JATINDER SINGH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 883/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3316

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 883 OF 2025

____________

BETWEEN

____________

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 24 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 2 December 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8 January 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 2 December 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 December 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In both the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 24 February 2026, the applicant gave the reason for his delay in lodging the appeal by saying that he had not received the decision letter until then, and he gave the ground for the intended appeal by saying that I disregarded his dangerous situation.

8.  However, at the hearing of the Summons on 28 May 2026, the applicant confirmed that he did not receive my decision at all, but just a letter from this court informing him that the decision would be ready for handing down within one month. He found this letter not in his own letter box but another letter box on 23 February 2026. He then sought advice from a lawyer who advised him to lodge an appeal.

9.  When I asked the applicant for his grounds of appeal, he simply said that he had a wife and children here and he wanted to live here, which are not grounds for the intended appeal at all.

10.  The explanation given by the applicant for his delay in lodging the appeal is clearly unsatisfactory. In both the Summons and his supporting affirmation, the applicant could state the date of my decision correctly and alleged that I disregarded his dangerous situation. If he did not receive my decision, he could not have given the date of my decision and make the allegation as aforesaid. Thus, I do not accept his explanation for the delay.

11.  There is also no valid ground for his intended appeal. It was not for me to assess his dangerous situation. The applicant’s application was for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Director’s decision in rejecting his subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. The Director had considered the applicant’s previous claim and the two new matters raised in the subsequent claim and had fully complied with section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, in determining that the applicant could not make a subsequent claim. There was simply no valid ground to challenge the Director’s decision.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.