香港特別行政區 訴 姚懿哲（又名姚瑋君）

DCCC 457/2023

[2026] HKDC 315

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2023年第457號

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判刑理由書

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1.  經審訊後，被告人被裁定一項「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」罪罪名成立，違反香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第25(1)及(3)條。

案情

2.  控方證實的案情如下：

亞洲商業集團有限公司（ACG）

(1) 2016年12月28日，被告人用姚瑋君的名字登記成立了Asia Commerce Group Limited亞洲商業集團有限公司（ACG）。被告人是該公司的唯一董事。

(2) 2017年2月15日，被告人在中銀香港（中銀）開了公司戶口。被告人為此戶口的唯一授權使用人，只有被告人有此戶口的網上理財代用名及密碼。

(3) 和本案有關的主要為ACG在中銀的外幣戶口012-616-9-217795-5。

(4) 於開戶時，被告人報稱ACG預期每年0 - 350次交易及0 - 250萬來往金額。但自開戶以來，ACG戶口幾乎沒有交易。

(5) 2020年4月23日，被告人改名為姚懿哲。

匯款1

(6) 2021年1月20日，有一間外國公司。（Valente Trucking Inc.）被騙，誤將 202,472.30 美元電匯到了 ACG 的外幣戶口。此筆金額，在少於5小時內經網上4次被轉走，直到剩下791.08 美元。

匯款2

(7) 2021年1月21日，有另一間外國公司（Eppoo Enterprises Inc.）被騙，亦將407,142,90美元電匯到了ACG的外幣戶口。此戶口及時經警方通知中銀後被凍結。

拘捕

(8) 2022年7月11日，被告人被拘捕，罪名為處理贓物罪。警誡下，被告人保持緘默。

ACG戶口的分析

(9) ACG的戶口至開戶後差不多靜止，和被告人開戶口時所聲稱的預期完全不相同。

稅局記錄

(10) 稅局記錄顯示ACG只曾就2019/2020年提交周年申報表。而周年申報表顯示營業額為0。

(11) 稅局記錄的僱主申報顯示，被告人曾在不同餐廳受雇為廚師或洗碗工人。

年度	收入
2019/2020	$87,643
2020/2021	$213,517
2021/2022	$9,600

(12) ACG完全沒有業務。中銀戶口的存款亦與被告人的收入完全不相稱。被告人知道或有理由相信該些存款代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產，但仍處理該財產。

被告人的背景

3.  被告人現年60歲。他於浙江省寧波市出生，2015年來港定居，並於2017年在香港與菲律賓籍太太結婚，兩人育一名11歲的女兒。2016年，他的母親於內地病逝。居於內地護老院，92歲的父親患有老年癡呆症，由被告人供養。

4.  被告人曾接受高中程度教育。2015年來港後曾任職餐飲業工作。大律師指被告人現為服裝商人，多年來於內地經營名牌服裝特賣場生意。2022年被捕後無法往返內地營商，但仍繼續艱苦經營。大律師亦指被告人為了解香港餐飲業的管理，以及學習製作燒味技術，特意投入各大快餐店，包括大家樂、大快活、美心及位於新蒲崗的燒豬工場工作，學會了斬切燒味及相關製作技巧。2024年

3月，被告人在旺角開設了一間名叫「阿壹叉燒皇」的燒味餐廳。

5.  被告人過往有一次管有第一類毒藥的刑事定罪紀錄，與本案並不類同。

原則

6.  「處理已知道或相信為代表從可公訴罪行的得益的財產」是嚴重控罪，一經循可公訴程序被定罪，最高刑期為罰款500萬及14年監禁。

7.  該類控罪的案情各有不同，因此沒有量刑指引：HKSAR v Shing Siu-ming and Ors [1999] 2 HKC 818；HKSAR v Mak Shing [2002] HKCU 1109 (CACC 322/2001，2002年9月18日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Kamran [2005] HKCU 923 (CACC 400/2004, 2005 年 4 月 12 日，未經𢑥編）；HKSAR v Jain Nikhil and Anor [2007] 2 HKC 205；香港特別行政區訴許有益 [2010] 5 HKLRD 536；HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 1 HKC 504。

