Case Details
For Applicant(s):
The Father applied for legal aid
Listing:
PHAM MY HOANG MINH (A MINOR) BY PHAM MY HUNG, HIS NEXT FRIEND v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
PHAM MY HOANG MINH (A MINOR) BY PHAM MY HUNG, HIS NEXT FRIEND v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5891 · HCAL 444/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 444/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5891
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 444 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Pham My Hoang Minh (a minor) |Applicant |
| |by Pham My Hung, his next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, “Pham My Hung” be deleted as the 1st
applicant, the 2nd applicant be changed to be the sole applicant
and his name be amended to “Pham My Hoang Minh (a minor) by Pham My
Hung, his next friend”, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 February 2026, Pham My Hung
and Pham My Hoang Minh applied for leave to apply for judicial review
(“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 December 2024 (“the Board’s
Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following
hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0444_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. Pham My Hung (“the Father”) is the father of Pham My Hoang Minh, who
is a minor. In Form 86, the Father named himself as the 1st applicant
and Pham My Hoang Minh as the 2nd applicant. The Father, however,
filed his own application for leave to apply for judicial review in
HCAL 1887/2020, and hence he should not be an applicant in the Leave
Application.
3. The Father also confirmed at the hearing before this court on 15
October 2026 that the Leave Application concerns only his son Pham My
Hoang Minh and not himself.
4. Moreover, the Board’s Decision concerns only Pham My Hoang Minh’s
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 11 July 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”).
Thus, Pham My Hoang Minh should be the sole applicant in the Leave
Application.
5. In the document with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”
that was annexed to Form 86, the applicants sought relief in respect
of both the Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision. However,
the Father confirmed at the oral hearing before this court on 15
October 2026 that the Board’s Decision should be the only subject
matter of the Leave Application.
6. The Board found that Pham My Hoang Minh’s appeal/petition against the
Director’s Decision failed on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed
his appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s Decision, which
rejected his claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
7. As aforesaid, Pham My Hoang Minh should be the sole applicant in the
Leave Application. His name should be stated in Form 86 as “Pham My
Hoang Minh (a minor) by Pham My Hung, his next friend”.
8. Thus, on this court’s own motion, “Pham My Hung” is deleted as the 1st
applicant, the 2nd applicant is changed to be the sole applicant and
his name is amended to “Pham My Hoang Minh (a minor) by Pham My Hung,
his next friend”.
9. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office and the Director as the putative respondents and did
not name any putative interested party, when only the Board should be
named as the putative respondent, and the Director should be named as
the putative interested party.
10. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” is added as the putative interested party.
Late application
11. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
12. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 24 February 2026, which was
more than 1 year and 2 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 4
December 2024). The applicant was hence late for more than 11 months
in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider
whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicant
to make the Leave Application.
13. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
14. The Father did not make an application for extension of time when he
filed the Leave Application for the applicant.
15. At the oral hearing before this court on 15 October 2026, the Father
explained the delay by saying that he wanted to wait for the result of
his own application for leave to apply for judicial review in order to
see how to proceed with the applicant’s application.
16. A delay of more than 11 months is very significant, and the Father’s
explanation for the delay is not satisfactory. Although the Father’s
own application in HCAL 1887/2020 was dismissed by this court on 16
February 2026 and he indeed filed the Leave Application for the
applicant 8 days after his own application was dismissed, the Father
could offer no cogent reason as why he had to wait for the result of
his own application before he could file a separate application for
his son, ie the applicant. More importantly, there is no merit in the
Leave Application whatsoever as discussed below.
17. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend the time for the applicant
to file the Leave Application. The Leave Application can be dismissed
on the ground of being made out of time alone.
18. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
Legal representation of the applicant
19. The applicant is a minor born on 18 September 2023 in Hong Kong and is
represented by the Father in the Leave Application.
20. The Father applied for legal aid for the applicant but his application
was refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 8 September 2026.
21. At the hearing before this court on 15 October 2026, the Father
confirmed that he would not engage a private lawyer to represent the
applicant.
22. As the applicant was legally represented before the Director, and no
new evidence would be advanced in the Leave Application, this court
considered that the lack of legal representation in the Leave
Application was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice the
applicant. Hence, this court waived the irregularity and proceeded to
deal with the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
23. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
24. In sum, the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by a creditor of
his mother, a creditor of his mother’s family and a creditor of the
Father due to his parents’ inability to repay their respective loans.
The applicant’s elder sister also claimed for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong for fear of harm from the creditors of their
parents in Vietnam.
Oral hearing
25. The applicant requested for an oral hearing and his case was heard on
15 October 2026.
26. The Father confirmed that the applicant would rely on the grounds
stated in the document with the title “Grounds on which relief is
sought” that was annexed to Form 86. When this court invited the
Father to elaborate on the said grounds, the Father merely said that
everything had been clearly stated in the said document and he had
nothing to add.
Grounds for judicial review
27. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
28. The contents of the said document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” were all very general and were in fact used by many
applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave
to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for
such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without
any regard to their own situations. Nevertheless, as the applicant is
relying on the said grounds to make the Leave Application, this court
will still deal with the grounds as discussed below.
29. As aforesaid, the Father did not elaborate on any of the grounds
stated in the said document at the oral hearing.
