譚國武 v. 三星電子香港有限公司 AND OTHERS

DCEC 1786/2019

[2020] HKDC 1136

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 1786 OF 2019

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DECISION

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A.      Introduction

1.  On 25 July 2019, the Applicant, pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance[1], filed a home-made Employees’ Compensation Application (EC Application) in person against Samsung Electronics HK Co Ltd (Samsung) for a personal injury he suffered in an alleged accident on 1 August 2017 (Accident Date) at 8^th Floor, Modern Terminal Warehouse Phase II, Berth One, Kwai Chung Container Terminal, Kwai Chung (Accident Site).

2.  On 13 November 2019, the Applicant was granted legal aid, and later on 23 December 2019, was assigned counsel, Mr Meyrick Wong (Mr Wong).  On 6 January 2020, the Applicant, after the two years’ limitation period had expired, issued a joinder application by summons, seeking to join three new parties - Alpha Creation Limited (Alpha), Chi Shing Construction Engineering Company Limited (Chi Shing) and Yeung Yiu Cheong trading as Gentoo Engineering Company (Gentoo) respectively as the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Respondents (Intended Respondents).

3.  On 9 April 2020, the Applicant was granted leave to discontinue these proceedings against Samsung, which was the owner of the Accident Site.

4.  The summons was opposed by all the Intended Respondents. At the substantive hearing of the summons, the Applicant was represented by Mr Wong, and Alpha and Chi Shing by their respective counsel, Mr Nicholas Oh (Mr Oh) and Mr Henry Suen (Mr Suen).

5.  Gentoo was unrepresented and filed no affirmation evidence in opposition even though this court had directed that such affirmation evidence be filed.  At the hearing, its sole-proprietor, Mr Yeung (Mr Yeung) applied to adjourn the hearing to enable Gentoo to file evidence in opposition.  Upon this court having refused the adjournment application, Gentoo therefore did not have any evidence to oppose the joinder summons.

B.      Reasons for the Applicant’s delay

B.1    No knowledge of the identities of the Intended Respondents when instituting the proceedings

6.  According to the Applicant’s supporting and reply affirmations filed in support of the joinder summons, the Applicant suffered severe head injuries and lost consciousness when he worked as an air-conditioning worker on the Accident Date.  However, the Applicant had no recollection of the details of the accident including who his employer was when he regained consciousness whilst in Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) 4 days after the accident.  The Applicant was told by the doctor at the PMH that he was found unconscious near to the bottom of a ladder at the Accident Site.

7.  Due to the symptoms of headache, amnesia and drowsiness the Applicant has since suffered from, the Applicant has been granted sick leave.  The Applicant averred that the only thing he could remember was going to work at the Accident Site on the Accident Date.  However, the Applicant’s attempts to find out the identity of his employer from his ex-colleagues and contractors that he had previously worked with were not successful.  Neither had the responses to his inquiries from PMH and the Fire Department respectively dated 20 February and 10 March 2019 in relation to the identities of the employer and the principal contractor yielded any positive result.

8.  Eventually, after the Applicant, upon his doctor’s advice, sought help from the Labour Department, he gave, on 15 July 2019, a “Notification of Accident” to the latter.  At the time of completing the said notice, the Applicant, apart from having knowledge that Samsung was the owner of the Accident Site, did not have any information about his employer or principal contractor.  In the notice, the Applicant therefore named Samsung as both the employer and the principal contractor.  It was for this reason that the Applicant could only claim against Samsung when he filed the EC Application before the two-year limitation period was due to expire.

B.2    Alpha’s Form 2

9.  The Applicant averred that on 9 September 2019, he received from the Labour Department an undated “Notification of Accident by the Employer” given by Alpha in the prescribed Form 2 in Chinese (Form 2). In the Form 2, Alpha reported that the principal contractor, and the 1^st and the 2^nd sub-contractors were respectively Alpha, Chi Shing and Gentoo.  The Applicant stated it was not until he had sight of the information disclosed in the Form 2 did he have knowledge of these Intended Respondents and their contractual relationship.

10.  The Applicant stated that the information disclosed in the Form 2 shows that the Intended Respondents knew all along about his accident but they had not only failed to contact him about his accident, worse still they failed to pay him any s 10 periodical payments.

11.  In the circumstances, the Applicant stated that there was good reason for his delay in joining the Intended Respondents.