8.  於HKSAR v Kamran（同上），上訴法庭指：

“money laundering is a very serious offence as it is an attempt to legitimise proceeds from criminal activities … Successful deterrents against money laundering could be effective measures against crime …”

9.  因此，法庭須判處阻嚇性刑罰；除非有特殊的求情因素，就算是初犯也需考慮即時監禁：HKSAR v Hui Kam [2000] 3 HKLRD 211；HKSAR v Xu Xia-li [2004] 4 HKC 16；HKSAR v Kamran （同上）；Secretary for Justice v Herzberg [2010] 1 HKC 531; HKSAR v Boma Amoso （同上）；HKSAR v Ng Man-Yee [2014] 4 HKC 241 及 Secretary for Justice v Siu Yun-yee  [2017] 3 HKC 454。

10.  前置罪行對判刑並不重要，但如被告人知悉「黑錢」的來源是加刑因素：，HKSAR v Xu Xia-li（同上）；HKSAR v Yam Kong-Lai [2008] 5 HKC 454；HKSAR v Choi Sui-hey [2008] 6 HKC 166 及 Secretary for Justice v Lau Man-ying [2012] 4 HKLRD 429。

11.  「黑錢」的金額是重要的判刑因素，而非被告人所獲的利益。

12.  於香港特別行政區訴許有益（同上），上訴法庭指：

「9. 由於處理公訴罪行得益的財產這類案件會涉及不同的案情，故此法庭沒有定下量刑指引。但以下各點是量刑的參考因素：

(i) 涉案的金額是重要的考慮因素，而非被告人本身在這次交易所獲得的利益。

(ii) 控罪的罪責是協助、支持及鼓勵有關的公訴罪行，故此被告人的參與程度及涉及「洗黑錢」的次數是有關連的因素。

(iii) 處理公訴罪行得益的財產控罪與有關的公訴罪行不一定有直接關係，但若果有關的公訴罪行是可以確認的，那麼法庭是可以在處理控罪時考慮有關公訴罪行本身的刑期。

(iv)若案件涉及國際跨境成份，法庭可採用較嚴峻的刑期，以免香港作為國際金融及銀行中心的形象受損。

(v) 涉案的時間。」

13.  於 HKSAR v Boma Amoso （同上），上訴法庭亦列出一些量刑因素：

“40. Less helpful though this may be than we had hoped, the best we can therefore do is to identify some of the significant features for which the court should look and take into account, though it is not possible to produce an exhaustive list: we can do no better than echo obvious factors that have been referred to by the cases:

(1) The nature of the predicate offence, if known, and the penalty available for the predicate offence: see R v Karen Monfries [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 9. So, for example, where the predicate offence is trafficking in dangerous drugs, the offender should expect a sentence significantly greater than where the predicate offence is gambling. It has in this regard been said that: “Those who launder large sums which are the proceeds of drug trafficking play an essential role in enabling the drugs conspiracy to succeed and as such can expect severe sentences comparable to others playing a significant role in the supply of drugs although it has to be borne in mind that Parliament has provided different upper limits to a judge’s sentencing process for dealing in Class A drugs (life imprisonment ) and money-laundering (14 years)”: R v El-Debi [2003] EWCA Crim 1767 at [90], (in reference to statutory provisions in England); although it is suggested that there must be a difference between the offender who knows what the predicate offence is and the offender who does not : R v Gonzalez [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 35 at para.13.

(2) This brings us to the question of the state of knowledge of the offender. This divides itself in two – knowledge of the nature of the predicate offence, where the predicate offence is known to the court; and knowledge of the fact that the funds are the proceeds of an indictable offence:

(i) Where the predicate offence is known to the court, the question of knowledge of the offender as to the nature of the predicate offence is relevant in that the person who knows the nature of the predicate offence is more culpable than the person who does not: see Gonzales above at [13] and Monfries above at para. 11. But this is a question to be approached with considerable caution, since many offenders will assert ignorance of the origin of the proceeds in question, particularly where the offender has deliberately turned a blind eye thereby choosing not to know. In such a case it must be recognised that he is nonetheless “assisting in the original crime, whether with knowledge or blind eye knowledge of it”: R v Basra above at p.472. The scheme and purpose of the legislation is to ensure care and honesty in the handling of other people’s money and those who are prepared to handle money on other people’s behalf and turn a blind eye to the source of that money do so at their own risk: see Attorney General’s Reference No. 48 of 2006 [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 558 at para. 24. So the person who is aware of the fact that he is dealing with proceeds of an indictable offence but deliberately chooses not to ask questions is barely less culpable than the person who asks or who is told.

