JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE v. ELECTORAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION AND OTHERS

CACV 489/2019

[2019] HKCA 1197

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 489 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 3042/2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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The Court:

A.  Introduction

1.  On 16 October 2019, Chow J (“the Judge”) heard the applicant’s urgent application for interim relief pending the rolled‑up hearing of its judicial review, restraining the putative respondents from making available to the public or the candidates for the coming District Council Election to be held on 24 November 2019 (“DC Election”), certain personal information relating to registered electors contained in the Final Register,[1] in particular the names of the registered electors linked to their principal residential addresses (“the Linked Information”).  After hearing senior counsel, the Judge dismissed the application but in anticipation of the applicant’s appeal against his decision, gave the applicant leave to appeal and granted limited interim injunctive relief up to 18 October 2019 4:30 pm.

2.  On 18 October 2019, the applicant filed a notice of appeal.  Given the urgency, we fixed it for hearing on 21 October 2019 and extended the limited injunctions granted by the Judge until disposal of the appeal.

3.  In the interest of time, we do not intend to give a very detailed judgment covering all the points raised by counsel.  We believe what we are going to say will be sufficient for present purposes.  We must stress at the outset that we are concerned with an application for interim relief which, even if granted, will only have a very limited duration pending the resolution of the judicial review.  It is also important to note that the interim relief sought is not a blanket prohibition against disclosure of the names of the registered electors and their principal residential addresses as contained in the Final Register[2] as such.  It only seeks to prohibit disclosure in such a form which allows them to be linked together.  And if whatever we are going to say touches upon the merits, it is no more than a provisional view expressed as the matter now stands.  It is neither definitive nor binding on the Judge.

B.  Background

4.  Very briefly, amidst recent public unrests involving increasing violence since June 2019 with the alarming tendency of engulfing a great part of Hong Kong, tensions have continued to run hot and high between large numbers of the public and the police.  More than 2,000 police officers and their families including young children in many cases have been subject to doxxing, that is, extensive leaking of personal information and cyber-bullying on the Internet and various social and other media.  There is a widespread insecurity and fear among many members of the police force for their and their family’s safety, especially young children.  They are also very concerned about the ongoing unlawful infringement of their and their family’s right to privacy and the privacy of their home by such doxxing practices.

5.  As required by the relevant provisions in the Electoral Affairs Commission (Registration of Electors) (Legislative Council Geographical Constituencies) (District Council Constituencies) Regulation, Cap 541A, a Final Register of electors has been prepared by the Electoral Registration Officer (“ERO”) for the DC Election.  It contains the Linked Information of all the registered electors.  It is divided into separate sections according to each Legislative Council constituency, which is further divided into separate subsections for each District Council constituency. The ERO published the Final Register on 25 September 2019.

6.  The information contained in the Final Register may be made available to the public through public inspection under section 20(3) and (4) of Cap 541A or supply of an extract by application under section 21(1) of Cap 541A.  The Chief Electoral Officer (“CEO”) must also supply a copy of the extract of the Final Register to each candidate for the DC Election (“Candidate”) which relates to the constituency for which the Candidate is nominated under section 38(1) of the Electoral Affairs Commission (Electoral Procedure) (District Councils) Regulation, Cap 541F.  The relevant extract must be supplied to a Candidate as soon as practicable after the relevant nomination form is submitted to the returning officer under section 38(2) of Cap 541F.

7.  According to the putative respondents, as at 16 October 2019, copy of the entire Final Register has already been supplied to 6 major political parties and 26 individuals[3] in Hong Kong pursuant to section 21(1) of Cap 541A. More than 30 public inspections of the Final Register have also taken place pursuant to section 20(3) and (4) of Cap 541A.  But for the interim injunctive relief extended by us, the intention of the electoral authority is to distribute the relevant extracts of the Final Register to the Candidates before the briefing to be held on 24 October 2019.

C.  Judicial review

8.  The applicant represents the interests of over 25,000 members, which is about 85% of the entire police force.  It consists of four different ranks of police officers, namely, police constables, senior police constables, sergeants and station sergeants.

