NPYJ v. SMRC

FCMC 9098 / 2018

[2020] HKFC 227

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 9098 OF 2018

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JUDGMENT
(To vacate registration of AR Notice at Land Registry)

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The application

1.  The petitioner of this case is the wife. The respondent is the husband.

2.  There is only one issue for determination in this judgment, namely whether a notice of intention to proceed with an application for ancillary relief dated 9 November 2017 (“AR Notice”), commonly known as Form A or Form 25 in the Family Court, registered by the wife against the following properties held in the sole name of the husband should be vacated:

(1)   The [redacted] property (ie the matrimonial home);

(2)   Carpark No 14;

(3)   Carpark No 88.

3.  By the order of HHJ A N Ching Tse (“Judge”) made on 18 May 2020, the parties agreed that the AR Notice registered against Carpark No 88 be lifted on condition(s) as follows:

“Upon the respondent’s undertaking to pay 30% of the sale proceeds of [Carpark No 88] into Court, by consent, the [AR Notice] in relation to [Carpark No 88] is lifted. Sale price of [Carpak No 88] to be agreed between the parties within 14 days, failing which each party is to obtain valuation from one expert within 7 days thereafter. The average price of the 2 experts shall be deemed as the market price.”

4.  As at the day of this Judgment, the court has no information as to the current progress of the sale of Carpark No 88, if any. But due to the order of the Judge, there remains to be determined by me in this judgment only this : whether the AR Notice registered at the land registry against the matrimonial home and Carpark No 14 should be vacated.

5.  However, for avoidance of any doubt that the order of the Judge has not disposed of the application in respect of Carpark No 88, I shall say that the matters considered and the finding made in this judgment shall apply equally to Carpark No 88. 

Housekeeping matters

6.  This application for vacating the AR Notice was made by the husband on 20 September 2019. It has been left undetermined for more than a year because of the closure and/or reduced capacity of the court due to Covid-19.  

7.  I came to have seizure of this case on 29 September 2020. By then, the husband has filed his 27^th affidavit in support of this application,[1] whereas the wife has filed her 16^th affirmation in opposition.[2]

8.  On my own motion and as agreed by the parties, I directed on 29 September 2020 that this application should be dealt with by way of paper disposal. Further, I gave time extension for the husband to file and serve his affirmation in reply by 6 October 2020,[3] and directed that no further affidavit/affirmation shall be filed without leave of the court.  I also gave directions for the parties to file and serve their written submission/submission in reply.

9.  The husband duly filed his affidavit in reply, ie his 67^th affidavit, but he was late by 2 days in filing his written submission.[4] Without further ado, I gave paper direction to extend the time for the parties to file and serve their written submission in reply by 28 October 2020, which they had complied with on time.

10.  However, it came to the attention of the court that the husband, without leave, filed a further affidavit, ie his 68^th affidavit, on 22 October 2020 claiming to support this application, to which I have the following to say.

11.  First, there is no proper summons taken out by the husband to seek leave to file this 68^th affidavit. He purports to seek leave to file it by merely mentioning in paragraph 2 therein that he was seeking such leave. This cannot be regarded as a proper application in any respect. Importantly, indulgence was already given by me for him to file his affidavit in reply (ie his 67^th affidavit) which was extended from the original deadline of 15 June 2020 to 6 October 2020. He failed to explain why further time indulgence should be granted to him to file an additional affidavit out of time.

12.  Second, the husband attempts to argue in this 68^th affidavit that the wife has failed to disclose her financial documents or means, such as her bank statements, or a property in Shatin registered under the name of her mother.  He deposes that the lack of disclosure on the part of the wife is “a highly material and relevant factor” that she should not be allowed to register the AR Notice against his properties.

13.  Clearly, this is a new ground and/or new evidence that the husband seeks to rely on in support of his application, which has not been mentioned or referred to in his 27^th or 67^th affidavits.

14.  It is trite to say that introduction to new evidence has to satisfy all the 3 conditions in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 at 1491 as follows:

(1)   the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below;

(2)   the evidence must be such that, if given, would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(3)   the evidence must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible. 