C.      The undisputed evidence

12.  Based on Mr Yeung’s open admission at the hearing on 4 August 2020, it was admitted that Gentoo was the Applicant’s employer at the time of the accident.

13.  Alpha and Chi Shing also admitted in their respective affirmations in opposition filed by their directors, namely Mr Miguel Lei (Mr Lei) for Alpha and Mr Kwan Kam Shing (Mr Kwan) for Chi Shing, (respectively “Lei’s Affirmation” and “Kwan’s Affirmation”) to being the principal contractor and sub-contractor.

14.  It is also undisputed that the Applicant met an accident on the Accident Date.  Their only contention is that the injury was a minor head injury.  It was alleged that the Applicant was already able to resume work for Mr Yeung in the same month as the accident: Kwan’s Affirmation, §§10 and 21.

15.  The principal grounds Alpha and Chi Shing rely on are unreasonable delay and prejudice.

D.      Unreasonable delay and prejudice

16.  Mr Kwan stated that the Applicant’s delay was unreasonable as he only started a search for the identities of the parties 18 months after the accident, i.e. in early 2019.  Mr Kwan believed that the Applicant had not been prevented by his injury from discovering the identities of the principal contractor and the sub-contractor.  Not only was the Applicant able to resume working for Mr Yeung within the same month as the accident, Mr Kwan alleged, he also did not, when attending the 2019 Chinese New Year dinner hosted by Chi Shing, mention anything about the accident.

17.  Mr Kwan stated that Chi Shing has now, due to the Applicant’s delay, lost the opportunity to preserve “more relevant records” and has suffered prejudice as a result.

18.  Alpha also made a similar complaint, and added that the Intended Respondents, as a result of the unreasonable delay, have been deprived of a chance to carry out an investigation into the alleged accident.  The prejudice was greater in this case as there was no eyewitness to the accident.

19.  Alpha further alleged that Zurich, its insurer, has declined rendering assistance under the policy “as a result of the Applicant’s delay and/or inaction”: Lei’s Affirmation, §27.

E.      Additional ground of objection by Alpha and Chi Shing: failure to give notice pursuant to s 24(6)

20.  Alpha and Chi Shing advanced an additional ground of opposition available to the principal contractor/sub-contractor only, namely the Applicant’s failure to comply with s 24(6) (see Part H below) by serving on them a written notice.  Mr Oh and Mr Suen both contended that upon the Applicant’s failure, his intended claim against them could not be maintained.

F.      Applicable Legal Principles

21.  Parties are in agreement that the criteria for the exercise of discretion laid down by the Court of Appeal in Tsang Loi Fat v Sun Fook Kong[2] apply in this joinder application.  These criteria are well established; they include:-

(a)      The reasons for delay;

(b)     The length of delay;

(c)      Sufficient ground to support an award; and

(d)     Prejudice to the respondents.

22.  These criteria will now be considered against the factual matrix of this application.

G.      Discussion

G.1    The reasons and the length of delay

23.  In my view, the veracity of the Applicant’s reason for the delay in support of the joinder summons is best considered by examining the particulars of the claim stated in the EC Application.  Since the Applicant was acting in person at the time of the commencement of these proceedings, the averments stated in the EC Application have therefore not been legally embellished.  These home-made averments will tend to throw light on the genuineness of the Applicant’s account stated in his affirmations.

24.  In the following sub-paras of §3 in relation to the matters stated in each of the sub-paragraphs, the Applicant averred:-

(3)     Date and place of accident, nature of work on which the applicant was then engaged and nature of accident and cause of injury –

(After stating the Accident Date, time of the accident and the Accident Site), could not remember what he was doing, and that he did not know how he was injured (“唔記得做緊咩，唔知點受傷”).

(6)     Monthly earnings of the applicant from employment with the respondent (a) for the month immediately preceding the accident; (b) on average during the 12 months (or any lesser period of employment with the employer) prior to the accident –

Could not remember (“唔記得”).

(9)     Date of giving notice of accident to the respondent –

Stated “No” (“沒有”).

(10)    If notice not given, reason for omission to give such notice –

He just obtained the information of Samsung (“因剛搵到答辯人資料”).

25.  These material averments the Applicant pleaded in the EC Application show that when the Applicant instituted these proceedings, he had very little recollection of the accident, and the only information he had at that time was Samsung and nobody else.

