香港特別行政區 訴 譚寧琼

HCMA65/2012

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

判刑及定罪上訴

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2012年第65號

(原沙田裁判法院刑事案件2011年第5226號)

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判案書

1.  上訴人在聆訊後被裁定兩項向根據或為執行《入境條例》第II部而合法行事的入境事務助理員作出虛假申述罪，違反香港法例第 115 章《入境條例》第 42(1)(a) 條﹑一項為施行《入境條例》第II部而使用虛假旅行證件罪﹑違反香港法例第 115章《入境條例》第 42(2)(b)條﹑及一項管有虛假文書，違反香港法例第200章《刑事罪行條例》第 75(2)條，罪名成立。裁判官就四項罪名每項判處上訴人8 個月，即時監禁，控罪二至四的刑期同期執行，並下令控罪一刑期中之一個月分期執行，即共判處即時監禁9 個月，上訴人本不服定罪和判刑，提出上訴，但在聆訊中上訴人放棄就刑期提出上訴，本席批准。

控方案情

2.  案情指上訴人在2007 年4 月9 日持一本編號為W15943304的往來港澳通行證來港(控罪一)。另外，她亦在2011 年10 月25 日持有編號為W34813633的通行證來港(控罪二和三)。兩本通行證均載有上訴人的名字及出世日期為1974 年4 月26 日的資料，另外，在2011 年10 月25 日，上訴人亦向入境處職員出示在有其名字及上述出世日期的中華人民共和國的身分證作檢查(控罪四)。

3.  被告在會面下表示她的真實出世日期是1972 年4 月26 日，與上述文件所載的出世日期不符，她指她大約15﹑6歲的時候申請內地身分證時已經知道真實的出世日期，但並沒有通知當局作出修改。

上訴理由

4.  就定罪上訴方面，上訴理由現綜合概述如下：

(1)  裁判官錯誤裁定上訴人的會面記錄可被採納為呈堂證供，她只裁定控方第一和第二證人為誠實可靠的證人，她拒納上訴人的證供的理由牽強剛愎。裁判官亦沒有考慮兩名控方證人已有足夠理由懷疑上訴人管有虛假文書，但並沒有就該項罪名即時警誡上訴人，反而繼續查問，違反查問疑犯及錄取口供的規則及指示。

(2)  在處理控罪一和三時，原審裁判官錯誤以上訴人出示涉案的兩本雙程證作為定罪基礎，而有關控罪的詳情是上訴人透過「聲稱」自己的出世日期作出申述，而並非透過「出示」雙程證的舉動作出申述的。控方針對上訴人的指控顯示雙程證僅屬第二項控罪的立案基礎，裁判官就控罪一和三的定罪基礎偏離了控罪和檢控基礎，有違公平審訊的原則。

(3)  裁判官沒有充分考慮控罪二和四中的「虛假」元素是否已被證實，因為案中沒有證據證明有關的雙程證和中華人民共和國身分證是虛假的，因為就前者而言，上訴人從其母親處獲悉的出生日期屬傳聞證供，即使可供證實第42(1)條，並不能用以證實第42(2)條所須的「虛假」元素，後者並不載有一個關於他本身的謊言，故不符合刑事罪行條例第 69(a) 條虛假的定義。

(4)  原審裁判官沒有充分考慮到上訴人這次來港的目的是應入境處的要求接受調查有關證件中所載的出生日期事宜，即上訴人具有合法權限或辯解去管有有關的身分證。

(5)  上訴人的定罪屬不安全及不穩妥。

答辯人回應

5.  首先，答辯人同意，本案沒有證供顯示，即使上訴人的中華人民共和國身分證上載有虛假的資料，有關情況屬《刑事罪行條例》第 69(a)條，符合「虛假文書」的定義，故答辯人同意，控罪四的定罪有欠穩妥。

6.  答辯人指裁判官耳聞目睹控方證人及上訴人就特別事項所作之證供，有權對控辯雙方的證供作出取捨。答辯人表示，會面記錄可見，調查之被控方證人警誡上證人的罪行包括了虛假陳述﹑串謀欺詐﹑管有及行使虛假通行證的罪行。此等罪行之嚴重性與“管有虛假文書”罪實不遑多讓，故即使在會面當中沒有再就此控罪警誡上訴人，亦不會對上訴人造成不公。