(ii) As to the second question, there seems to me to be unassailable logic in the scheme of the Australian legislation which draws a distinction in culpability between the person who intentionally deals with the proceeds of crime, meaning the person who knows or believes that the funds in question are the proceeds of crime; the person who is reckless as to that question; and the person who is negligent about it. The legislation makes it a criminal offence to deal with proceeds of an indictable offence where there are grounds to believe that that is the origin of the funds and the offender knows of the grounds, even where the offender does not positively know that the funds originate from the commission of such an offence, so care must be taken in the last category not thereby to dilute sentencing so as to defeat the object of the legislation; but the person who is reckless is more culpable and the person who knows or believes is more culpable still.

(3) An international dimension will always be a significant aggravating feature; and by international dimension we include money laundered from, or for those operating in, the Mainland.

(4) The sophistication of the offence is always relevant. This will include the degree of planning and whether deceit is practised to achieve the objective.

(5) Where the offence is committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate, that is an aggravating fact.

(6) It is relevant to take into account whether there is one transaction or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed.

(7) As in the case of Herzberg, it will be an aggravating feature where the offender continues to launder funds after he has discovered as a fact that the funds are the proceeds of an offence or after he has discovered the nature of an offence which is serious.

(8) The sentencing court should have regard to the role of the offender and the acts performed by him. In this regard, the director of a laundering operation or scheme should attract a greater sentence than a person engaged by him although sentences should be sufficient to deter those who might be prevailed upon by directing minds. In the case of a person down the chain, the court will wish to have regard to whether a benefit has been received and if so the nature and size of the benefit. But within the category of persons down the chain there will gradations of culpability. So for example the drug addict or petty crook who is paid a small sum to open an account and hand over its operation to another with no more participation and no more knowledge than that it is going to be used for some sort of crime is much less culpable than an offender of a different sort not “used” in that way.”

14.  雖然沒有量刑指引，上訴法庭法官於許有益案中列出當時多宗「洗黑錢」案的涉案金額及刑罰。香港特別行政區訴雲國強[2012] 1 HKLRD 197，上訴法庭援引許有益案例出的刑罰，指當涉案「黑錢」是100萬至200萬元時，量刑基準約為3年，300萬至600萬元約為4年，而1,000萬元以上則可超過5年。

量刑

15.  本案的「黑錢」為609,615.20美元，即約474萬多港元。

16.  涉案戶口分別2次於2021年1月14日及2021年1月20日接獲202,472.30美元（第一筆款項）及407,142.90美元（第二筆款項）。

17.  前置罪行是兩宗電郵騙案，受害人因詐騙電郵而將案中的款項匯進涉案戶口。

18.  兩筆款項的受害人均為美國公司。因此本案涉及國際跨境元素。

19.  涉案時間只有一周。第一筆款項被轉走後，銀行已即時將涉案戶口凍結。因此，第二筆款項仍在涉案戶口內。

20.  本席同意「洗黑錢」的程序簡單，沒有證供顯示被告人得悉前置罪行的性質，亦沒有證供顯示前置罪行涉及犯罪集團。可是被告人知悉戶口用作處理外滙。

21.  大律師援引香港特別行政區訴廖麗婷CACC 334/2015 （未經𢑥編，2016年4月7日）及 HKSAR v Zhan Jian-fu CACC 258/2007（未經𢑥編，2008年8月12日）。

22.  於廖麗婷案：

(1) 上訴人承認2項「串謀洗黑錢」罪。原審法官以4年半監禁為量刑基準。因上訴人承認控罪及在其前夫誘使和誤導下犯案，最終判處上訴人33個月監禁。上訴人不服判刑，提出上訴。

