SK DANISH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 874/2022

[2022] HKCFI 3239

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 874 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 20 May 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1770 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  The applicant appeared before the Court on 3 October 2022.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant is a national of India. He came to Hong Kong on 21 December 2014 as a visitor and was allowed to stay until 4 January 2015. He overstayed and was arrested by police 21 January 2015. He was referred to the Immigration Department the next day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 23 January 2015.

5.  His claim was considered on the grounds of Torture risk, BOR 2 risk under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. By Notice of Decision dated 29 January 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement application. He appealed to the Board and his appeal was dismissed by the Board on 24 August 2018.

6.  He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 24 June 2020 (“the Court’s Order”).

7.  His appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Court’s Order. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 28 January 2021.

8.  His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 16 April 2021.

9.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 15 November 2021.

10.  He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 1 March 2022.

11.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

12.  The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or even killed by his enemy Suraj Shaw.

13.  The Director found that his claim was not substantiated on the grounds that there were no substantial grounds for believing that he would be subject to the harm he claimed if he returned to India [13]; that state protection was available to him [18] and internal relocation was an option open to him [23].

14.  He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that it accepted that there was a business dispute between the applicant and Suraj. It did not accept his new evidence at the hearing that his brother was attacked at home and was hospitalized for one month and that their dispute had become a wider religious issue or taken on any religious connotations. On the evidence appeared it, the Board was not satisfied that there was any real risk that he would suffer any of the proscribed forms of harm at the hands of Suraj or his friends if he returned to India. See paragraphs 56-66 of the Board’s Decision.

15.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.  In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the immigration officer a statement, in which he said that he had information from his family members in India that Suraj is still looking for him. Suraj had gone to his family house in India to look for him. He and his people burnt down the house. His family had already relocated to somewhere else. He has lost contact with his mother. Suraj is well-connected with the authorities, he considers that he cannot relocate to avoid Suraj if he returns to India.

17.  The Director considered that the applicant relied upon the same or similar facts of his previous claim, which has been considered and rejected. The information from his family members are hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested.

18.  The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts in support of the subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

19.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he stated that he wants the Court to look into his case again as his life is still in danger.

DISCUSSION

20.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

21.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he understands the Director’s reasons. He complained that there was no interview for him and he was not given time to get the documents in support of his case. He asked for an adjournment for him to obtain the documents. I note that the immigration officer had given him time to obtain the documents in support of his application. I asked him what documents he intended to obtain from India. He said those documents were the police documents, which were in his family house. But his family are living elsewhere. He did not specify the use of the police documents. I refused to grant the adjournment as requested.

22.  As to his grounds stated under paragraph 22 above, they do not assist his application. The Ordinance does not provide for screening interview for subsequent claims. This is because screening interview has been provided for his previous claim. He is only repeating his facts in his previous claim for his subsequent claim. There is nothing amiss in this procedural provision. I cannot see the relevance of the police documents to his subsequent claim. He had been given time by the immigration officer to obtain the documents, which he failed to obtain. I am unable to see the relevance of those police documents, which he was unable to specify, to his subsequent claim.

23.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

24.  Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

25.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

26.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

27.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

28.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say.

29.  I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

30.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

31.  RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1