26.  After having examined the evidence in the round, I’m satisfied that the Applicant’s explanation was genuine.  I believe that the Applicant’s late discovery of the information of the Intended Respondents until the availability of Form 2 was contributed to by the condition of the Applicant’s head injury, and was further compounded by the lack of forthcomingness on the part of the Intended Respondents, especially his employer, Gentoo and the sub-contractor, Chi Shing.  Hence, I believe that the Applicant only had sufficient information to enable him to bring a claim against the three Intended Respondents when he had a copy of the Form 2 on 9 September 2019 (see §9 above).

27.  In the circumstances, if the period of delay is to be computed from 9 September 2019 to 6 January 2020, the filing date of the joinder summons, the length of delay was only 4 months.  At the highest, the period is about 5 months if it is counted from the date of the expiry of the statutory limitation period, on 31 July 2019, to 6 January 2020. On any view, I do not think that the length of delay is substantial.

28.  Having taken into account all the circumstances leading to the late issue of the joinder application, I’d be inclined to find that the Applicant has satisfied this court that there is good reason for the delay.

G.2    Merits

29.  It was alleged that the claim was weak as the Applicant’s injury was minor.  At the hearing, Mr Yeung submitted that when he visited the Applicant at the PMH after the accident, the Applicant allegedly told him that he was feeling alright, and that there was no need to report the accident to the Labour Department.

30.  The allegation that the Applicant’s injury was minor, in my view, does not assist the Intended Respondents as such contention only goes to the issue of quantum.  As it does not seem to be in dispute that periodical payment has not been paid, Gentoo, as an admitted employer, will be liable for this compensation. Alpha and Chi Shing, pursuant to s 24, will be liable as principal contractor and sub-contractor.  I believe that the Applicant has an extremely strong case against all the Intended Respondents irrespective of the seriousness of the injury.

31.  As for the alleged conversation the Applicant allegedly had with Mr Yeung at PMH, I do not think it takes the Intended Respondents’ case very far.  At its highest, the alleged conversation was only a mere representation, falling short of a binding agreement of forsaking any right to sue.  Even if it could arguably be an agreement, such an agreement would be null and void by virtue of the statutory contracting out provision under s 31, which prohibits an employee from relinquishing any right to compensation.

32.  From the evidence, I am of the view that the Applicant has shown sufficient grounds to support an award.

G.3    Prejudice to the Intended Respondents

33.  Alpha and Chi Shing alleged prejudice on the ground of losing of an opportunity to preserve documents, without however specifying what evidence or documents they would have allegedly failed to preserve.  Hence, their allegation is not substantiated, and it is, in my view, a bare assertion.

34.  I note however Alpha further alluded to the prejudice of having allegedly been deprived of the chance to investigate into the accident.  It was alleged that since there was no eyewitness to the accident, the investigation would be hampered.

35.  Given the strong case on liability (See Part G.2 above), I do not think Alpha’s allegation has any substance.

36.  In relation to the issue of quantum, Alpha asserted prejudice on the basis of having lost an opportunity to require the Applicant to attend a medical examination under s 16.  Alpha’s said contention, in my view, does not hold water.  Plainly, Alpha (including Gentoo and Chi Shing) have not fulfilled either of the stipulated criteria set out in s 16(1) and (2).

37.  Section 16 empowers an employer to require an employee to undergo a medical examination by the employer’s appointed doctor only if the conditions under sub-s (1): “… an employee has given notice of an accident” or sub-s (1A) “… an employee who is in receipt of a periodical payment under section 10…” are fulfilled.  However neither of these conditions was fulfilled as the Applicant had neither given notice of the accident to the employer nor been paid the s 10 periodical payment.

38.  In employees’ compensation claims, the amount of compensation awarded to an employee is largely based on the assessment conducted by the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board of the Labour Department, whose assessment certificate is binding.  It is only when a party wishes to appeal against the relevant certificate will it then become necessary for the engagement of a medical expert.  Since no such assessment certificate has been issued in this case, Alpha’s complaint of having lost a chance to carry out a medical examination of the Applicant at the earliest opportunity is not valid.

39.  All in all, I am unable to find any merits in this ground of opposition.

G.4    Conclusion

40.  In conclusion, this court is satisfied that the Applicant has shown good reason for the delay, and I consider it just to exercise my discretion in favour of the Applicant in allowing the joinder application by joining Gentoo, Alpha and Chi Shing.