7.  答辯人不同意裁判官在處理控罪一和三時，偏離了檢控基礎。控方之立場，由始至終均建基於有關不正確出生日期之申述，此申述可透過出示通行證聲稱，聲稱和申述，不一定是口述的，亦可以是通過文件的呈交的。而法庭有權透過“司法認知”而理解上訴人是通過出示其通行證。至於控罪二所涉的「虛假」元素，有別於控罪四，要項上的虛假已足夠。

判決

8.  本席首先處理會面記錄的可採納性的問題。裁判官在裁斷陳述書上已充分交待為何接納第一和第二控方證人的證供及拒納上訴人在特別事項的證供，詳見裁斷陳述書第 13段。上訴人大律師指，裁判官沒有在裁斷陳述書顯示她曾詳細評估控方證人的可信性，只作出結論性的評語，並沒有充分考慮上訴人在特別事項所作之證供。本席認為上訴人大律師所援引的案例HKSAR v Okafor [2012] 1 HKLRD 1041並不適用於本案。事實上本案的特別事項屬控辯雙方各執一詞的案件。雙方的說法並不能共存。賴磐德法官在HKSAR v So Pui Wah, HCMA1106/2005指出：

“At the centre of this case, as in so many other summary trials, was an issue in very short compass, which in effect amounted to assertion and counter assertion. Did the complainant say the words complained of, or did he merely say words to the effect, ‘You are queue jumping, move on’, as he claimed? It is not possible in circumstances like that to dissect and take apart the evidence given by the defendant. However, there can have been no doubt that this Appellant left the court knowing why had had lost the case, which was because the magistrate believed PW1…

Realistically the issue was, has the police officer made it up against the Appellant? Of course, police officers can invent cases, we all know that, but did he in this case? The magistrate who saw and heard the witness came to the clear conclusion that he had not, that he was telling the truth.  No sufficient material point taken before me makes me have any doubt about that finding.  Once that finding was made it meant that the evidence of the defendant had to be rejected, because the two could not live together.”

9.  另外上訴人大律師又指控方證人在已有足夠理由懷疑上訴人管有虛假文件(國內身分證)，卻沒有即時警誡上訴人，屬違反《查問疑犯及錄取口供的規條和指示》，大律師特別指出會面記錄的問答 9至11當上訴人提及她在15﹑16 歲已獲母親告知其真實出生日期時，控方證人理應即時就“管有虛假文書”的較嚴重的罪名作出相關警誡。其實控方證人在會面之初已對上訴人作出警誡。當然，根據HKSAR v Pang Ho Yin, CACC264/2009一案，調查人員有責任就著較疑犯原先提供本來的指控的資料較嚴重的罪行時，重新警誡他。但本席不認為就本案而言，“管有虛假文書”較其他罪行嚴重，見R v Fung Wing Ching [1998] 2 HKLRD 736。再者在HKSAR v Chan Ka Chun, CACC42/1999一案中，上訴庭亦表明即使警員有違盤問疑犯的原則，法庭亦未必需要自動拼棄有關之會面記錄。

10.  上訴人大律師力陳控方倚賴了上訴人「出示」兩本雙程證作為控罪一和三的事實基礎，偏離了原先的立案基礎，本席並不認同。雖然裁判官在控辯雙方陳詞後曾向控方查詢上述兩項控罪中所指的「聲稱」是否建基於她持通行證載有虛假出生日期一點並把通行證交予入境處職員的行為，構成此罪行，Jackson J在處理HKSAR v Li Xiao Feng, HCMA286/2003一案就s.42(1)(a)的刑期上訴時已表明：

“Whilst some authorities supported a distinction between offences of making false representation relating to forged or false travel documents and those of using such documents, these appeared to be no logic for the distinction. Although it was the choice of the prosecution to charge D with the former offence rather than latter, the fact was the representation made by D was that the travel document was genuine…”

11.  再者，從上訴宗卷第 49 頁可見，上訴人在2011 年10 月25 日的確是「出示」過有關的通行證，從而獲入境署蓋印的。在R v Hussain Sharif,HCMA61/1994一案中，Leonard J亦考慮了上訴人大律師所指，s.42(1)的控罪只能透過「會面」而干犯。他說：

“It was an irresistible inference from the evidence and the admitted facts that the appellant had made the false declaration by tendering documents bearing the false information when he was being examined by an Immigration Officer.”

