provides an appropriate and proportionate ‘second look’ at the information provided with the application for eligibility.  If still dissatisfied with the decision of the LSHK, the applicant can pursue a review in the CFI.

53.  As traversed above, it was the Applicant’s own choice to refuse to seek redress by following the Review Mechanism or application to the CFI.  In that context, it can be noted that such a review by the CFI would be on the merits of the claimed eligibility, whereas an application for leave to apply for judicial review focuses only on the integrity of the decision-making process engaged in by the LSHK.

54.  Ground 7 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

H.  Grounds 8 and 9: Failure to Recognise Mainland Legal Practice Experience and Disregard for Applicants Holding Multiple Legal System Qualifications

55.  The nature of and logic behind the Applicant’s complaints under Grounds 8 and 9 are similar, and therefore can be dealt with together.

56.  The essence of the Applicant’s complaint under Ground 8 is that the LSHK has failed to establish clear, reasonable, and suitably tailored eligibility criteria reflecting the characteristics of Mainland legal practice experience, showing a lack of understanding and consideration.  In particular, the Applicant alleged that:

(1)  In the application form (Form A) submitted to the LSHK, the Applicant clearly stated that he had obtained the legal professional qualification certificate in March 2018 and provided an employer’s certificate confirming that from March to June 2018 he worked as a legal assistant in a law firm, undertaking legal research, drafting documents, assisting in case preparation, and client communication, primarily in civil and criminal law.  This period of experience, he said, should be recognised as legal practice and counted toward the required years.

(2)  The Applicant obtained a trainee lawyer certificate by the Changsha Lawyers Association from June 2018 to August 2019 and duly completed the required traineeship in accordance with the law.

(3)  Mainland Chinese lawyers must complete at least one year of traineeship before qualifying to practise, and such experience ought to count as legal practice experience.

57.  For Ground 9, the Applicant asserted that the LSHK has not provided clear, fair and predictable assessment standards for applicants holding multiple legal system qualifications, constituting procedural unfairness and unreasonable discretion.

58.  It is fair for the LSHK to say that in the assessment by the LSHK on the Applicant’s OLQE application and eligibility, deficiencies and discrepancies were found in the application information and documents provided by the Applicant, the details of which need not be repeated for the present purposes.  In gist, the LSHK’s position and findings, which I accept, are as follows:

(1)  The Information Package clearly states that a review will be determined on the basis of and only of the information previously provided by an applicant to the LSHK.  It is an applicant’s responsibility to ensure that all documents are placed before the LSHK within the time limit stated in the Information Package, and the Applicant failed to do so.

(2)  Some documents were provided by the Applicant in the OLQE Application Bundle to the LSHK, but some were not.

(3)  Experience as a paralegal or legal assistant cannot be recognised as experience in the practice of law for the OLQE purpose, as stated in the Information Package and the OLQE Rules.

(4)  As stated in the Information Package, the statutory trainee solicitor training required for admission can be recognised as experience in the practice of law for the OLQE purpose; whilst that required for admission as a PRC lawyer is 12 months only, and any period in excess of the statutory trainee solicitor training cannot be recognised.

(5)  In the Applicant’s OLQE Application Form, the Applicant only stated his experience as a paralegal and lawyer, with two employers’ verification letters in support of his OLQE application also stating his experience as a paralegal and lawyer which did not verify his statutory trainee solicitor training in the PRC law firms.

(6)  The Applicant only disclosed his PRC trainee solicitor training in the supporting documents of his application for leave to apply for judicial review.  For the Trainee Lawyer Certificate issued by the Changsha Lawyers Association from June 2018 to August 2019, the Applicant did not provide any verification letter from the Applicant’s principal to verify or supplement such experience.

59.  On the facts of the present case as traversed above, there is no force in the Applicant’s suggestion that the LSHK has failed to reasonably recognise the legal practice experience in the Chinese Mainland, let alone the alleged insufficient understanding of the Mainland judicial system.  I also accept the LSHK’s submission that the qualifications and experience (supported by documentation provided by the Applicant) were given full recognition and duly assessed by the LSHK in accordance with the criteria set out in the Information Package.