15.  In my view, the husband has not satisfied the 1^st condition set out in Ladd v Marshall.  According to the correspondences exhibited in his 68^th affidavit, his request for disclosure by the wife of the alleged missing financial information/documents was made between June to December 2018, which means that he could have easily included this alleged non-disclosure in his 27^th or 67^th affidavits, but he has failed to do so. He has not proffered any explanation as to why he could not have so included, either. Further, for reasons which will become obvious in the latter part of this judgment, I am not satisfied that even if the alleged non-disclosure was considered, it would probably have an important influence on the result of this application.

16.  In such circumstances, it is obvious that the 68^th affidavit was filed without leave. But even if a proper application was taken out by the husband to file his 68^th affidavit, I am of the opinion that leave should not be granted. I shall further make an order that this 68^th affidavit should be expunged from court records, with no order as to costs.

A brief background of the case

17.  The parties of this case was married in 2008. They both has a [redacted] background. The wife had a [redacted] degree and the husband used to be a [redacted] practitioner but has been suspended from practice until 2022. They have 2 daughters, born in 2008 and 2011 respectively.

18.  The relationship of the parties started to deteriorate since 2013. It went worse from 2016, with alleged assaults or physical altercation from time to time, and sometimes in front of the daughters.

19.  The wife filed her petition in May 2017 relying on the ground of the behaviour of the husband (under FCMC 6134/2017) which was later amended to a new ground of 1-year separation under this case.

20.  The major area of dispute between the parties since the filing of the petition concerns their daughters. During the course of a 10-day’s custody trial before the Judge in 2019, the parties settled the matter. A consent order was made on 4 July 2019 (“Consent Order”), which provides that the parties have joint custody of the daughters, with care and control rests with the wife and reasonable access to the husband to be reviewed on a progressive manner.

21.  However, the Consent Order is unable to put the acrimonious argument of the parties over their daughters to an end.  The husband complains that he has great difficulty in seeing the daughters due to the alienation of the wife. The wife, on the other hand, retorts that the daughters simply refuse to see their father, because they are not happy with his relationship with his maid, his all-the-time photo-taking behaviour and his past alleged oral or physical abuse/assault on their mother.

22.  It is expected that despite the Consent Order, which was made about 14 months ago, another round of full-blown trial will take place to deal with the husband’s various applications for access, variation of care and control and relocation to the UK.

23.  Needless to say, the parties will still have a long way to reach the stage of the financial dispute resolution, let to mention the final ancillary relief trial.

The parties’ respective case

24.  In support of his application to vacate the AR Notice, the husband says that he is in urgent need for money which can only be raised by further mortgaging the matrimonial home to raise a loan of about $5,000,000; but such is made impossible by the registration of the AR Notice of the wife. He argues that the wife has ample assets of her own without the need to resort to registering the AR Notice against his properties, whereas he has no earning capacity since he has been forbidden to practice for 3 years since 2019 as a result of the disciplinary decision of his professional body.[5] He elaborates that he is in urgent need to raise a loan of $5,000,000 for 7 purposes, which include inter alia the following:

(1) to satisfy the order for maintenance pending suit for the wife and interim maintenance for the daughter, in the total sum of $64,000 per month, made by the Judge on 25 June 2019 (“MPS Order”);

(2) to fund his various litigation, such as his appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in respect of the aforesaid disciplinary decision; the outstanding legal fees to his former matrimonial lawyers and/or his claim for damages caused by the professional negligence of his former matrimonial solicitors and counsel; his various appeal applications in respect of various orders made in the Family Court, including the MPS Order;

(3) to pay his tax liability in the sum of $90,000;

(4) to fund his living expenses.

25.  The wife, on the other hand, objects to this application. She avers that the matrimonial home represents a substantial part of the family assets that she is entitled to preserve by way of registering the AR Notice against it at the land registry. The suggestion of the husband to raise a loan by further mortgaging the matrimonial home with the mortgagee bank will affect its net value. She also says that there are other landed properties owned by the husband in Hong Kong or in London, which are not subject to the AR Notice and thus which he can deal with or even sell them, such as the 11 motorcycle carparks in [redacted]. Some of such landed properties are actually generating rental income for his sole disposal. She is also adamant that the husband has not paid a single penny since the MPS Order was made, and continued to occupy the 1800-sq feet matrimonial home all by himself and enjoy the service of a maid. She asks that the husband’s application be dismissed with costs.