41.  However, Alpha and Chi Shing have advanced a separate and distinct argument by referring to the Applicant’s failure to give a written notice to them in accordance with s 24(6).  It is their contention that the Applicant’s failure will debar the Applicant from making any claim or application against them.

42.  Hence, I need to determine this remaining contention raised by Alpha and Chi Shing before I can order them to be joined.

H.      Section 24(6)

43.  Section 24:  Liability in case of employees employed by sub-contractors:-

“(1) Where any person (in this section referred to as the principal contractor), in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business, contracts with a sub-contractor for the execution by or under the sub-contractor of the whole or any part of any work undertaken by the principal contractor, the principal contractor shall be liable to pay to any employee employed by that sub-contractor or by any other sub-contractor in the execution of the work any compensation under this Ordinance which the principal contractor would have been liable to pay if that employee had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the principal contractor, then, in the application of this Ordinance, references to the principal contractor shall be substituted for references to the employer, except that the amount of any compensation calculated by reference to earnings shall be calculated by reference to the earnings of the employee under the employer by whom he is immediately employed.

(1A) …

(2) Where the principal contractor is liable to pay compensation under this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person who would have been liable to pay compensation to the employee independently of this section.

(3) An employee employed by a sub-contractor may issue a written request to the sub-contractor to supply to the employee the name and address of the principal contractor.

(4) A sub-contractor shall within 7 days after the date of issue of a written request under subsection (3)—

(a) supply to the employee the name and address of the principal contractor; and

(b) deliver a copy of the written request to the principal contractor.

(5) …

(6) An employee shall, before making any claim or application by virtue of this section against a principal contractor, serve on the principal contractor a notice in writing stating—

(a) the name and address of the employee;

(b) the name and address of the sub-contractor by whom he is employed;

(c) the address of the place of employment of the employee;

(d) the particulars of the accident and the injury suffered; and

(e) the amount of compensation to be claimed.

(7) Where a claim or application is made by virtue of this section against a principal contractor, the principal contractor shall give notice thereof to the sub-contractor specified in the notice served on the principal contractor under subsection (6), who shall thereupon be entitled to intervene in any application made against the principal contractor.

(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing an employee recovering compensation under this Ordinance from a subcontractor instead of the principal contractor.”

44.  Pursuant to the definition section under s 3, Alpha and Chi Shing, undisputedly, are respectively principal contractor and sub-contractor.  It is their contention that the s 24(6) notice requirement is mandatory.  In reliance on the two District Court decisions of Mohammad Munir v Yau Kei Tak & Anor[3] and Ng Siu Kwan 訴 吳錦華及其他[4], counsel for Alpha and Chi Shing argued that the Applicant’s undisputed failure to give the s 24(6) notice to either of them renders his intended claim against them unmaintainable, and is fatal to the joinder summons.  The Court of Appeal decision of Wong Leung-tak & Anor v Hip Hing Construction Co Ltd[5] concerning the s 24 procedure was also relied upon by Mr Oh and Mr Suen (see §47 below).

45.  On the other hand, in Yu Wing Sun v Ho Wai Leung t/a Hip Wo Engineering Co & Anor[6] and Wu Suen Pong v Kwok Wing Man t/a Ching Ching Transportation Co[7], the judges in these District Court decisions ruled that the lack of the giving of a notice under s 24(6) was not necessarily fatal to a claim, and an applicant could avail itself of the reasonable excuse exception under s 14(4) (see §49 below) to excuse the non-compliance.

46.  Wong Leung-tak is a leading authority on the procedure governing a s 24(6) notice and the right of a principal contractor to intervene in proceedings.  Counsel for the Applicant, Mr Wong, also accepted that this decision “has never been called into question”.  Mr Wong submitted that Yu Wing Sun and Wu Suen Pong are good law and asked the court to adopt these decisions.

47.  In its comprehensive analysis of the s 24 provisions in Wong Leung-tak, the Court of Appeal stated that the procedure governing the s 24(6) notice and the right of a principal contractor to intervene in proceedings gave an injured employee an additional right to claim compensation under s 24 against the principal contractor, making the employer and the principal contractor severally liable to pay compensation for the same injury.  It also confirmed the principal contractor’s entitlement to an indemnity from the employer under s 24(2)[8]. However, the Court of Appeal has not decided on the question of whether the failure of an employee in giving a s 24(6) notice will make an employee’s claim against a principal contractor unmaintainable.  Hence, it is not helpful to this discussion.

