SHAHZAD NAVEED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2121/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1655

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2121 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 7 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 2 December 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 16 October 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 2 December 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 December 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant alleged that he failed to appeal as he did not get my decision on time and he wanted to appeal. In his supporting affirmation dated 7 January 2026, the applicant alleged that his schedule time passed and he requested for permission. However, the applicant did not give any explanation as to why he did not receive my decision on time.

8.  The applicant also failed to give any ground for his intended appeal against my decision in the Summons or his supporting affirmation.

9.  At the hearing of the Summons on 12 March 2026, the applicant was absent. Hence, the applicant failed to explain why he did not receive my decision within 14 days from the date of the decision, and he did not give any ground for the intended appeal at all.

10.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

11.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

12.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal, even though the delay was not for too long.

Conclusion

13.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.