Applicable law

26.  Section 2 of the Land Registration Ordinance (“Ordinance”) provides for registration of instruments, including judgments, affecting land. By virtue of section 14 of the Ordinance, “judgments” shall extend to lis pendens as defined in section 1A of the Ordinance as follows:

(1) Any action or proceeding pending in a court or tribunal that relates to land or any interest in or charge on land;

(2) A bankruptcy petition.

27.  The husband’s application is said to be taken out pursuant to section 19 of the Ordinance, which states:

“19. Power to the court to order vacation of lis pendens

The court or judge before show any property sought to be bound is in litigation, may on determination of the lis pendens, or during the pendency thereof, where the said court or judge is satisfied that the litigation is not prosecuted bona fide, or for other good cause shown, make an order for vacating of the registration in the Land Registry of such lis pendens without the consent of the party who registered it, and may direct the party on whose behalf the registration was made to pay all the costs and expenses occasioned by the registration or the vacating thereof, including the costs if the application to vacate, or may make such others order as to such costs or any of them as to the said court or judge may seem just.” (the underlined is my emphasis)

28.  There is no dispute that the AR Notice of the wife is a lis pendens capable of being registered at the land registry. The wording of aforesaid section 19 shows that the court has the power to vacate the lis pendens in either of the following 2 situations:

(1) the litigation is not prosecuted bona fide; or

(2) There is other good cause shown.

29.  It is indisputable that the husband, but not the wife, bears the burden of proof in this application.

Bona fide prosecution

30.  There is no express allegation in the husband’s 27^th or 67^th affidavit suggesting that the wife has not prosecuted this case bona fide.

31.  However, the court observes that since the petition (under FCMC 6134/2017) was filed in May 2017, the matrimonial proceedings herein have been in action for about 3.5 years. Yet, little if any progress has been made on the ancillary relief front. As said above, their ancillary relief matters will still have a long way to reach the stage of financial dispute resolution (FDR) or the final ancillary relief trial.

32.  The last Form E of the parties were filed in January 2018. Despite previous order made by the Judge for the parties to file and serve their updated Form E within 28 days from 18 May 2020 (ie by 15 June 2020), neither party has complied with this direction. Time has now been extended by me for them to file their updated Form E by 4 November 2020.  Further, the parties have literally not started the discovery process in accordance with PD 15.11, in particularly paragraph 4 therein. It does not occur to me that they have attempted to agree on the valuation of various properties, whether owned solely or jointly by them.  

33.  In my view, the major reason for the slow progress on the ancillary relief matters is partly due to the fact that enormous court time was spent to deal with the various summonses taken out by the husband since the Consent Order, complicated by the fact that despite the great wealth of the parties, they have chosen to act in person.

34.  Since the Consent Order made in July 2019 up to the date of this judgment, the husband has filed a total of 30 summonses and roughly 44 affidavits of his own before the Family Court (which do not include those affidavits/affirmations of various witnesses, such as his parents, filed by the husband from time to time).  Carving out the period of time when the Registry of the Family Court was closed and/or operated under reduced capacity between the end of January to early May 2020 (ie for about 4 months) due to Covid-19, the husband literally took out about 2 to 3 summonses each month on average.   

35.  Further, the court observes that in some of these applications, the husband has taken an insistent but unreasonable stance. As a result, unnecessary time was spent in court to deal with such applications, leading to the undesirable result that court’s time was not able to be utilised in the most satisfactory way. For example, in the hearing of 29 September 2020, I was to deal with altogether 6 summonses of the husband, one of which was meant to be a substantive argument for expert directions. One of the summonses was his application for recusal of Deputy Judge Josephine Chow, who by then has already been deployed out of the Family Court. I thus enquired if the husband would still wish to proceed with his application. He nevertheless submitted that he would withdraw his application but only on the mutual understanding between the bench and him that the Deputy Judge would not handle this case anymore. I refused to accede to this request, as I told him that he could not impose conditions on the court. Although he finally decided to withdraw his application for recusal, court’s time was unnecessary wasted on that occasion.

36.  Due to the matters aforesaid, I conclude that the AR Notice will not be vacated on the ground of lack of bona fide prosecution. If there was any allegation of delay in prosecuting the ancillary relief matters caused solely by the wife, I shall bluntly reject this argument.  

