HOSSAIN MOHAMMAD ALI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6131 · HCAL 2318/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2318/2024
[2026] HKCFI 6131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2318 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Hossain Mohammad Ali |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 November 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 12 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
2318_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong were not made out on any of the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 1 November 2023, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “Torture Claim appeal Board / Non-
Refoulement Claim petition office” as the putative respondent, when
only the Board should be so named.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
5. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the
name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed his Form 86 on 29 November 2024, which
was 3 months and 17 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 12 August
2024). The applicant was hence late for 17 days in making the Leave
Application.
8. This court has to consider whether the time for the applicant to make
the Leave Application should be extended taking into account of the
criteria laid down in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393,
which are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application.
10. Although a delay of 17 days is not substantial, there is simply no
reason for this court to extend the time for the applicant to make the
Leave Application when no explanation was given for the delay at all.
More importantly, there is no merit in the Leave Application
whatsoever as discussed below.
11. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or even killed by
members of the Awami League (“AL”), the political opponents of his
elder brother Amir, who held a high position in the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (“BNP”).
Disposal on paper
15. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
16. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
17. The applicant did not advance any grounds for judicial review in Form
86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 29 November 2024. In the
said affirmation, the applicant only stated that he was not satisfied
with the judgment.
Discussion
18. First of all, the applicant’s mere comment on his affirmation that he
was not satisfied with the Board’s judgment cannot help him. He did
not state why he was not satisfied with it or how the Board had erred
in its determination of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim and/or
his appeal/petition.
19. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
20. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any ground
for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
21. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 23 January 2024. The applicant was present and was
thus given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.
22. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its
consideration of the applicant’s credibility and its findings on the
applicant’s claim were laid out in paragraphs 77 to 104 of the Board’s
Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
23. In gist, despite some concerns, the Board considered that some of the
applicant’s core claims were true. The applicant was consistent about
Amir’s historical involvement in the BNP, and country of origin
information (“COI”) supported the applicant’s proposition that AL
might have targeted his home in the belief that his brother had
returned from abroad, and perhaps harmed anyone such as the applicant
who got in their way. The Board also placed weight on the fact that
the applicant bore scarring consistent with his claims of having
suffered wounds including a gunshot injury in the 2022 incident.
24. The Board accepted that the applicant’s brother Amir was a BNP
activist and inflicted violence on the opposition AL people before he
left Bangladesh in 2005. Despite some reservation, the Board also
accepted that the applicant, as a young child at the material time,
might have followed his brother around and witnessed some of these
incidents. However, the Board found that the applicant had no
connection to or affiliation with the BNP. The Board did not accept
that AL had formed an adverse view of the applicant for this reason.
25. Moreover, the Board accepted that the applicant was shot, chased and
beaten by AL people in 2022 when he attempted to stand up to the
intruders who were vandalising his home. The Board further accepted
that the police refused to register any complaints about the 2
incidents the applicant referred to because the perpetrators were
connected to the ruling AL party.
26. With regards to the applicant’s future risk, the Board accepted that
the AL people continued to have an adverse interest in the applicant’s
brother Amir. Although the Board did not accept that AL had any
particular adverse interest in the applicant, the Board was prepared
to accept that if the applicant returned to his family home in
Bangladesh, there was more than a remote possibility that Amir’s AL
enemies could once again attend there thinking that perhaps Amir had
returned, and that as a consequence the applicant could once again
come into conflict with them and suffer relevant harm inflicted
incidental to their enmity towards Amir.
27. With regards to state protection, after consideration of COI, the
Board found that effective state protection might not be available to
the applicant in his home area.
28. However, the Board found that any threat to the applicant was
localised to his home area where enemies of his brother Amir knew of
the applicant and his family and where they lived. Given the Board’s
findings that the applicant was able to relocate in the past and
thereby avoid any further harm, including when he stayed for one month
at his in-laws’ home, and later for 16 months in Dhaka, the Board
found that there was no reason why the applicant could not once again
avoid the risk of harm he might be facing in his home area by
relocating to either of those places. The Board had also given
further reasons in paragraph 104 of the Board’s Decision for the
finding that it would not be unduly harsh to expect the applicant to
relocate within Bangladesh in order to avoid the feared harm.
29. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
30. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within
the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s
appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in
the way the Board reached its decision.
31. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
32. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
33. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 04/11/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Applicant’s ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Nil |04/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 22450 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 923/23 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000883/23) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1