48.  As for the four District Court decisions Mr Oh and Mr Suen cited, they are all decisions of coordinate jurisdiction.  Hence, none of the authorities Alpha and Chi Shing relied on (Mohammad Munir and Ng Siu Kwan) or that Mr Wong submitted as good law (Yu Wing Sun and Wu Suen Pong) binds this court.

49.  For easy understanding, it will be convenient to compare the relevant provisions to another provision also concerning with the giving of notice: the requirement of an employee to give notice to the employer, s 14.

50.  Section 14: Requirements as to notice of accident and application for compensation:-

“(1) Except where otherwise provided by this Ordinance, proceedings for the recovery under this Ordinance of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been given to the employer by or on behalf of the employee, in the manner hereinafter provided, as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and before the employee has voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured, and unless the application for compensation with respect to such accident (being an application to the Court by an employee under section 18A (2)) has been made within 24 months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or, in the case of death, within 24 months from the date of death or prior to a determination made by the Commissioner under section 6B(1)(a), whichever is the earlier:

Provided that the want of, or any defect or irregularity in, a notice shall not be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings—

(a) if the application is made in respect of the death of an employee resulting from an accident which occurred on the premises of the employer, or at any place where the employee at the time of the accident was working under the control of the employer or of any person employed by him, and the employee died on such premises or at such place, or on any premises belonging to the employer, or died without having left the vicinity of the premises or place where the accident occurred; or

(b) if the employer is proved to have had knowledge of the accident from any other source at or about the time of the accident, or if it is found in the proceedings for settling that claim that the employer is not prejudiced or would not, if a notice or an amended notice were then given and the hearing postponed, be prejudiced in his defence by the want, defect or irregularity, or that such want, defect or irregularity was occasioned by mistake, absence from Hong Kong, or other reasonable cause.

(2) A notice under this section may be given either in writing or orally to the employer (or, if there is more than one employer, to one of such employers), or to any foreman or other official under whose supervision the employee is employed, or to any person designated for the purpose by the employer, and shall specify the name and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the date on which and the place at which the accident occurred.

(3) Where section 24 applies, notice of an accident to an employee employed by a sub-contractor given in accordance with this section to the sub-contractor, or to any foreman or other official under whose supervision the employee is employed, or to any person designated for the purpose by the sub-contractor, shall be deemed to be notice to the principal contractor.

(4) The Court may receive and determine any application for compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice required by subsection (1) has not been given, or that the application has not been made in due time as required by that subsection, if it is satisfied that there was reasonable excuse for the failure so to give notice or to make an application, as the case may be.” (underline added).

51.  Pursuant to s 14(1) and s 24(6), an employee is required to give notices respectively to the employer and a principal contractor.  The main difference is that under s 14, a notice to the employer can be given either in writing or orally and is required to be made within 24 months from the date of the accident otherwise the application for compensation shall not be maintainable, and that a failure of the giving of notice can be excused upon showing of reasonable excuse.

52.  Under s 24(6), there is no time limit stipulated for the giving of a notice to the principal contractor so long as it is given in writing and before the making of a claim or application.  More importantly, similar provisions to those in s 14 rendering a claim unmaintainable if the notice requirement is not complied with, and the court’s power to excuse the failure, are not contained in s 24.

53.  Counsel for Alpha and Chi Shing therefore based their arguments on the absence of the court’s power to excuse non-compliance under s 24 in contending that the Applicant’s failure in this case was non-curable.

54.  I cannot accept their arguments.

55.  Before discussing the differences between the two provisions, I think it is important to understand the legislative purpose of the notice requirement under s 24(6).  As discussed in Wong Leung-tak, s 24 is to provide a procedural mechanism to enable a principal contractor, which/who shall be severally liable to pay compensation to the employee, to intervene in proceedings an employee brought against the employer.  Hence, it is important for the principal contractor to have notice of the proceedings under s 24(6) if the former is not a party to the proceedings so that the principal contractor can rely on s 24(7) and r 22(1)[9] of the Employees’ Compensation (Rules of Court) Rules (together with its prescribed Form 10)[10] to apply to intervene.