Other good cause shown

37.  In a nutshell, the reasons put forward by the husband to vacate the AR Notice boil down to 2 major points:

(1) He has no earning capacity but a lot of expenses including legal costs to meet, such that he needs to raise a loan in the sum of $5,000,000 by way of further mortgage with the mortgagee bank;

(2) The wife has more assets and money than him.

38.  I should start by looking into the Form Es filed by the respective parties in January 2018. The court is yet to receive their updated Form E.

39.  According to his Form E, the husband is the sole registered owner of the matrimonial home, Carparks Nos 14 and 88 and 11 motorcycle carparks in [redacted]. He estimates that the matrimonial home was then worth $40,000,000, Carpark Nos 14 and 88 were worth $1,750,000 each, and the 11 motorcycle carparks were worth $880,000 in total. In the same Form E, he reveals that the matrimonial home is mortgaged to Hang Seng Bank with outstanding mortgage then standing at about $16,241,909.

40.  The wife, however, avers in her 16^th affirmation that the husband has underestimated the value of the matrimonial home and various carparks.[6] She relies and exhibits the online valuation of Hang Seng Bank of the matrimonial home (at $48,600,000 as at 10 October 2019) and some transaction records of carparks and/or motorcycle carparks in [redacted] in July 2019, in order to show that Carpark Nos 14 and 88 should each worth $3,350,000 and that the 11 motorcycle carparks should each worth $200,000.  

41.  In my view, the wife’s estimation to the matrimonial home and various carparks is supported by documentary evidence. More importantly, it is noted that the husband has not expressly objected to the aforesaid estimation in his 67^th affidavit in reply to the wife’s 16^th affirmation. Hence, I shall adopt the wife’s aforesaid figures for the purpose of this application, with the caveat that the updated value of these properties will have to be obtained in due course for the purpose of the FDR or final ancillary relief trial.

42.  I thus set out below the parties’ respective assets as reflected in their Form Es filed in January 2018, and where there is dispute on the value of properties, I shall adopt the husband’s figures for the purpose of this application but subject always to the comment stated in aforesaid §41.  Further, only the estimated net value of the properties will be listed. 

Items	Husband (HKD)	Wife (HKD)
Banks	510,823	161,231.76
Stocks	2,000 (estimated only)	23,284,424.90
Insurance	N/A	618,593.08
Car	N/A	50,000
Jewellery/antique/paintings/ porcelain etc	167,580	100,000
MPF	(no figure provided)	1,368,583.74
Legal costs owed by Director of Legal Aid (to be taxed)	3,336,808	N/A
Debenture of school	1,250,000	N/A
Sub-total:	5,267,211	25,582,833.48
Properties
Matrimonial home (net of mortgage)	32,358,091	N/A
Carpark No 14	3,350,000	N/A
Carpark No 88	3,350,000	N/A
11 motorcycle carparks	2,200,000	N/A
[redacted] Centre (registered owner: AA Ltd with wife as sole shareholder)	N/A	3,139,672
[redacted] Court West, London	10,860,000	N/A
[redacted] Mews, London (registered owner: PC Investments Ltd with both parties as joint shareholders) (net of mortgage)	12,262,748.50	12,262,748.50
Sub-total:	64,380,839.50	15,402,420.50
GRAND TOTAL (1):	69,648,050.50	40,985,253.98
LESS
Liabilities	3,363,601	2,289,419
GRAND TOTAL (2):	66,284,449.50	38,695,834.98

43.  It can be seen from the above table that roughly the parties have total nets assets of over $104,980,000, of which the husband is holding about 63% (with the value of his MPF yet to be provided).  All the landed properties in the family pot, save and except [redacted] Centre in Hong Kong and [redacted] Mews in London, are registered under his sole name and thus under his control. The matrimonial home and 2 Carparks, worth of slightly over $39,000,000, already account for about 37% of the family pot.

44.  Pausing here, it is imperative for me to point out at this stage that the wife has not registered an AR Notice against all of the properties solely owned by the husband. She has registered an AR Notice against the matrimonial home and Carparks Nos 14 and 88 only, and it is these properties that she says in the AR Notice that she would seek a property settlement or transfer order for herself and on behalf of the children of the family. This would mean that if the husband so desires and upon notice and/or consent of the wife, he is free to raise a loan with his other solely-owned properties.