(2) 案情指上訴人在2009年12月22日至2012年8月17日期間，與其他身份不詳人士一同串謀處理一筆378,527.19 美元的款項（控罪一）和另外一筆總數為3,738,211.57 港元的款項（控罪二），而她知道或有合理理由相信該兩筆款項的全部或部份、直接或間接代表從可公訴罪行的得益。經換算後，兩項控罪所涉的總金額共6,670,093.87港元。

(3) 2009年12月2日，新專佳實業投資（香港）有限公司（新專佳）在香港公司註冊處登記成立，並報稱其業務是服裝貿易。上訴人持中國國籍，在深圳居住。上訴人一直是新專佳的唯一股東和董事。2009年12月22日，上訴人以新專佳的名義在中國銀行開立一個美元戶口（該美元戶口）和一個港元戶口（該港元戶口）。上訴人是兩個戶口的唯一授權簽署人。2012年8月17日，中國銀行結束該兩個戶口，當時兩個戶口都無任何結餘。

(4) 2012年8月7日，位於美國的BankcorpSouth銀行收到指示，把378,554.19美元由其客戶James G Marston的戶口轉賬到該美元戶口。同年8月9日，BankcorpSouth懷疑該轉賬有問題，但未能成功停止該筆轉賬，故立即通報美國警方。美國警方後來將案件轉介給本港警方跟進。本港警方經調查後，發現該美元戶口在2012年8月8日收到BankcorpSouth該筆款項，其中378,500美元在即日被滙走。

(5) 本港警方分析該港元戶口的資金流向後，發現2010年1月11日至2012年8月17日期間，合共有3,738,211.57元存款，大部份存款被即時轉走，最終該些款項全部被提取。而其中的3筆為數1,000,000元，5,380元和1,780,000 元的款項，都是由上訴人從國內抵港後在兩名男子陪同下親自以現金方式提取。

(6) 2014年12月8日，上訴人在羅湖管制站入境時被警方以「洗黑錢」的罪名拘捕。警誡下，上訴人表示一切由其前夫指示，所需的文件也是別人準備，她只是按指示簽署文件、開立戶口和提取款項。上訴人同時表示她的前夫沒有來香港的旅行證件，所以並沒親身來港。上訴人強調她對新專佳的實際業務不知情，也從沒親身參與其中，而自2012年8月離婚後，她便已跟前夫失去聯絡。

(7) 上訴法庭援引Boma案及許有益案所述的量刑因素及雲國強案的判刑建議後，指：

「25. 上訴人在本案扮演重要角色，而其參與程度甚深。她不僅簽署文件以成立“新傳佳”，更是其唯一董事。她從中國大陸到香港開設涉案的銀行戶口，其後更兩次親自到香港以現金提取巨額款項。雖然上訴人只是按其前夫的指使行事，但她在本案的角色屬不可或缺，如沒有她開立賬戶及協助提款，有關洗黑錢活動根本不能成事。

26. 雖然控方案情不足以證明上訴人的「洗黑錢」的活動一定涉及犯罪集團，但本庭不能忽視，除了上訴人和其前夫外，亦有其他人士參與「洗黑錢」。

27. “新傳佳”在2009年12月成立，該美元戶口和該港元戶口在同月開啟。控方指兩個涉案戶口從2010年12月起開始活躍，但卻沒有說明它們收支的具體情況。雖然兩個涉案戶口從開戶直至2012年8月戶口被銀行結束，時間不算太長，但也不能說很短。本庭同意本案是有一定程度的預備和計劃性，雖然不算是精心策劃，而本案亦具備一定的國際元素。但本庭認為該些因素在同類案件一般都會出現，故本案沒有特別需要加刑的因素。

28. 本庭留意到，並無任何證據顯示上訴人從「洗黑錢」中得到任何利益。

29. 本庭認為，從整體的案情看來，考慮到上文所提及的各點，就控罪一及控罪二，合適的的量刑起點分別是3年及4年…」

23.  本案的案情與廖麗婷案有類同之處，兩件案件均是使用公司「洗黑錢」、兩案涉案公司均於案發數年前設立、兩案的被告人均為涉案公司的唯一股東及董事，兩案均涉及網上騙案及跨國元素。可是亦有不同之處。廖麗婷案的被告人除了借出户口外，還分別兩次親自來港以現金提取巨額款項。本案中的被告人則居於香港。可是被告人承認案發前親自到銀行增加外滙的限額。沒有證供顯示廖麗婷案的被告人獲取任何報酬。本案中的被告人則獲得8萬元報酬。