56.  The situation in this case is entirely different.  The applicant did not have any knowledge of the identities of Alpha and Chi Shing, and he also wishes to join them as parties, along with the employer, Gentoo.  In the circumstances, the notice requirement assumes much less significance for the reason I discussed in the preceding paragraph.

57.  I believe that had the legislature intended to impose the consequence on the failure of the compliance with s 24(6) contended for by both Alpha and Chi Shing, it would have expressly provided for such consequences just like s 14(1).  Absent such express consequence provision, I do not accept the contention by counsel for Alpha and Chi Shing that the Applicant’s failure to comply with s 24(6) will make his claim against them unmaintainable.

58.  It should also be noted that under the deeming provision of s 14(3), a notice (whether written or oral) given “to an employee employed by a sub-contractor” or “to any foreman or other official … shall be deemed to be notice to the principal contractor”.  The Applicant in his affirmation in reply (at §6) stated that when he attended the Chinese New Year dinner hosted by Chi Shing, he had mentioned his accident.  However, he was unable to receive any constructive response.  Mr Kwan of Chi Shing had attended the dinner.  By the deeming provision of s 14(3), the Applicant’s mentioning of the accident could be deemed, arguably, to be notices to Alpha and Chi Shing.

59.  In this case, it is clear from the evidence that the Applicant had no knowledge of the identity of a principal contractor until shortly before the issue of the joinder application, and it would have been impossible for him to comply with s 24(6) to give notice to a principal contractor. Taking a liberal interpretation of the s 24(6) requirement, I accept Mr Wong’s submission that the applicant’s issuance of the joinder application could be regarded as the giving of the notice under s 24(6).

60.  I do not agree with Mr Suen’s supplemental submissions that the Applicant’s failure in giving the s 24(6) notice would cause prejudice to Chi Shing by depriving it of its entitlement to claim indemnity from Gentoo and its insurer.  Under s 24(2), the principal contractor has the statutory right to claim indemnity against “any person who would have been liable to pay compensation to the employee independently of this section”.  Thus, Chi Shing’s right to claim an indemnity is not lost.  As for the alleged loss of rights from its insurer, I do not think I can take that into account as Chi Shing has not substantiated the allegation.

61.  For the reasons stated above, I do not think that the obligation imposed on s 24(6) is engaged in the present situation. However, if I were wrong on this, I’m inclined to the view that s 24(6) should be similarly construed as giving a court a discretion in allowing the application to proceed upon being satisfied of the showing of good reasons, which I find the Applicant has done, and would exercise my discretion in his favour.

I.       Conclusion and order

62.  For the reasons stated above, I allow the joinder application and grant the following orders:-

(1)  Leave to the Applicant to join Alpha, Chi Shing and Gentoo as the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Respondents out of time;

(2)  The Applicant do amend the Application in the form of the draft annexed with the summons within 7 days of this order.  The Amended Application be served on these Respondents within 7 days thereafter;

(3)  The 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Respondents do within 21 days of the handing down of this Decision file and serve their respective answers;

(4)  The 4^th Respondent do within 21 days of the handing down of this Decision file and serve, for the purpose of calculating the monthly earnings of the Applicant under s 11 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282), a List of Earnings of the Applicant for the 12 month-period prior to the accident or such lesser period of the employment with the 4^th Respondent;

(5)  The parties do within 21 days of the handing down of this Decision file their respective mediation certificates;

(6)  The parties do within 35 days of the handing down of this Decision file and serve their respective lists of documents, and there be mutual inspection within 7 days thereafter;

(7)  The parties do within 63 days of the handing down of this Decision file and serve their respective witness statement(s) as to liability and quantum accompanied by a Statement of Truth in accordance with O.41A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H);

(8)  Since the 4^th Respondent is acting in person, I direct a directions hearing be held on 26 March 2021 at 11:30 am at Court No. 26 of the District Court;

(9)  I grant a costs order nisi that the costs of the joinder application be costs in the cause, including costs reserved and with certificate for counsel.  This nisi order stands absolute if no application by summons is made within 14 days of the handing down of this Decision; and

(10)  The Applicant’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

63.  If Mr Yeung requires interpretation of this Decision, he should contact my clerk to arrange interpretation.  Lastly, I wish to thank counsel for their assistance in this application.