9.  To arrest the ongoing, large scale doxxing targeted against many police officers, the applicant seeks to challenge, by way of judicial review, the publication of the entirety of the Final Register by the Electoral Affairs Commission (“EAC”); the decisions by the ERO to make available for public inspection of the Final Register under section 20(4) of Cap 541A and to supply copy of extracts of the Final Register under section 21(1) of Cap 541A; and the decision by the CEO to supply extracts of the Final Register to the Candidates.  The applicant complains that the enabling provisions and the putative respondents’ act of disclosure of the Linked Information pursuant to those provisions constitute an infringement of the registered electors’ right to privacy guaranteed by article 14 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR 14”).  The grievance underlying the applicant’s complaint is that by allowing access by the public and Candidates to the Final Register which reveals the Linked Information relating to police officers and their family members who are electors in the DC Election, there is a real and substantial risk that the police officers and their families concerned will be subject to the ongoing doxxing practices, if not already the case, facilitated and intensified by the easy and ready access to their Linked Information contained in the Register.

10.  In the Form 86, the applicant asks for, among other things :

“(4)  An injunction restraining [the respondents] from publishing or making available for public inspection any published register of electors for the forthcoming DC Election, including the Final Register, or from making available to members of the public or to the Candidates extracts of any Register, including the Final Register, such that members of the public or [the Candidates] are able to associate the electors’ names with their respective principal residential addresses.  (“Para 4”)

(5)  An injunction restraining [the respondents] from making any communication with, or supplying any information to, members of the public or the Candidates, such that they or any of them are able to associate the electors’ names with their respective principal residential addresses.  (“Para 5”)

(6)  An order of mandamus requiring the ERO and the CEO to recall and retrieve copies of the Final Register or any part thereof supplied to Candidates and/or any other persons (if any) within 48 hours from the time of service of the order on the ERO and CEO respectively.  (“Para 6”)”

D.  The Judge’s reasoning

11.  On 16 October 2019, the applicant moved for an urgent application before the Judge for interim relief in terms of Paras 4 to 6 pending the substantive hearing of the judicial review.  As said, the Judge dismissed the application but granted leave to appeal and an interim injunction in terms of Para 4 and Para 5 only up to 18 October 2019 4:30 pm pending appeal.

12.  The Judge first observed that the doxxing targeted against police officers and their families is well borne out on the evidence.[4] He considered that there is some prima facie validity to the applicant’s complaint, subject to the issue of justification.[5]  He acknowledged the genuine concern of the applicant that the disclosure of the Linked Information would have great and substantial adverse impact on its members and families and he could see the urgency of the application.[6]  He took the view that the question of whether relief ought to be granted boiled down to the issue of balance of convenience.[7]  He was however not satisfied on a balance of convenience that it would be right to grant interim relief.  He reasoned :

“7. The real difficulty to the application, as I see it, is the fact … that the entire register has already been given to 6 major political parties and 26 individuals in Hong Kong pursuant to section 21(1) of [Cap 541A]. For other political parties to be denied the same information may well result in unfairness to the forthcoming election as a whole. Furthermore, I am told that more than 30 public inspections of the Final Register have taken place pursuant to section20(3) and (4) of [Cap 541A]. The position therefore is that there has already been a degree of public dissemination of the registered electors’ information. In view of the speed with which information can now be transmitted and the extent of transmission which can occur within a short period of time, it is questionable whether the interim injunction sought would serve any real or practical purpose. Furthermore, it appears that the practice of ‘doxxing’ against police officers has been ongoing, and it is by no means clear how the additional or further information contained in the Final Register will make any significant difference.”

13.  In brief, in balancing the convenience against the applicant, the Judge was concerned about the fairness of the DC Election and he queried the utility of the interim relief in light of some public dissemination of the registered electors’ Linked Information having already taken place and the ongoing doxxing targeted against police officers.

E.  Our views

14.  The principles for dealing with interim relief in public laws cases have been well summarized by the Judge in his recent judgment in Re Leung Chung Hang Sixtus & Another [2018] 5 HKC 138, at [12] – [14].  We would respectfully adopt them.

15.  Like the Judge, we consider in the present case it is ultimately the balance of convenience or the balance of justice (as submitted by Mr Chan SC[8] to be a better expression of the test in a judicial review context) that determines the applicant’s application for interim relief.  On the basis of the arguments advanced before us, we are of the view that there is indeed a sufficiently cogent case for challenging the provisions in sections 20 and 21 of Cap 541A for the inspection of the Final Register and supply of extract in terms of their potential infringements on BOR 14.  Taking into account of the potential serious ramifications for the victims of doxxing, we agree that we should consider the grant of interim relief even though we (as the Judge did[9]) only come to a provisional view of some prima facie validity to the challenge.  Given the nature of that challenge, Mr Leung SC[10]’s argument that all electors are taken to have impliedly consented to the release of their personal particulars in the way authorized under sections 20 and 21 cannot forestall the application in limine as those very sections are being subject to constitutional challenge.