24.  於Zhan Jian Fu案：

(1) 上訴人承認2項「洗黑錢」罪。原審法官以3年監禁作為每項控罪的量刑基準，最終判處上訴人32個月監禁。上訴人不服判刑，提出上訴。

(2) 上訴人是內地居民。2005年11月，他於兩間香港銀行開設戶口。2006年2月至4月期間，該2個戶口接獲來自台灣共約200萬的滙款。滙款源自一宗網上騙案。上訴人不時從戶口取款後於2006年4月18日離港。他於2007年2月10日再次來港時被捕。上訴人稱替一名陳姓的台灣人開設2個涉案戶口獲得2千元報酬；另外直至2006年5月，每月獲1,500 元替陳姓男子提款。陳姓人士於2006年失蹤。

(3) 上訴法庭參閱了 HKSAR v Abayomi Bamidele Fayomi CACC 197/2005、HKSAR v Chen Szu Ming CACC 270/2005 及 HKSAR v Yam Kong Kai CACC 458/2006後，指考慮到被告人的角色及金額認為刑期適當。

25.  Zhan Jian Fu案無論金額、用作「洗黑錢」的戶口性質和上訴人的角色均與本案有別。

26.  於HKSAR v Chau Yu Tung [2025] HKCA 1135：

(1) 上訴人承認2項「洗黑錢」罪，被判處共42個月20日監禁。他不服判刑，提出上訴。

(2) 2022年8月19日至9月1日期間，一群人士受騙（包括投資騙案、僱傭騙案、勒索及電話騙案），按一些身份不詳人士的指示將不同金額轉賬予不同銀行戶口，包括上訴人的戶口。其中14名受害人向警方報案。

(3) 上訴人於2022年8月9日開設涉案的滙豐銀行戶口（控罪 1）；開戶時，上訴人聲稱是一名律師，每年收入約為24萬元，戶口用作儲蓄及存款來自他的月入。2022年8月19日至26日期間，涉案戶口接獲共108 筆合共1,910,728.02港元的存款。大部份存款均於同日提取，共88項提款合共1,893,007.55元。

(4) 另一個涉案的中銀戶口於2011年1月24日開設（控罪2）。2018年6月1日至2022年8月4日該戶口沒有任何交易。2022年8月5日，上訴人更新戶口，聲稱任職電腦技術人員，月入10,001至25,000；戶口用作儲蓄及支付日常所需，而存款來自其收入。2022年8月19日至24日，該中銀戶口接獲共88筆合共2,862,231港元的存款。大部份存款均於存款後的10小時內轉賬給他人，合共86次轉賬，總額2,862,425.62港元。該戶口於2022年8月24日的結餘為17,496.38港元。

(5) 判刑時，大律師指上訴人因經濟困難而犯案；角色輕微（merely a cog in the machine）、只是被利用，對前置罪行毫不知情及沒有跨國原素，而且只涉款470多萬元，要求以少於20個月監禁作為量刑基準。

(6) 原審法官考慮到涉案金額、受害人人數、交易數目、犯案時間及上訴人的角色後，分別以3年監禁及3年半監禁作為控罪1及控罪2的的量刑基準，再根據《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》加刑三分一，即刑期分別為48個月及56個月監禁，但沒有因上訴人過往5次涉及不誠實的刑事定罪紀錄再加刑。扣除三分一的認罪折扣後，兩項控罪的刑期減為32個月監禁及37個月10日監禁。考慮到總刑期原則，原審法官認為適當的總刑期為42個月20日監禁。

(7) 雖然上訴人對每項控罪的量刑基準沒有異議，只就加刑幅度提出上訴，上訴法庭指：

“13. I agree with the respondent’s submissions. This was a serious case of money laundering, where it was shown that the laundered funds were the proceeds of serious crime, involving a criminal syndicate scamming victims through various fraudulent and deceptive schemes.

