RE AHMAD AZIZ alias AZIZ AHMAD AND OTHERS

		CACV 897/2025, [2026] HKCA 1552

		On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 515

	IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

	HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

		COURT OF APPEAL

	CIVIL APPEAL NO 897 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1619 OF 2020)

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RE:	Ahmad Aziz alias Aziz Ahmad	1st Applicant

	Nasim Zubia alias Zubia Nasim	2nd Applicant

	Aziz Rabia alias Rabia Aziz	3rd Applicant

	Sahar Najam-Us	4th Applicant

	alias Najam Us Sahar 

	alias Sahar Najam Us alias Us Najam Sahar

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Before: Hon Au and K Yeung JJA in Court

Date of Judgment: 28 August 2026

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		J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

	On 21‍ April 2026, the applicants filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 10‍ April 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 515).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno‍ Chan (“the Judge”) dated 9 ‍October 2025, by which the Judge refused their application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 4675).

	The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph ‍3 of Practice Direction‍ 2.1.

	Section‍ 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap ‍484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

	In their Notice of Motion, the applicants complained that the court erred in law for not having applied the principles of procedural unfairness and irrationality to the Director’s Decision.  The applicants also contended that the decision makers relied solely on the “COL information” and their prior facts and had ignored the overwhelming evidence of violence towards minorities.  They asserted that their lives would be in danger in their home country and they would be killed or harmed upon refoulement.

	Pursuant to Practice Direction ‍2.1, the applicants lodged written submissions on 5 ‍May 2026 in support of the present application.  In those submissions, the applicants cited various case law on the requirement of high standards of fairness, Wednesbury unreasonableness and procedural fairness, as well as provisions of the Basic Law, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap‍ 383).  However, the applicants have failed to condescend upon particulars as to how these provisions were relevant to their case.

	In our view, the applicants’ application is plainly devoid of merit.  Their assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Their allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions they had previously made before this court in their appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] - [10] of the Judgment.  They have not identified any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV ‍221/2013, 14 ‍November 2014) at [2] and [3].  Their assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

	Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, their allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

	Accordingly, the applicants have failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section ‍22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section ‍22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

	For these reasons, the applicants’ intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

	(Thomas Au)	(Keith Yeung)

	Justice of Appeal	Justice of Appeal

The 1st to 4th applicants acting in person