16.  In considering the question of balance, there are, in our view, two primary aspects.

E1.    Privacy interest against doxxing

17.  The first aspect is the interest of a great majority of the police force (about 85%) advocated by the applicant on their behalf against being victimized by the ongoing, large scale and malicious doxxing practices.

18.  The evidence before the courts shows that the doxxing targeted against the police officers and their families is appalling, to say the least.  Their personal information is posted and widely spread indiscriminately across various social media platforms on the Internet, carrying with them abusive, vulgar or foul languages and remarks, harassment and intimidation, and serious threats of personal safety and even death, some of which were directed against young children.  Doxxing on such scale and the subsequent misuses of personal information in the way as depicted in the evidence before us is one of the worst and reprehensible forms of intrusion of the privacy of the individuals concerned.

19.  Doxxing should not and cannot be tolerated in Hong Kong if we still take pride in our city as a civilized society where the rule of law reigns.  Unfortunately, in the current turmoil, there are people in Hong Kong too readily resorting to these hideous practices as weapon to cause harms to individuals and target groups.  The damage of widespread doxxing goes well beyond the victims.  It seriously endangers our society as a whole.  For it will instil chilling effect on our society when many individuals or targeted groups or sectors of the public are intimidated into silence or suppressed to express their opinion openly and honestly or conduct their affairs or pursue their life in the way they wanted for fear of being victimized by doxxing.  If doxxing practices are not curtailed, the fire of distrust, fear and hatred ignited by them will soon consume the public confidence in the law and order of the community, leading to disintegration of our society.

20.  The court takes a very serious view on doxxing.  In fact, the present case is not the first application for interim injunctive relief in the midst of the recent turmoil in Hong Kong to seek protection against doxxing practices.  Quite recently, the court had granted an interim injunction on the application of a newspaper and a group of reporters against doxxing.[11] The victims, whoever they are, especially minors, are entitled to full protection of the law and the courts against doxxing, even at the interim stage of the proceedings, if justified in the overall circumstances of the case.

21.  Here, we respectfully differ from the Judge on his approach to the question of utility of interim relief.

22.  The Judge queried the utility of interim relief because public dissemination of the Linked Information had possibly taken place already and doxxing against police officers is still going on.  While that approach may be correct in cases involving previously confidential information where it is now in the public domain, it does not necessarily apply in cases for personal information where the right to privacy under BOR 14 is engaged.

23.  In Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential Information, 2^nd Edition, the learned editors, after referring to the court’s general approach in refusing interim injunction when the confidential information concerned is now in the public domain, continued to say :[12]

“18.09 This strict approach to the public domain does not to (sic) apply in relation to personal information. This was first suggested by Lord Keith in Attorney General v Guardian (No 2) and, by analogy, it has been accepted at the highest level when in Douglas v Hello! the House of Lords protected the Douglases’ photographs notwithstanding they were about to put very similar photographs into the public domain. Accordingly, the mere fact that private information is known and is thus ‘public’ within a limited circle of people does not mean that it is no longer possible to prevent publication to the world at large.

18.10   The court will still refuse a grant an injunction where it is futile to protect the personal information.  The question is whether the information is so widely known (and publicly discussed) that no useful purpose can be served by the court granting an injunction.  The rationale for granting an injunction to prevent publication of information which is no longer secret or unknown is that the repetition of the information may offend Article 8.[13]  That right protects intrusions into a person’s private and family life, and this right can be interfered with despite the fact that the information is strictly speaking in the public domain.  Such an injunction is therefore not to protect the secrecy of the information, but to prevent harassment and unjustified intrusion into a person’s family life.  Indeed, an injunction may be granted in these circumstances even where the information has become widely known on the Internet…”

24.  With respect, the Judge erred by adopting the strict approach to confidential information without sufficient regard to the protection of privacy interest under BOR 14 when he queried the utility of interim relief.  And for that reason, we are entitled to interfere.