14. The applicant did not dispute the starting points. In assessing the applicant’s overall criminality, the judge identified several aggravating features in this case. While it was accepted that there was no international element, the judge noted that the scheme was sophisticated and involved a criminal syndicate. She highlighted the serious nature of the predicate offences, including telephone deception, investment scams and blackmail, although the agreed facts did not state that the applicant was aware of the predicate offences or that he received any benefit. However, it was implicit in the admitted facts and mitigation that he received a financial benefit, in that he allowed the accounts to be used to launder funds because he was in a “financial crisis”.[12] She found that the applicant did more than merely allow his accounts to be used by the syndicate, having actively visited the banks and made false representations in opening or activating the accounts for the purpose of laundering illicit funds. The HSBC account was used for the offences just 10 days after its opening, while the BOC account had been inactive for over 11 years before it was used. She pointed out the multiplicity of transactions concerning different victims and involving a total sum of some HK$4.7 million. During the charge period, the HSBC account received 108 deposits within eight days from an unknown but substantial number of victims, while the BOC account received 88 deposits over 27 days from at least 12 victims.

15. The judge gave detailed reasons for the sentence, identifying the relevant facts and circumstances and the applicable sentencing principles in determining the overall sentence to be imposed on the applicant…

16. The applicant has no cause for complaint about the sentence imposed on him…

27.  Chau Yu Tung涉及的金額與本案十分相近，但餘下案情卻有分歧。

28.  上訴法庭已多次指出，每件案件的案情有別，其他案件的判刑指導性不大。法庭的責任是根據適用的原則及席前的案情作判刑。雖然只有兩次存款，犯案時間短暫，但本案涉款超過 470 萬元，金額可觀。涉案公司和戶口早已設立，但被告人承認多次往銀行增加外滙額度。本案亦涉及跨國元素，即美國、香港及內地。考慮到案情，適當的量刑基準為 4 年監禁。

減刑因素

29.  被告人是經審訊後被定罪，不可獲認罪扣減。

30.  大律師指被告人惦念患有老人癡呆症的父親，希望盡快與家人團聚。眾所周知，判刑對家人的影響並非減刑因素：見Sentencing in Hing Kong 11th Edition第 [30-130] 至 [30-142] 段。

31.  大律師續指被告人一直好學勤奮，干犯本案與他的性格相悖。

32.  如上文所述，這是極嚴重的罪行，須判處阻嚇性刑罰，就算初犯，也需即時監禁。沒有類同刑事定罪紀錄非減刑因素，只是沒有加刑因素。被告人沒有類同的刑事定罪紀錄，亦承諾永不重犯。

33.  Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出：

“[7-3] If an accused has a clear record, this may indicate that has crime is ‘completely out of character’：R v Law Cheuk-lung [1997] HKCU 404 (CACC 9/1997, 20 June 1997, unreported). If so, this may be of particular relevance to sentencing if the accused is of advanced years. That a 71-year-old accused had been a hard-working family man who had committed no prior criminal offences and had made some positive contribution to society was something which attracted credit in Secretary for Justice v Wong Hong-leung [2010] 1 HKLRD 226, 235 …

[7-6] Credit for a clear record is, however, by no means a given. Much will depend upon the nature of the offence and the position of the offender. In HKSAR v Law Num-chun [2014] 6 HKC 606, 617, Lunn VP said:

[T]he principal is that good character is not a factor relevant generally to determining the starting point to be taken for sentence in serious criminal offences for which a deterrent sentence is required.…

[7-18] the relevance of good character is related to the circumstances of the accused. Good character sometimes refers to no more than an absence of previous convictions, and this is not a basis for an additional discount: HKSAR v Wong Kam-Shing, Jackie [2010] 4 HKC 580, 584 … Good character can be recognized as a factor in mitigation ‘where positive good character is shown by, for example, the provision of unpaid service to the community, as opposed merely to the absence of a criminal record’: Secretary for Justice v Tso Tse-kin [2004] 2 HKC 139,144. The mere absence of criminal convictions must not be confused with positive good character, and the simple discharge of duties in a proper manner ‘does not constitute what is to be regarded as positive good character’: HKSAR v Leung Ping-nam [2007] 5 HKC 413, 427; HKSAR v Chung Ka-hung [2010] HKCU 738 (CACC 349/2008, 31 March 2010, unreported)…