60.  Grounds 8 and 9 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

I.  Grounds 10 and 11: Lack of Reasonableness in International Comparison and Contrary to the Nation-Level Policies

61.  The crux of the Applicant’s case on these grounds is that:

(1)  the LSHK imposes a 5-year legal practice requirement on non-common law background applicants, while requiring only 2 years for those with a common law background, which shows differential treatment based on “legal system of origin” and imposition of an additional 3-year practice requirement constituting unreasonable differential treatment; and

(2)  that is contrary to the national-level policies on “Strengthening Training of Foreign-Related Legal Talent” and the “Greater Bay Area Strategy”.

62.  There is obviously a significant degree of overlap between these Grounds 10 to 11 and Grounds 1 to 5.  For the same reasons as set out above, these two grounds must also be rejected as without merit.

63.  In addition, the Applicant’s reference to other jurisdictions’ admission systems and his allegation of contravention of national-level policies are of no relevance, because the present challenge concerns the admission of lawyers from other jurisdictions under the OLQE Regime in Hong Kong.  The Applicants’ allegations are made on bases which are not reasonably arguable.

64.  Grounds 10 and 11 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

J.  Ground 6: Wednesbury unreasonableness

65.  It is trite that a decision may be found to be Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational in circumstances including that the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.  Put without the double negatives, that means that a decision is Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational if it is one which no reasonable authority properly directing itself could have reached.  It is also trite that establishing irrationality is a high hurdle for a judicial review applicant to overcome.

66.  The complaint of the Applicant is that:

(1)  the LSHK has failed to provide any reasonable evidential basis to show that “5 years non-common law experience” is equivalent to or necessarily different from “2 years of common law experience”; and

(2)  the Decision lacks reasonable and clear standards, resulting in the imposition of arbitrary and capricious additional barriers on applicants who must all ultimately pass the OLQE, thereby constituting a decision that is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

67.  It seems to me that the Applicant is essentially repeating or repackaging the points already raised in other grounds relied upon by him.  I have already dealt with the issue of irrationality in the above context.

68.  But it also seems to me that there is a perfectly supportable basis to require a longer period of experience from a non-common law lawyer as opposed to a common law lawyer when seeking to obtain local qualification in a common law jurisdiction.  Further there is plainly no imposition of an arbitrary or capricious additional barrier.  In short, there is no reasonably arguable Wednesbury unreasonableness in the LSHK’s Decision.

69.  Ground 6 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

K.  Result

70.  Dissatisfied with the first decision on his eligibility, the Applicant had (but apparently chose deliberately to ignore) a perfectly straightforward and reasonable, available alternative remedy – one that comprised a review by the LSHK and a potential application for further review by the CFI.  The Applicant failed to exhaust the available alternative remedy of a review or further review on the merits.  For that reason alone, I would refuse leave to apply for judicial review.

71.  In any event, on the law and principles applicable, none of the grounds of review advanced by the Applicant is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

72.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

L.  Costs

73.  As to costs, in the Initial Response, the LSHK sought an order for costs to it.

74.  In his Reply, the Applicant submitted that the Court may grant a protective costs order or make no order as to costs, on the basis of judicial justice and access to justice, and that the present application is not a case in the “abuse of process or frivolous” category.

75.  As I stated in my recent decision in Boill Healthcare Holdings Limited v The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited [2026] HKCFI 3827 at §§54-59, the principles applicable to the costs issue have been set out by the Court of Final Appeal in Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative Council (No 2) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 841.  As relevant and applicable to the present case, it was held at §17(2) that since applications for leave to apply for judicial review are, by the rules themselves, meant to proceed on an ex parte basis, the general rule should be that an unsuccessful applicant will not be ordered to pay the costs of a putative respondent or putative interested party unless there are special or unusual circumstances which justify such an award.

76.  The exceptional circumstances in the present case that would (and do) justify departure from the usual “no order as to costs” are (1) the refusal of the Applicant to seek alternative remedies under the OLQE Regime of pursing the (relatively inexpensive) Review Mechanism and potentially an application to the CFI, when there was no good reason for him not to do so, (2) the lack of merit in his intended grounds of review, and (3) the assistance received by the Court from the submissions invited from, and provided by, the LSHK, properly exercising its statutory regulatory role.

77.  Therefore, in the exercise of my discretion, I order the Applicant to pay the costs of the LSHK, to be summarily assessed. The LSHK shall provide its Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment by 14 August 2026, and the Applicant may file a List of Objections, if any, by 28 August 2026.  Thereafter, the summary assessment will be made by me on paper.