25.  Turning to the evidence, we note that despite the supply of the copy of the Final Register to the 6 major political parties and 26 individuals under section 21(1) of Cap 541A and 30 plus public inspections under section20(3) and (4) of Cap 541A, and hence a certain degree of public dissemination of the registered electors’ Linked Information contained in the Final Register is possible, there is no evidence to suggest that there is any misuse or abuse of the Linked Information of the police officers contained in the Final Register in connection with or resulting in doxxing.  And there is no evidence to link any instances of the current doxxing to the misuse of the police officers’ Linked Information contained in the Final Register either.  That is perhaps explicable by the statutory provisions which mandate that the information supplied can only be used for election-related purposes and that any abuse or misuse of such information is a criminal offence punishable by a fine at level 2 (HK$5,000) and 6 months’ imprisonment (sections 21(3) and 22(3) of Cap 541A).

26.  So as the matter now stands, the limited dissemination of the registered electors’ Linked Information contained in the Final Register by the putative respondents’ acts of disclosure so far may not have given rise to the misuse of such information for doxxing purposes.

27.  But the release of the Final Register to the general public is very different.  A significant feature of the form of doxxing we are concerned with is that the person who wrongfully put the personal data of the target person onto a social media forum may not be the person who subsequently used the data for intimidation or other unlawful or even violent purposes.  Thus, the person who initially misused the information (be it by way of extracting the same from some social media platforms or some other data bases where public can have access) may not appreciate the full range of reprehensible attacks that the target person may be subject to.  In light of the present situation in Hong Kong where not an insignificant number of the public appear to have subscribed to the use of doxxing as a weapon against others, including police officers, the availability of the Final Register to the general public does significantly increase the risk of misuse of the Linked Information for doxxing purposes.  Further, given the difficulty in monitoring dissemination of information on the Internet, once the Linked Information is available generally to the public, the risk of misuse is obviously much higher than the risk pertaining to the limited disclosure so far.

28.  In this connection, though the provisional register had been open to public inspection,[14] the overall circumstances in Hong Kong were rather different at that time and the risk of the Linked Information being used for malicious doxxing purposes was not as high as today.

29.  Mr Leung submits that there are penal sanctions against the misuse of the information contained in the Final Register for doxxing : section 22(3) of Cap  541A and section 64 of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Cap 64.  However, doxxers, by definition, do not respect or abide by the law.  They will not be deterred by the penal sanctions as they stand.  In any event, post-doxxing remedy even in the form of penal sanction, when damage and sometimes irreparable harm has already been caused to the victims, is less preferable and effective than interim injunctive relief, a preventive measure to avoid damage and harm from being occasioned to them in the first place. 

30.  Even if there are instances of current doxxing where the perpetuators had been able to target the police officers concerned by using their Linked Information contained in the Final Register, it only strongly suggests that if unchecked, doxxing against more police officers by misusing their linked information contained in the Final Register would soon become even more prevalent.

31.  To sum up, the more of such disclosure to the public by public inspections or supply of extracts upon application, the wider the dissemination of the registered electors’ linked information in the Final Register in the public domain generally and hence the greater the risk of misuse of such information.  It is not a fanciful risk.  For the applicant’s evidence shows that the doxxing attempts so far had on numerous occasions failed to identify the subject police officers’ exact residential addresses. The availability of the Final Register will conveniently and easily, using the applicant’s words, fill the gap.  Contrary to the Judge’s reservation, the linked information contained in the Final Register would greatly facilitate and intensify doxxing against specific police officers and their families with precision.  A person may readily link up electors with the same address and rightly or wrongly treat those electors as the family members of each other.  If one of them is identified as a police officer, those registered under the same address could easily fall prey to the malicious doxxing and resultant unlawful harassment and threats.

32.  The above considerations weigh strongly in favour of granting interim injunctive relief against disclosing the Linked Information of registered electors contained in the Final Register to the general public in the current form.

E2.    Public interest in upholding the integrity of the DC Election

33.  The second primary aspect that we need consider in the balance of justice is the wider public interest involved in safeguarding the integrity of the coming DC Election.  In Hong Kong, we strive to conduct all elections openly, fairly and honestly.  We recognize the immense importance for securing the integrity and regularity of the DC Election.  The court should be very cautious to guard against the grant of an interim injunction that would give rise to a material ground for questioning or challenging the outcome in the DC Election.

34.  Now is not the occasion to go into great detail the election process and the legal requirements to ensure an election is conduced fairly, openly and honestly.  The present application focuses on the registered electors’ Linked Information contained in the Final Register and how limiting access would impact on the integrity of the DC Election.

35.  For present purposes, we note the following features.

(1)  Only registered electors whose names appear on the final register of electors may vote at an election.

(2)  The REO will assign a District Council constituency to each elector according to the residential address provided by him/her. And the elector must vote in the constituency according to his registered residential address.