Discussion
30. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
31. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s grounds were
directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used to challenge
the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Only paragraphs 1, 3,
4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave Application.
32. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable. It does not help the applicant to
establish any ground by just mentioning the right to life in paragraph
1 either.
33. In any event, the Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to
life but concluded that after consideration of all the information and
evidence, there was no sufficient reason to believe that the
applicant’s right to life would be violated upon his return to
Vietnam.
34. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of his personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
35. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and/or unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a
position to offer any response. This accusation lacks any particulars
in support.
36. The applicant was only an infant when his case was assessed by the
Board. His parents attended the Board’s hearing on his behalf and
answered questions for him. The applicant did not state which
explanations his parents provided were not accepted by the Board and
which questions his parents were not in a position to offer any
response.
37. There was in fact nothing wrong for the Board to question the
applicant’s parents who were acting on his behalf extensively to try
to understand the applicant’s claims better and to assess the
credibility of his parents and their accounts of the events leading to
the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions
were necessary for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in
relation to the applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or
unfairness in the Board’s questioning of the applicant’s parents on
his behalf at all.
38. Finally, in paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged
that the adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the
Board’s Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons
given to say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
39. The Board had in fact provided a very detailed analysis of the
applicant’s claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the
applicant failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM to claim
non-refoulement protection.
40. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
41. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case.
42. The applicant’s alleged danger in his home country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review unless there were errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
43. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
44. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
45. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 1 November 2024. As can be seen from paragraph 26 of
the Board’s Decision, the Board invited the Pilot Scheme for Provision
of Publicly-funded Legal Assistance for Non-refoulement Claimants to
consider if legal representation would be provided for the applicant
as he was a minor. However, the Pilot Scheme Office refused to offer
legal representation for the applicant. The Board then allowed both
parents of the applicant to represent the applicant. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board
through his parents.
46. The Board was clearly aware of the legal principles required for the
assessment of cases for non-refoulement claimants who were minors (see
paragraphs 25 to 40 of the Board’s Decision). There was in fact no
child specific risk in the applicant’s case, as he is a legitimate
child of his parents who are both Vietnamese.
47. As the applicant was essentially relying on both his mother’s and the
Father’s cases for claiming non-refoulement protection, the Board
heard the evidence of both his parents.
48. The Board had laid out its findings on the evidence given by the
applicant’s mother and the Father in paragraphs 49 to 69 and 70 to 89
of the Board’s Decision respectively, and it is not necessary to
repeat the same here.
49. In gist, the Board did not accept the evidence given by the
applicant’s mother and the Father in relation to their claims about
loans being taken out by them or by the mother’s family. The Board
found major inconsistencies in the evidence of both the applicant’s
parents. The Board rejected that the parents or the mother’s family
had taken out the alleged loans. It followed that the Board also
rejected their evidence in relation to the creditors’ chasing them for
repayment of the loans and the related assaults.
50. The Board had confirmed with both parents of the applicant that their
respective creditors might not even know of the existence of the
applicant. Both parents of the applicant had not seen or heard from
their respective creditors since 2015. Further, both parents agreed
that the intention of their respective creditors was only to put
pressure on them to repay their respective loans and might not have a
real intention to harm or kill them.
51. Moreover, the Board found that even if the applicant’s parent’s
evidence was accepted, their disputes with their creditors were all
private financial disputes arising from their inability to repay their
loans. The ill-treatment suffered by both the applicant’s parents
were not severe and did not attain a minimum level of severity. The
family members of both the applicant’s parents remained unharmed in
Vietnam. The fear of the applicant’s parents from their respective
creditors was not related to any Convention reasons. There was no
evidence of state acquiescence in the applicant’s parents’ cases.
52. The Board further found that even if the creditors of the applicant’s
parents were still looking for them and/or their family, state
protection would be available to the applicant. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Board had also taken into consideration the applicant
was only an infant when his case was being assessed. Thus, the Board
had also taken into account the existence of various organizations
offering assistance to women and children in need, and had found from
COI that Vietnam had in place legislations which protected the rights
of children, and banned all acts of cruelty against children. The
Board was satisfied that the Vietnamese government would provide
appropriate and reasonable protection to the applicant (see paragraphs
115 to 120 of the Board’s Decision).
53. In view of its findings as summarised above, it was not strictly
necessary for the Board to assess the viability of internal
relocation. Nevertheless, the Board did explicitly state that there
was no evidence that the alleged creditors of the applicant’s parents
had the ability to locate them anywhere in Vietnam. The applicant’s
parents’ claim in this aspect was only their own speculation. The
Board was of the view that if the applicant was concerned that he
would face risks upon returning to Vietnam, internal relocation could
be a viable option for him to reduce or negate any perceived risk (see
paragraphs 161 to 162 of the Board’s Decision).
54. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s appeal/petition against
the Director’s Decision failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
55. The finding of facts, including assessment of evidence, COI and risk
of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
56. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
57. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
58. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and devoid of merits.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |21/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 24148 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 376/24 (Formerly |
|the Applicant proposes| |RBCZ 5000335/24) |
|to use at the hearing,| | |
|including the | |Department of Justice, |
|affidavit in support | |Senior Assistant Law |
|of the application for| |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1