12.  控罪二所指控上訴人所干犯的犯罪作為，實與控罪三所指無異，兩罪的事實基礎乃建基於上訴人在2011 年10 月25 日入境時出示載有虛假出生日期的通行證，兩罪實具重疊性(duplicity)。

13.  至於控罪二的「虛假」元素，《入境條例》第 42(5)章已清晰指出：「虛假」指要項上的虛假。出生日期屬要項無疑，張慧玲法官在HKSAR v Li San Mei案中表明：

「出生日期是一名人士身分詳情的重要元素，尤其是以中國人而言，同名同姓大有人在，出生日期是可以作為識別的途徑之一。」

(另見香港特別行政區訴Tran Thi Ngat, HCMA162/2010)。

14.  麥健濤法官在HKSAR v Ma Michael一案分析第42(1)條說：

“20. …The offence is aimed at those who tell lies to an immigration assistant, stating or representing what they know to be false or do not believe to be true : if someone knows that such a representation is false, it follows that the representation is in fact false; and if the prosecution can prove such knowledge, it would inevitably prove that it was false. On the other hand, if someone believes a representation he makes to be false, whether or not it is false is immaterial : he has told a lie about it by representing to be true that which he did not believe to be true; and in those circumstances, the actual falsity of the representation is not an element of the charge which the prosecution has to prove. Any assertion to the contrary in Archbold Hong Kong 2010 at paragraph 27-81 is, in my judgment, incorrect.

21. This approach is consistent with the dictum of Leonard J in R v Hussein Sharif HCMA61/1994, which related to the same section of the Immigration Ordinance. The facts are not wholly dissimilar to the present case :the appellant there said he had been told by his mother that he was born in Lahore in 1953. When he applied for his first passport in 1989, he arbitrarily inserted Gujarat in 1951; and having obtained a passport with such false particulars, ‘he was obliged, for convenience, to stick with them.’ As a result, he made representations in question, not believing them to be true. The grounds of appeal included the claim that, absent documentary proof, a person’s knowledge and belief as to his date of birth is hearsay. Leonard J held that, ‘If… a person is told by his mother where and when he was born and he believes it, and if he tells an immigration officer that he was born on another date in another place, he is clearly saying something he did not believe to be true.’ He went on to say that when interviewed, the defendant in that case made a specific statement as to what his true date and place of birth were, and that was an admission against his interest.

22. It should be emphasised that the issue here is as to the appellant’s belief, not his knowledge. The prosecution was not seeking to prove when or where the accused was in fact born, only that he did not believe that he had been born in Nong Khai on 3^rd October 1966. They were able to do so by reference to his clear admission in interview that he was born in Vientiane, Laos on 3^rd September 1967, as well as aspects of his evidence, which established what his belief was.

23.     The source of a person’s knowledge or belief as to his date and place of birth, if not from an official record, may well be what he has been told; but the fact is that most people, including this appellant, grow up ‘knowing’ their birthday, and their place of birth, from what they have been told; and they act upon that information in the innumerable official or semi-official documents or activities with which most people deal in the course of everyday life, particularly businessmen like this appellant.  That is the foundation for the belief and it is the belief which is in issue here in this case : for if he believed what he agreed he had been told, he cannot have believed that what he represented to the immigration assistant was true.”

15.  由此可見，第42(1)和42(2)條不同之處，在於前者其中之一的元素為上訴人“明知為虛假或自己亦不信為真確的陳述或申述”，後者控方有必要證實「虛假」之元素，上訴人的知情或信念並不足夠，見Bruce & McCoy IV [205] – [250]。

16.  基於上述，本席認為控罪二的定罪並不穩妥，與控罪四一起被擱置。控方一和三的定罪駁回，維持原判。