45.  On the other hand, although the husband is currently forbidden to practice due to the disciplinary decision of his professional body, it remains true, because it is reflected in his own Form E filed in January 2018, that he is receiving about $153,979 per month from renting out of the [redacted]  Court West and [redacted] Mews in London, as well as the said 2 Carparks and some of the motorcycle carparks. There is also unsettled legal costs owed by the Director of Legal Aid to him in the sum of $3,336,808 (subject to taxation). The husband is silent in his 27^th or 67^th affidavits as to whether he has received any of these unsettled legal costs from the Director of Legal Aid during this intervening period.

46.  Viewing the above points in entirety, I am not persuaded that the husband does not have the financial ability and means to meet his expenses. The allegation that he has to pay for the monthly mortgage repayments of the matrimonial home, the 2 London properties and [redacted] Building in the sum of $232,827 per month is also considered but fails to lead me to a contrary conclusion.

47.  Even more, his allegation that he needs to raise a loan of $5,000,000 to satisfy, inter alia, the MPS Order and outstanding legal costs to his former matrimonial solicitors does not sit too well with the fact that he has sought an appeal against as well as a variation of the MPS Order, and that he has chosen to defend the claim for outstanding legal fees of his former matrimonial solicitors and to counterclaim them, as well as the counsel representing him, for professional negligence.

48.  As a matter of fact, in a letter from his then solicitors, Messrs Oldham, Li & Nie dated 19 July 2019 to the wife, the husband offered that the intended loan of $5,000,000 would be apportioned, namely $2,600,000 to satisfy the outstanding legal fees owed to Messrs Oldham, Li & Lie by the husband in the custody trial before the Judge in July 2019; and the remaining would be held by Messrs Oldham, Li & Nie for payment to the wife of outstanding and/or future sums under the MPS Order. A few points can be made out of this offer and they are these.  

49.  Firstly, this suggested purpose of the intended loan is to encumber the matrimonial home, which the wife is literally 50% beneficial owner of it and which she has said in the AR Notice that she would like to have a property settlement/transfer order relating to it but yet to be decided in the final ancillary relief trial. I agree that the wife is entitled to preserve the status quo of the matrimonial home, including not to create further encumbrances to it, pending the final ancillary relief trial.  Secondly, the crux of the husband’s case is that he does not have the money to pay his legal fees and expenses. The rhetorical question to ask is this: if he really lacks any financial ability and/or means, how can he repay the monthly mortgage repayment of the intended additional loan of $5,000,000? Is it intended that the loan which would create a further encumbrance with the matrimonial home, be shared out or even shouldered by the wife? The husband is totally silent on this point in his 27^th and 67^th affidavits. Thirdly, by a summons filed on 26 February 2018 (under FCMC 6134/2017), the husband sought an order for legal costs provisions from the wife, which was dismissed by the Judge in her judgment of 25 June 2019. By suggesting in disguise to raise a loan of $5,000,000 upon vacating the AR Notice registered against the matrimonial home and to apportion $2,600,000 to pay his outstanding legal fees, the husband would be effectually obtaining legal costs provisions to fund his own litigation, albeit that his application for legal costs provisions was dismissed by the Judge.    

50.  As to the wealth of the wife, the husband deposes in his 27^th affidavit that she has assets worth $65,622,943. While I notice that this is the figure provided by the wife herself in her Form E,[7] it is pertinent to say that she has actually included her beneficial shareholding of the properties registered in the sole name of the husband as her own assets.  As set out in the table at §42, the total estimated value of assets under her name as at her Form E, whether solely owned by her or jointly with the husband, is of $38,695,834.98 only. It is thus erroneous to say that she has more assets than the husband.

Other consideration

51.  There are other factors for consideration in order to arrive at the conclusion given in this judgment and they are these.

52.  It is imperative to point out that the right of a spouse to register a notice of application for ancillary relief, commonly known as Form A or Form 25 in the Family Court, is well recognized by our case law. The need to preserve the status quo of the matrimonial home, which has a central place in a marriage, should not be underestimated. 

53.  In Sun Ngai International Investment Limited v Zhang Su Hua [2009] 1 HKLRD 48, Deputy High Court Judge Carlson, in ruling that the Form A/Form 25 prepared by the wife there was a lis registrable at the land registry, allowed her application to register her Form A/Form 25 against various properties held by the companies of the husband.

