RE TAMANG JANAK KUMAR
[2026] HKCA 2079 · CACV 214/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 214/2026 [2026] HKCA 2079 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 1039 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 214 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 830 OF 2021) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Hon Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 4 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court): By our judgment handed down on 19 May 2026 ([2026] HKCA 981) (“the Judgment”), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Jeffrey Chau (“the Judge”) given on 2 March 2026 dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 10 June 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also lodged written submissions to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case, the applicant’s claim and our reasons for dismissing the appeal have been set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The Notice of Motion sets out six grounds of appeal: The Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) failed to properly assess the applicant’s right to life claim under the BOR 2 risk, which should apply to risk of killing by private individuals and is not limited to situations of genocide or death sentences. The Court of Appeal failed to correct this error of the Board. The Board failed to assess whether state protection is available in the proposed relocation destination (ie Mumbai or Delhi), particularly when the Board found that state protection may not be effective if the loan shark Mr Deepak was able to locate her. The Board confused the BOR 3 risk ground and torture risk ground of non-refoulement protection. The Board rejected her claim under the torture risk ground as there was no state involvement and wrongly relied on the same reason to dismiss her claim under the BOR 3 risk. The Court of Appeal failed to correct this error of the Board. The Board failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the her right to life claim under BOR 2 risk. The Court of Appeal did not identify this error of the Board. The Board and the reviewing court failed to apply the required standard of anxious scrutiny as required under Prabhakar v Secretary for Security (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 in dismissing her claim. In light of the errors set out above, coupled with the fact that the applicant has no legal training or assistance, leave to appeal ought to be granted on the alternative basis of substantial and grave injustice. In the written submissions, the applicant elaborated on grounds (1), (2) and (3) above, stating that they are questions of great general or public importance and warrant the determination by the Court of Final Appeal. She also requested an oral hearing of this application. We are of the view that the matters put forward in the Notice of Motion and the written submissions do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal for the following reasons. First, the applicant’s arguments regarding the Board’s assessment of her claims under the BOR 2 risk and its scope of protection were not raised as a ground for judicial review before the Judge, nor as a ground of appeal before us. It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the appeal before it. Nor is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal. In any event, these arguments are misconceived. Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Cap.383 (which is in identical terms to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) protects the inherent right to life and prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life from unlawful death, such as the imposition of a death penalty upon removal to one’s home country, and from crimes of genocide and capital punishment. On the materials before the Board, however, the requirements for establishing protection under the BOR 2 risk ground were simply not met, both on the facts and as a matter of law. There was no factual basis upon which the BOR 2 risk was engaged in the first place. Further, contrary to the assertion that the Board failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing her claim on the BOR 2 risk ground, the Board did in fact set out the relevant statutory provisions, and explained with reasons, why each of the risks envisaged under BOR 2 were not engaged on the facts and circumstances of the applicant’s claim ([48] and [49] of the Board’s decision). Therefore, grounds (1) and (4) do not give rise to any questions of great general or public importance. Second, the arguments in relation to ground (2) – that the Board did not assess the availability of state protection in the proposed relocation cities – cannot stand in light of the fact that the applicant failed to substantiate her claim in the first place. The facts of her claim were rejected entirely by the Board on the grounds of credibility. Given that the applicant failed to prove the centrepiece of her claim, it was not strictly necessary for the Board to address the availability of state protection and the option of internal relocation in its assessment of the risk of harm. For the same reason, it was not strictly necessary for the Board to assess the availability of state protection in the proposed relocation cities. Nevertheless, the Board proceeded to assess the option of internal relocation on the premise that her claims were accepted, and gave due consideration to the applicant’s personal circumstances and the objective country-of-origin information for its conclusion, as explained at [15] of the Judgment. Therefore, the alleged inadequacy in the Board’s assessment of state protection in the proposed relocation cities would not have affected the outcome of the Board’s decision. This ground does not raise any question of great general or public importance. Third, the arguments raised in relation to ground (3) – that the Board confused the legal thresholds for protection under the torture risk ground and the BOR 3 risk ground – are misplaced. The Board did not, as alleged by the applicant, simply rely on the state involvement test as the basis to dismiss her claim under the BOR 3 risk ground. Instead, the Board primarily found that the applicant’s claim did not meet the two requirements for establishing the BOR 3 risk ground (ie ill-treatment attaining a minimum level of severity and a genuine and substantial risk of being subjected to such treatment) because the claimed ill-treatment from Mr Deepak and his people was unlikely to materialise in light of the internal relocation alternatives ([50] to [53] of the Board’s decision). Therefore, we are not satisfied that this ground raises any question of great general or public importance. Fourth, the applicant’s arguments in relation to ground (5) as regards the court’s duty to subject the Board’s decision to rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny do not advance her case any further. The criticisms levelled against the Board in its assessment of the BOR 2 and BOR 3 risk grounds, and against the court in rejecting her appeal are no more than general assertions without properly engaging with the reasons given in [11] to [20] of the Judgment, and do not give rise to any questions of great general or public importance. Fifth, the applicant’s complaint that she had no legal assistance or knowledge at any stage of the proceedings before us is a repetition of her grounds of appeal and has already been addressed at [18] of the Judgment. They do not cumulatively amount to any substantial and grave injustice as alleged. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant acted in person.
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RE TAMANG JANAK KUMAR
CA · [2026] HKCA 2079
This judgment