(3)  Registered electors may visit the Online Voter Information Enquiry System (www.voterfinfo.giv.hk) at any time to check their registration particulars.

(4)  The final register is valid for one year and is updated on an annual basis.  In updating the final register, the REO will publish (a) a provisional register, containing the names and principal addresses of those electors whose names appear in the existing final register, updated or corrected by the ERO based on reported or available information; and the names and principal residential addresses of the eligible new applicants who have applied for registration in the constituency concerned on or before 2 July in a DC election year; and (b) an omissions list containing names of electors who have been suspected to have moved residence without notifying the REO of their new current principal residential address and have failed to respond to the REO’s statutory inquiry.  The provisional register and omissions list will be published for public inspection from 1 to 25 August in a DC election year.

(5)  Members of the public may lodge in person with the ERO a notice of objection on the specified from as regards any entry in the relevant provisional register not later than 25 August in a DC election year.  Such objection will be deal with according to the statutory procedures.

(6)  A final register will then be published not later than 25 September in a DC election year.  The final register shall remain valid until the publication of the next final register in the following year.

(7)  The final register in force is available for public inspection at the REO.

36.  The supply of his residential addresses by an elector serves two purposes.

37.  First, it helps to verify his eligibility.  As one of the eligibility requirements, the elector must ordinarily reside in Hong Kong and the residential address in his application for registration is his only or principal residence in Hong Kong.

38.  Second, his principal residential address determines the DC constituency in which he is allowed to vote.  He cannot vote in a DC constituency which is not assigned in accordance with his principal residential address.

39.  From the perspective of the Candidates and their political parties or supporters, they need the Linked Information of the registered electors for their election campaigns.

40.  With the above in mind, if the entire Final Register has already been supplied to 6 major political parties (which must have already fielded their candidates in the DC Election) and 26 individuals (14 of whom are already nominated candidates) under sections 21(1) of Cap 541A, we think fairness dictates that the extract relevant to their own constituency must also be made available to all validly nominated Candidates. All validly nominated Candidates must be put on the same level playing field to have a fair fight in the DC Election.  In this regard, we consider and Mr Leung also agrees with us that for the purpose of the DC Election, the interest of a validly nominated Candidate and his political party, if any, in obtaining the information contained in the Final Register relevant to his constituency is identical.  In other words, a validly nominated Candidate’s political party does not have a separate and distinct interest in obtaining the Final Register or an extract for the purpose of the DC Election as its interest is manifested in the Candidate.

41.  The applicant’s fear that the Linked Information of the police officers in the Final Register might be misused by the political parties and/or the Candidates is alleviated by the penal provisions prohibiting such misuse as aforesaid.  There is a further deterrent.  If a political party or a Candidate dared to misuse the Linked Information for or enabling doxxing, they might have committed a criminal offence such as illegal or corrupt conduct election practice at an election or would at least have to face adverse and heavy consequences politically.

42.  For these reasons, we are of the view that balance of justice does not favour the grant of an interim injunction which would have an adverse impact on the fairness of the DC Elections.  We do not accept Mr Chan’s submission that the unfairness can be resolved by the putative respondents issuing a guideline prohibiting the use of such information for electioneering purposes.  First, given the tight timeframe for the election process, time is not sufficient for such guideline to be prepared and promulgated with due considerations being given to its ramifications and practicalities.  Second, in Hong Kong the sending of canvassing materials to registered electors by post to their residential address has commonly been adopted as one of the usual modes for conducting election campaigns.  It would not be fair to require a change at the last minute to prohibit Candidates from adopting such mode of communication with the electors.

43.  This leaves us with public access to the Final Register.  There are two categories of the public.  One is individual electors.  The other is general public.

44.  For individual electors, it seems that the only reason why they would like to have access to the Final Register is to make sure that they have been duly registered.  But as said, they can check their registration particulars online.  It is not necessary for that reason for them to have physical access of the Final Register or an extract.  The other reason seems to be that a registered elector might wish to rectify his particulars on the Final Register.  But we are told by Mr Leung that after the publication for the Final Register, the electoral authority will not entertain any request by a registered elector to correct his particulars on the Final Register.  So that reason for access to the Final Register by a registered elector is not supportable either.