[7-23] If the court decides that the offence is such as to require a deterrent sentence, it may be necessary to select a higher starting point. The clear record of the accused will not, that is, affect the starting point for sentence: HKSAR v Lam Ying-yu [2014] 2 HKLRD 895 … In such circumstances, perhaps because of the magnitude or prevalence of the offence and the need for deterrence, the personal circumstances of the accused will count for little. In Re Applications for Review of Sentences [1972] HKLR 370, 406, Huggins J said:

Of course, there will be classes of case where the public interests so manifestly calls for a deterrent sentence that only most exceptional circumstances relating to the offender could outweigh the need to deter others, but we must never rule out that such exceptional circumstances may arise.

[7-24] Examples of offences in respect of which the courts have concluded that exemplary sentences are appropriate include:

…

(9) Money laundering: Secretary for Justice v Siu Yun-yee [2017] 3 HKC 454 …”

34.  另外，Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th edition 指出：

“[30-22] In Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi-Fung and Ors [2018] 2 HKC 50…, it was said that the ‘age of an offender, whether youth or advanced age, is always a relevant mitigating factor in sentencing’…

[30-31] At some point, the more mature age an accused may start to operate as a mitigating factor: R v C (1992) 14 Cr App R (S) 562. This is particularly so if combined with a clear record: R v Bowdler [1975] Crim LR 590. In Secretary for Justice v Wong Hong-leung [2010] 1 HKLRD 226, 235 … Stock VP said, in relation to an accused of good character aged 71, that:

[W]e will accord credit for the fact that until relatively late in life, this respondent was a hard-working family man who had committed no criminal offences and had made some positive contribution to society.

[30-32] The point at which the maturity of the accused is relevant as mitigation is sometimes said to have been reached at the age of 60: R v Tsui Lau-ying and Ors [1987] 5 HKLR 857, 881… However, in HKSAR v Chow Chi-ming [2006] HKCU 398 (HCMA 1247/2005, 21 February 2006, unreported), Leong DJ said it was generally accepted that ‘old age, unless extremely advanced in age, is generally not a mitigating factor’. In HKSAR v Lau Yuk-huen [2008] HKCU 864 (CACC 37/2008, 5 June 2008, unreported), it was said that the 66-year old accused was not to be regarded as old…

[30-33] … In R v Tsui Lai-ying and Ors [1987] HKLR 857, 881… Silke VP explained, in relation to an accused who was close to the age of 80, that ‘court tend to lean against, but only in special circumstances, sentences on persons of equivalent age which may lead to the possibility of death in the course of it being served’.…

[30-34] … In R v Clarke, R v Cooper [2017] EWCA Crim 393 … the English Court of Appeal, in considering cases involving accused aged 101 and 97, held that although an offender’s life expectancy, age, health and prospect of dying in prison were factors legitimately to be taken into account and sentencing, they had to be balanced against the gravity of the offending … and the public interest in seeing adequate punishment for very serious crimes …

[30-35] In R v Chen Chun-yeh [1997] HKCU 144 (CACC 513/1996, 12 February 1997, unreported), an 88-year old heroin trafficker who challenged his sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was told that there was nothing the Court of Appeal could do as leniency would encourage the syndicate to recruit aged persons. A 78-year-old drug trafficker received short shrift when he sought to pray in aid his age as mitigation in HKSAR v Wong Wan [2001] HKCU 117 (CACC 384/2000, 20 February 2001, unreported) (see also HKSAR v Lau Wai-ping [2009] HKCU 1914 (CACC 303/2008, 30 October 2009, unreported). Were it otherwise, ‘those who are inveigled into taking part in the manufacture and trafficking of dangerous drugs will be the lame, the halt, the blind, the young and the old - people who may have some ground for pleading for the mercy of the court if they are in fact arrested’: Lam Hak-hung v R (CACC 724/1972, 20 March 1973, unreported), as approved in Attorney General v Chan Chi Mei-wah [1990] 1 HKLR 190, 193 …”

35.  被告人是經審訊後被定罪，一直以來全無悔意。本案中完全沒有任何求情因素。因此本席判處被告人4年監禁（即48個月監禁）。