54.  In the most recent case of WHWV v WECH, CAMP 28/2020 & CACV 547/2020, date of judgement 23 October 2020, the wife there sought to vacate the lis pendens registered against the matrimonial home (held in her sole name) by the husband at the land registry, the deputy judge of the Family Court allowed the wife’s application. The husband there sought an appeal which was allowed by the Court of Appeal. In giving the judgment for the Court, Yuen JA noted at §11 of her judgment that such a registration is advised in Family Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 3^rd edition at §7.143:

“Particular care should be taken when the matrimonial home is held solely by one party ... It may be advisable in this case to register a caution at the Land Registry to ensure that the matrimonial home is not sold against the wishes of one of the parties.”

55.  Her Ladyship then went on to propound that the matrimonial home has a central place in any marriage:

“ 30. What is important however, particularly in the present case, is that the matrimonial home has a special position. Thus, exclusion from matrimonial assets is ‘not generally applicable to the matrimonial home ...’. Ribeiro PJ quoted Lord Nicholls’ judgment in Miller v Miller and McFarlane v McFarlane that:

‘The parties’ matrimonial home, even if this was brought into the marriage at the outset by one of the parties, usually has a central place in any marriage.  So it should normally be treated as matrimonial property for this purpose ... in principle the entitlement of each party to a share of the matrimonial home is the same however long or short the marriage may have been.’ ”

56.  I am thus convicted to say that the wife in our case is entitled to preserve not only the matrimonial home but also its status quo including any current encumbrances, pending the final ancillary relief trial.

57.  The husband deposes in his 27^th affidavit at that,

“there are recent decisions of the Family Court making it clear that the filing of Form As at the Land Registry is simply a caution and not an injunction or charge against properties and it should be removed when a property has to be sold or refinanced in order to pay debts, including those which involve legal and living costs.”

58.  However, he has not provided the citation or case number(s) of the said decisions of the Family Court in his affidavit(s) or written submission. But even if the same is provided, it is trite to say that such decisions have no binding effect on me.

59.  But merely for discussion purpose, the court is aware of the case of IDC v SSA, FCMP 158/2011, date of decision 11 May 2018. There, the applicant mother caused her variation summons (to vary upward the periodical payment made by the respondent father for the benefit of their child) to be registered against 6 units all located at the Hong Kong Convention Plaza and legally owned by companies in respect of which the respondent father has beneficial interest. HHJ Own allowed the application of the respondent father to vacate the applicant mother’s registration in 2 of the 6 units so that the sale of these 2 units could go ahead as scheduled.

60.  All I need to say is that the case before HHJ Own is totally distinguishable from the case before this court. There, HHJ Own is to deal with a variation application pursuant to Guardianship of Minor Ordinance, Cap 13, but here in our case, the court is dealing with the matrimonial assets, in particularly the matrimonial home which is confirmed by our Court of Appeal in WHWV v WECH (supra) to have a central place in the marriage, let alone to mention that the matrimonial assets in our case are still pending final determination of the court at the ancillary relief trial for distribution and sharing.

Conclusion

61.  Due to the matters set out above, I reject all the arguments of the husband in this application and conclude that his summons should be dismissed. As I see no reason why costs should follow the event, I will thus make an order as follows:

(1)    The husband’s 68^th affidavit be expunged from court records, as it was filed without leave, with no order as to costs;

(2)    The husband’s summons filed on 20 September 2019 is dismissed;

(3)    There be a costs order nisi that the husband do bear the wife’s costs of and occasioned by this application, to be taxed if not agreed, which shall be made absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment;

(4)    The husband do draw up this Order for approval forthwith.

[1] The 27^th affidavit of the husband was filed on 20/9/2019.

[2] The 16^th affirmation of the wife was filed on 14/10/2019.

[3] By the Order of HHJ A N Tse Ching made on 18/5/2020 (amended on 24/6/2020), the husband was to file and serve his affidavit in reply by 15/6/2020.

[4] The written submission should have been filed and served by 20/10/2020. The wife filed hers on 19/10/2020, but the husband filed his only on 22/10/2020.

[5] By the decision of the disciplinary board of the husband’s professional body made on [redacted], he was suspended for practice for 3 years.

[6] See §10 of wife’s 16^th affirmation.

[7] See page 17 of the wife’s Form E.