45.  For members of the general public, Mr Leung takes two points.

46.  The first point is that access to the Linked Information in the Final Register by the public by inspection or supply of extract promotes transparency.  We fully accept that allowing public access to the Final Register by inspection or application for extract promotes openness of the DC Election.  However, a limited injunctive relief restraining access to the Linked Information but not otherwise the names of registered electors and their registered residential addresses (which may be accessed or supplied separately) will not in our view significantly affect the openness of the DC Election overall.  The public will still have access to the names of the registered electors and their principal residential addresses, though not linked up together.  Further, if there is a real and substantial risk that the Link Information might be misused for doxxing, the privacy interest of the individuals concerned, which is constitutionally protected, must weigh heavily as compared to the limited openness engendered by the public access to such information by inspection of the Final Register or application for extract.

47.  The second point taken by Mr Leung is that such access enables any vigilant member of the public to monitor the election process by picking up from the Final Register mistakes or even signs of malpractice such as vote rigging.  Mr Leung told us that the electoral authority has in fact received complaints from the public but he for obvious reasons could not give us any detail.

48.  As to mistakes, as briefly described above, once finalized, the Final Register remains valid until the publication of the next final register.  Although under section 32(3) of the Legislative Council Ordinance, Cap 542, the ERO may amend a final register, it would appear that the amendment is to deal with clerical mistakes only.  It seems to us that it is not envisaged in the election scheme that objection to the contents of the Final Register should be readily entertained once it is finalized.  If that were not the case, the election process might be easily disrupted if not derailed by numerous objections to the eligibility of electors raised when voting actually takes place.

49.  As to detection of election malpractice, Mr Leung told us that when electoral authority receives a complaint against a elector and if that elector turns up to vote, he would be reminded of section 16 of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance, Cap 554.[15]  We do not think it can be seriously suggested that the electoral authority relies exclusively or heavily on the public to detect election malpractice.  In this regard, for obvious reasons, the Candidates, their political parties and supporters should be the first persons to vigilantly monitoring the election process.  If they detect any election malpractice, they for sure will complain or bring the matter to the electoral authority’s attention.  So even if an ordinary member of the public cannot do so for the very limited time being, we do not think the overall integrity or regularity of the DC Election will be significantly jeopardized.

50.  In our view, granting interim relief sought to limit the access by the public (but not the validly nominated Candidates) to the Linked Information of the registered electors in the Final Register pending the determination of the judicial review will not affect the overall integrity or regularity of the DC Election.

E3.    Striking the balance

51.  Having balanced the material considerations, we think in the overall circumstances of the case it is just to grant interim injunctions in terms of Para 4 and 5, modified to limit their application to political parties (as their interest is manifested in the validly nominated Candidates’) and members of public only but not the validly nominated Candidates.  It will protect the applicant’s members from the real and substantial risk of doxxing facilitated and intensified by the accessibility of their Linked Information on the Final Register without compromising the overall integrity and regularity of the DC Election.  We consider a just and fair balance is struck to adequately address the immediate private interest of protecting the privacy of a great majority of the police force protected by BOR 14 from the real and imminent threat of ongoing doxxing and the immense public interest involved in ensuring the integrity and regularity of the DC Election.

E4.    Doxxing on elections

52.  We would add one more observation.  It does not strictly arise in the present application but is important for all elections generally.

53.  If the Linked Information of registered electors in a final register (or for that matter a provisional register) can be misused for doxxing, it may have the chilling or deterrent effect on some individuals against registering as electors to exercise their right to vote under article 26 of the Basic Law.  If doxxing is targeted against specific groups of voters, it may affect the overall integrity of the election.  Doxxing thus presents a considerable threat to our elections.  We venture to suggest that the Government should move quickly to address the problem.[16]

F.  Dispositions

54.  In consequence, we allow the appeal and grant interim relief to the applicant as follows :

(1)   An injunction restraining the putative respondents from publishing or making available for public inspection any published register of electors for the DC Election, including the Final Register, or from making available to members of the public extracts of any register, including the Final Register, such that members of the public are able to associate the electors’ names with their respective principal residential addresses until disposal of HCAL 3042/2019.

(2)   An injunction restraining the putative respondents from making any communication with, or supplying any information to, members of the public, such that they or any of them are able to associate the electors’ names with their respective principal residential addresses until the disposal of HCAL 3042/2019.

(3)   For avoidance of doubt, neither (1) nor (2) shall prohibit the putative respondents from supplying an extract of the Final Register to a validly nominated Candidate pursuant to section 21 of the Electoral Affairs Commission (Registration of Electors) (Legislative Council Geographical Constituencies) (District Council Constituencies) Regulation, Cap 541A.

55.  Costs of the appeal and below are reserved with certificate for two counsel.