RE KHAN WAJID

CAMP 232/2020

[2021] HKCA 1353

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 232 OF 2020

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 253 OF 2018)

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D E C I S I O N

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Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court)  :

I.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal

1.  On 7 June 2021, this Court (Cheung and Chu JJA)  gave the decision dismissing the applicant’s renewed application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 6 July 2020 in which he refused to grant leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board.

2.  The applicant now applies, by a notice of motion and supporting affirmation filed on 8 July 2021, for leave to appeal against our decision to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant further lodged written submissions in support out of time.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s documents, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have, therefore, proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The applicant’s notice of motion is three days late.  According to section 24(2)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (‘Ordinance’), the applicant’s notice of motion ought to have been filed with the Court within 28 days of our extension decision.  Under section 24(5)  of the Ordinance, the Court may extend the time for filing of notice of motion, but good grounds must be shown before the Court’s discretion can be exercised.  An important consideration in this regard is the merits of the intended appeal: Full Wisdom Holdings Limited v Traffic Stream Infrastructure Co Ltd & Ors, CACV 266/2003, 27 July 2004 at [7] and [10].

5.  The applicant is three days late.  The applicant stated in his affirmation that ‘my time is over’ and stated he was ‘sorry’. No further details were provided.  However, given that the delay was insignificant, we will consider the merits of his intended appeal.

6.  The applicant provided no grounds of appeal in his notice of motion.  He merely repeated the fact that the Board and the Courts have rejected his claims in the appeal process.

7.  In his written submissions which were lodged out of time, the applicant repeated factual matters of his case, the fact that he had been rejected in his appeal process, and that he was not safe, hopeless and helpless.  Most if not all of these are personal opinions and issues.

2)  Legal principles

8.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Ordinance states that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question to be determined involves great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be determined by the Court of Final Appeal.

3)  Our view

9.  The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine in accordance with section 22(1)(b)  of the Ordinance.  Nor is there any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his documents.

10.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the ‘or otherwise’ limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the Ordinance.

4)  Disposition

11.  For these reasons, the notice of motion is dismissed.